“For Official Use Only” is Used Too Much at DHS, House Says
There is too much information that is marked “For Official Use Only” at the Department of Homeland Security, the House Appropriations Committee said in its report on DHS Appropriations for 2015. Efforts to sort out what is really sensitive have “wasted substantial staff resources,” the report said.
Therefore, the Committee would require any official who marked a document FOUO to identify himself or herself on the document, along with a justification for doing so.
The Committee inaptly described the use of FOUO controls as a problem of “overclassification,” and spoke of “classifying” records as FOUO. Strictly speaking, however, national security classification and FOUO are mutually exclusive domains. Classified records cannot be marked as FOUO, and information or documents that are FOUO are by definition unclassified. Still, the Committee’s point is clear.
Here is the Committee language from its June 19 DHS Appropriations report:
Over-Classification of Information
The Committee is concerned with the number of reports, briefings, and responses to requests for information that are designated by the Department as “For Official Use Only” (FOUO), often without a consistent and appropriate review as to why information requires such a classification. As a consequence, both the Committee and the Department have wasted substantial staff resources deliberating over what information can and could be publicly disclosed. The Committee directs that all reports, briefings, or responses to requests for information provided to the Committee that are classified as FOUO include the name(s) and title(s) of the personnel that made the designation and the specific reasons for the classification based on requirements detailed in DHS Management Directive 11042.1, which provides guidance for safeguarding sensitive but unclassified FOUO information.
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