FAS Obtains Report on US Arms Exports
In response to a Freedom of Information Act request filed by the FAS, the Defense Department has released its contribution to the Fiscal Year 2007 edition of the Annual Military Assistance Report required by Section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act.
The “Section 655” report, as it is known, contains information on five major security assistance programs: Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Excess Defense Articles Grant Authorizations and Deliveries (EDA), Drawdown Assistance Authorizations, and Foreign Military Sales (FMS). The section on FMS (i.e. government-to-government arms sales) is particularly valuable as it provides information on the types of items exported, not just the aggregate dollar value of the exported weapons.
The State Department voluntarily posts its section (on Direct Commercial Sales) on its website. The rest of the report is acquired by the FAS each year through the Freedom of Information Act.
To access the report, click here.
For more information:
U.S. Arms Transfers: Government Data
Defense Trade Data, Government Accountability Office, 28 January 2005.
State Department Needs to Resolve Data Reliability Problems that Led to
Inaccurate Reporting to Congress on Foreign Arms Sales, Government Accountability Office, 28 January 2005.
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