A few years ago the Office of the Director of National Intelligence established a “Biological Sciences Experts Group” consisting of scientists from industry and academia to advise the intelligence community on the threat of biological weapons proliferation and related matters. But not a single fact concerning the Group’s actions or accomplishments can be publicly disclosed, the ODNI said last week in response (pdf) to a Freedom of Information Act request.
As is often the case, a bit more about the Group can be learned through unofficial channels, as previously reported in Secrecy News (“Experts Advise IC on Classified Biosecurity Activities,” April 13, 2010).
In recent months, we’ve seen much of these decades’ worth of progress erased. Contracts for evaluations of government programs were canceled, FFRDCs have been forced to lay off staff, and federal advisory committees have been disbanded.
This report outlines a framework relying on “Cooperative Technical Means” for effective arms control verification based on remote sensing, avoiding on-site inspections but maintaining a level of transparency that allows for immediate detection of changes in nuclear posture or a significant build-up above agreed limits.
At a recent workshop, we explored the nature of trust in specific government functions, the risk and implications of breaking trust in those systems, and how we’d known we were getting close to specific trust breaking points.
tudents in the 21st century need strong critical thinking skills like reasoning, questioning, and problem-solving, before they can meaningfully engage with more advanced domains like digital, data, or AI literacy.