Talks at U.S. Strategic Command and University of California San Diego

By Hans M. Kristensen

It’s been a busy week with two talks; the first to the U.S. Strategic Command’s Deterrence Symposium on August 9, and the second to the Public Policy and Nuclear Threats “boot camp” workshop at the University of California San Diego on August 10.

STRATCOM asked me to talk on the question: Will advanced conventional capabilities undermine or enhance deterrence. My panel included former STRATCOM Commander General James Cartwright, former SAC CINC General Larry Welch, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs Madelyn Creedon. The panel was chaired by Rear Admiral John Gower of the U.K. Ministry of Defense. My speech is reproduced below. The video of Panel #7 is available later at the STRATCOM web site.

UCSD asked me to speak on New Directions for U.S. Nuclear Strategy. My panel included Daryl Press, who is Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, and Anne Harrington, a Postdoctoral Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. A copy of my briefing slides is available here.

Speech: USSTRATCOM Deterrence Symposium 2012

Hans M. Kristensen
Federation of American Scientists
August 9, 2012

The question for this panel – Will advanced conventional capabilities undermine or enhance deterrence? – is a difficult question to answer for several reasons. First, “advanced conventional capabilities” is a very broad definition that can include everything that’s better than what we had last year. Second, deterrence is a subjective condition that doesn’t come in one shape or form but depends on actors and scenarios.

So at the outset, I’ll say: Whether advanced conventional capabilities will undermine or enhance deterrence depends on what kinds of adversary we seek to deter, with what, in what scenario, and for what objective.

Unfortunately, “deterrence” is one of the most overused and abused terms. It is still widely associated with nuclear weapons, which are often called “the deterrent force” or “the strategic deterrent,” or the SLBMs, which are referred to as “the sea-based deterrent.” National leaders have been busy after the end of the Cold War reminding us that deterrence is not just nuclear but a much wider host of capabilities and scenarios.

For purpose of this talk, I will focus on advanced conventional weapons such as Prompt Global Strike (PGS), how they might effect deterrence, how they are different from nuclear weapons, whether they can be used as strategic deterrents – perhaps even replacing nuclear weapons?

Currently, much of the public debate on advanced conventional capabilities has focused on speed: that very quick strikes are needed to knock out targets in rogue states or non-state actors armed with weapons of mass destruction. Part of that perception is rooted in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review and its promotion of a New Triad with a seamless string of Global Strike capabilities ranging from nuclear, to non-nuclear, to non-kinetic effects.

This led to the Global Strike mission assigned to STRATCOM in 2003, at first a designated prompt Global Strike plan known as CONPLAN 8022, but later an integrated plan known as OPLAN 8010-08: Strategic Deterrence and Global Strike, which is currently in effect. The name reflects the dual mission of providing deterrence and, if that fails, Global Strike (or counterforce war fighting).

Compared with the old SIOP, the new plan includes “more flexible options to assure allies, and dissuade, deter, and if necessary, defeat adversaries in a wider range of contingencies.” So despite the challenges of tailoring deterrence to today’s world, it would seem that out strategic war plan has already been tailored to a considerable extent.

For the purpose of deterrence, despite significant advances in conventional weapons, nuclear weapons are still in a completely separate category because of their immensely destructive capability and will remain so for the foreseeable future.

But for war fighting, the Global Strike mission appears to accept that advanced conventional weapons can serve some missions that previously were only available for nuclear weapons. I have heard knowledgeable people say that up to 30 percent of the target base potentially could be covered with PGS weapons. But for all the talk of the urgency and importance of this mission, the weapons have been slow to emerge.

But what strikes me about the quest for PGS weapons is that it appears to be motivated less by deterrence and more by an expectation that deterrence will fail, and that new capabilities are therefore needed to destroy time-critical targets without having to resort to nuclear weapons.

Adversaries and allies alike have all seen the United State after the Cold War repeatedly being willing to use its ever-improving conventional forces in scenarios ranging from brief and limited punitive strikes to massive use of force over extensive periods of time to decisively defeat even large adversaries. In all of those cases, deterrence obviously failed despite our overwhelming capabilities; otherwise it wouldn’t have been necessary to strike.

PGS weapons would add to the toolbox and an adversary would obviously have to work around the capability. But it is much harder to predict whether – or to what extent – that would deter the adversary from taking action more or better than current capabilities would.

In the public debate the mission is almost entirely focused on regional and non-state adversary scenarios. Planners spend a lot of time trying to get inside the heads of these adversaries to understand what they value so we can figure out what to hold at risk to deter them. But if they’re already set on taking hostile action and know that they would be turned into rubble, why would PGS matter for deterrence?

Regional adversaries already bury their time-critical assets. Just look at North Korea where everything seems to live underground. Why has Iran focused its ballistic missile posture on mobile launchers? It’s a lot cheaper and simpler to build silos. China is no different; it’s hard to find a high-priority base that doesn’t include underground storage and their entire mobile missile modernization program is a reaction to someone holding their silos better at risk with more capable weapons.

All of these adversaries are already trying to work around our targeting capabilities. So why do we think that hitting them a little faster or a little better would strengthen deterrence? It seems more likely that PGS would push them even further toward more prompt launch capabilities. More trigger-happy postures could in fact weaken deterrence and increase the risk of mistaken, inadvertent, or even deliberate escalation. Keir Lieber made a similar argument yesterday.

What if the mission includes holding Chinese ASAT launchers a risk? China’s demonstration of an ASAT capability appears to have triggered a requirement for a quick-strike conventional capability to protect our eyes and ears in the sky.

Targeting ASAT missiles on DF-21 launchers is only a hairbreadth away from targeting other road-mobile launchers, whether for conventional DF-21C medium-range ballistic missiles, DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles, or even nuclear DF-31A missiles.

And how about using unmanned aerial vehicles with Hellfire missiles to hunt down Chinese mobile launchers?

Chinese planners would obviously have to assume that strikes would come quickly, that it could be preemptive, and that the risk to their nuclear launchers were increasing. In fact, they would have to conclude that a strike against their nuclear deterrent could come before the conflict had escalated to nuclear use.

Then suddenly the deterrence question changes dramatically. Add to that that some of the enablers for making PGS possible would require improvements to ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) and C3 (Command, Control, Communication) systems that would probably also significantly improve the capability of nuclear forces. Russia and China will probably detect these improvements and compensate for them in their own nuclear planning.

Add to that an advanced ballistic missile defense system that could take out some of the surviving weapons, and we could end up significantly exacerbating a budding and counterproductive nuclear competition with Russia and China. Whether we agree or not, Russia is already making this argument in Europe and China has warned against it.

The point here is not that we should simply give in and capitulate to Russian and Chinese concerns. The point is that we better think carefully about these side-effects before rushing to acquire more advanced conventional capabilities for what in any case is argued to be a very limited niche mission against small adversaries that won’t be able to provide an existential threat. And these are very expensive systems. So they better be essential and not just good to have.

In summary, in some limited scenarios, such as escalation, advanced conventional capabilities might enhance deterrence by providing senior leaders with additional non-nuclear options for signaling or striking. But it is hard to predict, to say the least. In other scenarios they may do exactly the opposite and weaken deterrence by triggering use-it-or-loose-it postures and deepen nuclear competition.

So to answer the panel question of whether advanced conventional capabilities will undermine or enhance deterrence, I’d say the answer is: probably yes.

For additional background on the Global Strike mission, see: Hans M. Kristensen, Global Strike: A Chronology of the Pentagon’s New Offensive Strike Plan, FAS, March 2006.

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

7 thoughts on “Talks at U.S. Strategic Command and University of California San Diego

  1. It is said that the US uses advanced conventional weapons and anti-ballistic missile capabilities to offset the reduction of nuclear weapons. What do you think of this opinion?

    Reply: Not directly, but indirectly. It is not as if we’re seeing nuclear warheads being reduced and simply replaced by advanced conventional weapons or missile defenses. The missions are too different. But indirectly it is certainly happening, and has been happening for many decades. The Navy used to deploy thousands of non-strategic nuclear weapons – including air-defense weapons, torpedoes, and depth charges – but all have been retired and their warfighting missions are today covered by conventional weapons. Moreover, as for the future, the Obama administration has stated that improvements in conventional weapons and missile defenses will allow a reduction in the role of nuclear weapons in regional scenarios. The big unknown is how this will play out in deterrence and reassurance scenarios. Will advanced conventional weapons or missile defenses be able to deter an adversary? Some might be deterred similarly to how they are deterred by overwhelming U.S. conventional capabilities today, but others might not and simply trying to work around it. As for reassuring allies, that seems more likely in regional scenarios, but as we recently saw in the case of NATO’s reaffirmation of nuclear status quo in Europe, some allies have a hard time shedding Cold War thinking. HK

  2. Your argument is very articulate and can be made for the case against missile defense, the alert status of our nukes, etc. If the establishment listens to your idea, the nuke business will become exceedingly boring. There will be no need to even have watchdogs such as FAS. The fact that FAS and others exist means that the system finds it more stable to let people vent their opinions, as long as these opinions can be adequately marginalized. Imaging that you sit in the chair of Leon Panetta. What would you say?

  3. What exactly is Prompt Global Strike? What weapon system, or systems, fall under this category? Back in ’06 when Hans Kristensen’s “Global Strike: A Chronology of the Pentagon’s New Offensive Strike Plan” was published PGS was perhaps a conventional Trident missile or maybe some kind of conventional ICBM; say, an Orbital Sciences’ Minotaur-type project. Today when the “whiz kids” at the Pentagon talk about Prompt Global Strike it’s more about hypersonic vehicles and such. The failure of the Wave-Runner test today (August 15, 2012) will, I’m sure, dampen their enthusiasm. Today and for the foreseeable future, Prompt Global Strike would be a Tomahawk launch by submarine or the venerable B-52H with a conventional ALCM. Or perhaps, a B-2 could undertake a night mission over target and drop gravity bombs with the CEP of meters. All in all, not very global or particularly prompt. I’m kinda lost here in the argument. Nuclear weapons don’t deter wars. Nuclear weapons only deter those wars from becoming “nuclear”. I don’t see the vast conventional war capacity of the United States deterring anyone. It only raised the stakes for any nation that gets in a shooting war with the US. Prompt Global Strike is a myth.

    Frank Shuler
    USA

  4. So is Bill Gertz just “speculating” or has the Chinese DL-41 actually been tested? Multi-warheads? Or, is that speculation also? Does the United States have the ability to monitor Chinese ICBM tests to the same degree we seem to have Russia calibrated? Just curious…

    Reply: Well, first of all, there is no official confirmation presented in Gertz’s article that the missile tested was the DF-41. I haven’t yet seen the Jane’s article. The DF-41 has made its way in and out of estimates for more than a decade. The Pentagon reported in 1997 that two new solid-fuel missiles were under development: DF-31 and DF-41. The DF-31 emerged but the DF-41 did not. The Pentagon stopped referring to the DF-41 and instead the extended-range version DF-31A emerged. Rumors predicted display of the DF-41 at the 2009 parade, but instead the DF-31A appeared (apparently). In 2010 and 2011 the Pentagon reported that China “may be” developing a new road-mobile ICBM. That prediction was not included in the 2012 report (nor was it in the Air Force’s Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat report from 2009).

    As for MIRV, I am highly skeptical about “10 warheads” that some attribute to the Jane’s article. Again, I haven’t yet seen the Jane’s article but the US intelligence community has stated for more than a decade that China for years has had the capability to develop and deploy multiple warheads, and that the silo-based CSS-4 (DF-5) would be the most likely carrier if a decision was made to do so. China has continued to research the technology, but not yet deployed multiple warheads on its missiles. If it were to do so, according to the U.S. intelligence community, that would probably require using the smaller warhead developed for the DF-31/JL-2 on the DF-5 instead of its current single large warhead. To deploy multiple warheads on road-mobile ICBMs, however, would probably require development of a smaller warhead. The MIRV capability is not included in the 2012 Pentagon report. The 2009 Air Force Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat report did not attribute multiple warheads to any of China’s missiles but repeated earlier intelligence assessments that “China could develop MIRV payloads for some of its ICBMs,” and speculated that “Future ICBMs will probably include some with multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles” (MIRV).

    I suspect that some of the reports and rumors about Chinese MIRV may be conflating “MIRV” and “multiple warheads” and “penetration aids.” Every time a missile is tested with multiple something, commentators and journalists might automatically assume this means MIRV. But MIRV is a particularly complicated technology intended to target different warheads on the same missile to different targets. That’s not needed if one wants to ensure penetration of missile defenses, which can be done much cheaper by loading multiple warheads (MRV – Multiple Reentry Vehicles) or penetration aids that can confuse interceptors to increase the likelihood that the warhead will reach its target.

    One of the factors that has the potential to trigger a Chinese decision to deploy multiple warheads on its missiles would be a U.S. missile defense system that, combined with advanced conventional strike capabilities, could weaken Chinese leaders confidence in the reliability of their retaliatory nuclear force. It is interesting that both the 2010 and 2011 Pentagon reports refer to the MIRV research as missile defense countermeasures. HK

  5. Hans Kristensen

    I think the 10-warhead yield of the DF-41 comes from much open-source speculation that significant technical information on the Russian RS-24 Yars has made its way to China. Similar to W-88 situation with the United States. And, the B-2… The Yars was tested with the ability to carry ten warheads; however, as we all know, the larger the number of warheads the less room (weight) for pen aids and shorter the range. Russia is deploying the mobile RS-24 with six warheads and the best “guesstimation” is that for China to target the United States with the DL-41, range wise, somewhere around 3 warheads and pen aids would be carried.

    It is naive to think if the United States shuttered down the GBI “system” in Alaska and California tomorrow and ended any future research on Aegis/Standard, that Chinese nuclear modernization would be affected. In fact, who can say Chinese nuclear modernization has anything to do with the United States at all? If this is to be the century of the “Middle Kingdom” and China’s goal is to dominate Asia, the US is not China’s future adversary.

    Frank Shuler
    USA

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