The intense and occasionally hyperbolic controversy that erupted in the late 1990s over alleged theft of U.S. nuclear weapons secrets by the People’s Republic of China is revisited in a newly updated report from the Congressional Research Service.
See “China: Suspected Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Secrets,” updated February 1, 2006.
Coincidentally, a Chinese newspaper yesterday accused the United States of relentlessly seeking to acquire Chinese nuclear secrets.
“In fact, as early as 1955, from the moment China decided to develop atomic bombs, US intelligence has been doing everything it could, with whatever means necessary, to gather relevant secret information,” the newspaper article said, presumably correctly.
See “The United States Has Been Probing for China’s Nuclear Intelligence by Various Methods and Whatever Means Necessary” by Yu Sung, Zhongguo Tongxun She, February 28, 2006.
This report serves as a landscape assessment and toolbox from which local governments can negotiate an informed position when it comes to the levers available to them and includes a first-of-its kind analysis of eight executed community benefits agreements.
When a hurricane hits, it’s all hands on deck – that goes for federal data, too. Pulling back from our investments in timely, accurate, and accessible public data will only make us less prepared and put us all at greater risk.
This is bigger than a singular elimination of race and ethnicity questions. It could accelerate the second wave of widespread reductions to demographic data, leaving public health officials with even less information to deliver better health outcomes for all Americans.
Soft law was never meant to be a permanent solution. Treating it as one, and letting the sandcastle stand in for the skyscraper indefinitely, is how we end up with a decade of voluntary commitments and no enforceable accountability to show for it.