General George C. Marshall and the Atomic Bomb (Praeger, 2016) provides the first full narrative describing General Marshall’s crucial role in the first decade of nuclear weapons that included the Manhattan Project, the use of the atomic bomb on Japan, and their management during the early years of the Cold War.

Marshall is best known today as the architect of the plan for Europe’s recovery in the aftermath of World War II—the Marshall Plan. He also earned acclaim as the master strategist of the Allied victory in World War II. Marshall mobilized and equipped the Army and Air Force under a single command, serving as the primary conduit for information between the Army and the Air Force, as well as the president and secretary of war. As Army Chief of Staff during World War II, he developed a close working relationship with Admiral Earnest King, Chief of Naval Operations; worked with Congress and leaders of industry on funding and producing resources for the war; and developed and implemented the successful strategy the Allies pursued in fighting the war. Last but not least of his responsibilities was the production of the atomic bomb.

The Beginnings

An early morning phone call to General Marshall and a letter to President Franklin Roosevelt led to Marshall’s little known, nonetheless critical, role in the development and use of the atomic bomb. The call, received at 3:00 a.m. on September 1, 1939, informed Marshall that German dive bombers had attacked Warsaw. The letter signed by noted physicist Albert Einstein and delivered a month later, informed Roosevelt of the possibility of producing an enormously powerful bomb using a nuclear chain reaction in uranium.

As Marshall hung up the phone, he told his drowsy wife, “Well, it’s come.” He dressed quickly and went to his office. Later that day he would be sworn in as Army chief of staff while German troops marched into Poland in a blitzkrieg that launched World War II.

Nearly one year before, German scientists had observed that bombarding uranium atoms with neutrons caused them to split into smaller elements, releasing a tremendous amount of energy. This fission of a uranium atom also generates additional neutrons, which can then split other uranium atoms to produce a nuclear chain reaction. Physicists in many countries recognized this rapid chain reaction in uranium could produce a powerful atomic bomb. Among them was Hungarian physicist Leo Szilard, who realized that the Germans in particular were in an excellent position to produce an atomic bomb. Szilard, like Albert Einstein, had immigrated to the United States to escape Nazi persecution. He believed the U.S. government should be alerted to this possibility. He reasoned that Einstein, a renowned scientist, would be in a position to gain the attention of the U.S. government. So, on July 12, 1939, he visited Einstein at his home on Long Island to discuss the prospect of a U.S. atomic bomb. Szilard’s explanation of a nuclear chain reaction in uranium surprised Einstein, who had not followed recent developments in nuclear physics. Einstein pondered this new revelation and then slowly remarked, “I haven’t thought about that at all.”¹ He realized that nuclear fission was the conversion of mass to energy (a demonstration of his famous 1905 E=mc2 equation).

In the letter, which was delivered October 4, 1939, Einstein warned the president that the Germans might be developing a game-changing bomb, and he raised the prospect of the United States building a weapon of its own. Roosevelt immediately approved the establishment of a committee to investigate the feasibility of the United States producing such a weapon, and Marshall’s remarkable career took a significant turn.

Marshall’s direct involvement with nuclear weapons came two years after these initial communications of 1939, when the president appointed him to the Top Policy Group, established to provide Marshall with advice on atomic energy. Little did Marshall realize that the atomic bomb would hasten the end of the war, dramatically alter the future of warfare, and profoundly influence the post-war world. As a soldier who came of age in the era that saw both trench warfare and the implementation of new technologies on the battlefield, Marshall was skeptical, but open, to the possibilities this new weapon presented. Almost a decade later, as secretary of state and secretary of defense, he confronted profound issues related to nuclear weapons.

Expanding the size of the Army, training new draftees, reorganizing the command structure, and acquiring the necessary materials and equipment had required strong leadership within both the military and Congress. In guiding these efforts, Marshall had gained the confidence of the president, advisor Harry Hopkins, Stimson, and the Army officer corps. He also acquired the respect of congressmen during his numerous committee appearances in support of the funds requested for the mobilization. Thus, despite the demands of these critical assignments, it was not surprising the president appointed Marshall to the influential policy group for atomic power.

As a member of the Top Policy Group, General Marshall was privy to the reports and plans for expanding the project. In 1943, when research indicated that the United States could produce a bomb, the Army assumed responsibility for its production. That meant Marshall, as Army chief of staff, became responsible for the massive effort known as the Manhattan Project, (that built the atomic bombs dropped on Japan). His oversight of the Army’s budget allowed him to divert funds necessary to initiate the project. Later, his reputation and influence were instrumental in securing approval for additional funding from congressmen who were told only that the project was important for winning the war. When the bomb emerged as a weapon that might end the war in the Pacific, he advised Secretary of War Henry Stimson and President Harry Truman regarding its use on Japan. This decision shortened the war and unleashed the specter of nuclear holocaust on the world.²

The Manhattan Project

Marshall and Stimson oversaw the largest scientific project in history. From 1942 to 1946, an estimated 500,000 people were involved in producing the bombs, only a few of whom knew the objective of the project. According to one estimate, the Manhattan project cost $2.2 billion (approximately $30 billion in 2014 dollars) from 1942 to 1946.³

The project encompassed a nationwide system of production plants and laboratories.   The Clinton Engineering Works at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, used sequence thermal diffusion, electromagnetic separation, and gaseous diffusion methods to enrich uranium in order to produce the concentrated, fissile uranium-235 required for the bomb. (Natural uranium has less than one percent uranium-235 and more than 99 percent non-fissile uranium-238, and nuclear explosives typically require a uranium mixture with 80 percent or more concentration in uranium-235.) Nuclear reactors at Hanford, Washington, produced small amounts of plutonium-239, which were separated from spent reactor fuel by chemical means. These fissile materials were then sent to Los Alamos, New Mexico, where they were transformed into the critical components of the first atomic bombs. In addition to these major installations, many other industries and laboratories throughout the U.S. contributed to the Project.

In early June 1945, the uranium and plutonium were fashioned into components for the atomic bombs nicknamed “Little Boy” (the uranium-235 bomb) and “Fat Man” (the plutonium-239 weapon). Because there was only enough enriched uranium for one “Little Boy” and its design was simpler than that of “Fat Man,” it was not tested. The weapons designers were confident in the simple gun type mechanism to trigger the bomb. One of the two available “Fat Man” weapons was used to test the more complicated implosion method of detonation on July 16 at Alamogordo, New Mexico.

Leslie Groves

In one key move, Marshall assigned Colonel Leslie Groves to manage the project and then provided him with the required resources to carry it through. The cooperation between the dynamic Groves and the reserved Marshall was critical in directing the largest scientific project in history, which produced the atomic bomb in less than two years.

Groves first met General Marshall when he reported with a group of officers for duty with the War Department General Staff in June 1939. Marshall appreciated Groves’ management skills and wanted to keep him at the War Department in Washington. Although Groves had little direct contact with Marshall, he appreciated the fact that Groves had turned down a transfer from Washington to engineering duty.

Groves was given full authority to create the organizational structure and lines of command for the project, which became an independent command, no longer held accountable to the Corps of Engineers. He reported directly to Marshall and Stimson. This structure worked well due to the relationship between Groves and his superiors during the three-year project. The relationship of mutual trust, support, and respect is reflected in a post-war interview where Groves stated:

One reason why we were so successful was non-interference from above. General Marshall never interfered with anything that was going on. He didn’t ask for regular reports; he saw me whenever I wanted to see him and his instructions were very clear. Never once did I have to talk about the approval for money appropriations. ⁴

Marshall’s Leadership

Marshall’s directional genius included the ability to foster collaboration among groups with disparate interests. As Army chief of staff, he worked with Allied military leaders and heads of state to implement strategies for defeating the Axis. This talent was also critical to the success of the Manhattan Project. Marshall insured cooperation between the Army and the scientists, obtained funds from Congress while keeping their intended use a secret, and supported Groves’ forceful management style. Marshall and Stimson provided continuity for the atomic program during the transition of presidential leadership from Roosevelt to Truman.

Marshall’s influence on decisions leading to the use of the atomic bomb on Japan was as important as that of President Truman’s two top advisors, Stimson and Secretary of State James Byrnes. Marshall’s wise counsel influenced the views of Truman and his advisors as they weighed options for ending the war. Marshall provided valued advice on military issues, including the impact of the Soviet Union’s entry into the Pacific war, the pros and cons of an invasion of the Japanese homeland, and the conditions for a Japanese surrender.

Uncertainty

As the war continued in the Pacific, Marshall and Stimson wrestled with the issues surrounding the use of the bomb on Japan and its implications for the post-war world. They often discussed the political and diplomatic issues associated with Japan’s surrender and Russia’s involvement in the Pacific theater. Stalin had agreed with Roosevelt and Churchill at the February 1945 Yalta Conference to enter the war against Japan within 90 days after Germany’s surrender. Marshall recognized the major role that the Soviet army could play in defeating Germany and believed it would also be valuable in the conquest of Japan. He thought Russian engagement of the Japanese on the Chinese mainland would keep Japan from moving troops to the home islands. He also noted that the Russians could invade Manchuria whenever they wished, thus allowing them to benefit from the surrender terms.

Still, Marshall kept his focus on military planning, leaving Stimson to manage the politics and diplomacy associated with the bomb. As the end of the war in the Pacific drew closer, allied military actions were dependent on Japan’s acceptance of the terms of surrender. Marshall understood that there was a choice between obtaining Japan’s unconditional surrender at a time when the nation’s morale was at a low point, and an invasion accompanied by Soviet intervention.⁵ He also considered the bomb as a possible means of “shocking the nation into surrender.”

Marshall was not certain that the strategic use of the bomb on a Japanese city would end the war and he believed an invasion was a real possibility. If necessary, he believed that additional atomic bombs could be used as tactical weapons to support the invasion. The low estimates of the explosive power of the bomb that Marshall received from Groves, as well as the wide range of estimates from the Project’s scientists, led him to doubt its strategic value⁶  Given this uncertainty, Marshall maintained his conviction that in the absence of a diplomatic solution, allied troops would have to occupy the Japanese home islands to insure the nation’s complete capitulation. If an invasion became necessary, he believed Soviet entry into the war with Japan would be most helpful.

Military Options

With the future of the bomb still uncertain, Marshall, as operative head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, heard proposals from the Army Air Forces and Navy for forcing Japan to surrender. Naval planners felt that a tight blockade would force the Japanese into capitulation, while the Air Force leaders favored bombing them into submission. Marshall maintained that invasion of the home islands would be necessary, given the resistance encountered on Saipan, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. Moreover, the resilience of the Japanese to the intense bombing of their cities reinforced his position. He remained a conventional soldier who felt an invasion would be necessary to conquer an enemy. Nevertheless, he viewed the atomic bomb as a possible means of ending the war to avoid an invasion.

Marshall supported a strategy to apply increasing pressure on Japan. It included an immediate increase in conventional bombing and a tightened naval blockade, followed by Russian entry into the war in August and use of the atomic bomb when it became available. If these actions failed to produce surrender, Kyushu would be invaded on November 1, followed by Honshu in March 1946. Marshall left the decision to use the bomb to the president. He told Assistant Secretary of War, John McCloy “whether we should drop the bomb on Japan was a matter for the president to decide, not the chief of staff, since it was not a military question.⁷ He maintained his position of civilian control of nuclear weapons after the war.

Japan’s Surrender

By the end of July 1945, leaders in the United States and Japan remained deadlocked on the means of ending the war. The options for the United States were either a costly invasion to force a quick surrender or the continuation of the bombing and blockade, which came with the risk of losing the American peoples’ support for the war. Japan’s choices were to seek terms of surrender that left the emperor on the throne or to offer fierce resistance, in the hopes that the American public would become weary of the war and accept surrender terms favorable to Japan. The atomic bomb changed the game for both nations.

As a result of the successful Trinity test on July 16 at Alamogordo, New Mexico,  U.S. leaders activated plans for dropping the two existing atomic bombs on Japanese cities. At the Potsdam Conference, Groves informed Marshall about preparations for the bombing missions. MAGIC intercepts of Japanese diplomatic and military communications indicated to the allies that the Japanese leaders remained divided on the means of ending the war. On July 25, Marshall approved the missions for the atomic bombing of Japan.

While at dinner with his family at the Army-Navy Club on August 6, Groves received the first report that the mission to Hiroshima had left on schedule. He immediately returned to his office to await further developments. Around 11:15 pm, Colonel Frank McCarthy, Marshall’s aide, called Groves to say that the general wanted to know if there was any news on the strike. Groves responded that there was none. Shortly after McCarthy’s call, Groves received the coded strike message from General Farrell on Tinian. The mission’s crew reported:

Results clear cut, successful in all respects. Visible effects greater than New Mexico tests. Conditions normal in airplane following the delivery.⁸

As soon as the message was decoded, an excited Groves phoned McCarthy, who then gave Marshall the news and received Marshall’s tempered response, “Thank you very much for calling me.”

Japan announced its surrender on August 15, 1945, six days after a second atomic bomb on Nagasaki.

Marshall’s Nuclear Legacy

After the war, Truman’s selection of Marshall first as secretary of state and then as secretary of defense reflected his confidence in Marshall’s judgment and leadership. In these positions, Marshall continued to confront issues involving nuclear weapons, including the Berlin crisis, the Korean War, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He believed that these weapons did not alleviate the need for a large conventional army and, while defending their use to end the war with Japan, he did not favor utilizing them in future wars. In an address to the United Nations assembly on September 17, 1948, he stated:

For the achievement of international security, and the well-being of the peoples of the world, it is necessary that the United Nations press forward on many fronts. Among these are the control of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction and has perhaps the highest priority if we are to remove the specter of a war of annihilation.⁹

As a conventional warrior, Marshall was skeptical of revolutionary technology in waging war. His view changed with the successful deployment of the atomic bomb on Japan. Inherently distrustful of wonder weapons, he nevertheless supported the Manhattan Project. Unsure that the atomic bomb would negate the need for invading Japan, he was surprised when it shocked the Japanese into surrendering. He believed the use of the atomic bomb ended the war, but realized that it posed a threat to the future of the world.

---

Dr. Frank A. Settle, professor emeritus of chemistry, Washington and Lee University and director of the ALSOS Digital Library for Nuclear Issues, was professor of chemistry at the Virginia Military Institute from 1964 to 1992. Before coming to W&L in 1998, he was a visiting professor at the U.S. Air Force Academy, a consultant at Los Alamos National Laboratory, and a program officer at the National Science Foundation. He is a co-author of Instrumental Methods of Analysis and the editor of The Handbook of Instrumental Analytical Techniques. He has published extensively in scientific, educational, and trade journals. At W&L he developed and taught courses on nuclear history, nuclear power, and weapons of mass destruction for liberal arts majors. This article contains excerpts from his new book, researched at the Marshall Library, General George C. Marshall and the Atomic Bomb to be published by Prager in spring 2016.

Professor Rob Goldston teaches in the areas of nuclear energy and non-proliferation at Princeton University. Rob is a leading researcher in plasma physics and fusion energy. He was director of the DOE Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory (PPPL), 1997 – 2009. Since then he has published on the tradeoff between climate change mitigation by nuclear energy, fission and fusion, and nuclear proliferation risks. Recently he has collaborated with Professors Alexander Glaser of Princeton and Boaz Barak of Harvard on a Zero-Knowledge Protocol for warhead verification, for which the three were named “Leading Global Thinkers of 2014” by Foreign Policy magazine. He was acting director of the Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School Program on Science and Global Security during the Spring semester of 2015.

What inspired you to become a scientist? Was there a particular person or an event that put you on this path?

As far back as I can remember I was interested in physics, but one incident does stand out. The father of a fellow high school student was a laser physicist – back when those were rare – and he was invited to teach our 8:30 am physics class. We were so enthralled with what he could tell us about modern physics that we made him keep answering our questions until lunchtime. We cut all of the intervening classes.

What are the potential benefits of fusion energy?

Fusion has a number of potential benefits. Its fuel is abundant. It cannot melt down or run away. And its proliferation risks are small – if it is safeguarded.

What are the proliferation risks, if any, from fusion energy? What can and should be done to minimize those risks?

Proliferation risks are conventionally divided into use of clandestine facilities to produce fissile material, covert misuse of declared facilities for this purpose, and breakout. A DT [deuterium-tritium] fusion device capable of producing enough neutrons to transmute uranium or thorium to make 1 SQ [significant quantity¹ worth of weapons material per year, while much smaller than a fusion power plant, is still quite large and would have very clear environmental signatures. So the risk of a clandestine facility making bomb material is small.

One could imagine, however, placing uranium or thorium targets in the vicinity of a neutron and power producing fusion plasma (the cloud of hot, ionized gas that is the fusion fuel). You would need to have safeguards to assure that no such material was present, but these would be relatively easy to implement, because the baseline amount is zero – so detection of any uranium, thorium or fission products would be a clear signature of misuse of the plant.

Finally, you could worry about breakout. The advantage of fusion is that even an unannounced breakout would be easily detected (again due to the presence of improper materials) and at the time of breakout there would be no fissile material yet produced. It would be relatively easy to disable a fusion power plant without risk of spreading radiation. I have written about these issues² and others associated specifically with inertial confinement fusion³, and worked in an IAEA Consultative Group to suggest ways in which safeguards could best be deployed for fusion systems.

What more needs to be done to deploy the first commercially viable fusion energy power plant? How far away approximately is the world from achieving that breakthrough?

I think we know how to make commercial amounts of power from fusion, and this will be demonstrated by the ITER [Latin for “the way”] experiment now being built in France. ITER is slated to produce up to 500 MW of fusion power in pulses lasting between 400 seconds and an hour. The next challenge – which is my current area of research – is learning how the heat of the plasma escapes from the edge of the plasma⁴⁵ and how to capture it most effectively. A parallel challenge is developing materials that can withstand the flux of 14 MeV neutrons from the DT reaction. In a sense our next challenges are set by our successes so far in making fusion power.

It is hard to say when all of this will come together. ITER should demonstrate major power production in the 2030s. We should bring along in parallel the other science and technology so that the device after ITER can put electricity on the grid. This is the structure of the plan that has been articulated in China, Europe, Japan and South Korea. In the U.S. we have been more reticent about articulating such a plan.

In particular, what advice would you give (or have you given) to the U.S. government (both the executive and legislative branches) to further advance the prospects for a commercial breakthrough in fusion energy?

I think that the U.S. needs to commit to being a commercial competitor in fusion energy, which means that we need a focused program with a set of specific goals and milestones. In particular, I think the winner in fusion will be the country that addresses the heat and neutron flux issues most effectively. We should be doing that in the U.S. while supporting the international ITER project, so that we can build a competitive pilot fusion power plant as soon as ITER succeeds.

Please describe in layperson’s terms what the “Zero Knowledge Protocol” is and how it can help address verification problems in nuclear arms control. Please describe the Consortium for Verification Technology.

A key issue for future arms control agreements will be for multi-national inspection teams to be able to verify that a nuclear warhead slated for dismantlement is truly a warhead, and one of the type specified. The problem is that this must be done without revealing anything about the design or composition of the warhead. (In other words, nuclear arms control should not facilitate nuclear proliferation!) Alex Glaser, Boaz Barak, and I have proposed a new interactive “Zero-Knowledge” technique⁶ to get around this apparent paradox. We propose that the inspectors would first select one or more warheads, randomly, from actively deployed missiles. At least one of these warheads, we assume, is a live one. If the inspectors are uncomfortable about this, they can select more. Then, say, 50 warheads are pulled out from storage. Now if the inspectors can prove to their satisfaction that these 50+ objects are identical, without learning anything about them, the problem is solved.

Our approach to this next step is a form of differential neutron radiography, and we are just now starting experiments on this at PPPL – using unclassified test objects. If we just were to take a neutron radiograph of a warhead, the resulting image would be highly classified. So our concept is that the owner of the warhead preloads the complement of this image onto an array of neutron detectors of a special type that record neutron fluence by producing small bubbles. Of course, the inspectors do not get to see these preloads either. However, when they irradiate a true warhead with neutrons that ultimately fall onto the preloaded array, the total signal at each detector should add up to a pre-agreed number of bubbles – the number that would have been produced with nothing there. So if we get an image of nothing – we have a real warhead! And we convey no information. The nice trick that made me fall in love with this idea is that if the preload is given a random Poisson distribution, there isn’t even information in the noisy speckle pattern on the image, since Poisson(n) + Poisson(m) = Poisson(n+m).

The astute reader, however, may have noticed a problem. Why can’t the owner of the warheads pull out a bag of rocks from storage, and give the inspectors a detector array preloaded with the complement of the bag of rocks? The answer – and this is where the interactive Zero-Knowledge feature comes in – is that the inspectors get to choose which preloaded array of detectors goes with which putative warhead. So the preload that is complementary to the bag of rocks could well end up behind a real warhead pulled off a missile. If we do this a few times, the odds that the warhead owner can get away with cheating are infinitesimal.

The Consortium on Verification Technology is a multi-institutional activity funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration of the Department of Energy. It provides funding for universities to collaborate with National Labs to work on a number of kinds of verification technology, not just associated with warheads. Princeton University and PPPL are members of this Consortium, working together on Zero-Knowledge warhead verification.

In early August, you joined 29 leading scientists in a letter⁷ to President Obama in support of the nuclear deal with Iran. Why did you sign the letter?

When I read the JCPOA, I was amazed at how strong it was. Viewed in the frame of other non-proliferation agreements, it is extremely innovative, very restrictive, and very well verified. I thought it was important for non-technical people to understand that this is indeed a very good deal – indeed the best that has ever been negotiated –and in absolute terms, able to get the job done. After 15 – 25 years of “good behavior” Iran will be constrained only as any other member in good standing of the NPT and signatory to its Additional Protocol is constrained, but this was inevitable after some period of time. As we said in the letter, and I have written separately, we need to strengthen the non-proliferation regime for the long run – and this deal gives us the time to do that.

What scientific opportunities do you think American scientists can pursue in collaboration with Iranian scientists?

JCPOA indicates that Iran is interested in fusion, and in particular in ITER. I would be very glad to welcome Iranian scientists to work on these.

What advice would you give fellow scientists who are considering applying their knowledge and skills to societal issues?

First of all, science is great fun. There is no thrill greater than understanding something deeply for the first time. If you are the first person in the world to understand it – that makes it a hundred times better. And if you can be solving societally important problems at the same time, what could be better?

Creating a Community for Global Security

by Charles D. Ferguson

The Iran Deal: A Pathway for North Korea?

by Manit Shah and Jose Trevino

The majority of all nuclear experts and diplomats, as well as aspiring nuclear and policy students, must have their eyes set on North Korea’s slowly but steadily expanding nuclear weapons program, as well as the recent updates on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran.

A Social Science Perspective on International Science Engagement

by Nasser Bin Nasser

Social and behavioral sciences play an increasingly critical part in issues as far ranging as arms control negotiations, inspection and verification missions, and cooperative security projects.

Review of Benjamin E. Schwartz’s Right of Boom: The Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism (Overlook Press, 2015)

by Edward A. Friedman

While capturing the mystery of the weapon’s origin, the title does little to convey the enormity or complexity of the issue being addressed.

Marshall and the Atomic Bomb

by Frank Settle

Marshall is best known today as the architect of the plan for Europe’s recovery in the aftermath of World War II—the Marshall Plan. He also earned acclaim as the master strategist of the Allied victory in World War II. Last but not least of his responsibilities was the production of the atomic bomb.

Rob Goldston: A Scientist on the Cutting Edge of Fusion and Arms Control Research

by Allison Feldman

An interview with a leading researcher in plasma physics and fusion energy and former director of the DOE Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory (PPPL), 1997 – 2009.

Not Much Below the Surface? North Korea’s Nuclear Program and the New SLBM

by Robert Schmucker, Markus Schiller and J. James Kim

In May 2015, only a month after key figures in the U.S. military publicly acknowledged the possibility that North Korea has perfected the miniaturization of a nuclear warhead for long-range delivery, the secretive country seems to have confirmed these claims with a series of announcements, including a “successful” submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) test at sea.

Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction

by Steven Starr

While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result from a nuclear winter, it is relatively simple to predict those which would be most profound. That is, a nuclear winter would cause most humans and large animals to die from nuclear famine in a mass extinction event similar to the one that wiped out the dinosaurs.

In May 2015, only a month after key figures in the U.S. military publicly acknowledged the possibility that North Korea has perfected the miniaturization of a nuclear warhead for long-range delivery, the secretive country seems to have confirmed these claims with a series of announcements, including a “successful” submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) test at sea. ¹, ² While many experts question the authenticity of these claims, the latest announcements do warrant closer scrutiny, given their implications for regional stability and order. ⁴ We will begin our discussion with a technical analysis of the latest available evidence about North Korea’s missile technology. Note that we will not consider the claims related to miniaturization, given that there is little open source information to confirm or disprove these claims. Instead, we provide an assessment of the so-called “KN-11” based on official photographs and a video released by the North Korean KCNA. The results of our finding are inconclusive – meaning there is not enough evidence supporting (or refuting) the existence of a functional ICBM or SLBM in North Korea. In the second part of our discussion, we will explore North Korea’s intentions by considering the broader political context within which this latest set of announcements has been made. We argue that these moves correspond to past patterns of North Korean behavior and are likely to be driven by the leadership’s desire to seek attention and possibly draw the United States to the bargaining table whereby North Korea can win important concessions.

The Chain of Events

In early April of this year, Admiral William Gortney, the head of Northern Command and the North American Aerospace Defense, stated that the North Koreans “have the ability to put a nuclear weapon on a KN-08 and shoot it at the homeland. We assess that it’s operational today….” ⁴ During a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing one week later, both Admiral Samuel Locklear, the head of Pacific Command, and General Curtis Scapparotti, the commander of USFK, corroborated Admiral Gortney’s statement. ⁵ This is not the first time that these officials have made claims to these effects, ⁶but it is interesting to note that they come in succession while the debate over missile defense (i.e. THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense]) has been gaining momentum in Seoul. ⁷ Even more importantly, they are followed by a new set of announcements from North Korea about its nuclear program.

To be more precise, the North Korean Defense Commission announced on May 20th that they “have had the capability of miniaturizing nuclear warheads… for some time.”⁸ This claim was preceded by another announcement on May 9th whereby the North Korean state news agency KCNA claimed that “there took place an underwater test-fire of Korean-style powerful strategic submarine ballistic missile.”⁹ Putting aside for the moment the motives behind these announcements and the context surrounding these events, we consider the validity of this latest claim using the photographs and video released by the North Korean media which will provide some reliable assessments about North Korea’s delivery capability (see Figure 1).

A Picture is (Not) Worth a Thousand Words

As the saying goes, “a picture is worth a thousand words”. Thankfully, the North Korean media has released more than a single photograph of the SLBM launch, which means we can piece together quite an interesting story about the North Korean missile capability using this set of pictures. The video, which was released in early June – more than three weeks after the photos, in what appeared to be a response to early Western analyses – confirms this story.

Figure 1. Selection of official launch photos

At first glance, the photos showing the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un observing the test appear to verify the official statement about an underwater missile launch. However, a closer scrutiny reveals that many of these photos were strongly modified. Therefore, technical details of this “missile” and its operational status have to remain unclear; what is clear, however, is that this event was not a full-scale launch of an operational SLBM.

Published Photographs

To date, six different launch photos have been identified from the set of photos that were officially released by North Korean media. ¹⁰ Although there may be more, these six are already sufficient for an analysis. The photos are hereby arbitrarily numbered, in this case according to the most likely chronological sequence (Figure 2).

Figure 2. KN-11 launch photos

Missile Characteristics at First Glance

The missile, by now designated the “KN-11” by Western analysts, looks quite similar to the Soviet R-27/SS-N-6 submarine missile that was developed in the 1960s. For more than 10 years now, North Korea is attributed with having access to the SS-N-6 technology, and even having developed a road-mobile version of this missile termed “Musudan”. However, no test of the Musudan has been observed as of yet, and there is no clear evidence that North Korea actually has access to this special kind of technology.

The presented SLBM seems to be a one-stage design with a length-to-diameter ratio of 6. This would mean a length of around 9 m for a diameter of roughly 1.5 m, which is consistent with the original SS-N-6 missile. With comparable size and technology, this missile could offer a performance of perhaps 2,400 km or more with a 650 kg warhead.

Nonetheless, it is important not to make too much out of this resemblance. Comparisons with the geometrical shape of the Chinese JL-1 missile, for example, also yield close similarities, but do not necessarily mean anything.

Launch Analysis

The early trajectory of missiles the size of an SS-N-6 has to be relatively steep for energetic reasons. SLBMs of this size might tilt at quite an angle just after clearing the water surface post submarine ejection, but they quickly readjust their angle to recover the steep trajectory once the engine is ignited. The photographs, however, reveal a different story. In this case, the missile’s trajectory already starts with a noteworthy angle instead of a vertical alignment, and this angle quickly continues to decline instead of recovering. This angled launch is typical for unguided missiles. It could also mean that this specific missile has low thrust or low acceleration.

The photographs also reveal some inconsistent information regarding the propellants used by this missile. The lack of a white smoke trail indicates that the missile does not use composite solid propellants. The lack of brownish-red nitric gases at ignition essentially rules out double-base solid propellants, as well as any liquid-propellant combinations with nitric acid or nitrogen tetroxide (NTO) as an oxidizer (for example, the combination of inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA) and kerosene). A blackish-grey cloud appears when the missile breaks the water surface and the cloud rapidly turns white; this is very unusual for any rocket launch, be it underwater or land launched. The shining exhaust flame also rules out unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH)-based propellant combinations, which are normally characterized by a transparent flame. In photograph #4, the shining flame seems to be detached from the nozzle by some distance, which in turn would actually indicate a double-base solid propellant. These inconsistencies suggest that there is something wrong with the photographs.

Photo Analysis

A detailed look at the available photographs reveals considerable irregularities and poor Photoshop edits.

Figure 3. KN-11 launch sequence

Figure 4. Identical position of letters and numbers

1. Photograph #2 is not part of the main photo sequence (Figure 3).

• The missile angle is lower than that of photographs #3 and #4; only at photograph #5, the missile starts to show a lower angle.
• If the pictures were not altered and we can assume that they are the same missile, the different angles can only be explained by a different camera position. Careful analysis shows that the red letters on the missile would have to be in a very different position due to the different perspective; however, they appear at the same position as in the other photos (Figure 4).
• The smoke cloud looks distinctly different from the other photos and also lacks the flat white spray water cloud.
• The smoke cloud touches down at the photo’s horizon line.

Figure 5. KN-11 exhaust flame reflection in the water

2. Photo 6 is also not part of the main photo sequence. The smoke cloud touches down at the photo’s horizon line, as well (Figure 3).

3. The dark smoke cloud dissipates rapidly from photographs #4 to #5 (Figure 3).

4. The reflection of the shiny exhaust flame in photographs #4, #5, and #6 are inconsistent (Figure 5).

• The reflection looks reddish. The flame itself is yellowish.
• The position of the flame reflection is of differing width, and also misplaced, shifting its relative position to the exhaust flame at each of the photos.

Figure 6. White line along the missile outline

5. There is a white line along parts of the missile in photograph #2 (Figure 6). This is most likely due to heavy photo editing.

6. A closer look at photograph #4 reveals very low-quality Photoshop work at the back end of the missile (Figure 7). Rectangular graphic blocks appear to have been inserted. The detached flame could be a result of this editing. Thus, any conclusions about the propellants derived from the exhaust flame are ambiguous.

Figure 7. Photoshop editing

Video Analysis

The brief video (of only 1:05 minutes) further shows Kim observing the test, including a total of 3 very short sequences showing a missile in flight (Figure 8). Sequences #A and #C actually consist of two sequences each, first showing the missile breaking through the ocean’s surface, and then quickly cutting to the missile in flight, while sequence #B only shows what looks like the missile in flight.

Figure 8. Launch video
sequence

Again, the video is not very convincing, and it appears that its intent is to create a different impression than what was actually shown.

1. The camera work is extremely shaky at sequences #A and #C, perhaps to make an analysis more difficult.

2. There is always a cut between the missile pushing through the surface of the water and the missile flying, thus disclosing the possibility that the in-flight sequences are not connected to the ejection sequences.

3. The dark smoke cloud at sequences #A and #C appears virtually out of nothing and starts disappearing just as quickly, within a few frames of the video (meaning within fractions of a second).

4. A blackish smoke cloud at ignition typically hints toward kerosene as a fuel, with a kerosene-rich ignition sequence. This was demonstrated by the Saturn V Moon rocket, for example, but no missile has yet been identified showing such a characteristic ignition cloud.

5. There is no way to ascertain the size of the missile depicted in the in-flight sequences, and if this is the same missile that was launched out of the water.

6. The length of the flame in the in-flight sequences is too long, more than two times the length of the missile body. Assuming a missile length of 9 m, the flame would be approximately 20 m. Comparable flame-missile length ratios are only known from small artillery rockets.

7. A later sequence just after #A, #B, and #C displays Kim in front of what appears to be the underwater launch site at the right half of the frame, marked by white water with traces of vapor or smoke still hanging in the air. Strangely, there is another area of white water a short distance to the left of the first area (Figure 9). Combining the size of this white water area, the distance of this area to the supposed launch site, and the trajectory of the ejected missile from the available photographs (Figure 3), it is possible that the ejected missile fell back into the ocean at this site.

Figure 9. Two white water areas

All this, along with some other inconsistencies, suggests that the released imagery and video footage was heavily edited by North Korean authorities.

Implied Aspects

The published photos apparently imply some aspects that fail to be validated with careful analysis.

Figure 10. Submarine and
surface ship

1. In several photographs, a submarine is clearly visible, surfaced in some photos and partially submerged in others. This would suggest that the missile was launched by this very submarine. But as was already pointed out on armscontrolwonk.com,¹¹ a photo with a surface ship in close proximity to the launch site, as well as several other indications, point toward a submerged barge being used at this event as opposed to a submarine (Figure 10).

Figure 11. Smoke trail and smokeless missile

2. Another photo publicized on North Korean TV displays a thick white smoke trail high up in the sky, implying that a successful missile launch took place, and also indicating the use of composite solid propellants. However, there is no trace of a white smoke trail in any of the other available launch photographs (Figure 11) or the video.

Questioning Motives

As our discussion has revealed, the photographs and video both prove inadequate in providing a sufficient basis for concluding that North Korea has mastered the technology to enable long range delivery of a miniaturized nuclear warhead. If anything, they do not reveal any new information about the progress of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. What then might we conclude was the motive behind these announcements? Given the lack of adequate information, we can only speculate.

One possibility is that North Korea possesses a fully functional SLBM but does not want to put “all of their cards on the table”. That is, they may have modified their image productions to keep their true accomplishments clandestine. Of all conceivable scenarios, this is the least likely, given that the authorities could have accomplished the same objective by simply making an announcement without having released any photographs or video. In fact, we would argue that a simple announcement would have been superior to actually releasing any photographs or video footage, given that the poor editing work on these images only raises more questions and causes North Korea to look less credible in the eyes of many outside observers. In this sense, one could argue that these images have had the opposite of the intended effect.

Of course, there is also the possibility that North Korea is releasing bad signals to conceal its capabilities and has every intention of engaging in an armed conflict with the United States and its allies. We would argue that this scenario is only likely if the North Korean authorities truly believe that they can prevail against superior adversaries (i.e. the United States and its allies) in an all-out war. Given the number of instances where the United States has displayed its military prowess in recent years (e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya), it is difficult to see how the North Korean leadership could conceivably reach this kind of conclusion. Nonetheless, the possibility that the leadership is engaged in this type of thinking cannot be discounted altogether given the stakes of an armed conflict with North Korea.¹² We think that this partially explains the cautionary words from a number of officials within U.S. military circles who have openly acknowledged the existence of a “functional ICBM” in North Korea.

But one could also argue that this was North Korea’s intention from the outset. Assuming that North Korea does not possess long-range strike capability, the “next best” option is to make its adversaries believe that it does. By being deliberately opaque and deceptive, North Korea could be trying to make the United States and its allies unable to choose between an option that involves the use of military force and one that does not. The goal in this scenario is to forestall an imminent attack by keeping its adversaries guessing. Given the recent set of announcements by the U.S. military, one could argue that North Korea is succeeding with this strategy.

There is another scenario where North Korea does not possess long-range strike capability but is instead using these announcements to signal that it intends to  develop this technology and subsequently demonstrate how far along it may be in this process. On the one hand, this achieves some of the objectives laid out above, but it also impels the United States and its allies to weigh the possibility of a diplomatic solution to North Korea’s nuclear program. The thinking would run along the following lines: “Given that North Korea has not fully perfected its nuclear capability, could it be possible to negotiate a deal with them in order to halt or delay this process?” This appears to be the guiding principle behind past deals with North Korea and even the current deal with Iran.

The likelihood that North Korea’s strategic logic may follow this line of reasoning is backed by several contextual factors surrounding the recent set of events, as well as a pattern of past practices that corroborates this type of behavior. First and foremost, we must recognize that the targeted recipient of this signal is the United States. Undeniably, North Korea having possession of a nuclear-tipped ICBM sends a strong message to the world, but the intended target of this capability must be none other than the United States, (the greatest threat for North Korea presently). If the United States perceives these images as serious threats to homeland security, U.S. leaders are likely to act. North Korea is staking that the reaction will not involve the use of military force, since the cost of an armed conflict would be too high for the allies, so this leaves open the possibility of diplomatic engagement. Recent moves by the Obama administration to normalize relations with Cuba and finalize a nuclear deal with Iran may have caught Pyongyang’s attention. While the comparison is hardly apropos, the latest SLBM announcement would be one way for Pyongyang to test the allies’ resolve to “stay the course” or revive the Six Party Talks.

An increase in the number of meetings between officials in China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the United States over the past several months suggests that this “bet” may be paying off. Aside from the fact that South Korean President Park Geun-hye expressed her desire to resume talks with North Korea on several occasions – (the latest being January of this year), there has been a significant upswing in the number of meetings among chief negotiators in the United States, South Korea, and Japan in recent months. But what of China and Russia? As early as March of this year, both countries expressed a willingness to reopen talks, and the chief negotiators appear to be reaching out to their counterparts in these countries.¹³ While it is unclear how long this consensus may last given the continuing evolution of North Korea’s nuclear program, the latest SLBM test seems to have created some sense of urgency and momentum on the diplomatic side.

Finally, North Korea’s relation with its closest ally in China is deteriorating with each additional test, inviting further rebuke and concern.¹⁴ Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Seoul last year marked the first time in history that a Chinese leader visited Seoul without having first visited Pyongyang.¹⁵ This change explains North Korea’s interest in improving relations with Russia. It is unclear, however, whether Russia will serve as a more reliable surrogate, as it currently appears to be mired in an economic crisis of its own. Given all this, the conditions are ripe for North Korea to turn instead towards gaining back the attention of its old adversaries. What better way to achieve this than by test launching a SLBM in its development phase?

What of the possibility that North Korea is reacting to the recent military exercises in the region by the US-ROK forces? One could argue that the latest test was a reaction to Key Resolve and Foal Eagle, which took place in March. Indeed, Pyongyang sees these annual U.S. and South Korean military exercises as more than irritable saber-rattling, but that they also warrant vitriolic complaints. Nonetheless they have responded with drills of their own, including firing rounds of mortars on the open sea. And two months is much too long of a delay for a response in the form of a poorly-staged mock SLBM launch.

Perhaps one can formulate a better argument that accounts for North Korea’s broader security dilemma. We cannot lose sight of the fact that North Korea’s desire to build a nuclear arsenal is largely based on its perception of the threat that the United States and U.S. allies pose for North Korea’s national security. Hence, we should not ignore the possibility that North Korea’s nuclear ambition is set on an irreversible course. If this were the case, North Korea would continue the development of its nuclear program with or without diplomatic overtures, which has been the case in the past. In this scenario, negotiations are not going to be effective in halting or delaying North Korea’s nuclear program.

So the question remains: why the announcements?  It is important to note that these announcements come on the heels of public statements by high-ranking officers within the U.S. military, which confirms (if not overestimates) North Korea’s nuclear capability. If the goal was to impress, there was no need for North Korea to release these photographs because the U.S. military was already doing it for them. Perhaps the North Korean authorities thought that these images and announcements would reinforce these assessments. But if this was their primary objective, our analysis has shown that they have failed. Even if they were successful in convincing the world that they possess a fully functional SLBM, what then? Is this their way of taunting their enemies into war? Undoubtedly, instigating a military response is not in the North Korean regime’s interest unless it is about to implode on its own.

Perhaps these images were never meant for consideration outside of North Korea. That is, the circulation of these images may have been a way to raise domestic support and national pride for the Kim Jong-un regime’s accomplishments. There is something to be said about the effect that these images have on the domestic audience in North Korea. But it is difficult to believe that the regime would need to go through all this trouble simply to raise public support when it has other means to maintain and manage its own legitimacy. Domestic appeal is most likely just a part of a broader agenda for a staged event such as this.

This brings us back to the hypothesis that North Korea may be signaling a readiness to talk. As we have discussed, these images achieve two objectives. First, they assist North Korea in further reinforcing the perception that it is developing the ability to deter its foes from exercising the military option. Second, they push the United States and its allies to consider a diplomatic response to North Korea’s nuclear problem. Already, some pundits are suggesting that the Obama administration should consider a different approach.¹⁶ However, the success of the diplomatic approach would depend on North Korea’s willingness to negotiate over the U.S. demand for verifiable denuclearization, which is a rather difficult proposition. Should North Korea be unwilling to accept these terms, the next question would be whether the United States and its allies would accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state—which would be an equally difficult proposition that would depend on the likelihood of installing a sophisticated combination of conventional offensive and defensive capabilities based in South Korea or Japan. However, it is clear that until this impasse is somehow resolved, North Korea will continue its slow but defiant march towards attaining an arsenal of long-range missiles tipped with miniaturized nuclear warheads. Which begs the question: what would the United States and its allies do then?

Conclusion

North Korea’s latest announcement regarding its nuclear capability should not be taken lightly. It has revealed the Kim Jong-un regime’s desire and intention to continue the development of its nuclear weapons program. The silver lining, of course, is that there is no verifiable proof that North Korea possesses a functional SLBM or ICBM tipped with a miniaturized nuclear warhead just yet. The latest revelation of the KN-11 corresponds with the broader pattern of claiming significant advances in missile technology while trying to substantiate them with contradictory proof.  Poor mock-ups of the KN-08 missile that were paraded through Pyongyang in 2012 and 2013 are just one of many examples.¹⁷ We have considered several explanations for why North Korea may be engaged in this kind of enterprise. While we think that diplomatic engagement is the most plausible motive behind the latest announcements, there are significant hurdles that the negotiators must overcome if this approach is to bear fruit.

It is also important to bear in mind that there may be other factors motivating the display of these mock-ups. For instance, we should not rule out the possibility that the North Korean leadership may be made to believe that its own missile program is more advanced than it really is, simply out of fear of not meeting given objectives – the fate of the late North Korean Defense Minister, Hyong Yong Chol, who was reportedly executed by antiaircraft fire for falling asleep at military events, indicates what the consequences might be if the Supreme Leader is not pleased. Whatever the case, it is resoundingly clear that North Korea wants to possess this capability. The recent rise in the number of missile tests suggests that they are redoubling their effort¹⁸ – meaning that we have not seen the last of these types of announcements in looking ahead.

Until there is some break in this trend, the best that we can do is continued observation and study. To gain insights on the reasons for North Korea’s announcements about its missile program, it is essential to closely follow any missile related developments in the future, but also to frequently revisit past developments and events to gain a better and more comprehensive sense of North Korea’s missile story.¹⁹

---

Markus Schiller holds degrees in mechanical and aerospace engineering from TU Munich. He was employed at Schmucker Technologie since 2006, except for a one-year Fellowship at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California, in 2011. In 2015, he started his own consulting firm ST Analytics, focusing on space technology, security and threat, and – of course – rockets and missiles.

Robert Schmucker has more than five decades of experience researching rocketry, missiles, and astronautics. In the 1990s, he was a weapons inspector for UNSCOM in Iraq. His consulting firm, Schmucker Technologie, provided threat and security analyses for national and international organizations about activities of developing countries and proliferation for more than 20 years.

James Kim is a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies and an adjunct lecturer in the Executive Master of Public Policy and Administration program at Columbia University. He has held positions at the California State Polytechnic University (Pomona), the RAND Corporation, and the Institute for Social and Economic Research and Planning at the School of International and Public Affairs in Columbia University.

While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result from a nuclear winter, it is relatively simple to predict those which would be most profound. That is, a nuclear winter would cause most humans and large animals to die from nuclear famine in a mass extinction event similar to the one that wiped out the dinosaurs.

Following the detonation (in conflict) of US and/or Russian launch-ready strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear firestorms would burn simultaneously over a total land surface area of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. These mass fires, many of which would rage over large cities and industrial areas, would release many tens of millions of tons of black carbon soot and smoke (up to 180 million tons, according to peer-reviewed studies), which would rise rapidly above cloud level and into the stratosphere. [For an explanation of the calculation of smoke emissions, see Atmospheric effects & societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts.]

The scientists who completed the most recent peer-reviewed studies on nuclear winter discovered that the sunlight would heat the smoke, producing a self-lofting effect that would not only aid the rise of the smoke into the stratosphere (above cloud level, where it could not be rained out), but act to keep the smoke in the stratosphere for 10 years or more. The longevity of the smoke layer would act to greatly increase the severity of its effects upon the biosphere.

Once in the stratosphere, the smoke (predicted to be produced by a range of strategic nuclear wars) would rapidly engulf the Earth and form a dense stratospheric smoke layer. The smoke from a war fought with strategic nuclear weapons would quickly prevent up to 70% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Southern Hemisphere. Such an enormous loss of warming sunlight would produce Ice Age weather conditions on Earth in a matter of weeks. For a period of 1-3 years following the war, temperatures would fall below freezing every day in the central agricultural zones of North America and Eurasia. [For an explanation of nuclear winter, see Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences.]

Nuclear winter would cause average global surface temperatures to become colder than they were at the height of the last Ice Age. Such extreme cold would eliminate growing seasons for many years, probably for a decade or longer. Can you imagine a winter that lasts for ten years?

The results of such a scenario are obvious. Temperatures would be much too cold to grow food, and they would remain this way long enough to cause most humans and animals to starve to death.

Global nuclear famine would ensue in a setting in which the infrastructure of the combatant nations has been totally destroyed, resulting in massive amounts of chemical and radioactive toxins being released into the biosphere. We don’t need a sophisticated study to tell us that no food and Ice Age temperatures for a decade would kill most people and animals on the planet.  Would the few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment?

It is, of course, debatable whether or not nuclear winter could cause human extinction. There is essentially no way to truly “know” without fighting a strategic nuclear war. Yet while it is crucial that we all understand the mortal peril that we face, it is not necessary to engage in an unwinnable academic debate as to whether any humans will survive.

What is of the utmost importance is that this entire subject –the catastrophic environmental consequences of nuclear war – has been effectively dropped from the global discussion of nuclear weaponry. The focus is instead upon “nuclear terrorism”, a subject that fits official narratives and centers upon the danger of one nuclear weapon being detonated – yet the scientifically predicted consequences of nuclear war are never publically acknowledged or discussed.

Why has the existential threat of nuclear war been effectively omitted from public debate? Perhaps the leaders of the nuclear weapon states do not want the public to understand that their nuclear arsenals represent a self-destruct mechanism for the human race?  Such an understanding could lead to a demand that nuclear weapons be banned and abolished.

Consequently, the nuclear weapon states continue to maintain and modernize their nuclear arsenals, as their leaders remain silent about the ultimate threat that nuclear war poses to the human species.

---

Steven Starr is the director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program, as well as a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility. He has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Strategic Arms Reduction (STAR) website of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology; he also maintains the website Nuclear Darkness. Starr also teaches a class on the Environmental, Health and Social Effects of nuclear weapons at the University of Missouri.

While China has received growing attention for modernizing and expanding its strategic offensive nuclear forces over the last ten years, little attention has been paid to Chinese activities in testing and developing ballistic missile defenses (BMD). Motivated to understand the strategic implications of this testing and to learn Chinese views, Adjunct Senior Fellow and Professor, Bruce MacDonald and FAS President, Dr. Charles Ferguson, over the past twelve months, have studied these issues and have had extensive discussions with more than 50 security experts in China and the United States. Ever since the end of the Cold War, U.S. security policy has largely assumed that only the United States would possess credible strategic ballistic missile defense capabilities with non-nuclear interceptors. This tacit assumption has been valid for the last quarter century but may not remain valid for long. Since 2010, China has been openly testing missile interceptors purportedly for BMD purposes, but also useful for anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.

A full PDF version of the report can be found here.

In the FAS Special Report entitled, Moving Advanced Nuclear Energy Systems to Global Deployment, Charles D. Ferguson, FAS President, identifies the major factors that will affect deployment of advanced reactors (often referred to as Generation IV reactors) in the coming years to decades and analyzes what industry and governments need to do to move forward toward the ultimate goal of widespread deployment of potentially hundreds of highly energy-efficient, much safer, more proliferation-resistant, and economically-competitive nuclear power systems. Moreover, the report looks at lessons learned from the history of development and deployment of Generation II and III reactors and seeks to learn explicitly about the reasons for the predominant use of light water reactors. It then seeks to apply these lessons to current efforts to develop advanced nuclear energy systems. In the process of that assessment, the report reviews the status of the global cooperative and national efforts to develop and eventually deploy advanced nuclear energy systems. The main intentions of the report are to provide a guide to policymakers in the form of findings that lay out potential pathways to forward deployment of one or more advanced nuclear power systems within the next ten to twenty years.

A full PDF version of the report can be found here.

Now that an agreement has been reached between the P5+1 and Iran, a non-partisan task force convened by FAS has published Six Achievable Steps for Implementing an Effective Verification Regime for a Nuclear Agreement with Iran, a report that addresses anticipated implementation challenges and offers findings and recommendations for strengthening the implementation process both internationally and within the United States.

Over the last 20 months, Iran has been in negotiations with the P5+1 regarding its nuclear program, culminating in an agreement on July 14, 2015 that was memorialized in a 159-page text. The essence of the agreement is that Iran has offered the P5+1 constraints on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. As part of these negotiations, in paragraph iii of the Preamble and General Conditions, “Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.”

The negotiation process and the resulting agreement posed a critical question for the United States’ political and scientific communities: What monitoring and verification measures and tools will the United States, its allies, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) require for a comprehensive and effective nuclear agreement with Iran? Although it is resoundingly clear that this issue is a sensitive and controversial one and there is discrepancy on the “wisdom, scope, and content” of a possible agreement with Iran, there does appear to be a general consensus that effective implementation is as important as the agreement itself, and an agreement with Iran without effective verification and monitoring measures “would be counterintuitive and dangerous” and would have negative long-term effects for all associated parties.

To examine and scrutinize these issues, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) convened the Verification Capabilities Independent Task Force that released a report last September titled Verification Requirements for a Nuclear Agreement with Iran. This new report, Six Achievable Steps for Implementing an Effective Verification Regime for a Nuclear Agreement with Iran, further dissects the issue and discusses potential strategies for successful implementation of the verification regime associated with the recent agreement.

This phase of the Task Force’s study focuses on the anticipation of implementation challenges and offers findings and recommendations for strengthening the implementation process both internationally and within the United States. The report emphasizes six feasible steps for executing a strong verification regime for a nuclear agreement with Iran:

1. Ensure that the Joint Commission Works Effectively Among the P5+1 and Iran to Facilitate Compliance and Communication
2. Organize Executive Branch Mechanisms to Create Synergy and Sustain Focus on Implementation Over the Long-Term
3. Support and Augment the IAEA in the Pursuit of its Key Monitoring Role
4. Create a Joint Executive-Congressional Working Group (JECWG) to Facilitate Coordination Across the Legislative and Executive Branches of the USG
5. Prepare a Strategy and Guidebook for Assessing and Addressing Ambiguities and Potential Noncompliance
6. Exploit New Technologies and Open Source Tools for Monitoring a Nuclear Agreement with Iran

The report was released to the public on Thursday, August 6, 2015 and the Task Force hosted a panel discussion in Washington, D.C. later that day to present their findings and discuss possible implications of the agreement. Over 50 attendees from the political, scientific, and NGO circles gathered to express their thoughts and share their opinions on the issue at hand.

In other relevant news regarding scientists and the agreement with Iran, 29 of the nation’s top scientists — including Nobel laureates, veteran makers of nuclear arms and former White House science advisers — wrote to President Obama on Saturday, August 8 to praise the Iran deal, calling it “innovative and stringent.” While many of those who signed the letter are prominent FAS members and affiliates, such as the lead writer Dr. Richard L. Garwin, who serves on the FAS Board of Directors, Dr. Frank von Hippel, who has served as chairman of the FAS Board, and Dr. Martin Hellman, who is an FAS adjunct senior fellow, FAS, as an organization, has not taken an organizational stance either for or against the deal. As indicated by the report released by FAS on August 6, the Task Force convened by FAS supports providing research, guidance, and recommendations for implementing an effective verification regime for a nuclear agreement with Iran. Scientists with nuclear expertise and scientifically credible analysis must continue to serve as essential components to a strong nonproliferation system that allows nations to use nuclear energy peacefully as long as safeguards commitments are upheld.

Since the early 1980s, the world has known that a large nuclear war could cause severe global environmental effects, including dramatic cooling of surface temperatures, declines in precipitation, and increased ultraviolet radiation. The term nuclear winter was coined specifically to refer to cooling that result in winter-like temperatures occurring year-round. Regardless of whether such temperatures are reached, there would be severe consequences for humanity. But how severe would those consequences be? And what should the world be doing about it?

To the first question, the short answer is nobody knows. The total human impacts of nuclear winter are both uncertain and under-studied. In light of the uncertainty, a risk perspective is warranted that considers the breadth of possible impacts, weighted by their probability. More research on the impacts would be very helpful, but we can meanwhile make some general conclusions. That is enough to start answering the second question, what we should do. In regards to what we should do, nuclear winter has some interesting and important policy implications.

Today, nuclear winter is not a hot topic but this was not always the case: it was international headline news in the 1980s. There were conferences, Congressional hearings, voluminous scientific research, television specials, and more. The story is expertly captured by Lawrence Badash in his book A Nuclear Winter’s Tale.¹Much of the 1980s attention to nuclear winter was driven by the enthusiastic efforts of Carl Sagan, then at the height of his popularity. But underlying it all was the fear of nuclear war, stoked by some of the tensest moments of the Cold War.

When the Cold War ended, so too did attention to nuclear winter. That started to change in 2007, with a new line of nuclear winter research² that uses advanced climate models developed for the study of global warming. Relative to the 1980s research, the new research found that the smoke from nuclear firestorms would travel higher up in the atmosphere, causing nuclear winter to last longer. This research also found dangerous effects from smaller nuclear wars, such as an India-Pakistan nuclear war detonating “only” 100 total nuclear weapons. Two groups—one in the United States³ and one in Switzerland⁴ — have found similar results using different climate models, lending further support to the validity of the research.

Some new research has also examined the human impacts of nuclear winter. Researchers simulated agricultural crop growth in the aftermath of a 100-weapon India-Pakistan nuclear war.⁵ The results are startling- the scenario could cause agriculture productivity to decline by around 10 to 40 percent for several years after the war. The studies looked at major staple crops in China and the United States, two of the largest food producers. Other countries and other crops would likely face similar declines.

Following such crop declines, severe global famine could ensue. One study estimated the total extent of the famine by comparing crop declines to global malnourishment data.⁶ When food becomes scarce, the poor and malnourished are typically hit the hardest. This study estimated two billion people at risk of starvation. And this is from the 100-weapon India-Pakistan nuclear war scenario. Larger nuclear wars would have more severe impacts.

This is where the recent research stops. To the best of my knowledge there are no recent studies examining the secondary effects of famines, such as disease outbreaks and violent conflicts. There are no recent studies examining the human impacts of ultraviolet radiation. That would include an increased medical burden in skin cancer and other diseases. It would also include further loss of agriculture ecosystem services as the ultraviolet radiation harms plants and animals. At this time, we can only make educated guesses about what these impacts would be, informed in part by what research was published 30 years ago.

When analyzing the risk of nuclear winter, one question is of paramount importance: Would there be permanent harm to human civilization? Humanity could have a very bright future ahead; to dim that future is the worst thing nuclear winter could do. It is vastly worse than a few billion deaths from starvation. Not that a few billion deaths is trivial—obviously it isn’t—but it is tiny compared to the loss of future generations.

Carl Sagan was one of the first people to recognize this point in a commentary he wrote on nuclear winter for Foreign Affairs.⁷ Sagan believed nuclear winter could cause human extinction, in which case all members of future generations would be lost. He argued that this made nuclear winter vastly more important than the direct effects of nuclear war, which could, in his words, “kill ‘only’ hundreds of millions of people.”

Sagan was however, right that human extinction would cause permanent harm to human civilization. It is debatable whether nuclear winter could cause human extinction. Alan Robock, a leader of the recent nuclear winter research, believes it is unlikely. He writes: “Especially in Australia and New Zealand, humans would have a better chance to survive.”⁸ This is hardly a cheerful statement, and it leaves open the chance of human extinction. I think that’s the best way of looking at it. Given all the uncertainty and the limited available research, it is impossible to rule out the possibility of human extinction. I don’t have a good answer for how likely it is. But the possibility should not be dismissed.

Even if some humans survive, there could still be permanent harm to human civilization. Small patches of survivors would be extremely vulnerable to subsequent disasters. They also could not keep up the massively complex civilization we enjoy today. It would be a long and uncertain rebuilding process and survivors might never get civilization back to where it is now. More importantly, they might never get civilization to where we now stand poised to take it in the future. Our potentially bright future could be forever dimmed.⁹ Nuclear winter is a very large and serious risk. But that on its own doesn’t mean much—just another thing to worry about. What’s really important are the implications of nuclear winter for public policy and private action.

In some ways, nuclear winter doesn’t change nuclear weapons policy all that much. Everyone already knew that nuclear war would be highly catastrophic. Nuclear winter means that nuclear war is even more catastrophic, but that only reinforces policies that have long been in place, from deterrence to disarmament. Indeed, military officials have sometimes reacted to nuclear winter by saying that it just makes their nuclear deterrence policies that much more effective.¹⁰ Disarmament advocates similarly cite nuclear winter as justifying their policy goals. But the basic structure of the policy debates is unchanged.

In other ways, nuclear winter changes nuclear weapons policy quite dramatically. Because of nuclear winter, noncombatant states may be severely harmed by nuclear war. Nuclear winter gives every country great incentive to reduce tensions and de-escalate conflicts between nuclear weapon states. Thankfully, this point has not gone unnoticed at recent international conferences on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons, such as the December 2014 conference in Vienna, which I spoke at.¹¹These conferences are led by, and largely aimed at, non-nuclear weapon states.

Nuclear weapon states should also take notice. Indeed, the biggest policy implication of nuclear winter could be that it puts the interests of nuclear weapon states in greater alignment. Because of nuclear winter, a nuclear war between any two major nuclear weapon states could severely harm each of the other six. (There are nine total nuclear-armed states, and North Korea’s arsenal is too small to cause any significant nuclear winter.) This multiplies the risk of being harmed by nuclear weapons, while only marginally increasing the benefits of nuclear deterrence. By shifting the balance of harms vs. benefits, nuclear winter can promote nuclear disarmament.

Additional policy implications come from the risk of permanent harm to human civilization. If society takes this risk seriously, then it should go to great lengths to reduce the risk. It could stockpile food to avoid nuclear famine, or develop new agricultural paradigms that can function during nuclear winter.¹² It could abandon nuclear deterrence, or shift deterrence regimes to different mixes of weapons.¹³ And it could certainly ratchet up its efforts to improve relations between nuclear weapon states. These are things that we can do right now, even while we await more detailed research on nuclear winter risk.

Seth Baum is Executive Director of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (gcrinstitute.org), a nonprofit think tank that he co-founded in 2011. His research focuses on risk, ethics, and policy questions for major risks to human civilization including nuclear war, global warming, and emerging technologies. The aim of this research is to characterize the risks and develop practical, effective solutions for reducing them. Dr. Baum received a Ph.D. in geography from Pennsylvania State University with a dissertation on climate change policy. He then completed a post-doctoral fellowship with the Columbia University Center for Research on Environmental Decisions. Prior to that, he studied engineering, receiving an M.S. in electrical engineering from Northeastern University with a thesis on electromagnetic imaging simulations. He also writes a monthly column for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

His research has appeared in many journals including Ecological Economics, Science and Engineering Ethics, Science and Global Security, and Sustainability. He is currently co-editor of a special issue of the journal Futures titled “Confronting future catastrophic threats to humanity.” He is an active member of the Society for Risk Analysis and has spoken at venues including the United Nations, the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, and the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University.

Here is some news from recent research in neuroscience that, I think, is relevant for FAS’s mission to prevent global catastrophes. Psychologists Dacher Keltner of the University of California, Berkeley, and Jonathan Haidt of New York University, have argued that feelings of awe can motivate people to work cooperatively to improve the collective good.¹Awe can be induced through transcendent activities such as celebrations, dance, musical festivals, and religious gatherings. Prof. Keltner and Prof. Paul Piff of the University of California, Irvine, recently wrote in an opinion article for the New York Times that “awe might help shift our focus from our narrow self-interest to the interests of the group to which we belong.”² They report that a forthcoming peer reviewed article of theirs in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, “provides strong empirical evidence for this claim.”

Their research team did surveys and experiments to determine whether participants who said they experienced awe in their lives regularly would be more inclined to help others. For example, one study at UC, Berkeley, was conducted near a spectacular grove of beautiful, tall Tasmanian blue gum eucalyptus trees. The researchers had participants either look at the trees or stare at the wall of the nearby science building for one minute. Then, the researchers arranged for “a minor accident” to occur in which someone walking by would drop a handful of pens. “Participants who had spent the minute looking up at the tall trees—not long, but long enough, we found, to be filled with awe—picked up more pens to help the other person.”

Piff and Keltner conclude their opinion piece by surmising that society is awe-deprived because people “have become more individualistic, more self-focused, more materialistic and less connected to others.” My take away is that this observation has ramifications for whether people will band together to tackle the really tough problems confronting humanity including: countering and adapting to climate change, alleviating global poverty, and preventing the use of nuclear weapons. I find it interesting that Professors Piff and Keltner have mentioned shifting individuals’ interest to the group to which those people belong.

What about bringing together “in groups” with “out groups”? Can awe help or harm? Here’s where, I believe, the geopolitical and neuroscience news is mixed. First, let’s look at the bad news and then finish on a positive message of recent psychological research showing interventions that might alleviate the animosity between groups who are in conflict.

While awe can be inspiring, a negative connotation toward out groups is implicit in the phrase “shock and awe” in the context of massive demonstration of military force to try to influence the opponent to not resist the dominant group. Many readers will recall attempted use of this concept in the U.S.-led military campaign against Iraq in March and April 2003. U.S. and allied forces moved rapidly with a demonstration of impressive military might in order to demoralize Iraqi forces and thus result in a quick surrender. While Baghdad’s political power center crumbled quickly, many Iraqi troops dispersed and formed the nuclei of the insurgency that then opposed the occupation for many years to come.³ Thus, in effect, the frightening awe of the invasion induced numerous Iraqis to band together to resist U.S. forces rather than universally shower American troops with garlands.

Nuclear weapons are also meant to shock and awe an opponent. But the opponent does not have to be cowed into submission. To deter this coercive power, the leader of a nation under nuclear threat can either decide to acquire nuclear weapons or form an alliance with a friendly nation that already has these weapons. Other nations that do not feel directly threatened by another nation’s nuclear weapons can ignore these threats and tend to other priorities. This describes the world we live in today. Most of the world’s nations in Central Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia are in nuclear-weapon-free-zones and have opted out of nuclear confrontations. But in many countries in Europe, North America, East Asia, South Asia, and increasingly the Middle East, nuclear weapons have influenced decision makers to get their own weapons and increase reliance on them (for example, China, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia), acquire a latent capability to make these weapons (for example, Iran), or request and receive protection from nuclear-armed allies (for example, non-nuclear countries of NATO, Japan and South Korea).

Is this part of the world destined to always figuratively sit on a powder keg with a short fuse? Perhaps if people in these countries can close the empathy gap, they might reduce the risk of nuclear war and eventually find cooperative security measures that do not require nuclear weapons. Empathy is the ability to understand and share the feelings of others. Empathy is a natural human capacity especially when dealing with people who share many common bonds.

If we can truly understand someone we now perceive to be an enemy, would we be less likely to want to do harm to that person or other members of his or her group? Empathic understanding between groups is not a guarantee of conflict prevention, but it does appear to offer a promising method for conflict reduction. However, as psychological research has shown, failures of empathy often occur between groups that are socially or culturally different. People in one group can also feel pleasure in the suffering of those in the different group, especially if that other group is dominant. The German word schadenfreude captures this delight in others’ suffering. Competitive groups especially exhibit schadenfreude; for example, Boston Red Sox fans experience glee when the usually dominant New York Yankees lose to a weaker opponent.⁴

Are there interventions that can disrupt this negative behavior and feelings? Cognitive scientists Mina Cikara, Emile Bruneau and Rebecca Saxe point out that “historical asymmetries of status and power between groups” is a key variable.⁵ If the same intervention method such as asking participants to take the perspective of the other into account is used for both groups, different effects are observed. For example, the dominant group tends to respond most positively to perspective taking in which members of that group would listen attentively to the perspective or views of the other group. A positive response means that people’s attitude toward the other group becomes favorable. In contrast, the non-dominant group’s members often experience a deepening of negative attitudes toward the dominant group if they engage in perspective taking. Rather, members of the non-dominant group show a favorable change in attitude when they perform perspective giving toward the dominant group. Importantly, they have to know that members of the dominant group are being attentive and really listening to the non-dominant group’s perspective. In other words, the group with less or no political power needs to be heard for positive change to occur. While these results seem to be common sense, Bruneau and Saxe point out that almost always perspective taking is used in interventions intended to bring asymmetric groups together and often this conflict resolution method fails. Their research underscores the importance of perspective giving, especially for non-dominant groups.⁶

This research shows promising results that could have implications for bridging the divide between Americans and Iranians on the different views on nuclear power, for example, or the gap between Americans and Chinese on the implications of the U.S. pivot toward East Asia and the Chinese rise in economic, military, and political power. I conclude this president’s message with encouragement to cognitive scientists in the United States and other nations to apply these and other research techniques to the grand social challenges such as how to get people across the globe to work together to mitigate the effects of climate change and to achieve nuclear disarmament through cooperative security.

For decades, scientists have had reasonable freedom and control over their research and experiments and able to publish and share their work without much inconvenience. The freedom of creativity in the field of science is much like that of an artist – often fueled by an inspiration from other sources, a passion for a unique realm of art (in this case, science), and a natural curiosity. Within reasonable limits, artists and scientists had the world at their fingertips; as long as they weren’t causing a societal disruption or engaging in illegal activity, their work was unregulated and not subject to state interference. With the continued growth of scientific knowledge and technological development, awareness of the risks associated with the misuse of scientific knowledge and new technology has continued to increase significantly – especially in microbiological research.

Microbiological research threats emerged on the public radar when anthrax strains used in the 2001 mailings to several United States government officials and citizens were found to have originated from the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) in Fort Detrick, Maryland. While senior biodefense researcher Dr. Bruce Ivins was the primary suspect for the anthrax mailings (mainly due to his unauthorized decontamination of several areas of USAMRIID), his involvement is still unresolved today. Since then, scientists have been scrutinized for working on certain research topics and published research literature labeled as “sensitive.” Ron Fouchier, a scientist at Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, Netherlands, completed research and wrote a research paper in 2011 on laboratory-created strains of H5N1 avian influenza.During the course of his research he faced pressure from the Dutch government over the content of the paper that contained potentially dangerous information that might essentially teach someone how to create synthetic H5N1. In 2012 the U.S. magazine Science was to publish the paper until the U.S. government stepped in to block the paper from being published. Eventually Fouchier and the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), an advisory committee for the United States government, came to a compromise about the publication –it could only be published if sensitive information were removed from the article. After that decision came proposals to create a system only accessible to “responsible scientists” where the removed sensitive information could be viewed. But who is responsible for deciding which scientists are responsible? And what makes one scientist more responsible than another? Which qualities would one use to measure how reliable a scientist is: Credentials? Previous research? Educational background?  Possession of a criminal record? While it is an interesting point to consider, society can’t make these decisions based on arbitrary methods of identification. There is no way to know if the Harvard educated, award-winning, highly skilled professor with a spotless criminal and driving record is going to be more trustworthy than the man who hasn’t published any major papers, committed a misdemeanor in his freshman year of college, and has not yet been able to contribute anything to the scientific community. In a radio interview for Science Friday, Dr. D.A. Henderson, a distinguished scientist and epidemiologist at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center’s Center for Biosecurity, pondered what this would mean for the scientific community.Scientists might be turned down for grants or jobs arbitrarily, which would prove to be disruptive to the fundamental tenets of scientific inquiry as well as to the basic rights of those individuals who would not understand why they weren’t chosen for access to the exclusive system.

Upon realization of the possible dangers on publishing certain components of scientific research, the United States government assembled the NSABB, a panel of voting members with expertise in medicine, life sciences, national security, and other related fields. The NSABB previously assisted in addressing issues related to biosecurity and dual use research in 2004. Decisions made by the NSABB have no legal authority and their findings are strictly advisory. As the majority of scientific work in the United States is funded by a government entity, refusal to comply with NSABB’s advice could result in the reduction or loss of funding. An NSABB decision, while in the best interest of national security and the safety of our citizens, could have a chilling effect on research and advancement. Knowing that one’s research may be abridged to omit sensitive details, or blocked from publication, could discourage scientists from publishing – or even attempting – certain types of research. History has shown that general open access to scientific research publication contributes to many advancements and scientific breakthroughs. Science is a field in which breakthroughs are built upon past innovations and discoveries. Restricting the publication of research could negatively impact such scientific progress in the long run.

There is no question that sensitive scientific information needs to be watched closely, but there does not seem to be a plausible solution to the problem at this time. The new restrictions and regulations on scientific research are meant for national security, but at what point does national security encroach on the right of free speech? At what point do we allow national security concerns to impede the scientific process upon which so many societal advancements are based? This debate not only has technical implications, but is an ethical quandary as well.

As is the case with many ethical debates, there is no perfect solution. A sound strategy begins with the heavy involvement of the scientific community in the discussion; fortunately members of the community are engaging on this topic. A 2007 study analyzed literature centered around the ethics of biodefense and dual-use research of concern from the Medical Literature Analysis and Retrieval System (MEDLINE) database, which holds bibliographical information for academic science journals. Ten articles met their inclusion criteria, and the study concluded that self-regulation within the scientific community, international cooperation, and increased security were the top three suggestions for minimizing the risks presented by dual-use research. Conscientious self-regulation would allow scientists to oversee their own research and associated literature without concerns of compromising the quality of their publications. Additionally, international cooperation would unify a larger group of scientists who may possess similar concerns against the problem. Finally, better cooperation establishes stronger safety and security measures through focused peer review. Combined, these three measures can increase security and make the misuse of sensitive scientific information more difficult for people with access to it, and with increased safety education and clarity of dual use definitions, could further decrease the risks from misusing science.

Herfst, S., Schrauwen, E. J., Linster, M., Chutinimitkul, S., de Wit, E., Munster, V. J., & Fouchier, R. A. (2012). “Airborne transmission of influenza A/H5N1 virus between ferrets.” Science, 336(6088), 1534-1541.

Anand, N.S. (Producer). (2012, January 06). Debate persists over publishing bird flu studies [Audio podcast]. Retrieved from http://www.sciencefriday.com/segment/01/06/2012/debate-persists-over-publishing-bird-flu-studies.html

Dolgitser, M. (2007). “Minimization of the Risks Posed by Dual-Use Research: A Structured Literature Review.” Journal of the American Biological Safety Association, 12(3), 175. Retrieved from http://www.absa.org/abj/abj/071203dolgitser.pdf

Tosin Fadeyi is currently a graduate student at the University of Maryland University College, pursuing a Master of Science in Biotechnology and specializing in Biosecurity and Biodefense. She is a biosecurity intern at the Federation of American Scientists, overseeing the Virtual Biosecurity Center (VBC). She is also a peer review associate handling clinical trials and medical science journals for PLoS One, a peer-reviewed science publication.

Editor’s note: The following is a compilation of letters by Dr. William Higinbotham, a nuclear physicist who worked on the first nuclear bomb and served as the first chairman of FAS. His daughter, Julie Schletter, assembled these accounts of Higinbotham’s distinguished career.

Thank you for this opportunity to share with you my father’s firsthand accounts of the inception of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS).  After my father died in November 1994, I inherited a truly intimidating treasure of letters, correspondence and most importantly a nearly complete manuscript (mostly on floppy disks) of his unpublished memoirs.  Over the last couple of decades, I have read widely and deeply, collected resources, transcribed and sorted through this material and am planning to publish a personal history of Willy in the near future.

William Higinbotham

Having studied this man from a more distant perspective, I am sure about certain things.  Willy was at his heart an optimist, a democrat, a child of liberal New England Protestants during the Great Depression, and a man who didn’t mind doing a lot of behind the scenes dirty work to make things happen.  He did this with self-deprecating humor, confidence in the humanity of others, a terrific sense of play, music, camaraderie, and most importantly a deep respect for the opinions of everyone.  He was humble, incredibly brilliant and could recall details from meetings many years in the past as well as lyrics to jazz standards and sea chanties not sung in a while.

Dad was a terrific story teller. This is his version of how he came to Washington, DC to serve as the first chairman of FAS. These are mostly his words with some additional anecdotes from colleagues and friends who knew him well during the war years and after.

In a letter to his daughter Julie in April 1994, Willy began his account with his parents, a beloved Presbyterian minister and wife: 

“It is from them and their example that I have been inspired to do something for humanity.  In my case, the opportunity did not arise until I was 30 and the Second World War had started. As a graduate student at Cornell I was too poor to consider marriage and had no prospects for a reasonable job. As soon as Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany, I knew that the US should prepare to go to war with our European allies. However, the vast majority of US citizens and Congressmen believed that we should have nothing to do with any European conflicts. It was only with difficulty that President Roosevelt was able to provide some assistance to the UK by “Lend Lease.” I was delighted to be invited to go to MIT in Jan. 1941, as Hitler’s Luftwaffe was bombing London and other British cities.

The US finally initiated the draft in March or April and (my brother) Robert was one of the first to be called up. When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor that fall, we were in the war for good. (My brother) Freddy was the next to be drafted. By the summer of 1943 he was a navigator on a small C47 transport plane that dropped parachuters on Sicily, and then (my brother) Philip was drilling with the Army Engineers. I had strong reasons to develop technology that would speed defeat of Germany and Japan.

As you know, it was when I saw the first nuclear test on July 16, 1945, that I determined to do what I could to prevent a nuclear arms race.” 

Willy and his wife Julie

From his unpublished memoirs, Willy described the Trinity test:

“Until the last moment, it was not clear if the implosion design [which used plutonium] would actually work. Everyone was confident that the gun design [which used highly enriched uranium] would work, but Hanford was producing plutonium at a good rate while Oak Ridge was producing highly enriched uranium with great difficulty. Consequently, the Trinity test was planned for early in 1945.

Almost everyone in Los Alamos was involved in constructing the implosion weapon or in designing and installing measurement instruments for the test. Most of my group was involved in the latter. Sometimes I drove, with others, to the site to install and test various devices. Many of the instruments were to be turned on minutes or seconds before the bomb was to be triggered. Joe McKibben, of the Van de Graff group, designed the alarm-clock and relay system which was to send out signals for the last ten minutes. I designed the electronic circuit which was to send out the signals during the last second and then to send the signal to the tower. Some of my scientists and many of my technicians spent many days at the site. By test day, we had done all that was requested and I was prepared to await the results of the test, at Los Alamos.

At the last minute, I had a call from Oppie [Scientific Director J. Robert Oppenheimer], asking me to bring a radio to the test site for a number of special observers who were to be at 18 miles from the tower. We had an all-wave Halicrafters receiver which needed a storage battery for the filaments and a stack of big 45 volt B-batteries for the plates. We also had several cheap loud speakers. So, I grabbed several of the remaining technicians and had them check the equipment and pack it into a small truck. They drove the truck to the site. I went with some of the special guests by bus to Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, whence a military bus took us to the place reserved for us, near where the road to the test site leaves the main highway north of it.

We arrived there in the evening. As has been reported often, the weather clouded over and there was some rain. So we waited. The radio worked although the sound was rather weak. The Halicrafter had less than a watt of output and the speakers were not very efficient. Eventually, the countdown began. We were issued slabs of very dark glass, used by welders. I couldn’t see the headlights on the truck through it. I only remember one of the others who was in our select group, Edward Teller. As the countdown approached the last 10 seconds, he began to rub sun screen on his face, which rather shook me. I had been assured that the bomb, if it worked, would not ignite the atmosphere or the desert. At 18 miles it seemed incredible to me that we might get scorched.

At T = 0, we saw a brilliant white flash of light through our dark glass filters, and the hills around us were suddenly brightly lit. Immediately, the point of light expanded to a white sphere and then to a redder inverted bowl shaped object which began to be surrounded with eddies and then rose up into the air and climbed rapidly to the sky, where a clear space suddenly opened in the high thin cloud layer and finally ended as an ugly white cap. All up and down the smoky column there were bluish sparks due to the radioactivity and electric discharges. It must have been more than a minute before the shock wave came through the ground, followed shortly by the sharp air-wave blast, which rumbled off the hills for another minute or so. It was clear that the bomb worked as predicted. I had hoped that the physicists might have been wrong and for many reasons I figured that this test would not be successful. Now I had to face the existence of nuclear weapons. It was a paralyzing realization.

As I recall, no one said anything. My boys packed up the radio equipment and headed home. I got into a bus with about fifteen others and we started for Albuquerque. I had saved one of the bottles of scotch, which my MIT friends had given me in 1943, and had it with me, in case. I pulled it out, opened it, and passed it around. The others on the bus, scientists and military types, quietly sipped it and passed it along until it was empty. No one said anything.

Several hours later we arrived at Kirtland and those of us from Los Alamos transferred to another bus to return there. I was paralyzed. I went back to the Lab and doodled there until closing time. I had supper and went to my room. I didn’t sleep. All I could think of was that the Soviet Union would surely develop nuclear weapons and might blow us off the map. I knew about radar and anti-aircraft and that a bomb, such as the one I had seen, would wipe out any city. The best defense against bombers in Europe had been to shoot down ten percent of the attackers. Ninety percent would not save us.

After agonizing for a day or more, I finally began to think about why Stalin might attempt to destroy the US. It was quite possible that Soviet aircraft could cross the oceans and attack the US. However, it would do them no good to just destroy cities. They would have to occupy us to gain any advantage. The more I thought about this, the more I came to believe that attacking the US with nuclear weapons would not make sense even to an evil man like Stalin. What might make more sense would be to use nuclear weapons to attack our allies in Europe. By then it was clear that Stalin intended to continue to occupy Poland, Hungary and other previously free countries that surrounded the Soviet Union. (In my mind) at least the US did not seem to be threatened. There would be time to see if the Soviet Union was going to threaten the other nations beyond those it now controlled. (Eventually) I got some sleep and went back to work on the new jobs which faced the Lab.

I had no intention of taking a major role in this effort. As soon as Japan surrendered, many of the scientists at Los Alamos began to discuss this subject. When General Groves said that we could keep the secret for 15 years, and Congressmen told scientists to design a defense, we held a big meeting and started to draft a statement for the public.”

In a letter Dad wrote to his mother from Los Alamos:[ref]Jungk, Robert. Brighter Than a Thousand Suns.  New York:  Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1958  p 223.[/ref]

“I am not a bit proud of the job we have done . . . the only reason for doing it was to beat the rest of the world to a draw . . . perhaps this is so devastating that man will be forced to be peaceful. The alternative to peace is now unthinkable. But unfortunately there will always be some who don’t think. . . . I think I now know the meaning of “mixed emotions.” I am afraid that Gandhi is the only real disciple of Christ at present . . . anyway it is over for now and God give us strength in the future. Love, Will.”

From his memoirs, Willy described how he came to Washington, DC in the fall of 1945:

“Strangely, I don’t remember many discussions of the implications of nuclear weapons at Los Alamos before the end of the war. My friends and I had some scattered discussions about how Nazism had taken hold, and of what the world might face after Hitler was defeated. I was invited a few times to sit in Oppie’s living room as Niels Bohr discussed his thoughts about the future control of atomic energy. Bohr was almost impossible to understand because he had an accent and because he always spoke several decibels below the audible threshold. Much later I would understand how wise he was, but at the time the whole subject seemed confusing and not very important to me.

Then came Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the Japanese surrender. We had a big party the night the surrender was announced. I sat on the hood of a jeep, playing my accordion, as we paraded around town. Immediately after that, the discussions began in earnest. A number of them were held in my office in the Tech area in the evenings. The public response to the development of atomic weapons was discouraging. General Groves asserted that it would take the Soviets fifteen years to develop an atomic weapon. Congressmen began talking about defenses. Scientists at Oak Ridge and Chicago were organizing and we began to hear from them.

The first large meeting was attended by about sixty people on August 20^th. All agreed that we should form an organization and the question of whether it should consider scientists’ welfare as well as the social implications of nuclear energy, was discussed. A committee was appointed to make arrangements for a meeting for all of the scientists and engineers.

On August 23^rd, a nine member committee issued an invitation to attend a meeting for all scientists and engineers on August 30^th for the following purpose:

“Many people have expressed a desire to form an organization of progressive scientists which has as its primary object to see that the scientific and technological advancements for which they are responsible are used in the best interests of humanity.

Most scientists on this project feel strongly their responsibility for the proper use of scientific knowledge. At present, recommendations for the future of this project and of atomic power are being made. It would be the immediate purpose of this society to examine our own views on these questions and take suitable action. However, the future will hold more problems and scientists will feel the need of a more general organization to express their views.

Before the next meeting had been held it was clear to everyone that the international control of atomic energy was the vital issue and should be the only issue with which the organization was concerned.”

The meeting on August 30^th was attended by about five hundred individuals. They overwhelmingly approved the following motion by Joe Keller:

1. We hereby form an organization of scientists, called temporarily, the Association of Los Alamos Scientists (ALAS).
2. The object of this organization is to promote the attainment and use of scientific and technological advances in the best interests of humanity. We recognize that scientists, by virtue of their special knowledge, have, in certain spheres, special social responsibilities beyond their obligations as individual citizens. The organization aims to carry out these responsibilities by keeping its members informed and by providing a forum through which their views can be publicly and authoritatively expressed.

We discussed what our statement should say to the President and to the public. Except for Edward Teller, we all agreed that the message was that (1) there is no secret (scientists anywhere could figure out how to make atomic weapons now that we had demonstrated that they are possible). In addition, (2) there is no defense that can prevent great devastation by atomic weapons, and (3) we must have “world control.”  Edward Teller would not agree with the latter because that was a political and not a technical conclusion. Leo Szilard’s counter to this, we later heard, was that you don’t shout “fire” in a crowded theater without telling people where the exits are. Anyway, the three phrases became our policy.

To my great surprise, I was elected the first chairman of the Association of Los Alamos Scientists. Later, I went to Washington and offered to spend a year managing the scientists’ office. Then I was elected the first chairman of the Federation of American Scientists in January, 1946. I was surprised and hoped that I would not let people down. I think that I understand this. I do not have strong beliefs as did Leo Szilard and many others. I was not a Nobel laureate. I was a team worker. I sought to unite people on positions that they could agree to. People trusted me.

The first executive committee was composed of David Frisch, Joseph Keller, David Lipkin, John Manley, Victor Weisskopf, Robert Wilson, William Woodward, and myself (chairman).

From the beginning, we were aware that the scientific and military success of our work would bring both new dangers and new possibilities of human benefits to the world.

We posed and answered five questions:

1. What would the atomic bomb do in the event of another war?
2. Use of such bombs would quickly and thoroughly annihilate the important cities in all countries involved. We must expect that bombs will be developed which will be many times more effective and which will be available in large numbers.
3. What defense would be possible? One hundred percent interception should be considered impossible. Therefore, were there a possibility of attack we could not gamble on defenses alone and would have to make drastic changes such as abandoning cities and decentralizing communications.  How long would it take for any other country to produce as atomic bomb?  Within a few years.
4. What would be the effect of an atomic arms race on science and technology? Emphasis on the development of more weapons would interfere with developments for peaceful applications.
5. Assuming that international control of the bomb is agreed upon, is such control technically feasible? From a scientific point of view we assert that international control of the atomic bomb is feasible and that such control need not interfere with free and profitable peacetime research and development.

Like everyone else, I visited congressmen, talked to reporters, lectured to local organizations and answered phone calls. A large part of the public was interested in atomic energy. A number of the leaders of major national organizations visited us or asked us to meet with them.

When the Soviets fired their first nuclear test in 1949, the President and the Congress pushed for development of the H bomb, which stimulated the nuclear arms race. It was a sad story after that. Edward Teller was convinced that the Soviets would blow up the US if it ever had the opportunity to do so without suffering much retaliation. More rational people felt that the Soviets would have enough trouble keeping on top of their people and satellites, especially after Stalin died in 1970. I could go on. The US became paranoid about communists. Joseph McCarthy lied but many innocent people lost their jobs. Oppenheimer was publicly disgraced. The US continued to accelerate the nuclear arms race. By good luck, the US and USSR agreed to halt tests in the atmosphere in 1963 and the Cuban missile crisis did not lead to the Apocalypse, though that was close. I have spent a lot of my time and effort trying to influence US policy in this area. A lot of that was spent talking to the already converted. My friends and I have had some minor successes. But we never could convince our government that the nuclear arms race was unnecessary and that the Soviets would respond favorably if we were to suggest winding it down. It was the Soviet leaders, with Gorbachev, who realized that the arms race was a waste of effort and who were willing to take the risk of offering to reduce their deployed nuclear weapons and go further if the US agreed.

If we and others are to survive, we must understand the present situation and try to find new and better ways to deal with international problems. The development of nuclear weapons means that the traditional policies will probably fail. I have had a few opportunities to discuss this with some of the doubters. Most of the time, however, the people that I talked to were sympathetic to our attempts at developing a new approach.

So, the objective that I devoted so much time, effort, and thought to was finally attained by the Soviets. Most of the time I was discouraged but did not give up. A number of the scientists who were active at the start gave up. Some of the scientists that I have worked with thought that I was crazy — but they never took the trouble to find out what I knew about what was going on or what I was really doing. There were many distinguished scientists who thought as I did, and we encouraged each other. They have been a great help to me.”

These last few anecdotes come from the many letters that were sent to my father on the occasion of his 80^th birthday.  I believe they speak to the qualities that made Dad so incredibly successful at ALAS, FAS, and then on to Brookhaven National Laboratory where he worked on an astounding number of projects and committees, and where he established the Technical Support Organization Library.  During his tenure at BNL he attended some of the Pugwash meetings, SALT talks and traveled extensively all over the world to communicate honestly with scientists and policy makers regarding atomic energy and nuclear safeguards.

He also built the prototype for Pong in the mid-fifties as a demonstration exhibit for the public and guests at the summer open lab events. He was “discovered” by computer gamers all over the world by around 1972.  Dad was mortified by this! He thought anyone with a simple understanding of electronics could have invented that sort of game just as easily as he did!  He bemoaned the idea that he would be remembered not for his life’s work on nuclear non-proliferation, but on a silly computer game.  And (regrettably) he was right about that.

Willy on Long Island with his beloved accordion around 1951

Jim de Montmollin, colleague from the Manhattan Project:

“I think the most important thing to me is your sensitivity and selflessness. In an era when people seek to project an image of sophistication through a cynical and ‘me first’ attitude toward everything, I especially value knowing people like you. I think of myself also as a sort of pragmatic idealist, and I consider you to be the ultimate model. Far more than I, you have worked tirelessly toward unselfish objectives, always seeking practical and feasible steps toward getting there.

I also admire your tolerance. You don’t hesitate to call it like you see it, but neither are you ever hesitant to defend any cause or individual, however unpopular or unfashionable they may be. That is what has always made it such a pleasure to discuss anything with you:  it [is] rare to know people who think for themselves, who absorb new information and develop their thoughts from it, who are more than carriers of the conventional wisdom, and who are so well—informed on so many things as you. What I refer to as your tolerance is both an openness toward new facts and ideas and a lack of animosity toward those who differ in any way.

Your dedication and drive over at least the last 50 years toward objectives that are not self-seeking or necessarily fashionable is another aspect that makes you so outstanding to me. Long before I knew you, you did it at no small personal sacrifice. When you became too old to meet the bureaucratic rules for continued work, you have worked as hard as ever, taking advantage of the freedom to apply yourself wherever you could be the most effective. If you ever have any private doubts about what you may have sacrificed, let me assure you that I appreciate and admire you for it.

I remember you commenting on more than one occasion that you regarded George Weiss as a ‘real gentleman.’ I agree, but that also applies to you even more so. It is your sensitivity to others’ feelings, your tolerance of their shortcomings, and your efforts to point out their good qualities that mark you as a gentleman to me, in the finest sense of the word.”

From Freeman Dyson, English-born American theoretical physicist and mathematician:

“I am delighted to hear that the FAS headquarters building is to be named in your honor. In this way we shall celebrate the historic role that you played in the beginnings of FAS.  And we make sure that future generations did not forget who you were and what you did.

I remember vividly the day I joined FAS, soon after I arrived in the USA as a graduate student in 1947.  Gene Lochlin, who was a fellow student at Cornell, took me to an FAS meeting and I was immediately hooked.  One of the things that attracted me most strongly to FAS was the spontaneous and un-hierarchical way in which [it] should function. Coming fresh from England, I found it amazing that the leader of FAS was not Sir Somebody-Something, but this young fellow Willy Higinbotham who had grabbed the initiative in 1945 and organized the crucial dialogue between scientists and congressmen.

And [by] 1947 you were already a legendary figure, a symbol of the ordinary guy who changes history by doing the right thing at the right time.  To me you were also a symbol of the good side of America, the open society where everyone is free to make a contribution. You just happen to make one of the biggest contributions. I am proud now to join and honoring your achievement.”

The world has certainly changed since the atomic bomb first exploded over the white sands of New Mexico in July 1945, yet it is clear that in regard to nuclear non-proliferation and world peace we have a mighty long way to go.  William Higinbotham served as the first chairman of FAS in 1945; the mission and objectives were clear and imperative. The work he began now continues 70 years later.    On behalf of my father, thank you for your most noble efforts to make our world a safer and saner place for all of humanity.

Julie Schletter retired in 2013 after almost forty years working in education as a school counselor. Her recent project has been completing a book about her father, Accordion to Willy:  A Personal History of William Higinbotham the Man who Helped Build the Atom Bomb, Launched the Federation of American Scientists and Invented the First Video Game.