2017 Nuclear Stockpile Total Declassified
The number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile dropped to 3,822 as of September 30, 2017, down from 4,018 a year earlier. (Retired weapons awaiting dismantlement are not included in the totals.)The totals do not include weapons that are retired and awaiting dismantlement.)
Meanwhile, 354 nuclear weapons were dismantled in 2017, up from 258 the year before.
These figures were declassified in response to a request from the Federation of American Scientists and were made public yesterday.
The declassification of the current size of the US nuclear arsenal was a breakthrough in national security transparency that was accomplished for the first time by the Obama Administration in 2010.
It was uncertain until now whether or when the Trump Administration would follow suit.
Because the stockpile information qualifies as Formerly Restricted Data under the Atomic Energy Act, its declassification does not occur spontaneously or on a defined schedule. Disclosure requires coordination and approval by both the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense, and it often needs to be prompted by some external factor.
Last October, the Federation of American Scientists petitioned for declassification of the stockpile numbers, and the request was ultimately approved.
“Your request was the original driver for the declassification,” said Dr. Andrew Weston-Dawkes, the director of the DOE Office of Classification. “We regret the long time to complete the process but in the end the process does work.”
Earlier this week, FAS requested declassification of the current inventory of Highly Enriched Uranium, which has not been updated since 2013.
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