Researchers from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) asked two physicists who are experts in missile defense issues, Dr. Yousaf Butt and Dr. George Lewis, to weigh in on the announcement on March 15, 2013 regarding missile defense by the Obama administration.

Before exploring their reactions and insights, it is useful to identify salient elements of U.S. missile defense and place the issue in context. There are two main strategic missile defense systems fielded by the United States: one is based on large high-speed interceptors called Ground-Based Interceptors or “GBI’s” located in Alaska and California and the other is the mostly ship-based NATO/European system. The latter, European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense is designed to deal with the threat posed by possible future Iranian intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles to U.S. assets, personnel, and allies in Europe – and eventually attempt to protect the U.S. homeland.

The EPAA uses ground-based and mobile ship-borne radars; the interceptors themselves are mounted on Ticonderoga class cruisers and Arleigh Burke class destroyers. Two land-based interceptor sites in Poland and Romania are also envisioned – the so-called “Aegis-ashore” sites. The United States and NATO have stated that the EPAA is not directed at Russia and poses no threat to its nuclear deterrent forces, but as outlined in a 2011 study by Dr. Theodore Postol and Dr. Yousaf Butt, this is not completely accurate because the system is ship-based, and thus mobile it could be reconfigured to have a theoretical capability to engage Russian warheads.

Indeed, General James Cartwright has explicitly mentioned this possible reconfiguration – or global surge capability – as an attribute of the planned system: “Part of what’s in the budget is to get us a sufficient number of ships to allow us to have a global deployment of this capability on a constant basis, with a surge capacity to any one theater at a time.”

In the 2011 study, the authors focused on what would be the main concern of cautious Russian military planners —the capability of the missile defense interceptors to simply reach, or “engage,” Russian strategic warheads—rather than whether any particular engagement results in an actual interception, or “kill.” Interceptors with a kinematic capability to simply reach Russian ICBM warheads would be sufficient to raise concerns in Russian national security circles – regardless of the possibility that Russian decoys and other countermeasures might defeat the system in actual engagements. In short, even a missile defense system that could be rendered ineffective could still elicit serious concern from cautious Russian planners. The last two phases of the EPAA – when the higher burnout velocity “Block II” SM-3 interceptors come on-line in 2018 – could raise legitimate concerns for Russian military analysts.

A Russian news report sums up the Russian concerns: “[Russian foreign minister] Lavrov said Russia’s agreement to discuss cooperation on missile defense in the NATO Russia Council does not mean that Moscow agrees to the NATO projects which are being developed without Russia’s participation. The minister said the fulfillment of the third and fourth phases of the U.S. ‘adaptive approach’ will enter a strategic level threatening the efficiency of Russia’s nuclear containment forces.” [emphasis added]

With this background in mind, FAS’ Senior Fellow on State and Non-State Threat, Charles P. Blair (CB), asked Dr. Yousaf Butt (YB) and Dr. George Lewis (GL) for their input on recent developments on missile defense with eight questions.

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Q: (CB)On March 15, Secretary of Defense Hagel announced that the U.S. will cancel the last Phase – Phase 4 – of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense which was to happen around 2021. This was the phase with the faster SM-3 “Block IIB” interceptors. Will this cancellation hurt the United State’s ability to protect itself and Europe?

A: (YB) No, because the “ability” you mention was always hypothetical. The Achilles’ Heel of all versions of the SM-3 (Block I A/B and Block II A/B) interceptors — indeed of “midcourse” missile defense, in general, is that it is straightforward to defeat the system using cheap decoy warheads. The system simply does not have a robust ability to discriminate a genuine warhead from decoys and other countermeasures. Because the intercepts take place in the vacuum of space, the heavy warhead and light decoys travel together, confusing the system’s sensors. The Pentagon’s own scientists at the Defense Science Board said as much in 2011, as did the National Academy of Sciences earlier this year.

Additionally, the system has never been successfully tested in realistic conditions stressed by the presence of decoys or other countermeasures. The majority of the system would be ship-based and is not known to work beyond a certain sea-state: as you might imagine, it becomes too risky to launch the interceptors if the ship is pitching wildly.

So any hypothetical (possibly future) nuclear-armed Middle Eastern nation with ICBMs could be a threat to the Unites States or Europe whether we have no missile defenses, have just Block I interceptors, or even the Block II interceptors. Since the interceptors would only have offered a false sense of security, nothing is lost in canceling Phase 4 of the EPAA. In fact, the other phases could also be canceled with no loss to U.S. or NATO security, and offering considerable saving of U.S. taxpayer’s money.

Q: (CB) What about Iran and its alleged desire to build ICBMs? Having just launched a satellite in January, could such actions act as a cover for an ICBM?

A: (YB) The evidence does not point that way at all. It points the other way. For instance, the latest Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on Iran’s missile program observes: (emphasis added)

“Iran also has a genuine and ambitious space launch program, which seeks to enhance Iran’s national pride, and perhaps more importantly, its international reputation as a growing advanced industrial power. Iran also sees itself as a potential leader in the Middle East offering space launch and satellite services. Iran has stated it plans to use future launchers for placing intelligence gathering satellites into orbit, although such a capability is a decade or so in the future. Many believe Iran’s space launch program could mask the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) – with ranges in excess of 5,500 km that could threaten targets throughout Europe, and even the United States if Iran achieved an ICBM capability of at least 10,000 km. ICBMs share many similar technologies and processes inherent in a space launch program, but it seems clear that Iran has a dedicated space launch effort and it is not simply a cover for ICBM development. Since 1999, the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) has assessed that Iran could test an ICBM by 2015 with sufficient foreign assistance, especially from a country such as China or Russia (whose support has reportedly diminished over the past decade). It is increasingly uncertain whether Iran will be able to achieve an ICBM capability by 2015 for several reasons: Iran does not appear to be receiving the degree of foreign support many believe would be necessary, Iran has found it increasingly difficult to acquire certain critical components and materials because of sanctions, and Iran has not demonstrated the kind of flight test program many view as necessary to produce an ICBM.”

Furthermore, the payload of Iran’s space launch vehicles is very low compared to what would be needed for a nuclear warhead — or even a substantial conventional warhead. For instance, Omid, Iran’s first satellite weighed just 27 kg [60 pounds] and Rasad-1, Iran’s second satellite weighed just 15.3 kilograms [33.74 pound], whereas a nuclear warhead would require a payload capacity on the order of 1000 kilograms. Furthermore, since launching an ICBM from Iran towards the United States or Europe requires going somewhat against the rotation of Earth the challenge is greater. As pointed out by missile and space security expert Dr. David Wright, an ICBM capable of reaching targets in the United States would need to have a range longer than 11,000 km. Drawing upon the experience of France in making solid-fuel ICBMs, Dr. Wright estimates it may take 40 years for Iran to develop a similar ICBM – assuming it has the intention to kick off such an effort. A liquid fueled rocket could be developed sooner, but there is little evidence in terms of rocket testing that Iran has kicked off such an effort.

In any case, it appears that informed European officials are not really afraid of any hypothetical Iranian missiles. For example, the Polish foreign minister, Radoslaw Sikorski, once made light of the whole scenario telling Foreign Policy, “If the mullahs have a target list we believe we are quite low on it.” As if to emphasize that point, the Europeans don’t appear to be pulling their weight in terms of funding the system. “We love the capability but just don’t have the money,” one European military official stated in reference to procuring the interceptors.

Similarly, the alleged threat from North Korea is also not all that urgent.

It seems U.S. taxpayers are subsidizing a project that will have little national security benefits either for the United States or NATO countries. In contrast, it may well create a dangerous false sense of security. It has already negatively impacted ties with Russia and China.

Q: (CB) Isn’t Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program a big concern in arguing for a missile defense? Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel said Iran may cross some red-line in the summer?

A: (YB) Iran’s nuclear program could be a concern, but the latest report from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) says Iran has not even decided to make nuclear weapons yet. Building, testing and miniaturizing a warhead to fit on a missile takes years – after a country decides to do so. In any case, no matter how scary that hypothetical prospect, one would not want a missile defense system that could be easily defeated to address that alleged eventual threat. Even if you believe the threat exists now, you may want a system that is effective, not a midcourse system that has inherent flaws.

Incidentally, the DNI’s report explicitly states: “we assess Iran could not divert safeguarded material and produce a weapon-worth of WGU [weapons grade uranium] before this activity is discovered.” As for the red-line drawn by Prime Minister Netanyahu: his track-record on predicting Iranian nuclear weaponization has been notoriously bad. As I point out in a recent piece for Reuters, in 1992 Mr. Netanyahu said Iran was three to five years from a bomb. I assess he is still wrong, more than 20 years later.

Lastly, even if Iran (or other nations) obtained nuclear weapons in the future, they can be delivered in any number of ways- not just via missiles. In fact, nuclear missiles have the benefit of being self-deterring – nations are actually hesitant to use nuclear weapons if they are mated to missiles. Other nations know that the United States can pinpoint the launch sites of missiles. The same cannot be said of a nuclear device placed in a sailboat, a reality that could precipitate the use of that type of device due to the lack of attribution. So one has to carefully consider if it makes sense to dissuade the placement of nuclear weapons on missiles. If an adversarial nation has nuclear weapons it may be best to have them mated to missiles rather than boats.

Q: (CB) It seems that the Russians are still concerned about the missile defense system, even after Defense Secretary Hagel said that the fourth phase of EPAA plan is canceled. Why are they evidently still concerned?

A: (YB) The Russians probably have four main concerns with NATO missile defense, even after the cancellation of Phase 4 of EPAA. For more details on some of these please see the report Ted Postol and I wrote.

1. The first is geopolitical: the Russians have never been happy about the Eastward expansion of NATO and they see joint U.S.-Polish and U.S.-Romanian missile defense bases near their borders as provocative. This is not to say they are right or wrong, but that is most likely their perception. These bases are to be built before Phase 4 of the EPAA, so they are still in the plans.

2. The Russians do not concur with the alleged long-range missile threat from Iran. One cannot entirely blame them when the Polish foreign minister himself makes light of the alleged threat saying, “If the mullahs have a target list we believe we are quite low on it.” Russian officials are possibly confused and their military analysts may even be somewhat alarmed, mulling what the real intent behind these missile defense bases could be, if – in their assessment – the Iran threat is unrealistic, as in fact was admitted to by the Polish foreign minister. The Russians also have to take into account unexpected future changes which may occur on these bases, for instance: a change in U.S. or Polish or Romanian administrations; a large expansion of the number or types of interceptors; or, perhaps even nuclear-tipped interceptors (which were proposed by former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld about ten years ago).

3. Russian military planners are properly hyper-cautious, just like their counterparts at the Pentagon, and they must assume a worst-case scenario in which the missile defense system is assumed to be effective, even when it isn’t. This concern likely feeds into their fear that the legal balance of arms agreed to in New START may be upset by the missile defense system.

Their main worry could be with the mobile ship-based platforms and less with the European bases, as  explained in detail in the study Ted Postol and I did. Basically, the Aegis missile defense cruisers could be placed off of the East Coast of the U.S. and – especially with Block IIA/B interceptors –engage Russian warheads. Some statements from senior U.S. officials probably play into their fears. For instance, General Cartwright has been quoted as saying, “part of what’s in the budget is to get us a sufficient number of ships to allow us to have a global deployment of this capability on a constant basis, with a surge capacity to any one theater at a time.” To certain Russian military planners’ ears that may not sound like a limited system aimed at a primitive threat from Iran.

Because the mobile ship-based interceptors (hypothetically placed off of the U.S. East Coast ) could engage Russian warheads, Russian officials may be able claim this as an infringement on New START parity.

Missile defenses that show little promise of working well can, nevertheless, alter perceptions that the strategic balance between otherwise well-matched states is stable. Even when missile defenses reveal that they possess little, if any technical capabilities, they can still cause cautious adversaries and competitors to react as if they might work. The United States’ response to the Cold War era Soviet missile defense system was similarly overcautious.

4. Finally, certain Russian military planners may worry about the NATO EPAA missile defense system because in Phase 3, the interceptors are to be based on the SM-3 Block IIA booster. The United States has conducted research using this same type of rocket booster as the basis of a hypersonic-glide offensive strike weapon called ArcLight. Because such offensive hyper-glide weapons could fit into the very same vertical launch tubes – on the ground in Poland and Romania, or on the Aegis ships – used for the defensive interceptors, the potential exists for turning a defensive system into an offensive one, in short order. Although funding for ArcLight has been eliminated in recent years, Russian military planners may continue to worry that perhaps the project “went black” [secret], or that it may be resuscitated in the future. In fact, a recent Federal Business Opportunity (FBO) for the Department of the Navy calls for hypersonic weapons technologies that could fit into the same Mk. 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) tubes that the SM-3 missile defense interceptors are also placed in.

To conclude, advocates of missile defense who say we need cooperation on missile defense to improve ties with Russia have the logic exactly backward: In large part, the renewed tension between Russia and the United States is about missile defense. Were we to abandon this flawed and expensive idea, our ties with Russia — and China — would naturally improve. And, in return, they could perhaps help us more with other foreign policy issues such as Iran, North Korea, and Syria. As it stands, missile defense is harming bilateral relations with Russia and poisoning the well of future arms control.

Q: (CB) Adding to the gravity of Secretary Hagel’s announcement , last week China expressed worry about Ground-Based Interceptors, the Bush administration’s missile defense initiative in Poland discarded by the Obama administration in 2009, in favor of Phase 4 of the EPAA. Why is there concern with not only the Aegis ship-based system, but also the GBIs on the West Coast?

A: (YB) Like the Russians, Chinese military analysts are also likely to assume the worst-case scenario for the system (ie. that it will work perfectly) in coming up with their counter response . Possessing a much smaller nuclear arsenal than Russia or the United States, to China, even a few interceptors can be perceived as making a dent in their deterrent forces. And I think the Chinese are likely worried about both the ship-based Aegis system as well as the West Coast GBIs.

And this concern on the part of the Chinese is nothing new. They have not been as vocal as the Russians, but it is evident they were never content with U.S. and NATO plans. For instance, the 2009 Bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission pointed out that “China may already be increasing the size of its ICBM force in response to its assessment of the U.S. missile defense program.” Such stockpile increases, if they are taking place, will probably compel India, and, in turn, Pakistan to also ramp up their nuclear weapon numbers.

The Chinese may also be looking to the future and think that U.S. defenses may encourage North Korea to field more missiles than it may originally have been intending – if and when the North Koreans make long range missiles – to make sure some get through the defense system. This would have an obvious destabilizing effect in East Asia which the Chinese would rather avoid.

Some U.S. media outlets have also said the ship-based Aegis system could be used against China’s DF-21D anti-ship missile, when the official U.S. government position has always been that the system is only intended only against North Korea (in the Pacific theater). Such mission creep could sound provocative to the Chinese, who were told that the Aegis system is not “aimed at” China.

In reality, while the Aegis system’s sensors may be able to help track the DF-21D it is unlikely that the interceptors could be easily modified to work within the atmosphere where the DF-21D’s kill vehicle travels. (It could perhaps be intercepted at apogee during the ballistic phase). A recent CRS report was quite explicit that the DF-21D is a threat which remains unaddressed in the Navy: “No Navy target program exists that adequately represents an anti-ship ballistic missile’s trajectory,’ Gilmore said in the e-mail. The Navy ‘has not budgeted for any study, development, acquisition or production’ of a DF-21D target, he said.”

Chinese concerns about U.S. missile defense systems are also a source of great uncertainty, reducing Chinese support for promoting negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). China’s leaders may wish to maintain the option of future military plutonium production in response to U.S. missile defense plans.

The central conundrum of midcourse missile defense remains that while it creates incentives for adversaries and competitors of the United States to increase their missile stockpiles, it offers no credible combat capability to protect the United States or its allies from this increased weaponry.

Q: (CB) Will a new missile defense site on the East Coast protect the United States? What would be the combat effectiveness of an East Coast site against an assumed Iranian ICBM threat?

A: (GL) I don’t see any real prospect for even starting a program for interceptors such as the [East Coast site] NAS is proposing any time soon in the current budget environment, and even if they did it probably would not be available until the 2020s. The recent announcement of the deployment of additional GBI interceptors is, in my view, just cover for getting rid of the Block II Bs, and was chosen because it was relatively ($1+ billion) inexpensive and could be done quickly.

The current combat effectiveness of the GBIs against an Iranian ICBM must be expected to be low. Of course there is no current Iranian ICBM threat. However, the current GMD system shows no prospect of improved performance against any attacker that takes any serious steps to defeat it as far out in time, as plans for this system are publicly available. Whether the interceptors are based in Alaska or on the East Coast makes very little difference to their performance.

Q: (CB) There were shortcomings reported by the Defense Science Board and the National Academies regarding the radars that are part of the system. Has anything changed to improve this situation?

A: (GL) With respect to radars, the main point is that basically nothing has happened. The existing early warning radars can’t discriminate [between real warheads and decoys]. The only radar that could potentially contribute to discrimination, the SBX, has been largely mothballed.

Q: (CB) Let’s say the United States had lots of money to spend on such a system, would an East Coast site have the theoretical ability to engage Russian warheads? Regardless of whether Russia could defeat the system with decoys or countermeasures, does the system have an ability to reach or engage the warheads? In short, could such a site be a concern for Russia?

A: (YB) If you have a look at Fig 8(a) and 8(b) in the report Ted Postol and I wrote you’ll see pretty clearly why an East Coast site might be a concern for Russia, especially with faster interceptors that are proposed for that site. Now I’m not saying it necessarily should be a concern – because they can defeat the system rather easily – but it may be. Whether they object to it or not vocally depends on other factors also. For instance, such a site will obviously not be geopolitically problematic for the Russians.

Charles P. Blair is the Senior Fellow on State and Non-State Threats at the Federation of American Scientists.

Dr. Yousaf Butt, a nuclear physicist, is professor and scientist-in-residence at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. The views expressed are his own.

Dr. George N. Lewis is a senior research associate at the Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies at Cornell University.

The Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus poses a public health threat in many regions of the world. Approximately 600 human cases have been reported since 2003, with a laboratory-confirmed case fatality rate of up to 60% according to the World Health Organization (WHO). The recent death of a woman from southwest China, attributed to H5N1, has sparked concerns with public health officials that the strain can now be transmitted between humans. Typically, H5N1 is contracted by people in direct contact with poultry. Health authorities in Guiyang, Guizhou province concluded that two patients, including the woman who died, did not have contact with poultry before showing symptoms of the illness. Currently, the public health community remains cautious as H5N1 influenza viruses continue to evolve and potentially gain the ability to be transmitted efficiently to humans. One of the objectives for H5N1 research is to identify genetic changes that are linked to transmission or enhanced virulence in mammals. This information may lead to improved pandemic preparedness efforts such as development of better vaccines, antivirals, and diagnostics for H5N1 strains that have the potential to spread among humans.

Similar to other research experiments involving infectious pathogens, some H5N1 studies, due to their inherent dangers, are described as Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC). Biosafety risks include laboratory-acquired infections or accidental release of the virus, which are major threats for public health. In fact, last year, researchers around the world took the remarkable step of imposing a moratorium on “gain-of-function” experiments due to concerns about public health risks. The following provides answers to basic questions about the risks of this type of research, the status of the moratorium, and what steps are being taken to mitigate future public health risks.

What are “gain-of-function” experiments?

A “gain-of-function” experiment introduces or amplifies a gene product. This type of research is intended to increase the transmissibility, host range, or virulence of pathogens. Most “gain-of-function” experiments are used to examine the subtle complexities of biology. The gene products of the majority of these experiments result in cellular death or with phenotypes that are difficult or impossible to interpret. Specific to H5N1 influenza research, it is hoped that enhancing and analyzing the transmissibility of the pathogen could provide new information that could lead to improved vaccines to prevent an outbreak that may arise in the future. However, there is also risk that it could lead to an inadvertent release of a virus with enhanced transmissibility.

Why were they ceased?

The H5N1 influenza virus research was temporarily ceased in January 2012 due to the risks involved with disseminating experimental results that could be used for nefarious purposes. All research on H5N1 transmission was halted after laboratories at the University of Wisconsin and the Dutch Eramus Medical Center in Rotterdam, Netherlands created mutant forms that could be transmitted directly among ferrets. This was concerning because viruses that are easily transmissible between ferrets are often also easily transmissible between humans. Some experts argued that the benefits of this kind of H5N1 research to health and medicine were overhyped and not worth the risk of an accidental release that would expose the public to these mutant strains.

Bioterrorism, biosafety, and regulatory issues have also been brought to light since the initiation of the year-long voluntary moratorium. Many scientists fear that the scientific details on creating a potentially dangerous virus could be used for bioterrorism. Researchers claim that the experiments have the potential to lead to public health benefits but have also exposed regulation gaps on dual-use research. The public health benefits include: influenza surveillance that catches infectious strains early, better drugs, and improved vaccines. Yoshihiro Kawaoka of the University of Wisconsin and Ron Fouchier of Erasmus University in the Netherlands, both leading H5N1 researchers, argued the fears were overblown and surpassed by the potential public health preparedness their studies may lead to.

Has there ever been a similar moratorium before for other experiments?

This is not the first time that scientific research has been suspended due to security concerns. In July 1974, a call for a voluntary moratorium on research using emerging recombinant DNA (rDNA) technology stunned the scientific community. American scientists were concerned that unrestricted pursuit of this research might produce unanticipated and damaging consequences for human health and the ecosystem. Despite widespread apprehension, the moratorium was collectively observed worldwide. The 1975 Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA – named after the Asilomar Conference Center in California, where it was held – marked the beginning of a unique era for the public discussion of science policy. The major goal of the conference was to consider whether to lift the voluntary moratorium and, if so, under what circumstances could the research proceed safely. The moratorium was enacted by scientists and governments to protect laboratory personnel, the general public, and the environment from potential hazards that might be directly generated from rDNA experiments. During the conference, recommendations were established for how to safely conduct experiments using rDNA. The debate on potential biohazards was the primary focus of the conference, which is still a continued discussion in biotechnology today.

The conference also highlighted the fact that policy and regulations have both private and public stakeholders. Although the conference was primarily run by molecular biologists, the debate resulted in other scientists and non-scientists joining national and local review boards. Also resulting from the Asilomar Conference was membership expansion of the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) to 16 members in fields to include experts from: molecular biology, genetics, virology, microbiology, epidemiology, infectious diseases and the biology of enteric organisms. The purpose of the RAC was and is to promote transparency and access for all stakeholders, enabling public approval of critically important technology, and creating an environment in which scientific research can be performed in an informed, safe, and ethical manner.

How many researchers/countries are involved in “gain-of-function” experiments?

The letter that announced the voluntary moratorium on H5N1 transmission research, published in Science and Nature, was signed by 40 leading influenza researchers from the United States, China, Japan, Britain, the Netherlands, Hong Kong, Germany, Italy, and Canada. Everyone, in some way, may be affected by “gain-of-function” experiments. The “gain-of-function” experiments have a plethora of stakeholders within the international community. In December 2012, the United States hosted the “Gain-of-Function Research on Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 Viruses: An International Consultative Workshop.” This workshop integrated experts in various fields, including: influenza and other infectious diseases, bioethics, public health surveillance, biosafety, national and global public health, biosecurity, epidemiology, national security, agriculture and veterinary sciences, global public health law and those specifically involved with developing the WHO International Health Regulations and the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework, and medical countermeasures to disease outbreak. While the purpose of the moratorium was primarily to take time to discuss risk/benefit analysis of gain-of-function experiments, another important consideration was how to educate the public and gain their acceptance for continued research.

What new steps are being taken to minimize the risk of H5N1 research to public health?

The RAC of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) has called for additional precautions on H5N1 “gain-of-function” experiments that are conducted strictly in biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) laboratories, which have been used in recent studies on H5N1 transmissibility. The committee has rejected the option of restricting research to facilities designated as BSL-4 – the highest level of biosafety laboratories – because only a few laboratories around the world would meet this standard. Limiting H5N1 research to only these labs would slow the pace of discovery. Additionally, many experts argue H5N1 experiments can safely be done in BSL-3 with enhanced safeguards. Existing BSL-3 laboratory requirements include: powered air purifying respirators (PAPRS), donning a protective suit, wrap-back disposable gowns, double gloving, shoe covers, and a shower before exiting the laboratory. The recommended steps are aimed at reducing the risk of laboratory-acquired infections and the accidental release of the dangerous pathogens. The additional requirements devised recently by the RAC include: increased personal protective equipment (PPE), a “buddy system” for all personnel, maintaining baseline serum samples, providing a licensed H5N1 vaccine, and requiring personnel to avoid contact with susceptible bird species for five days after working with the viruses. The RAC also recommended proper training of lab personnel would be essential and recommended that personnel be required to sign a statement confirming that they understand the safety and incident-reporting requirements. Additionally, the RAC recommended that all incidents that have the potential to be harmful to personnel and/or the public be reported to institutional authorities immediately and to public health officials within 24 hours.

What are the recommended next steps for the United States concerning the recent moratorium?

Although the H5N1 international research moratorium was lifted in January 2013, the United States has yet to resume research involving gain-of-function experiments on the H5N1 virus and is currently designing a framework for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to make judgments about funding for this type of research. This framework will provide HHS’ funding agencies with guidance on how to classify potentially high-risk gain-of-function projects at the funding proposal stage and make determinations as to whether they are acceptable for HHS funding. For the proposals that are deemed acceptable for funding, the framework will also establish a basis for HHS’ funding agencies to designate any additional biosafety, biosecurity, and DURC risk mitigation measures that they will require of researchers.

With China’s February report of two new human cases of H5N1, the debate of moving forward with “gain-of-function” research remains of upmost importance for global public health. In light of the new cases, researchers are insistent to resume experimentation on the deadly virus in hopes to produce results for prevention or new countermeasures. But the dangerousness of the virus underscores the importance of prioritizing safety when carrying out this research, even if it means pausing for a moment to make sure experimentation does not inadvertently create more problems than it solves.

Malerie Briseno is a Biosecurity Intern at the Federation of American Scientists. She graduated from Georgetown University’s School of Medicine with a M.S. in Biohazardous Threat Agents and Emerging Infectious Diseases.

Christina England is currently a Masters Candidate from the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, specializing in International Security and Economic Policy.  She is serving as a biosecurity intern at the Federation of American Scientists, overseeing its Virtual Biosecurity Center.  She graduated from the United States Air Forces Academy as distinguished graduate, receiving her BS in Biochemistry.

Senator Sam Nunn has often underscored that humanity is in “a race between cooperation and catastrophe.” As co-chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, he has urged greater and faster international action on reducing nuclear dangers. He has also joined with former Secretary of State George Shultz, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, a bipartisan group of senior statesmen, to put forward an agenda for taking the next steps to achieve a nuclear weapon free world. They are making progress in convincing more and more political leaders to support their initiative.

To complement their efforts, we now need a dedicated coalition of scientists, engineers, and other technically trained people to work together and devote their knowledge and skills toward reducing the risks of catastrophes. As the founders of the Federation of American Scientists knew very well from their experience serving in the Manhattan Project, humanity has within its power the capability to destroy itself. Even though there would have been survivors from a massive thermonuclear war during the Cold War, they would have envied the dead (as Soviet Chairman Nikita Khrushchev observed after the Cuban Missile Crisis) because the effects of such a war would have been catastrophic on billions of people worldwide, not just in the countries directly targeted. “Nuclear War is National Suicide,” warns a sticker pinned to my office’s bulletin board. Emblazoned with a mushroom cloud, the sticker was made by FAS more than thirty years ago.

While the likelihood of nuclear war between Russia and the United States has faded with the receding shadow of the Cold War, nuclear dangers have arguably grown even more threatening, with the race to secure vulnerable nuclear materials before they land in the hands of terrorists, the possibility of inadvertent nuclear war between Russia and the United States, the increasing nuclear arsenal of North Korea, the continuing build up of nuclear arms in India and Pakistan, the expanding latent weapons capability of Iran’s nuclear program, and the interest among some non-nuclear weapon states such as Japan and the Republic of Korea to use or continue to use plutonium in nuclear fuels.  Today more than ever, the Federation of American Scientists must redouble its efforts to lessen these threats.

I am pleased to announce that FAS is nearing the conclusion of more than a yearlong strategic planning process to assess its future direction. I am very grateful to all of you who took part in the membership survey and other interviews last year. Your advice was essential to help guide us and refocus our work in what matters. In effect, we are launching a “back to the future” strategy that will replant FAS’s roots from its founding in 1945 to its new beginning in the 21^st Century. That is, we will not just counter nuclear threats that stemmed from the Second World War, but we will become the organization that will provide science-based analysis and solutions

to catastrophic risks. I purposely use the word “risks” (defined as probability times consequences) to make clear that FAS will work to reduce the probability of the threats occurring as well as offer ways to mitigate massively destructive or disruptive consequences that these threats can cause.

Catastrophic threats can affect millions or perhaps billions of people through huge numbers of deaths and serious illnesses, massive economic damage, extensive and lasting harm to food, water, and energy supplies, or widespread dislocations of populations. These threats can be human-induced, such as use of biological or nuclear weapons or too much emissions of greenhouse gases, or naturally occurring, such as pandemics, massive earthquakes, tsunamis, or major asteroid collisions with earth. Moreover, new catastrophic threats could emerge with the misuse of cyber technologies, synthetic biology, or robots, to name a few possibilities.

In this renewed mission, FAS has multi-fold audiences: the scientific and engineering communities, policymakers in the executive and legislative branches of the United States and other governments, the public, and the news media. FAS will serve as the bridge between the technical communities and the policymaking community. In the coming months, we will improve our communications to these audiences and communities. For example, we will refresh FAS.org, which is a treasure trove of tens of thousands of documents, features innovative analysis and tools such as uranium enrichment and nuclear weapon effect calculators, and receives up to one million visitors monthly. But this website needs significant updating and a more user-friendly structure. We will keep you informed of the updates.

With this issue of the Public Interest Report, you will see a new look, which aims to provide a user-friendlier online magazine with articles focused on our renewed mission of science-based analysis and solutions to catastrophic risks. We very much welcome your advice about how to further improve the PIR. FAS can only do its work with members and supporters like you.

Similarly, humanity can only reduce the risks of catastrophes though cooperation. We need to break free of zero-sum mindsets and urgently come together in the spirit of cooperative games. I am heartened that one of the most popular recently released games is Pandemic^TM in which the players work as a team to cure four diseases before the globe becomes engulfed in a pandemic. One of the team members is a scientist. But the scientist alone does not have enough skills and powers to win the game. She needs an operation officer, a medic, a dispatcher, and a researcher.

The core belief of FAS’s founders is as relevant today as it was in 1945. Scientists and engineers have the ethical obligation to ensure that the fruits of their intellectual labor benefit humankind. I look forward to continue working with you to support that endeavor.

Charles D. Ferguson, Ph.D.

President, FAS

On December 12, 2012, North Korea finally succeeded in placing an object into low Earth orbit. Recovered debris of the launcher’s first stage verified some previous assumptions about the launch system, but it also included some surprises. Independent from the technical findings and their consequences, the public debate seems to miss some important points.

Fundamental Remarks

Threat is a product of two parameters: intention and capability. If a potential actor has the intention to act, but no capability, there is no threat. If the actor has the capability, but no intention, there is no threat either. Only the combination creates a real threat, but this threat is limited by the magnitude of both factors.

Looking at the public debate about the first successful Unha launch, it is often presupposed that North Korea has an intention to act against the United States (or at least be able to), and so its capabilities are typically interpreted according to that assumed intention: The launch of a large rocket is marked as a camouflaged long range missile test, and the debate now focuses on this missile’s exact throw-weight performance, and on implications of the United States being in reach of a postulated North Korean nuclear missile capability.

A different approach might offer unbiased conclusions, though: first, focus on a capability analysis. After that, figure out what these capabilities might reveal about the intentions. Only then start thinking about the threat and adequate responses. In this case, it means analyzing the Unha-3 on a wide scope, from technical details to the whole program, then considering what the consequences are, and only then re-evaluating the threat situation in a larger context.

Available Data

Reliable data on North Korea’s activities is often in short supply. We have high confidence that the data gathered from the launch footage and the recovered debris is reliable. But it is hard to judge the validity of other available data, especially data that comes from official North Korean sources.

For example, some video footage and photos from the mission control room are also available. There is clear evidence, however, that the video is from a staged presentation. It is therefore unclear how reliable any information extracted from these sources might be.

General Observations

The basic design of the Unha-3 rockets launched in April and December 2012 seems to be widely the same.

The Unha-3 of December 2012 was powered by a cluster of four Nodong-class engines and four small control engines. Available photos of the recovered engines suggest that there might be minor differences between “Nodong/Shahab 3”-engines in Iran and the Unha engine cluster. The control engines show the typical design (corrugated metal sheets) of old Soviet engines, often referred to as “Scud technology.”These small engines are not related to the engines known from the Iranian Safir launcher’s upper stage.

With its Safir satellite launcher, Iran had successfully demonstrated that a two-stage rocket using a Nodong engine in the first stage and a wrung-out upper stage with highly energetic propellants (NTO/UDMH) can carry a small satellite weighing a few dozen kilograms into low Earth orbit (LEO). North Korea had to use a three-stage design for its satellite launch, thus indicating a different approach.

Control Room Video and Photos

An available video implies that the launch was filmed from within the launch control room (Figure 2). However, the various small videos that are displayed on the wall are out of sync, and the clearly visible Media Player interfaces suggest that the whole scene was recorded after the launch, with available launch clips being replayed for the recording. This raises the question of how reliable the displayed data is.

Analysis Results

According to the control room data, the second stage is powered by a Scud-class engine. This is further backed by imagery of the second stage in the assembly building, hinting at a small propulsion unit. The third stage seems to use NTO/UDMH, comparable to the Iranian Safir upper stage. This is further backed by the estimated tank volume ratio. However, some minor differences can be observed between the Safir upper stage and the North Korean Unha third stage.

With the available data, it was possible to reconstruct a model of the Unha rocket that, in simulated launches, could mirror the published trajectory data within a few percent.

The reconstruction is consistent with all the available data. It clearly shows that the Unha-3 is designed as a satellite launcher. The low-thrust engines in the second and third stage prevent the need for free-coast flight phases in the satellite launcher role, but in a ballistic missile role, they lead to significant gravity losses that result in a high performance penalty. A different second stage propulsion unit –a throttled engine, for example, or a simple Nodong engine – would offer range gains in the order of 1,000 km or more.

In a missile role, the three-stage Unha-3 offers around 8,000 km range with a 700 kg payload. With different propulsion units, this could have been extended, perhaps putting the U.S. East Coast into range.

Conclusions

The Unha seems to be designed as a space launch vehicle, with several constraints dictating the observed design (available engines, available technologies, etc.). Being in development for 20 years or more, the program pace is very slow, with only four launches so far. The current success rate of 25 percent is within the expected bandwidth for such a program. It will improve, but only slowly. Different design solutions would have offered more performance in a ballistic missile role.

According to available data, the Unha-3 looks like a typical, slow paced satellite launcher program, producing single prototypes every now and then. A serious missile program would look different. However, close observation is recommended.Table: Reconstructed Unha-3 Data
(approximate figures as of 2013-02-14)Total Length [m]30Total Launch Mass [t]88Payload Mass to LEO [t]~ 0.1+Range [km] (ballistic, 3-stage, 0.7 t)around 8,000First StageAirframealuminumEngine4 x Nodong, 4 x controlThrust (sea level) [t]120Burn Time [s]120FuelkeroseneOxidizerIRFNAUsed Propellant Mass [t]62.6Launch Mass [t]71.3Second StageAirframealuminumEngine1 x Scud-levelThrust (vacuum) [t]14.5Burn Time [s]200FuelkeroseneOxidizerIRFNAUsed Propellant Mass [t]11.6Initial Mass [t]13.1Third StageAirframealuminumEngine?Thrust (vacuum) [t]2.9Burn Time [s]260FuelUDMHOxidizerNTOUsed Propellant Mass [t]2.6Initial Mass [t]3.3

Markus Schiller studied mechanical and aerospace engineering at the TU Munich and received his doctorate degree in Astronautics in 2008. He has been employed at Schmucker Technologie since 2006, except for a one-year Fellowship at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California, in 2011.

Robert Schmucker has five decades of experience researching rocketry, missiles and astronautics. In 1992, he opened his consulting firm, Schmucker Technologie, which provides threat and security analyses for national and international organizations about activities of developing countries and proliferation.

Despite enormous reductions of their nuclear arsenals since the Cold War, the United States and Russia retain more than 9,100 warheads in their military stockpiles. Another 7,000 retired – but still intact – warheads are awaiting dismantlement, for a total inventory of more than 16,000 nuclear warheads.

This is more than 15 times the size of the total nuclear arsenals of all the seven other nuclear weapon states in the world – combined.

The U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals are far beyond what is needed for deterrence, with each side’s bloated force level justified only by the other’s excessive force level.

The FAS report – Trimming Nuclear Excess: Options for Further Reductions of U.S. and Russian Nuclear Forces – describes the status and 10-year projection for U.S. and Russian nuclear forces.

The report concludes that the pace of reducing nuclear forces appears to be slowing compared with the past two decades. Both the United States and Russia appear to be more cautious about reducing further, placing more emphasis on “hedging” and reconstitution of reduced nuclear forces, and both are investing enormous sums of money in modernizing their nuclear forces over the next decade.

Even with the reductions expected over the next decade, the report concludes that the United States and Russia will continue to possess nuclear stockpiles that are many times greater than the rest of the world’s nuclear forces combined.

New initiatives are needed to regain the momentum of the nuclear arms reduction process. The New START Treaty from 2011 was an important but modest step but the two nuclear superpowers must begin negotiations on new treaties to significantly curtail their nuclear forces. Both have expressed an interest in reducing further, but little has happened.

New treaties may be preferable, but reaching agreement on the complex inter-connected issues ranging from nuclear weapons to missile defense and conventional forces may be unlikely to produce results in the short term (not least given the current political climate in the U.S. Congress). While the world waits, the excess nuclear forces levels and outdated planning principles continue to fuel justifications for retaining large force levels and new modernizations in both the United States and Russia.

To break the stalemate and reenergize the arms reductions process, in addition to pursuing treaty-based agreements, the report argues, unilateral steps can and should be taken in the short term to trim the most obvious fat from the nuclear arsenals. The report includes 32 specific recommendations for reducing unnecessary and counterproductive U.S. and Russian nuclear force levels unilaterally and bilaterally.

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The escalating confrontation between the United States and Iran over the latter’s nuclear program has triggered much debate about what actions should be taken to ensure that Iran does not develop a nuclear weapon. How might certain actions against Iran affect the global economy? FAS released the results of a study, “Sanctions, Military Strokes, and Other Potential Actions Against Iran”  which assesses the global economic impact on a variety of conflict scenarios, sanctions and other alternative actions against Iran. FAS conducted an expert elicitation with nine subject matter experts involving six hypothetical scenarios in regards to U.S. led actions against Iran, and anticipated three month cost to the global economy. These scenarios ranged from increasing sanctions (estimated cost of U.S. $64 billion) to full-scale invasion of Iran (estimated cost of U.S. $1.7 trillion).

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Only three days after the 2012 national election, FAS hosted a day-long symposium that featured distinguished speakers and provided recommendations to the Obama administration on how best to respond to catastrophic threats to national security at the National Press Club in Washington, DC.

These experts addressed the policy and technological aspects of conventional, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons; nuclear safety; electricity generation, distribution, and storage, and cyber security. These policy memoranda call for a coordinated national effort to prepare for, prevent and respond to catastrophic threats to the United States.

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On May 20-21, 28 NATO member countries will convene in Chicago to approve the conclusions of a year-long Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR). Among other issues, the review will determine the number and role of the U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and how NATO might work to reduce its nuclear posture as well as Russia’s inventory of such weapons in the future.

Lack of transparency fuels mistrust and worst-case assumptions and the concerns some eastern NATO countries have about Russia have been used to prevent a withdrawal of the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe. The DDPR is expected to endorse the current deployment in Europe.

A new FAS report (PDF) concludes that non-strategic nuclear weapons are neither the reason nor the solution for Europe’s security issues today but that lack of political leadership has allowed bureaucrats to give these weapons a legitimacy they don’t possess and shouldn’t have.

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For most of human existence, people were unaware of the powerful nuclear forces deep inside atoms, although they were exposed to natural background radiation derived from these forces. Not until the end of the 19th century did the first “nuclear scientists,” notably Henri Becquerel and Marie and Pierre Curie, discover energetic rays emanating from certain types of atoms due to these forces. Because of its relative natural abundance and its powerful radiation, radium became a workhorse radioactive substance for the first half of the 20th century.

In this report, FAS President Charles Ferguson examines the national and international efforts to control and secure radioactive materials. He provides background on the basic principles of the science of ionizing radiation and radioactive materials; a risk assessment of the safety and security of these materials; a discussion of various pathways for malicious use of commercial radioactive sources; and an analysis of the many efforts underway to reduce the risk of radiological terrorism with recommendations for the inclusion of this issue at the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit (“Seoul Summit”) and beyond.

A full PDF version of the report can be found here.

In the wake of the devastating meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan, many Americans are now reevaluating the costs and benefits of nuclear energy. If anything, the accident underscores that constant vigilance is needed to ensure nuclear safety.

Policymakers and the public need more guidance about where nuclear power in the United States appears to be headed in light of the economic hurdles confronting construction of nuclear power plants, aging reactors, and a graying workforce, according to a report (PDF) by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and Washington and Lee University.

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Iran’s controversial nuclear program has been front and center on the international stage for more than eight years. Despite negotiations, sanctions, and political tug-of-war, the United States and its allies have yet to tame Iran’s atomic phoenix. At the center of this nuclear standoff is Iran’s controversial uranium enrichment program and efforts to obtain full nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities. To alleviate concerns about the intended nature of these activities, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has demanded -through six resolutions – that Iran suspend enrichment activities as well as construction of a heavy-water research reactor. Yet, Iran has opted to pay no heed to these resolutions and despite numerous proposals from different sides, the stalemate persists.

Dr. Charles D. Ferguson and Dr. Ali Vaez, authored a FAS report (PDF) analyzing the outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program, and provide recommendations to the major stakeholders in this debate including Iran, the United States, Russia and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Additionally, the report proposes a multipronged approach to resolving this deadlock, including enhanced safeguards and positive-sum diplomacy with incentives for Iran and other aspiring nuclear states.

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The discovery and subsequent killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan raises troubling questions. The success of the U.S.’s airborne raid on bin Laden’s compound-undetected by Pakistan’s radar- lends credence to the belief that terrorists might be capable of successfully seizing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

Mr. Charles P. Blair has authored a new FAS report (PDF) that addresses the security gap and identifies specific terrorists within Pakistan who are motivated and potentially capable of taking Pakistani nuclear assets. Blair explains in the report details why, amid Pakistan’s burgeoning civil war, the Pakistani Neo-Taliban is the most worrisome terrorist group motivated and possibly capable of acquiring nuclear weapons.

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