By most available measures, official secrecy continued to expand last year, according to a new “Secrecy Report Card” issued by the coalition OpenTheGovernment.org.
“Every administration wants to control information about its policies and practices,” observed coalition director Patrice McDermott, “but the current administration has restricted access to information about our government and its policies at unprecedented levels.”
See “Secrecy Report Card 2006: Indicators of Secrecy in the Federal Government” (pdf), a report by OpenTheGovernment.org, September 2006.
Perhaps as significant as any of the report’s findings is the existence of the OpenTheGovernment.org coalition itself.
“Notwithstanding you,” former Information Security Oversight Office director Steven Garfinkel told me in a 1993 interview, “very few people give a tinker’s damn about the security classification system.”
That is manifestly not the case today. In addition to OpenTheGovernment.org, which is a broad coalition of politically diverse organizations including FAS and other veteran advocates of greater transparency, there are several other new efforts to confront official secrecy, including the Coalition of Journalists for Open Government, the Sunshine in Government Initiative, and Sunshine Week.
If you’re new to the climate intervention space, welcome! The TL;DR: if we can’t stop the most catastrophic impacts of climate change with current tools quickly enough, then we need a bigger toolbox.
After months of delay, the council tasked by President Trump to review the FEMA released its final report. Our disaster policy nerds have thoughts.
FAS and FLI partnered to build a series of convenings and reports across the intersections of artificial intelligence (AI) with biosecurity, cybersecurity, nuclear command and control, military integration, and frontier AI governance. This project brought together leaders across these areas and created a space that was rigorous, transpartisan, and solutions-oriented to approach how we should think about how AI is rapidly changing global risks.
Investment should instead be directed at sectors where American technology and innovation exist but the infrastructure to commercialize them domestically does not—and where the national security case is clear.