Intelligence Agency Budgets Revealed in Washington Post

Secret intelligence agency budget information was abundantly detailed in the Washington Post yesterday based on Top Secret budget documents released by Edward Snowden.  See “U.S. spy network’s successes, failures and objectives detailed in ‘black budget’ summary” by Barton Gellman and Greg Miller, Washington Post, August 29.

The newly disclosed information includes individual agency budgets along with program area line items, as well as details regarding the size and structure of the intelligence workforce.  So one learns, for example, that the proposed budget for covert action in FY2013 was approximately $2.6 billion, while the total for open source intelligence was $387 million.

Some of the information only confirms what was already understood to be true. The budget for the National Security Agency was estimated to be about $10 billion, according to a recent story in CNN Money (“What the NSA Costs Taxpayers” by Jeanne Sahadi, June 7, 2013). The actual NSA budget figure, the Post reported, is $10.8 billion.

And the involuntary disclosure of classified intelligence budget information, while rare, is not unprecedented.  In 1994, the House Appropriations Committee inadvertently published budget data for national and military intelligence, the size of the CIA budget, and other details. (“$28 Billion Spying Budget is Made Public by Mistake” by Tim Weiner, New York Times, November 5, 1994)

But the current disclosure of intelligence budget information dwarfs all previous releases and provides unmatched depth and detail of spending over a course of several years, based on original documents.  The disclosure is doubly remarkable because the Post chastely refrained from releasing about 90% of the Congressional Budget Justification Book that it obtained.  “Sensitive details are so pervasive in the documents that The Post is publishing only summary tables and charts online,” Post reporters Gellman and Miller wrote.

This is not a whistleblower disclosure; it does not reveal any illegality or obvious wrongdoing. On the contrary, the underlying budget document is a formal request to Congress to authorize and appropriate funding for intelligence.

But the disclosure seems likely to be welcomed in many quarters (while scorned in others) both because of a generalized loss of confidence in the integrity of the classification system, and because of a more specific belief that the U.S. intelligence bureaucracy today requires increased public accountability.

Though it has never been embraced as official policy, the notion of public disclosure of individual intelligence agency budgets (above and beyond the release of aggregate totals) has an honorable pedigree.

In 1976, the U.S. Senate Church Committee advocated publication of the total intelligence budget and recommended that “any successor committees study the effects of publishing more detailed information on the budgets of the intelligence agencies.”

In a 1996 hearing of the Senate Intelligence Committee, then-Chair Sen. Arlen Specter badgered DCI John Deutch about the need for intelligence budget secrecy.

“I think that you and the Intelligence Community and this committee have got to do a much better job in coming to grips with the hard reasons for this [budget secrecy], if they exist. And if they exist, I’m prepared to help you defend them. But I don’t see that they exist. I don’t think that they have been articulated or explained,” the late Sen. Specter said then.

Committee Vice Chair Sen. Bob Kerrey added: “I would concur in much of what the Chairman has just said. I do, myself, believe not only the top line, but several of the other lines of the budget, not only could but should, for the purpose of giving taxpayer-citizens confidence that their money is being well spent.”

In 2004, the 9/11 Commission itself recommended disclosure of intelligence agency budgets: “Finally, to combat the secrecy and complexity we have described, the overall amounts of money being appropriated for national intelligence and to its component agencies should no longer be kept secret” (at page 416, emphasis added).

These are clearly minority views.  They could have been adopted at any time — as disclosure of the aggregate total was — but they haven’t been.  (And even these voices did not call for release of the more detailed budget line items that are now public.)  And yet they are not totally outlandish either.

The initial response of the executive branch to the Washington Post story will be to hunker down, to decline explicit comment, and to prohibit government employees from viewing classified budget documents that are in the public domain.  Damage assessments will be performed, and remedial security measures will be imposed.  These are understandable reflex responses.

But in a lucid moment, officials should ponder other questions.

How can public confidence in national security secrecy be bolstered?  Is it possible to imagine a national security secrecy system that the public would plausibly view not with suspicion but with support, much as the strict secrecy of IRS tax returns is broadly understood and supported?  What steps could be taken to reduce national security secrecy to the bare minimum?

Looking further ahead, is it possible to devise an information security policy that is based on “resilience” to the foreseeable disclosure of secrets rather than on the fervently pursued prevention of such disclosure?

Bee Health, Nanotechnology, and More from CRS

A comprehensive overview of the still-not-fully explained decline of honeybee and other bee populations is presented in a new report from the Congressional Research Service.

“To date, the precise reasons for bee colony losses are not yet known. Reasons cited for bee declines include a wide range of possible factors thought to be affecting pollinator species. These include bee pests and disease, diet and nutrition, genetics, habitat loss and other environmental stressors, agricultural pesticides, and beekeeping management issues, as well as the possibility that bees are being affected by cumulative, multiple exposures and/or the interactive effects of several of these factors,” the CRS report said.

The problem is not a trivial one particularly since, according to one estimate, “bee pollination of agricultural crops is said to account for about one-third of the U.S. diet.”  See Bee Health: Background and Issues for Congress, August 27, 2013.

Other new or newly updated CRS reports that Congress has withheld from online public distribution include the following.

The Debt Limit: History and Recent Increases, August 27, 2013

House Apportionment 2012: States Gaining, Losing, and on the Margin, August 23, 2013

Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF): Characteristics of the Cash Assistance Caseload, August 21, 2013

Financing Natural Catastrophe Exposure: Issues and Options for Improving Risk Transfer Markets, August 15, 2013

The National Nanotechnology Initiative: Overview, Reauthorization, and Appropriations Issues, August 9, 2013

China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy — Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, August 26, 2013

European Union Wind and Solar Electricity Policies: Overview and Considerations, August 7, 2013

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 and Beyond: Detainee Matters, August 27, 2013

National Security Strategy: Mandates, Execution to Date, and Issues for Congress, August 6, 2013

Dispute Over US Nuke in the Netherlands: Who Pays For An Accident?

Air transport of nuclear weapons
Who pays for a crash of a nuclear weapons airlift from Volkel Air Base?

By Hans M. Kristensen

Only a few years before U.S. nuclear bombs deployed at Volkel Air Base in the Netherlands are scheduled to be airlifted back to the United States and replaced with an improved bomb with greater accuracy, the U.S. and Dutch governments are in a dispute over how to deal with the environmental consequences of a potential accident.

The Dutch government wants environmental remediation to be discussed in the Netherlands United States Operational Group (NUSOG), a special bilateral group established in 2003 to discuss matters relating to the U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons in the Netherlands.

But the United States has refused, arguing that NUSOG is the wrong forum to discuss the issue and that environmental remediation is covered by the standard Status of Forces Agreement from 1951.

The disagreement at one point got so heated that a Dutch officials threatened that his government might have to consider reviewing US Air Force nuclear overflight rights of the Netherlands if the United States continue to block the issue from being discussed within the NUSOG.

The dispute was uncovered by the Brandpunt Reporter of the TV station KRO (see video and also this report), who discovered  three secret documents previously released by WikiLeaks (document 1, document 2, and document 3).

The documents not only describe the Dutch government’s attempts to discuss – and U.S. efforts to block – the issue within NUSOG, but also confirm what is officially secret but everyone knows: that the United States stores nuclear weapons at Volkel Air Base.  Continue reading

Avoiding Needless Wars, Part 8: Syria

belle syriaThere are strong indications that President Obama will take military action against Syria,  even though several key questions have not been answered.

First, what good will an American attack do? Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey recently told Congress, “Syria today is not about choosing between two sides but rather about choosing one among many sides. … It is my belief that the side we choose must be ready to promote their interests and ours when the balance shifts in their favor. Today, they are not.”

Second, what harm will an American attack do? There is evidence that keeping this civil war going will increase the fighting strength of al Qaeda. In addition to threatening our own nation, that also increases the risk of chaos in the Russian Federation, particularly its Chechen Republic. Unrest in a nation with thousands of nuclear weapons – especially when pointed at us – is a threat to our national security. And, as the Boston Marathon bombing shows, Chechen jihadists are not solely a threat to Russia, but to us as well.

Third, how certain are we about who is responsible for the recent chemical weapons attacks? Today, George Kenney has an excellent article on the Huffington Post, which notes:

… it remains far from clear who did it. None of the many insurgent groups are saints; to be honest, with the fighting going against the insurgency in recent months there would be far greater incentives on their side to use chemical weapons, in the hope of triggering western intervention, than there would be on the part of Syrian government forces. …

During the Bosnian civil war the Bosnian Muslims skillfully leveraged the propaganda value of various massacres to catalyze western intervention. Yet in many cases the identity of the perpetrators was in doubt. From my own several stays in the besieged city of Sarajevo during the war, my own inspection of alleged mortar impact sites (from the “flower” a mortar/bomb impact leaves in pavement an expert can estimate direction and angle of attack), and my conversations both with very senior, serving U.S. officers (one major general, for example, told me if it had always been the Serbs he only wished the U.S. Army had a few mortar squads with that ability to make impossible shots) and with senior UN military officers on the scene, I concluded that some of the more sensational attacks, such as the Markale massacre, were carried out by Bosnian Muslim forces against their own civilians. A few seasoned western reporters concluded the same. To be fair, the evidence was never absolutely definitive and a rancorous debate continues to this day. Shocking, but such is the nature of war.

Fourth, do we have any options other than doing nothing or attacking Assad? Most accounts assume those are our only two options, but as George Kenney’s article concludes:

If the U.S. government feels that it has to do something, the best thing and, to be honest, the only thing — at the moment — is to provide assistance to the millions of Syrian refugees and internally displaced, and redouble our efforts at diplomacy.

A diplomatic solution would be the best of all possible worlds, but will never happen so long as our bottom line is “Assad must go.” Given the fate of some other deposed Middle East rulers – Gaddafi was killed and Mubarak was thrown in jail – there is no way Assad will negotiate on those terms.

Given our painful experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, isn’t it time we thought things through more carefully before pulling the trigger on military action yet again?

Martin Hellman

Links to all posts in this series on Avoiding Needless Wars: Part 1Part 2Part 3Part 4Part 5Part 6Part 7Part 8.

Additional Reference: After I wrote this post, a highly relevant interview came to my attention in today’s Christian Science Monitor. The headline gives the gist, “In an interview, Hans Blix (chief UN arms inspector for Iraq from 2000-2003) says: If US military action in Syria is all about ‘punishing’ Bashar al-Assad to satisfy public and media opinion without even hearing the UN inspectors report, it will be a sad day for international legality.” Blix makes a number of important points which warrant our attention before taking military action.

The post Avoiding Needless Wars, Part 8: Syria appears on ScienceWonk, FAS’s blog for opinions from guest experts and leaders.

FAS Roundup: August 26, 2013

Summer issue of the PIR, Fukushima and much more.

Summer Issue of the Public Interest Report

The Summer issue of the PIR is now available online; it includes articles on benefits and challenges of active monitoring of nuclear weapons, history of the U.S. nuclear stockpile,  and mechanisms to attract students to the nuclear policy field.

Summer 2013 Public Interest Report

Volume 66, No 3


Building a Foundation for the Future of Nuclear Security

PDF Version

The future of domestic and global nuclear security depends on today’s university students and young professionals feeding the pipeline to supply the requisite scientific workforce. To develop the next generation of nuclear security experts, universities must not only train students in technical nuclear science but also provide a comprehensive educational platform including nuclear energy and weapons policy in the context of the current political science architecture. By Erika Suzuki, Bethany Goldblum and Jasmina Vujic. 

President’s Message: Innovative Ideas to Reduce Nuclear Dangers

PDF Version

FAS President Charles Ferguson discusses ideas to reduce nuclear dangers.

The History of the U.S. Nuclear Stockpile 1945-2013

PDF Version

The United States has produced approximately 66,500 nuclear weapons from 1945 to mid-2013, of approximately 100 types. The historic high of the U.S. stockpile was reached in 1967 with 31,255 nuclear warheads. This article examines three main factors which led to the growth and diversity of the U.S. nuclear program: rivalry between the branches of the armed forces, belief that the United States could achieve security through superiority with nuclear weapons and a hyperactive definition of deterrence. By Robert S. Norris.

Using Trade to Build Stability in South Asia

PDF Version

South Asia is a region home to nearly one-fifth of the world’s population. In order to create stability between India and Pakistan, it is necessary to build better trade relations. This article discusses recommendations to achieve economic stability in both countries, including improvements to infrastructure and forming a uniform trade policy. By Ravi Patel.

The Benefits and Challenges of Active Monitoring in Support of Future Arms Control Initiatives

PDF Version

As the United States remains on a path towards continued reductions of nuclear weapons in concert with Russia, there is a likelihood that future arms control initiatives may include individual warheads – strategic and tactical, deployed and non-deployed. Verification of such an agreement could prove to be challenging and costly under an inspection-oriented regime. An active monitoring system could reduce the burden of inspection activities to achieve equivalent confidence that treaty obligations are being upheld by increasing transparency of operations. This article explores the active monitoring concept, in addition to highlighting both the challenges and solutions such a system would provide. By Jay Brotz, Justin Fernandez and Sharon DeLand. 

Deterrence and Assurance: Reassessing the Nuclear Posture

PDF Version

Remarks from Hans Kristensen’s presentation to the Deterrence and Assurance Working Group at the U.S. Air Force’s Global Strike Command at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. The remarks address critical questions including how many nuclear weapons are enough and ways the United States can reduce nuclear targeting and alert levels of forces. By Hans Kristensen.

More from FAS

PDF Version

News and Notes from FAS Headquarters.

Continue reading

US Cyber Offense is “The Best in the World”

The subject of offensive cyber action by the U.S. government was classified for many years and was hardly discussed in public at all.  Then several years ago the possibility of U.S. cyber offense was formally acknowledged, though it was mostly discussed in the conditional mood, as a capability that might be developed and employed under certain hypothetical circumstances.

Today, however, U.S. offensive cyber warfare is treated as an established fact.  Not only that but, officials say, the U.S. military is pretty good at it.

“We believe our [cyber] offense is the best in the world,” said Gen. Keith B. Alexander, director of the National Security Agency and Commander of U.S. Cyber Command. His comments appeared in newly published answers to questions for the record from a March 2013 hearing of the House Armed Services Committee (at p. 87).

“Cyber offense requires a deep, persistent and pervasive presence on adversary networks in order to precisely deliver effects,” Gen. Alexander explained in response to a question from Rep. Trent Franks (R-AZ). “We maintain that access, gain deep understanding of the adversary, and develop offensive capabilities through the advanced skills and tradecraft of our analysts, operators and developers. When authorized to deliver offensive cyber effects, our technological and operational superiority delivers unparalleled effects against our adversaries’ systems.”

“Potential adversaries are demonstrating a rapidly increasing level of sophistication in their offensive cyber capabilities and tactics. In order for the Department of Defense to deny these adversaries an asymmetric advantage, it is essential that we continue the rapid development and resourcing of our Cyber Mission Forces.”

In response to another question for the record from Rep. James R. Langevin (D-RI), Gen. Alexander said that “Over the next three years we will train the Cyber Mission Forces that will perform world-class offensive and defensive cyber operations as part of our Cyber National Mission Teams, Cyber Combat Mission Teams and Cyber Protection Forces. We do not require additional authorities or resources to train the currently identified cyber professionals” (at page 85).

See Information Technology and Cyber Operations: Modernization and Policy Issues to Support the Future Force, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities, March 13, 2013 (published July 2013).

At the time of his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2010, Gen. Alexander was asked in a pre-hearing question, “Has the U.S. ever ‘demonstrated capabilities’ in cyberspace in a way that would lead to deterrence of potential adversaries?”  He replied (Question 15p):  “Not in any significant way.”

This seems to have been an incomplete response. Committee Chairman Sen. Carl Levin noted in questions for the record of Gen. Alexander’s confirmation hearing in 2010 that in fact offensive cyber capabilities had already been demonstrated: “Unfortunately, we also learned, after asking a specific question following the appearance of a Washington Post article reporting on an apparent offensive cyber operation, that DOD has undertaken a number of offensive cyber operations in the last several years, none of which was reported to the Armed Services Committees….”

On the vital question of oversight, Senator Levin asked:  “Lieutenant General Alexander, do you agree that it is appropriate that the Armed Services Committees be informed of all U.S. offensive cyber operations?”

Gen. Alexander provided an affirmative response, but in a way that altered the terms of the question:  “Yes, I agree that in almost all circumstances the Armed Services Committees should be informed in a timely manner of significant offensive cyber operations conducted by CYBERCOM.”


IG Says Homeland Security Secrecy Program is in Good Shape

The Department of Homeland Security “is streamlining classification guidance and more clearly identifying categories of what can be released and what needs to remain classified,” according to a new report from the DHS Inspector General.

The Reducing Over-classification Act of 2010 required the Inspector General at each executive branch agency that classifies information to evaluate the agency’s classification practices and to report on the results by the end of September 2013.  The new DHS report is the first of the bunch to be published.  See Reducing Over-classification of DHS’ National Security Information, DHS Office of Inspector General Report OIG-13-106, August 2013.

The report sheds new light on DHS classification practices and provides some useful criticism, but it has a serious conceptual flaw.

The flaw lies in the report’s definition of the problem:  “Over-classification is defined as classifying information that does not meet one or more of the standards necessary for classification under Executive Order 13526.”

The problem is that this is a definition of misclassification, not over-classification.  If information does not meet the standards for classification — for example, if it is not government information — then its classification is simply a mistake, not an act of over-classification.  By using such a definition, the DHS IG fails to recognize the real dimensions of over-classification and overlooks its most vexing aspect:  the classification of information that arguably does meet the standards of the Executive Order but that need not or should not be classified.

Over-classification in this deeper sense is at the center of many current controversies over government secrecy policy.  Can the role of the CIA in targeted killing operations be acknowledged?  Should the fact of bulk collection of telephone metadata records by NSA have been admitted before it was leaked?  Though such information was eligible for classification under the Executive Order, the decision to classify it now appears questionable.

But such issues are unfortunately beyond the scope of the DHS IG report, which does not allow for the possibility that information could both “meet the standards necessary for classification under the Executive Order” and still be over-classified.  Not a single instance of such over-classification was identified.  Rather, the IG concluded that DHS has “successfully implemented all policies and procedures required” and thus “DHS has a strong [classification] program.”

Despite its limited conception of the problem, the IG report found some significant areas for improvement.  Notably, DHS classifiers have been using obsolete software to apply classification markings.  As a result, “59 of the 372 DHS we reviewed contained declassification, sourcing, and marking errors.”  A new Classification Marking Tool is currently being acquired by DHS.  Still, “eighty interviewees noted that they would like more hands-on training to ensure they could classify information properly.”

Curiously, the IG report found that DHS officials had an equivocal attitude towards efforts to challenge classification decisions.

“All persons interviewed knew and were trained on the process of formally or informally challenging a classification, but some stated that they would be reluctant to disagree with the originator’s classification.  They did not fear retribution from senior management, but they did not believe that they were experts in challenging classification” (p. 16).

However, DHS employees resisted the possibility of offering incentives to challenge classification decisions.  “When asked, 90 out of 100 DHS derivative classifier interviewees said that they believed offering incentives may lead to unnecessary challenges, and challenges will be raised not in the spirit of reducing classification but for incentive reasons” (p. 10).

Such skepticism is totally speculative, and ought to be tested in practice.  But instead of proposing a pilot program to validate or discredit the use of incentives for classification challenges, the DHS Inspector General unfortunately just dropped the subject.

The IG report found that DHS had successfully performed the Fundamental Classification Guidance Review, leading to a 39 percent reduction in the number of security classification guides.

The report also noted that the classification statistics reported by DHS to the Information Security Oversight Office “may not be accurate,” and DHS officials acknowledged that there are “long-standing issues associated with the reliability and accuracy” of the reported numbers.

Despite its limitations, the DHS IG review seems to have been a useful exercise that focused new attention on the Department’s classification activities.  Additional reports from other agencies that conduct much larger classification programs are expected shortly.

Financial Disclosure by Federal Officials, and More from CRS

New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that Congress has withheld from broad public distribution include the following.

Financial Disclosure by Federal Officials and Publication of Disclosure Reports, August 22, 2013

Defense Surplus Equipment Disposal: Background Information, August 22, 2013

Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights, August 22, 2013

The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy, August 20, 2013

Changing the Federal Reserve’s Mandate: An Economic Analysis, August 12, 2013

The Affordable Care Act and Small Business: Economic Issues, August 15, 2013

Financing Natural Catastrophe Exposure: Issues and Options for Improving Risk Transfer Markets, August 15, 2013

Reauthorizing the Office of National Drug Control Policy: Issues for Consideration, August 13, 2013

International Drug Control Policy: Background and U.S. Responses, August 13, 2013

Mexico’s Peña Nieto Administration: Priorities and Key Issues in U.S.-Mexican Relations, August 15, 2013

Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues for the 113th Congress, August 9, 2013

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, August 21, 2013

Mental Health Problems Surge in the Military: CRS

Mental health problems in the military are on the rise and pose a growing challenge to active duty forces, the Congressional Research Service said in a major new report on the subject.

“Between 2001 and 2011, the rate of mental health diagnoses among active duty servicemembers increased approximately 65%. A total of 936,283 servicemembers, or former servicemembers during their period of service, have been diagnosed with at least one mental disorder over this time period. Nearly 49% of these servicemembers were diagnosed with more than one mental disorder,” the CRS report said.

“Overall, mental health disorders have significant impacts on servicemember health care utilization, disability, and attrition from service. In 2011, mental disorders accounted for more hospitalizations of servicemembers than any other illness and more outpatient care than all illnesses except musculoskeletal injuries and routine medical care.”

The CRS cautioned that the data should be kept in perspective, considering the prevalence of mental health concerns among the civilian population. “Research suggests that an estimated 26.2% of Americans ages 18 and older experience a diagnosable mental disorder in any given year.”  See Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Other Mental Health Problems in the Military: Oversight Issues for Congress, August 8, 2013.

Other noteworthy new or updated CRS reports that Congress has withheld from broad public release include the following.

Veterans’ Medical Care: FY2014 Appropriations, August 14, 2013

Military Justice: Courts-Martial, An Overview, August 12, 2013

In Brief: Assessing DOD’s New Strategic Guidance, August 13, 2013

FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues, August 19, 2013

GAO Bid Protests: Trends and Analysis, August 9, 2013

Egypt in Crisis: Issues for Congress, August 19, 2013

Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress, August 20, 2013

Telecommunications and Media Convergence: Selected Issues for Consideration, August 14, 2013

The Warrior Ethos, and More Military Doctrine

“Modern combat is chaotic, intense, and shockingly destructive. In your first battle, you will experience the confusing and often terrifying sights, sounds, smells, and dangers of the battlefield–but you must learn to survive and win despite them…. You must keep faith with your fellow Soldiers, remember your training, and do your duty to the best of your ability. If you do, and you uphold your Warrior Ethos, you can win and return home with honor.”

So begins the Introduction to a newly updated US Army Training Circular on The Warrior Ethos and Soldier Combat Skills (TC 3-21.75, August 2013, very large PDF file), which aims to communicate and instill core military values.

Another newly updated Pentagon publication presents joint doctrine on Homeland Defense (HD). It “defines and clarifies the domestic use of rules of engagement and rules for the use of force in HD operations.”  And it “Clarifies and elaborates thoroughly the role of planning for cyberspace operations and the duties involved.”

The document also provides lots of incidental details of interest, such as a reference to a previously unheard-of Presidential Policy Directive 10 on US Ballistic Missile Defenses.  “PPD-10 acknowledges that ballistic missile systems present an increasingly important challenge and threat to the security of the US, its deployed forces, and its allies and partners. PPD-10 provides policy and guidelines for the development and deployment of US BMDs.” See Joint Publication 3-27, Homeland Defense, July 29, 2013.

The Navy has issued new guidance to combat the Insider Threat, as the Army did last month.

The insider threat program places unauthorized disclosures (or “leaks”) on a par with espionage or terrorism, and prior to either of them in the official definition.  Thus an insider threat, as defined by the Department of Defense, is “a person with authorized access, who uses that access, wittingly or unwittingly, to harm national security interests or national security through unauthorized disclosure, data modification, espionage, terrorism, or kinetic actions resulting in loss or degradation of resources or capabilities.”  See Department of the Navy Insider Threat Program, SECNAV Instruction 5510.37, August 8, 2013.