From its beginning, the Federation of American Scientists has been immersed in policies and issues regarding government secrecy and censorship. By the time World War II broke out, the fission process had been observed, followed by detection of the neutron, and recognition of induced uranium fission. In the early 1940s, some scientists in the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and Germany realized the potential for nuclear weapons.

The three atomic bombs detonated in the summer of 1945 were created and assembled at secret U.S. government sites by a mixed pedigree of scientists, engineers, and military officers. The decision to drop two of them on Japanese cities was determined by military and political events then occurring, particularly in the final year of World War II.

Our Soviet wartime ally, excluded from the American, British, and Canadian nuclear coalition, used its own espionage network to remain informed. Well-placed sympathizers and spies conveyed many essential details of nuclear-explosive development. Through this network, Stalin learned of the Manhattan Project and the Trinity test. As the German invaders began to retreat from Soviet borders, he established his own secret nuclear development project.

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Frequent contributor and longtime FAS member Dr. Alexander DeVolpi has just published a new book, Cold War Brinkmanship. Dr. DeVolpi’s firsthand account “chronicles the half-century nuclear crisis,” with several mentions of and citations to the work of FAS. It is available now in paperback on Amazon.

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“I was chairman of FAS from 1962-63. Fifty-year-old memories are hopelessly unreliable and historically worthless. Fortunately, my mother preserved the letters that I wrote to her describing events as they happened. The letters are reliable and give glimpses of history undistorted by hindsight. Instead of trying to recall fading memories, I decided to quote directly from the letters. Here are two extracts. The first describes an FAS Council meeting in 1961 before I became chairman. The second describes conversations in 1962 after I became chairman…”

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“I am sharing some memories of the period 1960-1970 when I served as FAS General Counsel. I start by echoing Freeman Dyson’s caution that 50-year old memories are unreliable. I first learned about FAS in late 1958 when my wife, Dr. Maxine Singer, a molecular biologist employed by NIH, shared with colleagues her concerns about a range of science-related public issues. I was then a young lawyer in the small DC office of a larger NY-based general practice firm; the DC office had substantial experience representing, among many other clients, American Indian tribes in matters before Federal agencies and on Capitol Hill. At that time, FAS volunteers published a newsletter 8-10 times a year to keep its members (approximately 2000) informed about matters of concern to scientists – e.g., radiation hazards, nuclear weapons, passport denials, government secrecy, loyalty oaths, and civil liberties for scientists – in anticipation that scientists would take direct policy to influence governmental action. For several years, the FAS Newsletter was assembled on our dining room table and, willy-nilly, I became part of the process…”

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FAS Staff Photo, April 1987.

“When, in 1970, I descended from the FAS Executive Committee to become the chief executive officer, FAS had 1,000 members and an annual budget of $7,000 per year. The organization was very near death. During my 30 year tenure, FAS became a famous, creative, and productive organization….”

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by Frank von Hippel

“When, at Jeremy Stone’s instigation, I was elected chair of the Federation of American Scientists in 1979, I had no idea what an adventure that I was about to embark upon. This adventure was triggered by President Reagan taking office in 1981 and resulted in FAS making significant contributions to ending the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race and the Cold War. This was not the President Reagan we remember now as the partner of Mikhail Gorbachev in ending the Cold War. This was a president who had been convinced by the Committee on the Present Danger that the United States was falling behind in the nuclear arms race and was in mortal danger of a Soviet first nuclear strike…”

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“Supporting and expanding on Frank von Hippel’s cogent and exciting narrative of some of the great accomplishments of the Federation of American Scientists, I detail below two endeavors, at least one of which may have had far-reaching impact. The first was the initiative of FAS Director (and later President) Jeremy J. Stone who, in 1971, wrote the president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences to introduce FAS and to begin some kind of dialogue…”

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“In late 1945, a group of scientists who had been involved with the Manhattan Project felt it was their civic duty to help inform the public and political leaders of both the potential benefits and dangers of nuclear energy. To facilitate this important work, they established the Federation of Atomic Scientists, which soon became the Federation of American Scientists. Over the years, FAS has evolved into a model non-governmental organization that plays a leading role in providing scientifically-sound, non-partisan analyses of nuclear and broader security issues. I have long admired FAS and was therefore deeply honored when President Charles D. Ferguson asked if I would be interested in preparing a brief essay for a special edition of the PIR that would commemorate the organization’s 70th anniversary. A period of mild apprehension then followed: What could I say on the relationship between science and society that had not been said a thousand times before?”

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President’s Message: Reinvention and Renewal

by Charles D. Ferguson

From its inception 70 years ago, the founders and members of the Federation of American Scientists were reinventing themselves.

The Legacy of the Federation of American Scientists

by Megan Sethi

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) formed after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, precisely because many scientists were genuinely concerned for the fate of the world now that nuclear weapons were a concrete reality.

Scientists and Nuclear Weapons, 1945-2015

by Robert S. Norris

Soon after the end of World War II, scientists mobilized themselves to address the pressing issues of how to deal with the many consequences of atomic energy.

Government Secrecy and Censorship

by Alexander DeVolpi

Our Soviet wartime ally, excluded from the American, British, and Canadian nuclear coalition, used its own espionage network to remain informed. Well-placed sympathizers and spies conveyed many essential details of nuclear-explosive development.

FAS History, 1961-1963

by Freeman Dyson

The meeting started predictably with a discussion of the Test Ban. Many of them spoke suggesting ways and means of getting the public more enthusiastic about the Test Ban.

FAS in the 1960s: Formative Years

by Daniel Singer

By 1960, the test ban treaty and creation of an Arms Control and Disarmament Agency had been added to the FAS agenda and the Kennedy-Nixon presidential campaign was underway.

Revitalizing and Leading FAS: 1970-2000

by Jeremy J. Stone

At the beginning, critics whispered that FAS was just “Jeremy and a telephone” because I operated out of a one-room office and made a business of rounding up famous FAS sponsors and/or the FAS executive committee to sign off on my petitions and testimony. In fact, this was my modus operandi throughout the next 30 years.

FAS’s Contribution to Ending the Cold War Nuclear Arms Race

by Frank von Hippel

FAS, in partnership with Velikhov’s Committee of Soviet Scientists, made vital contributions to ending the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race and the Cold War.

FAS Engagement With China

by Richard L. Garwin

We soon learned of the world travels of a delegation of Chinese scientists who were investigating environmental affairs and
remediation in other countries, and both NAS and FAS worked vigorously and enthusiastically to bring the delegation to the United States.

Nuclear Legacies: Public Understanding and FAS

by B. Cameron Reed

In late 1945, a group of scientists who had been involved with the Manhattan Project felt it was their civic duty to help inform the public and political leaders of both the potential benefits and dangers of nuclear energy.

More From FAS: Highlights and Achievements Throughout Recent Months

In this report, Christoper Bidwell, JD and Randall Murch, PhD, explore the use of microbial forensics as a tool for creating a common base line for understanding biologically-triggered phenomena, as well as one that can promote mutual cooperation in addressing these phenomena. A particular focus is given to the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region, as it has been forced to deal with multiple instances of both naturally-occurring and man-made biological threats over the last 10 years. Although the institution of a microbial forensics capability in the MENA region (however robust) is still several years away, establishing credibility of the results offered by microbial forensic analysis performed by western states and/or made today in workshops and training have the ability to prepare the policy landscape for the day in which the source of a bio attack, either man-made or from nature, needs to be accurately attributed.

A full PDF version of the report can be found here.

The threat from the manufacture, proliferation, and use of biological weapons (BW) is a high priority concern for the U.S. Government. As reflected in U.S. Government policy statements and budget allocations, deterrence through attribution (“determining who is responsible and culpable”) is the primary policy tool for dealing with these threats. According to those policy statements, one of the foundational elements of an attribution determination is the use of forensic science techniques, namely microbial forensics. In this report, Christopher Bidwell, FAS Senior Fellow for Nonproliferation Law and Policy, and Kishan Bhatt, an FAS summer research intern and undergraduate student studying public policy and global health at Princeton University, look beyond the science aspect of forensics and examine how the legal, policy, law enforcement, medical response, business, and media communities interact in a bioweapon’s attribution environment. The report further examines how scientifically based conclusions require credibility in these communities in order to have relevance in the decision making process about how to handle threats.

A full PDF version of the report can be found here.

Imagine thousands and potentially millions of scientists committed to making the world safer and more secure. This was the vision of the dedicated group of “atomic scientists” who founded the Federation of Atomic Scientists (the original FAS) in November 1945. As we will soon reach the 70th anniversary, let’s reflect on the meaning of FAS and most especially look forward to the next 70 years. While the next issue of the Public Interest Report will feature many articles that assess the accomplishments of the organization and its affiliated scientists and policy experts during the past 70 years, this PIR issue features many outstanding experts who care deeply about global security.

Before discussing the content of this PIR, I am pleased to introduce to our readers the new Managing Editor: Allison Feldman. Allison started working at FAS in early August as the Communications and Community Outreach Officer. With an undergraduate degree in environmental science and biology from Binghamton University, Allison has a passion for science, and she also brings to FAS her experience in previous jobs in which she has worked with the scientific community and educated the public about science. I am happy to have her working at FAS because she will help FAS continue to revitalize itself as an organization dedicated to involving scientists, engineers, and other technically trained people in advising policymakers and informing the public about practical ways to make the world more secure against dangers such as use of nuclear weapons and outbreaks of pandemics. For example, Allison has recently begun the Scientist Spotlight series that features a prominent FAS-affiliated scientist or engineer on FAS.org each month.

Due to the transition time to have Allison start in this position, she and I decided to make this PIR a larger issue with about twice the number of articles typically found in the PIR. So, this combined summer-fall issue showcases several articles by seasoned practitioners in the fields of science, policy, and arms control, as well as younger engineers who are seeking to apply their technical training to stopping the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

This PIR has thought-provoking pieces on nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear winter, preventing nuclear terrorism, the vital importance of intercultural understanding, and several other critical issues. Notably, Steven Starr, Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri Hospital and Clinics, writes on a core mission issue for FAS: the survival of humanity in the event of a nuclear war that could trigger a massive cooling of the earth. Also addressing a dreaded event that is preventable, Edward Friedman, Emeritus Professor at the Stevens Institute of Technology, and longtime FAS member for more than 50 years, has contributed an in-depth review article about the threat of nuclear terrorism and efforts that can reduce this risk.

FAS has an eminent reputation of featuring the work of prominent “hybrid” scientists: those who have distinguished careers in scientific research while also devoting a significant portion of their professional efforts toward societal issues. In this PIR, we show two of these so-called “hybrid” scientists: Professor Rob Goldston and Professor Frank Settle. Dr. Goldston has done path-breaking research for more than 30 years on nuclear fusion and, more recently, has helped develop innovative methods to confirm that nuclear warheads slated for dismantlement are genuine warheads without revealing classified military information. The Q&A with him explores both of these issues as well as his other interests in science and society. Dr. Settle has straddled the worlds of chemistry, teaching, and nuclear policy issues for decades. He has received international recognition for his excellent work in analytical chemistry and in creating an online annotated database for nuclear issues called ALSOS. In his article, he delves into the history of the nuclear age by examining the many leadership roles of General George Marshall in the development of the first atomic bombs and the first initiatives in arms control.

We are also pleased to present the work of early to mid-career engineers and scientists. In this issue, mid-career stars Markus Schiller and James Kim, who have done excellent technical and policy work in Germany, South Korea, and the United States, reveal that the allegedly North Korean missile-launching submarine appears to be “an emperor with no clothes.” They employ their skills in photographic analysis, missile technology, and political assessment to blow the cover on North Korea’s latest purported “super” weapon. This is not to suggest that North Korea is not an international security threat. However, we would be remiss not to provide a possible pathway for resolving this threat. To do that, Texas A&M University graduate students Manit Shah and José Trevino propose adapting the model of the agreement with Iran to limit its nuclear program to the problem of curtailing North Korea’s nuclear program. Of course, North Korea is a greater challenge than Iran, given the fact that North Korea has developed and tested nuclear weapons and Iran has not. But this underscores the need for creative thinking to prevent the further buildup of nuclear weapons by North Korea.

As an organization that supports having all scientific disciplines contribute to improving global security, we are excited to feature an insightful article by Nasser bin Nasser, the head of the Middle East Scientific Institute for Security (MESIS), headquartered in Amman, Jordan. Nasser discusses the urgent need to understand the role of social science and cultural studies in effectively addressing international security. Among several issues, he highlights the misunderstandings that arose during the inspections in Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War. Unfortunately, cultural miss-readings exacerbated an already tense situation between the Iraqis and the inspectors looking for weapons of mass destructions or the programs to make such weapons.

In other news from FAS headquarters, we are happy to welcome Dr. David Hafemeister, an emeritus professor from California Polytechnic State University (Cal Poly), who will work as a visiting scientist at FAS for the next year. An FAS member since the mid-1960s, Dave has led a distinguished career during which he has served as a scientist in the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government and has been an award-winning educator. During his visiting fellowship at FAS, he will be studying the science policy advisory process and will be seeking opportunities to educate policymakers.

To further our outreach, in June this year, FAS organized a salon dinner in Berkeley. The participants were prominent scientists, engineers, and community leaders in energy, air pollution, climate change, and national security. The two thematic questions the assembled considered were: (1) If you had only three minutes with the president of the United States, what one important issue should he or she know about and act on? And (2) who at the dinner (you had not met before) would you want to collaborate with in your work? In this not for attribution event, we had a very lively discussion with many providing practical advice on how FAS could serve in advancing energy security. Also, we believe that FAS has helped play a convening role in bringing together a diverse group of experts and in fostering interdisciplinary collaboration. We will be seeking to continue these conversations across the United States in the coming years.

We are thankful for the generous financial support from donors like you for FAS to perform these outreach programs and to sustain FAS’s core projects in nuclear security and government secrecy. We are also very appreciative of the advice from several FAS-affiliated scientists about energy and security policy and how FAS can play an effective role in this complex set of issues. Moreover, we welcome and encourage you to send us your ideas about how to get scientists and engineers more involved in societal issues.

The majority of all nuclear experts and diplomats, as well as aspiring nuclear and policy students, must have their eyes set on North Korea’s slowly but steadily expanding nuclear weapons program, as well as the recent updates on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran. North Korea has disregarded all issued warnings to carry out nuclear tests and claims to have nuclear weapons capable of striking the United States. Other nations have considered North Korea’s actions as signs of hostility but still have shown willingness to restart nuclear talks. Iran under President Hassan Rouhani was able to come to terms with the P5+1 group that includes six world powers, namely, the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, France, and Germany. They successfully negotiated the JCPOA after almost a decade of conciliation efforts to limit Iran’s nuclear program to one with only peaceful purposes. The JCPOA is also significant because of the effect the deal will have on the Iranian economy; following its implementation, billions of dollars will be unfrozen. The deal promotes objectives central to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as well as promises to stimulate democracy, potentially bringing stability to the region. The deal with Iran and the companion JCPOA could open up opportunities for nations (like North Korea) to stabilize their regions in exchange for assistance in growing a peaceful nuclear program. In this article, key elements of the JCPOA are addressed, along with issues that demand attention for a deal with North Korea. Our hope is that the information provided will serve as a reference and stepping stone for the international nuclear community to resume discussions with North Korea.

The JCPOA

The so-called “Iran Deal,” an international agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, was signed in Vienna on July 14, 2015 between Iran, the P5+1 group of nations, and the European Union. The deal helps to promote the three objectives of the NPT, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament. Groundwork for the agreement was founded in the Joint Plan of Action – a temporary agreement between Iran and the P5+1 group that was signed in late 2013. The nuclear talks became most meaningful when Hassan Rouhani came to power in 2013 as President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It took almost twenty months for the negotiation parties to come to a final “Framework Agreement” in April 2015.

Iran was ensnared in a heavy load of sanctions beginning in 2006 that subsequently contributed to sinking its economy over the last decade. Yet by 2013, Iran had about 20,000 centrifuges that could be used to enrich uranium, an increase from a mere few hundred in 2002. (A uranium enrichment facility can either be used to make low-enriched uranium, typically 3 to 5 percent in the fissile isotope uranium-235, or highly-enriched uranium, greater than 20 percent U-235 and that could be useful for nuclear weapons.) Furthermore, Iran had developed a heavy water reactor in Arak that (once operational) could produce plutonium, a uranium conversion plant in Isfahan, a uranium enrichment plant in Natanz, a military site in Parchin, and an underground enrichment plant in Fordow. As Iran has latent capability to pursue either the uranium enrichment or plutonium (the most sought after nuclear material through which it is realistic to fabricate a nuclear weapon) routes to build a nuclear weapon, the agreement, which addresses both routes, has major significance in the global community that seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Under the agreement, Iran has agreed to curtail its nuclear program in exchange for lifting imposed sanctions, which would help to revive its economy. These restrictions demand verification by which Iran would have to cooperate with inquiries and monitoring requirements. In addition, Iran’s past nuclear activities would be investigated (various sites could be inspected and environmental samples could be taken). Following these assessments, continuous monitoring would be required to maintain established knowledge that no clandestine activities are taking place. This will leverage the assistance of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to keep a lookout for any import or export of dual-use technology. In particular, the agreement calls for a so-called “white” procurement channel to be created to monitor Iran’s acquisition of technologies for its nuclear program.

Key elements of the Iran deal are: a. Reduction of centrifuges to only 6104 – while only 5060 are allowed to enrich uranium over the next 10 years; b. Centrifuges will only enrich uranium to 3.67 percent (useful for fueling the commercial nuclear power plant at Bushehr) for 15 years; c. No new uranium enrichment facilities will be built; d. Stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium will be either blended down or sold; e. Only 300 kg of low-enriched uranium will be stockpiled for 15 years; f. Extension of the breakout time to about a year from the current status of two to three months for 10 years; g. The Fordow facility, located about 200 feet underground, would stop enriching uranium for at least 15 years; h. Current facilities will be maintained but modified to ensure the breakout time of about one year (such as the heavy water reactor in Arak); i. the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the nuclear “watch-dog” for the United Nations, will gain access to all of Iran’s facilities, including the military site in Parchin, to conclude an absence of weapons related activities; and j. The sanctions will be lifted in phases as the listed requirements are met. However, if Iran is found violating any obligations, the sanctions will be reinstated immediately.

The requirements in the Iran deal have been placed to lessen its nuclear program to a peaceful one and to increase the breakout time to about one year for the next 10 years. This would not only help other nations (as the deal will keep Iran from producing a nuclear weapon and bring stability and security to the region) but also Iran, who seeks to revive its economy and continue its peaceful nuclear program while maintaining sovereignty of their nation.

North Korea

On the other hand, North Korea’s nuclear ambitions started early in the 1950s, soon after the bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. North Korea’s close rapport with the Soviet Union led to a nuclear cooperation agreement, signed in 1959. Under this agreement, the Soviet Union supplied the first research reactor, the IRT-2000. This became the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, North Korea’s major nuclear site, which has several facilities to support the North Korean nuclear program. In 1974, the IRT-2000 reactor was upgraded to a power level of 8 MW_th (megawatt-thermal).^{1 2} A year later in 1975, North Korea installed the Isotope Production Laboratory (“Radiochemistry Laboratory”) to carry out small-scale reprocessing operations. Moreover, North Korea in the 1970s performed various activities such as: the indigenous construction of Yongbyon’s second research reactor, uranium mining operations at various locations near Sunchon and Pyongsan, and installation of ore-processing and fuel rod-fabrication plants in Yongbyon. They also began construction on their first electricity-producing reactor in 1985, which was based on the United Kingdom’s declassified information regarding the Calder Hall 50 MWe (megawatt-electric) reactor design.

North Korea was a part of the NPT for about two decades, from its ratification by the government in 1985 until its withdrawal in 2003. [North Korea had first begun to withdraw in 1993, but when the dialogue commenced directly with the United States, they later suspended this action (with only one day left on the intent to withdraw).] Due in part to diplomacy between former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and North Korean leader Kim Il-sung, North Korea signed the Agreed Framework with the United States in 1994. However, the Agreed Framework dissolved in 2002 after President George W. Bush named the country as part of the “axis of evil.” Following its withdrawal, North Korea still showed readiness in freezing its nuclear program in exchange for various concessions. The nuclear talks between North Korea and world powers were recurring, as they never found a common ground, including the Six-Party talks in which South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, the United States, and North Korea were involved. In fact, the last time Six-Party talks were held was six years ago in 2009, despite numerous efforts to resume them.

“On October 9, 2006, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test, despite warnings by the country’s principal economic benefactors, China and South Korea, not to proceed,” states Marcus Nolan, an economist at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. ³ According to Nolan, “the pre-test conventional wisdom was that a North Korean nuclear test would result in sanctions with dramatic economic consequences.” Five days later, the UN imposed economic sanctions on North Korea, with the passing of Resolution 1718. What is compelling to note, according to Nolan, is that “there is no statistical evidence that the nuclear test and subsequent sanctions had any impact on North Korean trade.” Nolan’s analysis of the trade data suggests that “for better or worse, North Korea correctly calculated that the penalties for nuclear action, at least in this primary sphere, would be trivial to the point of being undetectable – potentially establishing a very unwelcome precedent with respect both to the country’s future behavior and to the behavior of potential emulators.” Following the very first nuclear test in 2006, North Korea carried out two more tests in 2009 and 2013. “Sanctions won’t bring North Korea to its knees,” said Kim Keun-sik, a specialist on North Korea at Kyungnam University in Seoul. “The North knows this very well, from having lived with economic sanctions of one sort or another for the past 60 years.” ⁴ Does this mean the sanctions are not firm? The answer may be debatable, but the nuclear tests do demonstrate their failure. According to recent reports, activities at the Yongbyon reactor and Radiochemistry Laboratory are proceeding swiftly and it is assumed that the country is gearing up for a fourth nuclear test. This suggests that either sanctions needs to be more robust, which paves a pathway for serious nuclear talks, or North Korea is simply not interested in nuclear talks.

The Across-the-Board Treaty

The Iran Deal has been the hot topic in nonproliferation for various and obvious reasons, but two key questions remain: 1.) Is the deal apt to restrain Iran from advancing further in its nuclear weapons technology? 2.) And would the world see the deal through to successful implementation? The easy answer is that the world powers will know almost immediately whether restraints will take effect because of important milestones within the next six months, but the long-term implementation is more complicated. However, according to various experts, the JCPOA is the best that world powers can achieve given the competing interests among the negotiating parties. Moreover, we argue that this deal can act as a benchmark for many other countries like India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan that seek to expand or preserve their nuclear weapons capabilities. The challenge is how to craft deals with these other nuclear-armed states that will not lead to further proliferation or buildup of their nuclear arsenals.

One of the main reasons why North Korea has been able to operate in such a hostile manner in the past is the failure of sanctions. As part of the 1718 resolution of the UN Security Council, an embargo was imposed on exports of heavy weapons, dual-use items, and luxury goods to North Korea, as well as on the exportation of heavy weapons systems from North Korea, though the administration of the sanctions was left to each individual-sanctioning countries. “Russia, for example, defined luxury goods so narrowly (e.g., fur coats costing more than $9,637 and watches costing nearly $2,000) that the effect of the sanctions was questionable,” says Nolan. It is the sanctions themselves that can be the first step in bringing a country to the bargaining table; then, offering some concessions can lead to the meaningful and significant decisions. In this case, it appears North Korea was never cornered-off in yielding them. Most analysts, including Kim Keun-sik, suggest that the most effective measures are “those that target the lifestyle of North Korean leaders: financial sanctions aimed at ending all banking transactions related to North Korea’s weapons trade, and halting most grants and loans. This would effectively freeze many of the North’s overseas bank accounts, cutting off the funds that the North Korean leader has used to secure the cognac, Swiss watches, and other luxury items needed to buy the loyalty of his country’s elite.”

Another dimension to the issue of imposed sanctions is the support North Korea has received from China, who has been their primary trading partner and has provided them with food and energy. In fact, China supported the 1718 resolution only when the sanctions were reduced – less than severe, as they fear the regime collapse and subsequent, refugee invasion across their border. This is the key reason why China has played an important role in the Six-Party talks. However, following the third nuclear test in 2013, China’s patience with North Korea appeared to run out, as they imposed new sanctions and called for nuclear talks. In fact, a forum is planning to be held by a think-tank, the China Institute of International Studies, and backed by the Chinese government. ⁵ Academics and experts from the United States, Russia, China, South Korea, Japan, and North Korea (Six-Party) will be attending with the intent to restart the nuclear talks on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. According to a recent report, the United States and China have also discussed ways to boost the sanctions.

A deal with North Korea could potentially be realized once the sanctions are applied in an effective manner, such that loopholes that have previously allowed shortcutting of sanctions are henceforth closed off. Specifically, sanctions will only be effective if China is on board with the other major powers. China has been lenient in the past while dealing with North Korea, as they fear the ripple effects that could be triggered by the sanctions. China can be a part of the enforcement, provided additional world powers offers their support in terms of finance and manpower to maintain the law and order in China’s territory by the border, as they fear the refugee invasion. Furthermore, China has personal interest to reform North Korea. Thus, an assertion from other world powers that they will help to reestablish government in North Korea could strongly sway China.

Once these firm sanctions are enforced, the prime factors, which will be of utmost importance to address during the deal, are hereby listed for diplomats and nuclear experts for their perusal: a. The IRT-2000 reactor was upgraded to use a weapons-usable, highly-enriched uranium fuel containing 80% U-235 by weight (from the original that used only low-enriched uranium fuel, 10% U-235 by weight); b. The reactor modeled after the UK’s Calder Hall was a gas-graphite design that is of concern for proliferation – it uses natural uranium fuel, making it self-reliant on North Korea’s indigenous uranium and able to allow for production of weapons-grade plutonium; c. In the 1970s, the Radiochemistry Laboratory was used to separate 300-mg of plutonium from the irradiated IRT-2000 fuel. This information was not revealed until 1992 to the IAEA and requires significant attention; d. North Korea had initiated the construction of a second 50 MWe reactor, but the specific details were unclear as to its origin and therefore need to be examined; e. According to the IAEA, the activities at the Yongbyon site suggest that the country houses uranium enrichment centrifuges that could help create a uranium-based bomb; f. North Korea was constructing another light-water reactor in the vicinity of Yongbyon that may have become operational; and g. Recent reports indicate a large amount of activity being carried out at the Yongbyon and Pyongsan sites, possibly meaning they are preparing for another nuclear detonation test. ^{6 7}

Presently, the Iran deal has been finalized and the hard task of implementation is underway; yet the activities carried out by North Korea demand valuable attention as well. The aforementioned issues will be vital points of discussion between the world powers during their negotiations with North Korea to curtail their nuclear activities. However, the sanctions need to be effective a priori in order for North Korea to be genuine during the bargaining process. Here, China plays an important role in the implementation of sanctions, as they have been so far submissive due to fear of potential hullabaloo effects. An assertion (moreover, an undertaking) from other world powers that their manpower and funds are accessible for mitigating any ripple effects of harsh sanctions will ensure China’s full backing to boost the efforts against North Korea.

Summary

In this article, Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear programs have been outlined, as well as the central factors of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Further, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and a summary of obstacles that will need to be overcome are detailed – a possible pathway to negotiate with North Korea has been presented with the caveat that it will be extremely challenging to implement effective controls on the North Korean nuclear program (given the hermetic and hostile behaviors of the North Korean government). In the near future, one can anticipate the implementation of the Iran deal, which will have a great impact in the global community and especially the greater Middle Eastern region. In return, the Iranian economy will have tens of billions of dollars unfrozen and ready to be spent, while promoting NPT objectives, as well as bringing stability to the region. In many ways, the Iran deal could act as a stepping stone in establishing a similar relationship with countries such as India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan, but given that these nations are already nuclear-armed, the challenges to creating agreements for them are much tougher than for Iran. Such agreements have the potential to further bolster the pillars of the NPT regime: safeguards and verification, safety and security, and science and technology.

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Manit Shah is a Ph. D. Candidate in the Department of Nuclear Engineering at Texas A&M University and is a part of the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI). His fields of interest are Nuclear Safeguards and Security, and Radiation Detectors. He plans to graduate by May 2016 and is on a job hunt.

Jose Trevino is a Ph. D. Student in the Department of Nuclear Engineering at Texas A&M University and is also a part of the NSSPI. He has interests in Health Physics and Emergency Response. He plans to graduate by May 2016 and hoping to join Nuclear Regulatory Commission.