A new U.S. Marine Corps Order establishes Corps policy governing the disclosure of U.S. classified military information and controlled unclassified information to foreign governments. See “Disclosure of Military Information to Foreign Governments and Interests” (pdf), MCO 5510.20A, May 15, 2009.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff issued new doctrinal guidance on combating weapons of mass destruction, including the three pillars of nonproliferation, counterproliferations, and WMD consequence management. See “Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction” (pdf), Joint Publication 3-40, June 10, 2009.
The Merit Systems Protection Board upheld the firing of federal air marshal Robert MacLean for allegedly disclosing “sensitive security information,” even though the information in question had not been marked as “sensitive” at the time, reports Nick Schwellenbach of the Center for Public Integrity. But then the Board published its ruling online even though the document (pdf) was marked “sensitive security information.” No word yet on whether the Board will fire itself. See “Transparency: A Shrill Message for Whistleblowers,” June 25.
DNA synthesis and export controls remain the primary regulatory safeguards against de novo production of harmful biological agents, yet governance frameworks lack the situational awareness and enforcement capacity to keep pace with rapidly falling technical barriers.
Called today to speak on behalf of U.S. science and technology, Dr. Jedidah Isler, astrophysicist, educator, strategist, policy-maker, and science communicator, will provide constructive, nonpartisan feedback to the House Committee’s hearing “American Global Competitiveness at 250: Legislative Proposals to Secure U.S. Technology Leadership.”
“Federal data and access to it is not a partisan issue. It is a people issue. Our country cannot achieve greatness without access to the data that measure what we value, who we are, and where we’re heading.”
The United States’ biosecurity governance system is structurally incapable of detecting and responding to certain classes of threats. U.S. biosecurity tools have not kept pace with technological advancements or a changing threat landscape.