For decades, President Reagan’s 1981 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 7 remained entirely classified. According to a 1999 listing of Reagan NSDDs issued by the National Security Council, even the title of NSDD 7 was classified.
In 2008, the document was partially declassified, bearing the title “[deleted] Weapons.” It stated: “The production and stockpiling of [deleted] weapons is authorized with stockpiling being restricted to the United States [deleted].”
What is this all about? What mysterious weapons were to be produced and stockpiled that could not be acknowledged three decades later?
In all likelihood, said Hans Kristensen of FAS, the deleted term describing the weapons is “enhanced radiation.” Two enhanced radiation weapons started production in August/September 1981, he noted: the W70 (Lance warhead) and the W79 (artillery shell).
That likelihood is actually a certainty, said our colleague Allen Thomson, who pointed to the 1991 Bush directive NSD 59. The Bush directive, declassified in 1996, listed the title of NSDD 7 with no redactions: Enhanced Radiation Weapons.
After months of delay, the council tasked by President Trump to review the FEMA released its final report. Our disaster policy nerds have thoughts.
FAS and FLI partnered to build a series of convenings and reports across the intersections of artificial intelligence (AI) with biosecurity, cybersecurity, nuclear command and control, military integration, and frontier AI governance. This project brought together leaders across these areas and created a space that was rigorous, transpartisan, and solutions-oriented to approach how we should think about how AI is rapidly changing global risks.
Investment should instead be directed at sectors where American technology and innovation exist but the infrastructure to commercialize them domestically does not—and where the national security case is clear.
AI is already consequential, but its future trajectory remains contested. Policymakers should make their assumptions explicit, focus on what can be shaped rather than what can be perfectly predicted, and build institutions that can learn and respond as evidence changes.