DHS updates Ready.gov…sort of.
Earlier this month, The Department of Homeland Security added two new sections to the Ready.gov website, one for people with disabilities and another for seniors. However, when you take a close look at them, you will notice that all they have done is shuffled the information they already had on the site onto two new pages. There is no new information on the web pages themselves.
What they have also done is supplied two new downloadable brochures that have very good information for seniors and people with disabilities. Kudos DHS! It is absolutely puzzling to me, however, that they have not taken the information from their brochures and simply added it to the new web pages. It would take very little time to do this and having two different sets of information on the site, one on the web page itself and one in the brochure, will almost certainly lead to confusion.
We applaud their efforts to improve their site and hope they will move quickly to rectify the shortcomings we identified in our previous analysis. We have formally offered DHS the content of reallyready.org at no cost, but have yet to hear word if they are going to take us up on our offer.
Finally, we have received several suggestions that we change the graphics on our nuclear threat page from a reactor because it implies that nuclear reactors pose a threat of nuclear explosion. This is an excellent point. The graphic was taken directly from ready.gov and we have changed it on our site to reflect the reality of a nuclear threat.
The Department of Defense has finally released the 2024 version of the China Military Power Report.
With tensions and aggressive rhetoric on the rise, the next administration needs to prioritize and reaffirm the necessity of regular communication with China on military and nuclear weapons issues to reduce the risk of misunderstandings.
Congress should ensure that no amendments dictating the size of the ICBM force are included in future NDAAs.
In early November 2024, the United States released a report describing the fourth revision to its nuclear employment strategy since the end of the Cold War and the third since 2013.