Summary

Climate change has resulted in extreme and irregular rain events across the United States. Consequently, farmers in the High Plains region have been increasingly dependent on the Ogallala Aquifer for water supplies. With an estimated value of $35 billion, this aquifer supports one-fifth of the nations’ wheat, corn, cotton, and cattle. The Ogallala once held enough water to fill Chicago’s Sears Tower over 2,000 times. Today, the aquifer has lost 30% of its supply — and it is being recharged at half the rate it is being depleted. The consequence of inaction is 70% aquifer depletion by 2060, which will reduce crop output by 30–40%.

This $14 billion loss to the High Plains agricultural production may be slowed and eventually reversed by (1) reducing Ogallala use, (2) repurposing existing supplies, and (3) recharging the aquifer. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), in collaboration with the Department of the Interior (DOI) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), should accordingly create the Reduce, Repurpose, Recharge Initiative (RRRI), a voluntary program designed to keep farmers engaged in groundwater conservation. This multi-state program will provide financial incentives to participating farmers in exchange for pledges to limit groundwater withdrawal and participate in training that will equip them with knowledge needed to fulfill those pledges. The RRRI will also make expert advisors available to consult with farmers on policies and funding opportunities related to groundwater conservation. Finally, this program will connect farmers across state lines, allowing them to learn from each other and work together on sustainable management of the Ogallala. The program should be funded through the various water-sustainability budgets of the DOI and USDA, as well as through FEMA’s Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities grant program.

Challenge and Opportunity

Climate-change-induced droughts have increased the nation’s dependence on groundwater as a source for agriculture, industry, and domestic use. Excessive groundwater pumping has led to land subsidence and deterioration of water quality, increasing water-use cost and jeopardizing crop yield. The problem is especially acute in the Ogallala Aquifer of the High Plains region. The aquifer underlies eight states of the nation’s breadbasket — including Nebraska, Kansas, and Texas — and spans 175,000 square miles. Dependence on the Ogallala has depleted its supply by 30% to date, as shown in Figure 1. 90% of water withdrawn from the Ogallala is used for agricultural irrigation.

Strategic plans for the USDA and DOI make it clear that drought preparedness and water conservation/sustainability are national priorities. Multiple federal efforts exist to advance these priorities. Publicly accessible platforms hosting and providing groundwater data exist at the United States Geological Survey (USGS), the National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA), and the cross-agency National Integrated Drought Information System (NIDIS) partnership. The 2018 Farm Bill strengthened technical- and financial-assistance programs to help individual farms implement water-conservation technology; the bill also created an incentive program for agriculture-to-wetland conversion. From 2011–2018, the USDA’s Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) ran the Ogallala Aquifer Initiative (OAI) to “support targeted, local efforts to conserve the availability of water, both its quantity and quality, in each of the States” covering the Ogallala. The OAI was successful in meeting its water-conservation goals. Recent surveys found that 93% of agricultural producers in the High Plains region believe that water conservation is important.

These past and ongoing initiatives demonstrate that federal will and stakeholder buy-in for aquifer conservation and restoration are there. The key need is for a program that provides farmers the incentives and technical assistance needed to minimize groundwater reliance, ending the tragedy of the commons in the Ogallala once and for all.

Plan of Action

USDA, DOI, and FEMA should launch a joint program designed to embed the three pillars of groundwater conservation — Reduce, Repurpose, and Recharge — into the practices of farmers in Ogallala states. The RRRI will provide a financial incentive to farmers in exchange for farmer commitments to:

1. Achieve specified water-conservation targets.
2. Participate in training opportunities and workshops teaching best practices for water conservation and aquifer recharge.

To succeed, the RRRI will require enthusiastic, voluntary participation from farmers across the High Plains region. Participation should be voluntary because studies have shown that voluntary programs are significantly more effective than mandates in achieving water-conservation goals. In a comparative case study about implementing

In a comparative case study about implementing a voluntary versus mandated water restriction, farmers under the voluntary restriction conserved more water relative to the mandatory regulation. A survey of these farmers attributed the group-education component of the voluntary program as the driving force for their restriction. Another survey similarly found that farmers’ altruistic views of water conservation led to longer-lasting participation in water-conservation activities. A comprehensive review of the outcomes of different water policies found that educational programs about water conservation were more effective in water use reduction and improving attitudes towards water conservation relative to mandatory water use restrictions.

To encourage voluntary participation, farmers who enroll in the RRRI would receive a financial incentive. The exact nature of the incentive would need to be determined by the implementing agencies, but could include preferential price setting, preferential market placement, or subsidies based on crop type. In exchange, farmers would agree to an initial water-use assessment performed by field experts (either employees or contractors of USDA or DOI). An appointed advisor (again, either employees or contractors of USDA or DOI) would then work with each farmer to establish long-term (5-year) water-conservation targets based on the assessment results. Each participating farmer would meet quarterly with their advisor to review their water-conservation plan, assess progress towards targets, make mutually agreeable target adjustments, and discuss challenges and solutions. Advisors would also be available in between quarterly meetings for interim questions and concerns.

Farmers who enroll in the RRRI would also commit to attending group trainings and workshops designed to help them identify and implement best water-conservation practices. These learning opportunities would be led by experts sourced from existing agricultural committees (e.g., NRCS Conservation Planners and Technical Service Providers, State Technical Committees, etc.) and water-conservation groups (e.g., Ogallala Water Coordinated Agriculture Project, Groundwater Protection Council, etc.). The group-education curriculum would cover the three tenets of groundwater conservation: reduce, repurpose, and recharge. Table 1 provides a brief description of each tenet, along with examples of aligned activities and potential sources of funding for those activities. The curriculum would teach farmers how each tenet contributes to groundwater conservation, existing and emerging technologies and practices that farmers can implement to achieve each tenet, and financial vehicles available to fund implementation. An added benefit of the group education will be the establishment of a community of farmers across the Ogallala states in which ideas and experiences can be shared.

The RRRI should be established as a multi-agency collaboration. Each involved agency (USDA, DOI, and FEMA) can provide unique expertise. USDA can leverage its research arm, NIFA, to produce up-to-date technology recommendations and scientific assessments. USDA’s NRCS can provide the underlying technical and financial support for realizing the RRRI tenets. DOI can rely on USGS’s existing groundwater database and the NIDIS’s affiliated expert community of data scientists to support the granular, up-to-date groundwater measurements needed to assess water-conservation progress. DOI’s Bureau of Land Management (BLM) can ensure the RRRI tenets are enacted (in parallel with implementation on privately owned farmland) across public lands in the High Plains region. Finally, FEMA can collaborate with NIDIS and with USDA’s Risk Management Agency (RMA) to formally assess risks of drought and Ogallala depletion — assessments that can be used to make the case for the RRRI to farmers, funders, and policymakers. 

Early actions needed to launch the RRRI include:

• Appoint a joint USDA/DOI task force to refine program goals and implementation strategy.

• Create teams of technical and financial experts to build the group-education curriculum.

• Identify people working at the interface of water conservation, land use, and drought preparedness who could serve as potential advisors.

• Recruit an initial cohort of farmers for a pilot version of the program. One pool to draw on for initial recruitment consists of the respondents to Lauer and Sanderson’s 2019 survey of producer attitudes in the Ogallala region.

• Socialize the proposal for RRRI with the House Agriculture Committee staff for authorization. The RRRI would fit well as part of the upcoming (in 2023) Farm Bill renewal. 

Conclusion

Climate-change-induced droughts have increased farmer dependence on groundwater, resulting in a 30% depletion of the Ogallala Aquifer to date. Under current management practices, depletion of the Ogallala will reach 70% by 2060. We can solve the problem. The technology, technical expertise, programmatic and data infrastructure, and financial support for groundwater conservation exist. The key need is to directly connect farmers with — and motivate them to use — these resources. A joint USDA/DOI/FEMA program founded in the “Reduce, Repurpose, Recharge” tenets of water conservation can do just that for farmers across the High Plains region. By coupling financial incentives with tailored water-conservation targets, technical expertise, and group educational opportunities, the RRRI will meaningfully advance the long-term security of the critically important Ogallala—and the farmers whose livelihoods depend on it.

Summary

Environmental justice (EJ) is a priority issue for the Biden Administration, yet the federal government lacks capacity to collect and maintain data needed to adequately identify and respond to environmental-justice (EJ) issues. EJ tools meant to resolve EJ issues — especially the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)’s EJSCREEN tool — are gaining national recognition. But knowledge gaps and a dearth of EJ-trained scientists are preventing EJSCREEN from reaching its full potential. To address these issues, the Administration should allocate a portion of the EPA’s Justice40 funding to create the “AYA Research Institute”, a think tank under EPA’s jurisdiction. Derived from the Adinkra symbol, AYA means “resourcefulness and defiance against oppression.” The AYA Research Institute will functionally address EJSCREEN’s limitations as well as increase federal capacity to identify and effectively resolve existing and future EJ issues.

Challenge and Opportunity

Approximately 200,000 people in the United States die every year of pollution-related causes. These deaths are concentrated in underresourced, vulnerable, and/or minority communities. The EPA created the Office of Environmental Justice (OEJ) in 1992 to address systematic disparities in environmental outcomes among different communities. The primary tool that OEJ relies on to consider and address EJ concerns is EJSCREEN. EJSCREEN integrates a variety of environmental and demographic data into a layered map that identifies communities disproportionately impacted by environmental harms. This tool is available for public use and is the primary screening mechanism for many initiatives at state and local levels. Unfortunately, EJSCREEN has three major limitations:

1. Missing indicators. EJSCREEN omits crucial environmental indicators such as drinking-water quality and indoor air quality. OEJ states that these crucial indicators are not included due to a lack of resources available to collect underlying data at the appropriate quality, spatial range, and resolution. 
2. Small areas are less accurate. There is considerable uncertainty in EJSCREEN environmental and demographic estimates at the census block group (CBG) level. This is because (i) EJSCREEN’s assessments of environmental indicators can rely on data collected at scales less granular than CBG, and (ii) some of EJSCREEN’s demographic estimates are derived from surveys (as opposed to census data) and are therefore less consistent.
3. Deficiencies in a single dataset can propagate across EJSCREEN analyses. Environmental indicators and health outcomes are inherently interconnected. This means that subpar data on certain indicators — such as emissions levels, ambient pollutant levels in air, individual exposure, and pollutant toxicity — can compromise the reliability of EJSCREEN results on multiple fronts. 

These limitations must be addressed to unlock the full potential of EJSCREEN as a tool for informing research and policy. More robust, accurate, and comprehensive environmental and demographic data are needed to power EJSCREEN. Community-driven initiatives are a powerful but underutilized way to source such data. Yet limited time, funding, rapport, and knowledge tend to discourage scientists from engaging in community-based research collaborations. In addition, effectively operationalizing data-based EJ initiatives at a national scale requires the involvement of specialists trained at the intersection of EJ and science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM). Unfortunately, relatively poor compensation discourages scientists from pursuing EJ work — and scientists who work on other topics but have interest in EJ can rarely commit the time needed to sustain long-term collaborations with EJ organizations. It is time to augment the federal government’s past and existing EJ work with redoubled investment in community-based data and training.

Plan of Action

EPA should dedicate $20 million of its Justice40 funding to establish the AYA Research Institute: an in-house think tank designed to functionally address EJSCREEN’s limitations as well as increase federal capacity to identify and effectively resolve existing and future EJ issues. The word AYA is the formal name for the Adinkra symbol meaning “resourcefulness and defiance against oppression” — concepts that define the fight for environmental justice.

The Research Institute will comprise three arms. The first arm will increase federal EJ data capacity through an expert advisory group tasked with providing and updating recommendations to inform federal collection and use of EJ data. The advisory group will focus specifically on (i) reviewing and recommending updates to environmental and demographic indicators included in EJSCREEN, and (ii) identifying opportunities for community-based initiatives that could help close key gaps in the data upon which EJSCREEN relies.

The second arm will help grow the pipeline of EJ-focused scientists through a three-year fellowship program supporting doctoral students in applied research projects that exclusively address EJ issues in U.S. municipalities and counties identified as frontline communities. The program will be three years long so that participants are able to conduct much-needed longitudinal studies that are rare in the EJ space. To be eligible, doctoral students will need to (i) demonstrate how their projects will help strengthen EJSCREEN and/or leverage EJSCREEN insights, and (ii) present a clear plan for interacting with and considering recommendations from local EJ grassroots organization(s). Selected students will be matched with grassroots EJ organizations distributed across five U.S. geographic regions (Northeast, Southeast, Midwest, Southwest, and West) for mentorship and implementation support. The fellowship will support participants in achieving their academic goals while also providing them with experience working with community-based data, building community-engagement and science-communication skills, and learning how to scale science policymaking from local to federal systems. As such, the fellowship will help grow the pipeline of STEM talent knowledgeable about and committed to working on EJ issues in the United States.

The third arm will embed EJ expertise into federal decision making by sponsoring a permanent suite of very dominant resident staff, supported by “visitors” (i.e., the doctoral fellows), to produce policy recommendations, studies, surveys, qualitative analyses, and quantitative analyses centered around EJ. This model will rely on the resident staff to maintain strong relationships with federal government and extragovernmental partners and to ensure continuity across projects, while the fellows provide ancillary support as appropriate based on their skills/interest and Institute needs. The fellowship will act as a screening tool for hiring future members of the resident staff.

Taken together, these arms of the AYA Research Institute will help advance Justice40’s goal of improving training and workforce development, as well as the Biden Administration’s goal of better preparing the United States to adapt and respond to the impacts of climate change. The AYA Research Institute can be launched with $10 million: $4 million to establish the fellowship program with an initial cohort of 10 doctoral students (receiving stipends commensurate with typical doctoral stipends at U.S. universities), and $6 million to cover administrative expenses and staff expert salaries. Additional funding will be needed to maintain the Institute if it proves successful after launch. Funding for the Institute could come from Justice40 funds allocated to EPA. Alternatively, EPA’s fiscal year (FY) 2022 budget for science and technology clearly states a goal of prioritizing EJ — funds from this budget could hence be allocated towards the Institute using existing authority. Finally, EPA’s FY 2022 budget for environmental programs and management dedicates approximately $6 million to EJSCREEN — a portion of these funds could be reallocated to the Institute as well.

Conclusion

The Biden-Harris Administration is making unprecedented investments in environmental justice. The AYA Research Institute is designed to be a force multiplier for those investments. Federally sponsored EJ efforts involve multiple programs and management tools that directly rely on the usability and accuracy of EJSCREEN. The AYA Research Institute will increase federal data capacity and help resolve the largest gaps in the data upon which EJSCREEN depends in order to increase the tool’s effectiveness. The Institute will also advance data-driven environmental-justice efforts more broadly by (i) growing the pipeline of EJ-focused researchers experienced in working with data, and (ii) embedding EJ expertise into federal decision making. In sum, the AYA Research Institute will strengthen the federal government’s capacity to strategically and meaningfully advance EJ nationwide. 

Summary

In response to growing supply chain challenges and rising inflation, the Biden Administration should create a national competition — The Make it in America Regional Challenge (MIARC) — that activates demand in underinvested regions with cluster-based techno-economic development efforts. MIARC would be a $10 billion two phase competition that would award 30-50 regions planning grants and then 10-15 ultimate winners up to $1 billion to strengthen regional capacity in economic clusters that align with critical U.S. supply chain priorities. 

Challenge and Opportunity

Roughly one in five Americans mention the high costs of living or fuel prices as the most important problem facing the United States. Meanwhile, the COVID-19 pandemic, global competition with China, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine has exposed significant, long-standing weaknesses in U.S. supply chains. For example, more than 40 percent of active pharmacological ingredients, 50 percent of global personal protective equipment supplies, and 90 percent of chemical ingredients for generic drugs are sourced or made in China. 

This is just one small cross-section of a range of critical sectors with diffuse but at-risk supply chains globally. Offshored production in critical sectors not only induces economic loss — like the recent chip shortage which resulted in over $210 billion of foregone revenue — but places a drag on America’s ability to innovate. Indeed, America’s innovation ecosystem has lost the art of “learning-by-building”,  the substantial, value-add interactions that happen when manufacturers are seated at the table with designers. The past is full of examples, including solar panels in which China-based firms have captured nearly 80 percent of market share by betting early on manufacturing innovations that precipitated a nearly 100 percent drop in PV cells’ module costs over the last 30 years.

One reason for the breakdown in supply chains is the geographic gap between where innovation and production takes place in America. Currently, there are only a handful of cities with the “industries and a solid base of human capital [to] keep attracting good employers and offering high wages … ecosystems form in these hot cities, complete with innovation companies, funding sources, highly educated workers and a strong service economy.”  Increasing the capability for non-“superstar” regions to have comprehensive supply chain solutions that couple research, manufacturing, and distribution would improve these regions’ global competitiveness and drastically reduce the nation’s reliance on unstable, global supply chains. Doing so would create new jobs in distressed communities and strengthen U.S. economic independence.

The $1 billion Build Back Better Regional Challenge (BBBRC) launched in 2021 by the Economic Development Administration offers a recent example of how national competitions can spur both local and national economic competitiveness. The competition received 529 applications from all 50 states  and will ultimately award between 20 and 30 regions up to $100 million. Representing tribal, coal, and next-generation hubs of global competitiveness, the 60 finalists each brought unique regional resources to bear including leveraging a total of $30+ billion in federal R&D investments at universities and national labs. 

Final awards aside, new and extraordinary local collaborations and clusters have sprouted across these regions due to the convening power of the BBBRC. Congress and the Department of Commerce should take advantage of this nascent, in-real-time progress by creating a new national competition — The Make it in America Regional Challenge (MIARC). 

If modeled after BBBRC, MIARC would restore America’s full potential to innovate, with supply chains secured by onshoring innovation and production capacities in both the heartland and coastal regions. But it would also spread bring demand to underinvested “stone cold” markets. In turn, total demand and multi-factor economic growth would skyrocket, while prices would stabilize, from the bottom up and middle out.

This approach should not be attempted in every sector. Given the serious supply chain needs, MIARC should focus on critical innovation industries where manufacturing can play a complementary role: semiconductors, high-capacity batteries, rare earth minerals, and pharmaceuticals. As described in the BBBRC Finalist Proposal Narratives, each region is uniquely positioned to support the growth of different sectors. However, public R&D funding into certain industries often generates spillover patent and citation creation in entirely different fields as well. For example, every patent generated from R&D grant funding for energy technologies yields three more patents in other sectors, suggesting a more holistic economic development strategy from targeted cluster investments. 

In fact, extant academic research has described an unparalleled multiplier effect by investing in innovation sectors: “for each new high-tech job in a city, five additional jobs are ultimately created outside of the high-tech sector in that city, both in skilled occupations (lawyers, teachers, nurses) and in unskilled ones (waiters, hairdressers, carpenters).” Exemplifying this effect are America’s top 25 “most dynamic” metros, which over-index on “technology hub” cities that are beginning to spread away from Silicon Valley to previously underutilized regions as  “other metros are now more capable than ever of producing the next tech company with a trillion-dollar market value.”

But successful regional innovation is a complex process, dependent on interregional spillovers of private and university knowledge, frequent face-to-face contact and knowledge-sharing between capable workforces, and sufficient resources for startups to commercialize research from labs to the marketplace. To accomplish these effects, MIARC should target investments that support a dual R&D and commercialization effort, similar to BBBRC’s cluster-building approach. 

This research-commercialization funding approach would yield dividends, as the Department of Energy, National Science Foundation, and additional Department of Commerce programs are deploying a range of regional economic growth strategies. Stitching together ongoing federal resources — either through research assets such as FFRDCs and national labs, or federal research funding at universities — would multiply the effects of these collective upfront investments. For example, empirical research found that research funding investments generated two times as many startups in the proximity of a national laboratory and three times the amount of successful startups (i.e., $10+ million IPO). 

In addition to BBBRC, both the Senate and House have passed different versions of legislation that calls for up to $10 billion for regional “tech hubs”, which programmatically align with the concept of the Make it in America Regional Challenge.

Plan of Action

The Make it in America Regional Challenge would be a $10 billion two phase competition that would award 30-50 regions planning grants and then 10-15 ultimate winners up to $1 billion to strengthen regional capacity in economic clusters that align with critical U.S. supply chain priorities (e.g. semiconductors, lithium batteries, etc.). Drawing from lessons from the BBB Regional Challenge, these investments would be: 

• Split across multiple projects within an economic region and focused on a targeted industry or technology cluster that is critical to both regional competitiveness and U.S. economic independence. 

• Based on regional supply chain needs, including investments in tailored workforce strategies, innovation, and entrepreneurship. 

• Include some percentage of rural counties within the chosen geography, due to the rural-urban nature of supply chains. 

In addition, any application design should allow for throughput from BBBRC applications components into MIARC Phase I applications. The existing Phase I BBBRC applicants, regardless of final award, have embarked on a herculean undertaking assembling unique regional coalitions. 

In selecting additional regions, the Department of Commerce should identify the industry, the region’s related extent of intersectoral knowledge, its source (e.g., local, neighboring, or external regions), and effect on patenting. For example, recent research describes a serious difference in interregional spillover as “innovation in the chemical and electrical and electronic industries is not affected by long-distance private R&D spillovers while it is in other industries.”

Summary

While becoming a parent can bring great joy, having children can also impose an economic burden on families, reduce familial productivity in society, or cause one or more adults in a family — often mothers — to step back from their careers. In addition, many parents lack access to reliable information and resources related to childhood wellness, nutrition, and development.

As the saying goes, “It takes a village to raise a child.” But what if the metaphorical “village” was our entire nation? The momentum of the American Rescue Plan, as well as the spotlight that the COVID-19 pandemic focused on the demands of caretaking, provides the federal government an opportunity to create a new branch of its existing service corps — AmeriCorps — focused on early childhood education (ECE). This new “Village Corps” branch would train AmeriCorps members in ECE and deploy them to ECE centers across the country, thereby helping fill gaps in childcare availability and quality for working families. The main goals of Village Corps would be to:

• Alleviate the economic burden on parents by making affordable, consistent, and reliable care and education available for all children ages zero to four.
• Address the high turnover rate in ECE by leveraging AmeriCorps as a stable pipeline of ECE workers, and by coupling corps placements in ECE centers with a training program designed to grow and retain the overall ECE workforce.
• Boost the American economy by making it easier for parents with young children — particularly mothers — to stay in the workforce.
• Increase childhood health and education outcomes through high-quality early care.

Challenge and Opportunity

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the vast disparity in childcare services available for families in the United States. Our nation spends only 0.3% of GDP on childcare, lagging most other countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Put another way, average public spending on childcare for toddlers in the United States is about $500, while the OECD average is more than $14,000 (Figure 1). The problem is compounded by the lack of mandated paid family or medical leave in most states.

The Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCBG)’s Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) is the primary source of federal funding for childcare. CCDF support is intended to assist eligible families by providing subsidy vouchers for childcare. However, only one out of every nine eligible children actually receives this support, and many families who need support do not meet eligibility requirements. Furthermore, according to the National Center for Children in Poverty, the federal Early Head Start program (which includes infants and toddlers before pre-K age) serves only 3% of those eligible, leaving a major gap for families of children under the age of three.

Limited federal support for families that need childcare creates a vicious cycle. Unlike public school from kindergarten onwards, ECE and childcare facilities rely mostly on parent fees to stay open and operational. When not enough parents can afford to pay, ECE and childcare facilities will lack sufficient revenue to provide high-quality care. Indeed, the Center for American Progress found that “the true cost of licensed child care for an infant is 43 percent more than what providers can be reimbursed through the [CCDF] child care subsidy program and 42 percent more than the price programs currently charge families.” This revenue gap has resulted in a worrying hollowing of our nation’s ECE infrastructure. 51% of Americans live in an area that has few or no licensed¹ childcare options. Only in high-income communities does the predominant model of parent-funded childcare provide enough high-quality ECE to meet the demand. 

Underfunding has left ECE workers barely making a living wage with little to no benefits; although there has been a heavy public focus on low K–12 teacher salaries, the situation for ECE workers is worse. The average annual salary for childcare workers falls in the lowest second percentile of occupations in the United States, versus the 61^st percentile for kindergarten teachers (Figure 2). Poor working conditions and compensation create high turnover in ECE, making it even harder for ECE facilities to meet demand. 

Moreover, scholarship and policy initiatives designed to strengthen the training and satisfaction of the ECE workforce tend to focus on lead teachers. Such initiatives largely overlook the needs of assistant teachers/teacher’s aides, even though (i) these support personnel contribute meaningfully to classroom quality, and (ii) professional development at the aide level has been found to increase retention (Figure 3) and improve longer-term career outcomes. 

These challenges merit federal intervention. Even though ECE is largely a private endeavor, high-quality and widely available early childcare and education contributes to the public good. Research shows that public investment in childcare pays for itself several times over by making it easier for parents to participate in the labor force. Additionally, spending $1 on early care and education programs has been shown to generate $8.60 in economic activity.

But it is not only the cost of childcare that is inhibitory. In 2016, two million parents made career sacrifices due to problems encountered with obtaining childcare. Mothers and single parents are especially likely to be adversely impacted by limited access to childcare. In 2020, mothers of older children remained more likely to participate in the labor force than mothers with younger children. Families are finding it increasingly difficult within the current system to find and gain access to quality childcare, leading to employment issues and an attrition of women from the workforce. Deploying a federally funded corps to fill the ECE personnel gap would stabilize ECE and childcare centers, creating a strong foundation for families and communities that will yield increased economic growth and equity. Americans have never fully benefited from a federally funded and run childcare system. It is time for the federal government and Congress to treat childcare as a public responsibility rather than a personal one

Plan of Action

Building on momentum for familial support established by the American Rescue Plan, the federal government should launch Village Corps, a new ECE-focused branch of AmeriCorps. AmeriCorps is “one of the only federal agencies tasked with elevating service and volunteerism in America.” AmeriCorps also has a long history of implementing programs in classrooms throughout the United States to “support students’ social, emotional, and academic development”, but has never had a program dedicated exclusively to training and placing Corps members in ECE. Village Corps would do just that. Participants in Village Corps would receive federally administered and/or sponsored training in fundamental aspects of high-quality ECE, including but not limited to CPR and first aid, child-abuse prevention, appropriate child and language development, classroom management, and child psychology. Village Corps members would then be placed in ECE centers across the country, providing an affordable, reliable source of infant and early childhood care for working families in the United States. Village Corps members would also have access to ongoing professional-development opportunities, enabling them to ultimately receive a Child Development Associate® (CDA) or similar tangible credential, and preparing them to pursue longer-term career opportunities in ECE.

Village Corps can be developed and deployed via the following steps:

Step 1. Establish Village Corps as a new programmatic branch of AmeriCorps.

AmeriCorps already comprises several distinct branches, including State and National, VISTA, and RSVP. Village Corps would be a new programmatic branch focused on training corps members in ECE and placing them in ECE centers nationwide. The program could start by placing corps members in Early Head Start and Head Start locations, since these are directly funded by the federal government. Piloting the program for a year at 10 sites, with five corps members per site, would require about $2 million: $1.25 million to cover salary costs, plus an additional $750,000 to subsidize living and healthcare expenses, provide an optional education credit, and account for administrative costs.

Program reach could ultimately be expanded to additional childcare centers. The federal government could even consider creating and operating a new network of ECE centers staffed predominantly or exclusively by corps members. As Village Corps develops and grows, it should prioritize placements in states, regions, and cities where a disproportionate share of the population lives in a childcare desert.

Step 2. Develop the core components of the Village Corps volunteer experience.

Recruitment and placement of Village Corps participants should follow the same general mechanisms used for other AmeriCorps divisions; however, the program should strive to place Village Corps participants in positions within their own communities. Village Corps service should be for a minimum of one year, with the option to extend to two. In addition to a modest salary, access to healthcare benefits, and a possible living stipend, Village Corps participants should receive the following benefits:

• Student loan forgiveness. There is precedent for AmeriCorps offering participants assistance with student loan debt: AmeriCorps service counts towards Public Service Loan Forgiveness and may make participants eligible for temporary loan forbearance; the Segal AmeriCorps Education Award can also be used to repay qualified student loans and/or to pay current educational expenses at eligible institutions. Expanding this precedent — at least temporarily — to provide complete student-loan forgiveness for Village Corps participants would be a compelling way to attract initial cohorts and help get the program off the ground.

• Non-Competitive Eligibility status to give Village Corps alumni a step up in the federal hiring process.

• A pathway to Child Development Associate® (CDA) credentialing. The CDA® credentialing program “is a professional development opportunity for early educators working in a variety of settings with children ages birth to 5 years old”. Earning a CDA credential yields multiple benefitsfor people interested in pursuing careers in ECE. CDA® credentials can currently be earned through a variety of pathways. AmeriCorps should work with the Council for Professional Recognition on establishing a designated pathway for Village Corps members.

• Connections to future career opportunities. Leveraging models like Grow Your Own Teachers, Village Corps should provide participants with structured avenues to translate skills and experienced acquired during their service into long-term career opportunities in their home communities. Additionally, Village Corps and its training could be utilized as a talent pipeline and pathway for upward mobility in Head Start and Early Head Start centers. 

Step 3. Build a path for program funding and growth.

To start, the Biden-Harris Administration should work with the House Committee on Education and Labor and the Senate HELP Committee to see if Village Corps can be integrated into legislation like the Universal Child Care and Early Learning Act. The Administration could also consider launching Village Corps as part of the American Families Plan, and/or capitalizing on the budget reconciliation package for Build Back Better. This package is awarding $9.5 billion in grants to Head Start agencies in states that have not received payments under universal preschool programs and $2.5 billion annually for FY2022–2027 to improve compensation for Head Start staff. An additional way to make the program even more attractive would be to propose cost-matching of federal funds for Village Corps by states (if program participants are deployed in state-aided childcare centers), and/or through partnerships with key stakeholders and philanthropic organizations (e.g., Child Care Aware of America, the Child Care Network, the National Association for the Education of Young Children (NAEYC), and the First Five Year Fund) that have a history of supporting expansion and access to ECE. Given the downstream effects of ECE disparity in the workforce, capitalizing on the Defense Production Act could also be an avenue of support for Village Corps (see FAQ). For the longer term, the federal government could consider complementing Village Corps with a Federal Childcare and Education Savings Account (CESA) that would further subsidize childcare for families nationwide.

Conclusion

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted gaping holes in our national early childhood care and education (ECE) fabric and has significantly exacerbated a failing system. The effects of this failure are widespread, compromising familial stability and economic security, the health, and future outcomes of American children, ECE worker retention, national productivity, and workforce participation. Establishing a new ECE-focused branch of AmeriCorps is an innovative solution to a pressing issue: a solution that builds on existing programmatic infrastructure to use talent and funds efficiently and equitably. Village Corps would create a talent pipeline for future ECE educators, boost the American workforce, and make high-quality infant and childcare easily accessible to all working families. 

Summary

Global pandemics cause major human and financial losses. Our nation has suffered nearly a million deaths associated with COVID-19 to date. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that COVID-19 will cost the United States $7.6 trillion in lost economic output over the next decade. While much has rightly been written on preventing the next pandemic, far less attention has been paid to mitigating the compounding effects of endemic diseases. Endemic diseases are consistently present over time and typically restricted to a defined geographic region. Such diseases can exacerbate pandemic-associated financial losses, complicate patient care, and delay patient recovery. In a clinical context, endemic diseases can worsen existing infections and compromise patient outcomes. For example, co-infections with endemic diseases increase the likelihood of patient mortality from pandemic diseases like COVID-19 and H1N1 influenza. 

Accurate and timely data on the prevalence of endemic diseases enables public-health officials to minimize the above-cited burdens through proactive response. Yet the U.S. government does not mandate reporting and/or monitoring of many endemic diseases. The Biden-Harris administration should use American Rescue Plan funds to establish a National Endemic Disease Surveillance Initiative (NEDSI), within the National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System (NNDSS), to remove barriers to monitoring endemic, infectious diseases and to incentivize reporting. The NEDSI will support the goals of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)’s Data Modernization Initiative by providing robust infection data on a typically overlooked suite of diseases in the United States. Specifically, the NEDSI will:

1. Provide healthcare practitioners with resources to implement/upgrade digital disease reporting.
2. Support effective allocation of funding to hospitals, clinics, and healthcare providers in regions with severe endemic disease.
3. Prepare quarterly memos updating healthcare providers about endemic disease prevalence and spread.
4. Alert citizens and health-care practitioners in real time of notable infections and disease outbreaks.
5. Track and predict endemic-disease burden, enabling strategic-intervention planning within the CDC and with partner entities.

Challenge and Opportunity

The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the need for a multilevel approach to addressing endemic diseases. Endemic diseases are defined as those that persist at relatively stable case numbers within a defined geographic region. Though endemic diseases are typically geographically restricted, changes in population movement, population behaviors, and environmental conditions are increasing the incidence of endemic diseases. For example, Valley fever, a fungal respiratory disease endemic to the California Central Valley and the American Southwest, is predicted to spread to the American Midwest by 2060 due to climate change. 

Better preparing the United States for future pandemics depends partly on better countering endemic disease. Effective patient care during a pandemic requires clinicians to treat not only the primary infection, but also potential secondary infections arising from endemic pathogens taking advantage of a weakened, preoccupied host immune system. Though typically not dangerous on their own, secondary infections from even common fungi such as Aspergillus or Candida can become deadly if the host is pre-infected with a respiratory virus. On the individual level, secondary infections with endemic diseases adversely impact patient recovery and survival rates. On the state level, secondary infections impose major healthcare costs by prolonging patient recovery and increasing medical intervention needs. And on the national level, poor endemic-disease management in one state can cause disease persistence and spread to other states. 

Robust surveillance is integral to endemic-disease management. The case of endemic schistosomiasis in the Sichuan province of China illustrates the point. Though the province successfully controlled the disease initially, decreased funding for disease tracking and management—and hence lack of awareness and apathy among stakeholders—caused the disease to re-emerge and case numbers to grow. During active endemic-disease outbreaks, comprehensive data improves decision-making by reflecting the real-time state of infections. In between outbreaks, high-quality surveillance data enables more accurate prediction and thus timely, life-saving intervention. Yet the U.S. government mandates reporting and/or monitoring of relatively few endemic diseases. 

Part of the problem is that improvements are needed in our national infrastructure for tracking and reporting diseases of concern. Approximately 95% of all hospitals within the United States use some form of electronic health record (EHR) keeping, but not all hospitals have the same resources to maintain or use EHR systems. For example, rural hospitals generally have poorer capacity to send, receive, find, and integrate patient-care reports. This results in drastic variation in case-reporting quality across the United States: and hence drastic variation in availability of the standardized, accurate data that policy and decision makers need to maximize public health. 

With these issues in mind, the Biden-Harris administration should use American Rescue Plan (ARP) funds to establish a National Endemic Disease Surveillance Initiative (NEDSI) within the CDC’s National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System (NNDSS). Fighting an individual pandemic disease is difficult enough. We need better systems to stop endemic diseases from making the battle worse. Implementing NEDSI will equip decision makers with the data they need to respond to real-time needs— thereby protecting our nation’s economy and, more importantly, our people’s lives.

Plan of Action

To build NEDSI, the CDC should use a portion of the $500 million allocated in the ARP to strengthen surveillance and analytic infrastructure and build infectious-disease forecasting systems. NEDSI will support the goals of the CDC’s Data Modernization Initiative by allocating resources to implement and/or upgrade digital-disease reporting capabilities needed to obtain robust infection data on endemic diseases. Specifically, NEDSI would strive to minimize healthcare burdens of endemic diseases through the following four actions: 

• Disease monitoring. NEDSI will identify and track notable endemic infectious diseases for each state, including but not exclusive to (i) existing infectious diseases with historical presence and/or relevance, and (ii) infectious diseases that disproportionately impact particular workers. For example, Valley fever disproportionately impacts those employed in outdoor occupations related to ground/soil work (such as agricultural workers, solar farmers, construction workers, etc.). Endemic-disease reporting under NEDSI will follow reporting templates and frameworks that have already been developed by the NNDSS, but will also include information on co-infections (i.e., whether a reported endemic-disease case was a primary, secondary, or higher-order infection).

• Disease notification. As part of monitoring, case-report numbers that rise above historical norms will be automatically flagged for alerts to community members, health-care providers, public-health officials, and other stakeholders.
  • Alerts to community members will be geotargeted (for example, by city, county, or region), enabling residents and travelers in endemic zones to take precautions. Alerts will be text-message-based and include resource links vetted by public-health experts.
  • Alerts to health-care providers will contain links to resources providing the latest information on accurate diagnosis and appropriate treatment of the disease in question. This will allow providers to quickly identify emerging cases of the disease, as well as to prepare for above-average use/need of particular treatments and equipment. 
  • Alerts to public-health officials will help shape recommendations for travel restrictions, emergency-funding requests and allocations, and rapid-response resources. 

• Disease prediction. NEDSI will work with the CDC and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to build an endemic-disease prediction model that ranks the severity of current and anticipated endemic-disease burden by geographic region in the United States, enabling proactive intervention against emerging threats.
  • Model insights will be shared with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and state health departments to inform allocation of funds (e.g., from the federal-to-state and state-to-county levels) to support public health.
  • Key model insights could also be posted on the CDC’s website and transmitted in notices to regional public-health officials and healthcare practitioners, especially when predicted risks and infection trends are high. 
  • Data underlying the model should be made publicly available and accessible to support external disease-modeling and -prediction efforts. 
  • In alignment with priorities of the Data Modernization Initiative and the American Pandemic Preparedness Plan, the CDC could also consider offering financial assistance (e.g., through grants or cooperative agreements) to external research efforts conducted in partnership with NEDSI and/or using NEDSI data. NEDSI and NNDSS should work to identify key research targets and promote them appropriately in Notices of Funding Opportunities.  

• Health education. The NNDSS, utilizing data and model outputs from NEDSI, should prepare quarterly memos synthesizing key information related to endemic diseases in the United States, including (i) summary statistics of endemic-disease case numbers and co-infections by state and county; (ii) an up-to-date list of available treatments, medications, and therapies for different endemic diseases, and (iii) predicted disease trends for coming months and years. Memos should be published digitally and archived on the CDC website. Publication of each memo should be accompanied by a digital campaign to help spread the resource to healthcare practitioners, public-health authorities, and other stakeholders. NEDSI representatives should also prioritize participation in disease-specific research/clinical conferences to ensure that the latest scientific findings and developments are reflected in the memos.

Conclusion

Despite the clear burdens that endemic diseases impose, such diseases are still largely understudied and poorly understood. Until we have better knowledge of immunology related to endemic-disease co-infections, our best “treatment” is robust surveillance of opportunistic co-infections—surveillance that will enable proactive steps to minimize endemic-disease impacts on already vulnerable populations. Establishing a National Endemic Disease Surveillance Initiative within the National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System will close a critical gap in our nation’s disease-monitoring and -reporting infrastructure, helping reduce healthcare burdens while strengthening pandemic preparedness. 

Summary

In the coming decades, the United States’ space industry stands to grow into one of the country’s most significant civil, defense, and commercial infrastructure providers. However, this nearly $500 billion market is threatened by a growing problem: space trash. Nonoperational satellites and other large-scale debris items have accumulated in space for decades as a kind of celestial junkyard, posing a serious security risk to future business endeavors. When companies launch new satellites needed for GPS, internet services, and military operations into Earth’s lower orbit, they risk colliding with dead equipment in the ever-crowding atmosphere. While the last major satellite collision was over a decade ago, it is only a matter of time until the next occurs. As space traffic density increases, scientists project that collisions (and loss of satellite-based services as a result) will become progressively problematic and frequent. 

Due to the speed of innovation within the space industry, the rate of space commercialization is outpacing the federal government’s regulatory paradigms. Therefore, the U.S. government should give businesses the means to resolve the space debris problem directly. To do so, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the U.S. Space Force, and the Department of Commerce (DOC) should create an advanced market commitment for recycling and de-orbiting satellites and large-sized debris. By incentivizing businesses with financial stimulus, novel regulation, and sustained market ecosystems, the federal government can mitigate the space debris problem in a way that also bolsters national economic growth.

Challenge and Opportunity

The sustainability and security of Earth’s outer orbit and the future success of launch missions depend on the removal of sixty years’ worth of accumulated space debris. The space debris population in the lower-Earth orbit (LEO) region has reached the point where the environment is considered unstable. Over 8,000 metric tons of dead, human-deposited objects orbit the planet, including over 13,000 defunct satellites. While this accumulated trash is the product of numerous countries’ space activities, the United States is an undeniably large contributor to the problem. Approximately 30% of orbiting, functional satellites belong to the United States. As such, we as a nation have a responsibility to tackle the space debris challenge head-on. 

Space is becoming littered with dead satellites, and the United States is a major contributor. Over 19,000 satellites have been launched between 1950 and 2020 and currently orbit the Earth (Tile A). The red dots in Tile B above represent the satellites, both dead and active, owned and launched by the United States. Nearly 70% of all satellites in orbit are classified as “junk” (Tile C). The United States is one of the largest contributors of satellite refuse, second only to Russia (4,138 satellites vs. 4,714; Tile D). (Source: Generated using ESRI satellite data)

Our nation’s responsibility is especially acute since rapid growth in the American commercial space sector is likely to further exacerbate the space debris problem. New technology advancements mean that it is cheaper than ever to manufacture and launch new satellites. Additionally, recent improvements in rocket engineering and design provide more economical options for getting payloads into space. This changing cost environment means that the space industry is no longer monopolized by a select number of large, multinational companies. Instead, smaller businesses now face fewer barriers-to-entry for satellite deployment and have an equal opportunity to compete in the market. However, since space debris management is not yet fully regulated, this increased commercial activity means that more industries may be littering LEO in the near future.

America’s mounting demand for satellite-based services will congest LEO’s already crowded environment even further. The U.S. defense sector in particular requires further space resources due to their reliance on sophisticated communication and image-capturing capabilities. As a result, the Department of Defense (DOD) has started recruiting space industries to provide these services through increased satellite deployment in LEO. Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic has boosted consumer demand for satellite-based internet. In response, space industries are racing to extend broadband access to rural areas and remote populations, an effort which the Biden Administration hopes to support through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal. Overall, this combined demand for commercial satellite services from the American public and federal government means that more launches will occur in the years ahead and add to the ongoing debris issue.

The worsening congestion in outer space is a severe nuisance for America’s space industry. Floating trash in LEO creates an immediate physical barrier to commercial space activity. Rocket launches and payload delivery must first chart a safe flight that avoids collision with pre-orbiting objects, which, given the growing congestion in LEO, will only become more difficult in the future.

The space debris issue is also a serious security risk that may one day end in disaster. If space traffic becomes too dense, a single collision between two large objects could produce a cloud of thousands of small-scale debris. These fragments could, in turn, act as lethal missiles that hit other objects in orbit, thereby causing even more collisional debris. This cascade of destruction, known as the Kessler Syndrome, ultimately results in a scenario where LEO is saturated with uncontrollable projectiles that render further space launch, exploration, and development impossible. The financial, industrial, and societal consequences of this situation would be devastating. 

Space debris, especially debris resulting from collisions, is projected to grow significantly in the years ahead. Lines in this figure represent the number of trackable low-Earth orbit (LEO) objects (based on a NASA-based mathematical simulation). The blue line represents rocket bodies, spacecrafts, and other launch-related refuse that have not experienced breakups. The brown line represents debris resulting from explosions, which are caused by internal malfunctions of a given piece of equipment. The pink line represents debris resulting from two or more objects colliding with one another in orbit. (Source: Science Magazine)

If outer space is to remain a viable environment for development and industry, the space debris problem must be solved. NASA and other space agencies have shown that at least five to ten of the most massive debris objects must be removed each year to prevent space debris accumulation from getting out of hand. Orbital decay from atmospheric drag, the only natural space clean-up process, is insufficient for removing large-sized debris. In fact, orbital decay could compound problems posed by massive debris objects as surface erosion may cause wakes of smaller debris cast-offs. Therefore, cleanup and removal of massive debris objects must be done manually. 

According to the National Space Policy, the U.S. government can “develop governmental space systems only when it is in the national interest and there is no suitable, cost-effective U.S. commercial or, as appropriate, foreign commercial service or system that is or will be available.” As such, any future U.S. space cleanup program must actively involve the space industry sector to be successful. Such a program must create an environment where space debris removal is a competitive economic opportunity rather than an obligation. 

Presently, an industrial sector focused on space debris removal and recycling—including on-site satellite servicing, in-orbit equipment repair and satellite life extensions, satellite end-of-life services, and active debris removal—remains nascent at best. However, the potential and importance of this sector is becoming increasingly evident. The U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Robotic Servicing of Geosynchronous Satellites program seeks to cheaply recycle still-functioning pieces of defunct satellites and incorporate them into new space systems. Northrop Grumman, an American multinational aerospace and defense-technology company, as well as a number of other small and medium-sized U.S. businesses, have ongoing projects to build in-orbit recycling systems to reduce the costs and risks of new satellite launches. However, federal intervention is needed to rapidly stimulate further growth in this sector and to address the following challenges:

• The cost of active space debris removal, satellite decommissioning and recycling, and other cleanup activities is largely unknown, which dissuades novel business ventures.

• Space law can be convoluted and the right to access satellites and own or reuse recycled material is contentious. To generate a successful large-scale debris mitigation economy, business norms and regulations need to be further defined with safety nets in place. 

• The large debris objects that pose the greatest collision risks need to be prioritized for decommission. These objects have not yet been identified, nor has their cleanup been prioritized.

Plan of Action

To address the aforementioned challenges, multiple offices within the federal government will need to coordinate and support the American space industry. Specifically, they will need to create an advanced market commitment for space debris removal and recycling, using financial incentives and new regulatory mechanisms to support this emerging market. To achieve this goal, we recommend the following five policy steps:

Recommendation 1. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) should collaborate to provide U.S. space industries with a standard means of identifying which satellites are viable for recycling once they have reached the end of their life cycle.

One reason why the satellite and large debris object recycling and removal industry remains small is because the market is small. The market can be grown by creating a verified system for satellite providers and operators to indicate that their equipment can be recycled or decommissioned by secondary service providers once a mission is completed. To encourage widespread use of this elective registration system, it will need to be incentivized and incorporated into ongoing satellite and rocket regulatory schemes.

Because federal authority over space activity has evolved over time, multiple federal agencies currently regulate the commercial space industry. The FCC licenses commercial satellite communications, the FAA licenses commercial launch and reentry vehicles (i.e., rockets and spaceplanes) as well as commercial spaceports, and NOAA licenses commercial Earth remote-sensing satellites. These agencies must collaborate to develop a standard and centralized registration system that promotes satellite recycling.

Industries will need incentives for opting into this registration system and for marking their equipment as recyclable and decommission-viable. With respect to the former, the recycling registration mechanism should be incorporated into federal pre-launch or pre-licensing protocols. With respect to the latter, the FCC, the FAA, and NOAA could:

• Coordinate with satellite and space insurance industries to offer reduced premiums to those who elect into the registration system.

• Coordinate with satellite and space insurance industries to offer a subsidy for in-orbit satellites that retroactively enroll.

• Offer prioritized licensing or expedited payload launch to registered satellites and rockets.

Recommendation 2. NASA’s Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO), in coordination with the DOD’s Space Surveillance Network, should create a prioritized list of massive space debris items in LEO for expedited cleanup.

Rocket bodies, nonfunctioning satellites, and other large debris represent the highest percentage of overall orbital debris mass in LEO. Since these objects pose the highest risks of additional debris generation through collisions and decay, reducing their stay in LEO is a priority. However, given the continuous generation of space debris and sometimes uncertain or tenuous ownership of older debris items, the federal government needs to create a public and regularly updated “large-debris criticality” index. This index would give large debris items a risk-assessment score based on (i) their ability to generate additional debris through erosion or collision, (ii) the feasibility of their removal, (iii) their ownership status, and (iv) other risk factors. Objects that were put into orbit before NASA ODPO issued its standard debris mitigation guidelines need to be assessed retroactively.

By creating and regularly updating this public index, the federal government would make it easier for public and private actors alike to identify which debris items need to be prioritized for cleanup, what risks are involved, and what technology may be required for successful removal.

Recommendation 3. The Space Force, in collaboration with the Department of Commerce (DOC), should fund removal and/or recycling of a set number of large debris objects each year, thereby creating a reliable market for space debris removal.

By committing to fully or partially fund the NASA-recommended removal of five to ten large debris items each year, the Space Force and the DOC would lower the risk of business entry into the orbital debris removal market and create a sustained market economy for space debris mitigation. The specific monetary reward offered by these agencies for debris removal could be commensurate with the nature and size of the debris item, the speed of removal, and the manner of removal. An additional payout could be offered for the removal of a high-priority large debris item (e.g., an item identified in Recommendation 2 above), or for debris removal that is done sustainably (e.g., in ways that recycle or reuse parts and do not generate secondary, smaller debris).

Recommendation 4. The Space Force – Space Systems Command should coordinate with NASA’s Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer (SBIR/STTR) program to issue a satellite design-based grand challenge aimed at facilitating future satellite recycling efforts.

Grand challenges are popular and often effective tools for stimulating public interest in a given issue and advancing technologies. However, they can fall short of creating a sustainable, long-lasting commercial industry. The Space Force and NASA can overcome this difficulty by designing a grand challenge wherein: (i) research and development costs are shared among private and public participants; (ii) multiple winners are selected at the end of the challenge; (iii) winners are chosen based on whether they meet government capability thresholds in addition to being commercially viable; and (iv) challenge winners are guaranteed a long-term government service contract.

For this grand challenge, Space Force and NASA should encourage the creation and, afterwards, widespread commercial use of satellite design strategies that facilitate satellite recycling, mission extension, or deconstruction. Specifically, the design challenge should focus on:

• Providing enhanced protection against mission-ending impacts by small orbital debris.

• Generating standardized features (e.g., docking mechanisms) that allow future servicing equipment to latch in orbit for repair, deconstruction, and recycling.

• Crafting modular and scalable components that can be easily swapped out, removed, and replaced and thereby lead to downstream recycling and repair.

Recommendation 5. NOAA’s Office of Space Commerce, in conjunction with the Space Force and NASA’s ODPO, should jointly issue an annual research report outlining risk, cost-benefit analyses, and the economics of orbital debris removal and recycling. 

For the growing number of debris recycling and satellite maintenance industries, large orbital debris represent a potential source of valuable materials and resources. While it is theorized that repurposing or salvaging these large debris objects may be more cost effective than de-orbiting them, exact costs and benefits are often unspecified. Additionally, the financial repercussions of accumulating space debris and collisions are largely unknown. 

If industries know the upfront expenses and potential profit of space debris removal, the debris removal market will be far less risky and more lucrative. NASA, NOAA, and the Space Force can fill that information gap by collaboratively creating better tools to assess both the risk and costs posed by orbital debris to future uses of space, including commercial development and investment. 

Conclusion

For America’s space industry to grow to its full potential, end-of-life satellites and other orbiting dead equipment need to be cleared from Earth’s lower orbit. Without removing these items, the increasing possibility of a severe in-orbit collision poses a major security risk to civilian, military, and commercial infrastructure providers. By creating an advanced market commitment for recycling and de-orbiting large-sized debris items, the federal government does more than just address the growing space debris problem. It also creates a new market for the U.S. space industry and stimulates further economic growth for the country. Additionally, it encourages greater public-private collaboration as well as consistent communication between crucial offices within the U.S. government.

This memo is part of the Day One Project Early Career Science Policy Accelerator, a joint initiative between the Federation of American Scientists & the National Science Policy Network.

Summary

One-third of the food Americans eat comes from honeybee-pollinated crops. Honeybees used for commercial pollination operations are routinely treated with antibiotics as a preventative measure against bacterial infections. Pre- and probiotics are marketed to beekeepers to help restore honeybee gut health and improve overall immune function. However, there is little to no federal oversight of these supplements. Apiculture supplements currently on the market are expensive but often ineffective. This leaves unaware farmers wasting money on “snake oil” products while honeybee colonies remain weakened — threatening not just the U.S. agricultural economy, but also the livelihoods of beekeepers and farmers. At the same time, widespread use of antibiotics in apiculture puts honeybees at high risk of spreading antibiotic resistance.

To address these issues, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)’s Office of Human and Animal Food Operations and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)’s National Institute for Food and Agriculture (NIFA) should work together to (1) create an FDA review and approval process for pre- and probiotic apiculture products, (2) design educational programs designed to educate veterinarians on best practices for beekeeping health and husbandry, and (3) offer grants to help farmers and apiculturists access high-quality veterinary care for honeybee colonies.

Challenge and Opportunity

Honeybee pollination services are pivotal to the U.S. agricultural economy. It is estimated that about one-third of the food Americans eat comes from crops pollinated by honeybees. Throughout the past decade, beekeepers have suffered colony losses that make commercial apiculture challenging. These colony losses are caused by complex and interconnected issues including the rise of honeybee diseases such as bacterial infections like American Foulbrood or viral infections linked to pests like the Varroa mite, a general increase in hive pests, habitat fragmentation and nutrition loss, and increased use of pesticides and/or pesticide exposure. 

The substantial threats posed by bacterial and viral diseases to honeybee colonies have driven commercial beekeeping operations to routinely treat their hives with antibiotics (mainly oxytetracycline). Unfortunately, antibiotic treatment can also (i) compromise honeybee health by wiping out beneficial bacteria in the honeybee microbiome, and (ii) promote antibiotic resistance. Routine use of antibiotics in apiculture hence compounds the challenges mentioned above and further compromises the livelihoods of U.S. farmers and the security of U.S. food systems.

In 2017, the FDA responded to antibiotic overuse in apiculture by amending the Veterinary Feed Directive (VFD) section of the Animal Drug Availability Act of 1996 (ADAA). The 2017 amendment required beekeepers to obtain veterinary approval to treat their colonies with antibiotics against certain diseases. While attractive on paper, the implementation of this policy has encountered challenges in practice. Finding a vet who understands the highly complex dynamics of apiculture has been a substantial challenge for commercial beekeepers, especially in rural areas. Improvements to the implementation of the VFD are needed to contain the spread of antibiotic resistance in apiculture.

Relatedly, researchers, beekeepers, and companies alike have all been on the hunt for a solution to restore honeybee health after antibiotic treatment. Pre- and probiotic therapy has recently been proposed as a promising and cost-effective strategy to enhance human and animal health, particularly to restore beneficial gut bacteria following antibiotic treatment. Several companies have developed pre- and probiotic supplements targeted at commercial apiculturists. Two popular supplements are HiveAlive^TM and SuperDFM®-HoneyBee^TM. HiveAlive^TM is marketed as a prebiotic and is composed of seaweed, thymol, and lemongrass extracts. Although there is some evidence that HiveAlive^TM decreases infectious fungal-spore counts and reduces winter honeybee mortality, the value of this supplement as a honeybee prebiotic (i.e., to boost growth or activity of beneficial gut bacteria prior to antibiotic treatment) has not been tested. SuperDMF®-HoneyBee^TM is marketed as a probiotic that can restore the honeybee gut microbiome. But SuperDMF®-HoneyBee^TM is exclusively composed of microbes — isolated from mammals or the environment — that have never been found in honeybees and therefore are probably incapable of colonizing the bee gut. To date, neither HiveAlive^TM nor SuperDFM®-HoneyBee^TM has been scientifically shown to protect or restore the honeybee gut microbiome from adverse effects of antibiotic treatment.

A big part of the reason why pre- and probiotic supplements for honeybees (as well as for other agricultural uses) have not been externally validated is that such products are not subject to FDA or USDA regulation. This lack of federal oversight means that beekeepers interested in using such products have only the manufacturer’s word that the products will work as promised. Federal intervention is needed to protect commercial farmers and beekeepers from predatory companies selling expensive “snake oil” products.

Plan of Action

To ensure the long-term sustainability of U.S. apiculture and agriculture, the FDA and USDA should work together on the following three-part strategy to improve the administration of antibiotics in apiculture and to strengthen the regulation of pre- and probiotic supplements marketed to commercial beekeepers. 

Part 1. Educate veterinarians in beekeeping to limit misuse and overuse of antibiotics.

For instance, the USDA’s Office of Pest Management Policy (OPMP) and National Institute for Food and Agriculture (NIFA) could collaborate with the U.S. Honeybee Veterinary Consortium on an annual training program, hosted at the USDA’s Bee Research Laboratory, to educate vets working in agricultural areas on the basics of honeybee disease, prevention, treatment, and post-treatment options. The training could also discuss the latest evidence on the efficacy of pre- and probiotic supplements, ensuring that vets can help beekeepers navigate this emerging marketplace of products. Additionally, for veterinarians who are unable to travel to in-person training, these resources could be made available in an online portal. 

Part 2. Strengthen regulation of pre- and probiotics marketed to beekeepers. 

Currently, the market for pre- and probiotics targeted at beekeepers is a veritable “wild west”: one that allows the marketing and sale of essentially any product as long as the ingredients included are deemed safe per the Official Publication of the Association of American Feed Control Officials and are either (i) approved for addition to animal feed (per part 573 in Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations (21 CFR 573)), and/or (ii) generally recognized as safe (GRAS) for the intended use (including those listed in 21 CFR 582 and 584). Notably, the efficacy of marketed pre- and probiotics does not have to be demonstrated. Therefore, in alignment with an FDA guidance document recommending stronger oversight of pre- and probiotics targeted at beekeepers, FDA’s Office of New Animal Drug Evaluation (ONADE) should extend its normal animal drug approval process to include pre- and probiotic supplements marketed to beekeepers.

Part 3: Provide apiculturists with better access to high-quality veterinary care.

USDA could create a new Honeybee Veterinary Services Grant Program (HVSGP) that offers rural farmers and beekeepers funding to obtain vet care for their colonies. This program would be modeled after the American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA)’s Veterinary Services Grant Program, which provides funding to help rural farmers access high-quality vet care for farm animals. The USDA could also consider launching a parallel Honeybee Veterinary Medicine Loan Repayment Program (HVMLRP; again modeled on an AVMA program), which would help place vets trained in beekeeping husbandry “in high-need rural areas by providing strategic loan repayment help in exchange for service”. Vets participating in this program would agree to provide the following services:

• Quarterly visits to commercial apiaries in need of vet support. 

• Prescriptions of antibiotics as appropriate after colony inspection.

• Collection and reporting of data on health and treatment outcomes of serviced hives

Conclusion

Widespread use of antibiotics in commercial beekeeping is a problem for bees, beekeepers, and the larger ecosystem due to the spread of antibiotic resistance and the negative effects of antibiotic treatment on honeybee health. The federal government can mitigate these adverse effects by improving the knowledge and reach of vets trained in best practices for antibiotic treatment in apiculture, as well as by improving regulation of pre- and probiotic supplements purported to restore honeybee gut microbiomes following antibiotic treatment. These actions will collectively secure the health of honeybees — and the livelihoods of farmers who depend on them — for the long term.

Summary

For decades, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) has been the patron of groundbreaking biomedical research in the United States. NIH has paved the way for life-saving gene therapies, cancer treatments, and most recently, mRNA vaccines. More than 80% of NIH’s $42 billion budget supports extramural research, including nearly 50,000 grants disbursed to more than 300,000 researchers.

But NIH has grown incremental in its funding decisions. The result is a U.S. biomedical-research enterprise discouraged from engaging in the risk-taking and experimentation needed to foster scientific breakthroughs. To maximize returns on its massive R&D budget, NIH should consider the following actions:

• Form a “Science of Science Funding” Working Group based out of the Advisory Committee to (1) evaluate NIH’s existing funding mechanisms, and (2) pilot several (three to five) novel funding mechanisms. The Working Group should also suggest a structure for evaluating novel funding mechanisms through Randomized Control Trials (RCTs), and should recommend ways in which the NIH can expand its capacity for policy evaluation.
• By Fiscal Year 2025, aim to fund one high-risk, high-reward research proposal for every 20 R01 grants awarded by NIH—instead of the one per 100 that it awards today.
• Explicitly dedicate 5% of its extramural research funding to early-career researchers—including new faculty and postdoctoral researchers—and evaluate those researchers’ proposals separately from the larger proposal pool.

Challenge and Opportunity

Each year, federal science agencies allocate billions of dollars to launch new research initiatives and to create novel grant mechanisms.  But an embarrassingly tiny amount is invested into discerning which funding policies are actually effective. Despite having the requisite data, methods, and technology, science agencies such as NIH do not subject science-funding policies to nearly the same rigor as the funded science itself.

Another problem plaguing science funding at NIH is that it is difficult for scientists to secure funding for risky but potentially transformative work. When NIH’s peer-review process was designed more than half a century ago, over half of grant applications to the agency were funded. NIH’s proposal-success rate has dropped to 15% today. Even credible researchers must submit an ever-growing number of proposals in order to have a reasonable chance of securing funding. The result is that scientists spend almost half of their working time on average writing grants—time that could otherwise be spent conducting research and training other scientists. Our nation has created a federally funded research ecosystem that makes scientists beg, fight, and rewrite to do the work they’ve spent years training to do.

Compounding the problem is the fact that fewer and fewer early-career researchers are getting adequate support to do their work. Indeed, it takes fewer years to become an experienced surgeon than it does to launch a biomedical research career and obtain a first R01 grant from NIH (the average age of R01 grantees in 2020 was 44 years). When we place hurdles in front of young scientists, we lose out on empowering them at a particularly innovative career stage.¹ Limited access to funding early on hamstrings the ability of early-career scientists to set up labs, tackle interesting ideas, and train the next generation. And the early careers of young scientists are often judged by their publishing records, which has the pernicious effect of guiding young scientists to propose safe research that will easily pass peer review. 

A scientific ecosystem that incentivizes incrementalism instead of impact discourages scientists from bringing their best, most creative ideas to the table² — an effect multiplied for women and underrepresented minorities. The risky research underpinning mRNA vaccines would struggle to be funded under today’s peer-review system. To catalyze groundbreaking biomedical research—and lead the way for other federal science-funding agencies to follow suit—NIH should reconsider how it funds research, what it funds, and who it funds. The Plan of Action presented below includes recommendations aligned with each of these policy questions.

Plan of Action

Recommendation 1. Diversify and assess NIH’s grant-funding mechanisms.

In 2020, privately funded COVID “Fast Grants” accelerated pandemic science by allocating over $50 million in grants awarded within 48 hours of proposal receipt. In a world where grant proposals typically take months to prepare and months more to receive a decision, Fast Grants offered a welcome departure from the norm. The success of Fast Grants signals that federal research funders like the NIH can and must adopt faster, more flexible approaches to scientific grantmaking—an approach that improves productivity and impact by getting scientists the resources they need when they need them. 

While Fast Grants have received a great deal of attention for their novelty and usefulness during a crisis, it’s unclear whether the wealth of experimental funding approaches that the NIH has tried—such as its R21 grant for developmental research, or its K99 grant for on-ramping postdoctoral researchers to traditional R01 grant funding—have positively impacted scientific productivity. Indeed, NIH has never rigorously assessed the efficacy of these approaches. NIH must institute mechanisms for evaluating the success of funding experiments to understand how to optimize its resources and stretch R&D dollars as far as possible. 

As such, the NIH Director should establish a “Science of Science Funding” Working Group within the NIH’s Advisory Committee to the Director. The Working Group should be tasked with (1) evaluating the efficacy of existing funding mechanisms at the NIH and, (2) piloting three to five) experimental funding mechanisms. The Working Group should also suggest a structure for evaluating existing and novel funding mechanisms through Randomized Control Trials (RCTs), and should recommend ways in which the NIH can expand its capacity for policy evaluation (see FAQ for more on RCTs).

Novel funding mechanisms that the Working Group could consider include:

• Establishing a “fast-grant” funding track that awards select grants to scientists within weeks, not months, of proposal submission. 
• Funding grant lotteries that select a small percentage of pre-screened and well-qualified grant applications at random for funding.
• Creating a public-private “marketplace of funders” (comprising non-NIH grantmakers such as the Howard Hughes Medical Institute or the Gates Foundation) to which researchers can opt into having their grant proposal automatically submitted if not funded by the NIH. 
• Awarding large (on the order of $5–15 million) project grants designed to support focused research organizations in developing a fundamental tool, platform technology, scientific dataset, or a refined process or resource that would dramatically accelerate progress in the biomedical field.  
• Eliminating grant deadlines. In the last five years, the National Science Foundation (NSF) removed proposal deadlines from several of its directorates. NSF concluded that the policy change gave investigators more time to build strong collaborations and to think more creatively without the pressure and burden of a deadline, leading to an improved quantity of high-quality proposals. NIH should consider doing the same.
• Leveraging artificial intelligence to help identify high-impact research and guide funding decisions. While computers should not make funding decisions alone, data-driven algorithms can help grantmakers identify promising proposals and can help policymakers determine how to structure and where to focus calls for funding.

This Working Group should be chaired by the incoming Director of Extramural Research and should include other NIH leaders (such as the Director of the Office of Strategic Coordination and the Director of the Office of Research Reporting and Analysis) as participants. The Working Group should also include members from other federal science agencies such as NSF and NASA. The Working Group should include and/or consult with diverse faculty at all career stages as well. Buy-in from the NIH Director will be crucial for this group to enact transformative change.

Lastly, the working group should seek to open up NIH up to outside evaluation by the public. Full access to grantmaking data and the corresponding outcomes could unlock transformative insights that holistically uplift the biomedical community. While NIH has a better track record of data sharing than some other science-funding agencies, there is still a long way to go. One key step is putting data on grant applicants in an open-access database (with privacy-preserving properties) so that it can be analyzed and merged with other relevant datasets, informing decision-making. Opening up data on grant applicants and their outcomes also supports external evaluation—paving the way for other groups to augment NIH evaluations conducted internally, as well as helping keep the NIH accountable for its programmatic outcomes.

Recommendation 2. Foster a culture of scientific risk-taking by funding more high-risk, high-reward grants.

Uncertainty is a hallmark of breakthrough scientific discovery. The research that led to rapid development of mRNA COVID vaccines, for instance, would have struggled to get funded through traditional funding channels.  NIH has taken some admirable steps to encourage risk-taking. Since 2004, NIH has rolled out a set of High-Risk, High-Reward (HRHR) grant-funding mechanisms (Table 1). The agency’s evaluations have found that its HRHR grants have led to increased scientific productivity relative to other grant types. Yet HRHR grants account for a vanishingly small percentage of NIH’s extramural R&D funding. Only 85 HRHR grants were awarded in all of 2020, compared to 7,767 standard R01 grants awarded in the same year.³ Such disproportionate allocation of funds to safe and incremental research largely yields safe and incremental results. Additionally, it should be noted that designating specific programs “high-risk, high-reward” does not necessarily guarantee that those programs are funding high-risk, high-reward research in reality.

It is time for the NIH to actively foster a culture of scientific risk-taking. The agency can do this by balancing funding relatively predictable projects with projects that are riskier but have the potential to deliver greater returns.

Specifically, NIH should:

• Strive to shift its HRHR to R01 ratio from 1:100 to 1:20 by FY 2025. Like an investor who mixes reliable blue-chips with riskier growth stocks, NIH should take a portfolio-based approach to balancing lower- and higher-risk research.One HRHR domain that NIH could focus on is increasing investments in developing platform technologies, such as advanced equipment, data-analysis tools, and specialized analysis techniques that support biomedical advances broadly (See FAQ for more on platform technologies). Multiple NIH-funded Nobel Prize winners have won the award for platform technologies (including CRISPR-Cas9, cryo-electron microscopy, and phage display) that have fundamentally shifted the way scientists approach problem solving. Without investing deeply in platform technologies, our nation risks continuing its piecemeal approach to solving pressing challenges.  
• Experiment with a new exploratory HRHR grant. This grant could combine the best features of the MERIT (R37) and Pioneer Award mechanisms, using a set of evaluation criteria that emphasize risk-taking rather than robust preliminary results. The grant would include a time horizon of 8–10 years, with an intermediary review after five years. The grant would also include a renewal mechanism that incentivizes awardees to conduct revolutionary work in their fields, and would be subject to rigorous evaluation. This type of grant would take on a more exploratory and curiosity-driven flavor than the solutions-oriented research—research directed at solving a practical problem—that would be funded under the forthcoming Advanced Research Projects Agency-Health. 
• Revisit high-variance proposal evaluations and explore a “golden ticket” model of proposal evaluation. NIH’s peer-review process for grant proposals typically averages evaluation scores—a choice that drives award decisions towards consensus but creates bias against riskier proposals. Riskier proposals are more likely to garner negative reviews because “they don’t fit neatly within established scientific paradigms” that the peer-review process favors. One way to identify and capture HRHR research through traditional funding channels is to identify grants that have high variance in evaluator scores—an indicator of healthy disagreement. Another option is for NIH to experiment with a “golden-ticket” model wherein a proposal can be greenlighted under peer review if a single reviewer strongly advocates for it. To avoid abuse, golden tickets should be allocated in limited numbers among reviewers, commensurate with the funding payline for a study section. The selection process for NIH’s Transformative Research Award serves as a precedent for this model, which NIH policymakers can build upon and should be pilot in other grant programs.
• Pilot post-award projectmanagement for 100 funded high-risk research proposals. Post-award program management (PPM) is a practice wherein funders are involved choosing collaborators, determining intermediate milestones, and conducting ongoing monitoring. If a project is not meeting milestones, the funders may choose to terminate it early. When combined with high upfront risk tolerance, PPM can ensure that public research dollars are being well spent. PPM also allows funders to shape scientists’ research trajectories by choosing whether and how to conduct reviews for grant renewal, and the extent to which to reward risk-taking as part of intermediate evaluations.

Recommendation 3. Better support early-career scientists.

NIH can supercharge the biomedical R&D ecosystem by better embracing newer investigators bringing bold, fresh approaches to science. In recent years, NIH allocated seven times more R01 funding to scientists who are older than 65 years old than it did to scientists under 35. The average age of R01 grantees in 2020 was 44 years. In other words, it takes fewer years to become an experienced surgeon than it does to launch a biomedical research career and obtain a first R01 grant. This paradigm leaves promising early-career researchers scrambling for alternative funding sources, or causes them to change careers entirely. Postdoctoral researchers in particular struggle to have their ideas funded.

NIH has attempted to alleviate funding disparities through some grants—R00, R03, K76, K99, etc.—targeted at younger scientists. However, these grants do not provide a clear onramp to NIH’s “bread and butter” R01 grants. 

NIH should better support early-career researchers by:

• Explicitly dedicating 5% of its extramural research funding to young researchers, including new faculty and postdoctoral researchers. Evaluation of grant proposals from these researchers should be separated from the larger application pool. By providing a dedicated funding pathway for early-career scientists, NIH will ensure a healthy pipeline of talent and ideas. While the success of funding earmarked for specific groups can’t be rigorously evaluated through an RCT, NIH should still create a set of metrics to evaluate whether dedicated funding is working as intended to boost retention and creativity in the federally funded biomedical ecosystem. 
• Expand funding for young researchers from underrepresented backgrounds. For instance, NIH could create a “Scientists of the Future” grant program that provides support for promising underrepresented scientists at the postdoctoral level. The Hanna H. Gray Fellows Program at the Howard Hughes Medical Institute could act as a model for such a program.
• Experiment with non-traditional metrics in peer-review processes. One reason that older scientists tend to receive more grants is that the peer-review process places emphasis on previous citations (or a derivative thereof, such as the h-index) as a predictor of success. This hurts the chances for younger investigators, who have had less time to publish. NIH should therefore instruct peer-review panels to also consider other indicators of merit, such as:
• Whether an applicant has developed a key dataset or tool that dramatically advances their field. 
• Whether an applicant holds patents for inventions and/or has substantially commercialized prior research.
• The broader impacts of the proposed work. For instance, the NIH could follow the NSF in incorporating a Broader Impacts criterion into its grant-review processes.
• Make funded principal investigators (PIs) accountable for training outcomes. Improving training outcomes is holistically beneficial for the U.S. research ecosystem, but there is little data on the availability of training and mentorship opportunities, or on how effective the opportunities that do exist are. Moreover, PIs have few incentives to invest in training and mentorship. NIH currently has a set of institutional training grant programs that are subject to evaluations, but they are few and far between and not nearly comprehensive enough to meaningfully help the thousands of NIH-funded scientists in training. NIH can act to remedy these problems by embedding training and mentorship into the evaluation criteria for the agency’s flagship R01 grants.

Conclusion

NIH funding forms the backbone of the American biomedical research enterprise. But if the NIH does not diversify its approach to research funding, progress in the field will stagnate. Any renewed commitment to biomedical innovation demands that NIH reconsider how it funds research, what it funds, and who it funds — and to rigorously evaluate its funding processes as well.

The federal government spent about $160 billion on scientific R&D in 2021. It is shocking that it doesn’t routinely seek to optimize how those dollars are spent. While this memo focuses on the NIH, the analysis and recommendations contained herein are broadly applicable to other federal agencies with large extramural R&D funding operations, including the National Science Foundation; the Departments of Defense, Agriculture, NASA, Commerce; and others. Increasing funding for science is a necessary but not sufficient part of catalyzing scientific progress. The other side of the coin is ensuring that research dollars are being spent effectively and optimizing return on investment.

This memo is part of the Day One Project Early Career Science Policy Accelerator, a joint initiative between the Federation of American Scientists & the National Science Policy Network.

Summary

Decarbonizing our energy system is a major priority for slowing and eventually reversing climate change. Federal policies supporting industrial-scale solutions for carbon capture, utilization, and sequestration (CCUS) have significantly decreased costs for large-scale technologies, yet these costs are still high enough to create considerable investment risks. Multiple companies and laboratories have developed smaller-scale, modular technologies to decrease the risk and cost of point-source carbon capture and storage (CCS). Additional federal support is needed to help these flexible, broadly implementable technologies meet the scope of necessary decarbonization in the highly complex industrial sector. Accordingly, the Department of Energy (DOE) should launch an innovation initiative comprising the following three pillars:

1. Launch a vocational CCS training program to grow the pool of workers equipped with the skills to install, operate, and maintain CCS infrastructure.
2. Develop an accelerator to develop and commercialize modular CCS for the industrial sector.
3. Create a private-facing CCS Innovation Connector (CIC) to increase stability and investment. 

These activities will target underfunded areas and complement existing DOE policies for CCS technologies.

Challenge and Opportunity

Carbon dioxide (CO₂) is the largest driver of human-induced climate change. Tackling the climate crisis requires the United States to significantly decarbonize; however, CCS and CCUS are still too costly. CCUS costs must drop to $100 per ton of CO₂ captured to incentivize industry uptake. U.S. policymakers have paved the way for CCUS by funding breakthrough research, increasing demand for captured CO₂through market-shaping, improving technologies for point-source CCS, and building large-scale plants for direct-air capture (DAC). DAC has great promise for remediating CO₂ in the atmosphere despite its higher cost (up to $600/ton of CO₂ sequestered), so the Biden Administration and DOE have recently focused on DAC via policies such as the Carbon Negative Shot (CNS) and the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA). By comparison, point-source CCS has been described as an “orphan technology” due to a recent lack of innovation.

Part of the problem is that few long-term mechanisms exist to make CCS economical. Industrial CO₂ demand is rising, but without a set carbon price, emissions standard, or national carbon market, the cost of carbon capture technology outweighs demand. The Biden Administration is increasing demand for captured carbon through government purchasing and market-shaping, but this process is slow and does not address the root problems of high technology and infrastructure costs. Therefore, targeting the issue from the innovation side holds the most promise for improving industry uptake. DOE grants for technology research and demonstration are common, while public opinion and the 45Q tax credit have led to increased funding for CCS from companies like ExxonMobil. These efforts have allowed large-scale projects like the $1 billion Petra Nova plant to be developed; however, concerns about carbon capture pipelines, the high-cost, high-risk technology, and years needed for permitting mean that large-scale projects are few and far between. Right now, there are only 26 operating CCUS plants globally. Therefore, a solution is to pursue smaller-scale technologies to fill this gap and provide lower-cost and smaller-scale — but much more widespread — CCS installations. 

Modular CCS technologies, like those created by the startups Carbon Clean and Carbon Capture, have shown promise for industrial plants. Carbon Clean has serviced 44 facilities that have collectively captured over 1.4 million metric tons of carbon. Mitsubishi is also trialing smaller CCS plants based on successful larger facilities like Orca or Petra Nova. Increasing federal support for modular innovation with lower risks and installation costs could attract additional entrants to the CCS market. Most research focuses on breakthrough innovation to significantly decrease carbon capture costs. However, there are many existing CCS technologies — like amine-based solvents or porous membranes — that can be improved and specialized to cut costs as well. In particular, modular CCS systems could effectively target the U.S. industrial sector, given that industrial subsectors such as steel or plastics manufacturing receive less pressure and have fewer decarbonization options than oil and gas enterprises. The industrial sector accounts for 30% of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions through a variety of small point sources, which makes it a prime area for smaller-scale CCS technologies.

Plan of Action

DOE should launch an initiative designed to dramatically advance technological options for and use of small-scale, modular CCS in the United States. The program would comprise three major pillars, detailed in Table 1.

DOE should leverage IIJA and the new DOE Office of Clean Energy Demonstration (OCED) to create a vocational CCS training program. DOE has in the past supported — and is currently supporting — a suite of regional carbon capture training. However, DOE’s 2012 program was geared toward scientists and workers already in the CCS field, and its 2022 program is specialized for 20–30 specific scientists and projects. DOE should build on this work with a new vocational CCS training program that will:

• Offer a free, 2- to 3-hour online course designed to raise private-sector awareness about CCS technologies, benefits, and prospects for future projects and employment. DOE should advertise this new program alongside existing grant programs and industry connections.
• Work with community colleges, four-year institutions, and workers’ unions to disseminate the online course and create aligned vocational training programs specifically for CCS jobs. In this effort, DOE should target states like Texas and Louisiana that have carbon-rich economies and low public approval of CCS.
• Partner with DOE-sponsored public university programs and private issue groups like ConservAmerica, American Conservation Coalition, and the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions to advertise and update the course.

This educational program would be cost-effective: the online course would require little upkeep, and the vocational training programs could be largely developed with financial and technical support from external partners. Initial funding of $5 million would cover course development and organization of the vocational training programs.

Pillar 2. Create an accelerator for the development and commercialization of modular CCS technologies.

The DOE Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management (FECM) or OCED should continue to lead global innovation by creating the Modular CCS Innovation Program (MCIP). This accelerator would provide financial and technical support for U.S. research and development (R&D) startups working on smaller-scale, flexible CCS for industrial plants (e.g., bulk chemical, cement, and steel manufacturing plants). The MCIP should prioritize technology that can be implemented widely with lower costs for installation and upkeep. For example, MCIP projects could focus on improving the resistance of amine-based systems to specialty chemicals, or on developing a modular system like Carbon Clean that can be adopted by different industrial plants. Projects like these have been proposed by different U.S. companies and laboratories, yet to date they have received comparatively less support from government loans or tax credits. 

Figure 1. 

Proposed timeline of the MCIP accelerator for U.S. startups.

As illustrated in Figure 1, the MCIP would be launched with a Request for Proposals (RFP), awarding an initial $1 million each to the top 10 proposals received. In the first 100 days after receiving funding, each participating startup would be required to submit a finalized design and market analysis for its proposed product. The startup would then have an additional 200 days to produce a working prototype of the product. Then, the startup would move into the implementation and commercialization stages, with the goal to have its product market-ready within the next year. Launching the MCIP could therefore be achieved with approximately $10 million in grant funding plus additional funding to cover administrative costs and overhead — amounts commensurate with recent DOE funding for large-scale CCUS projects. This funding could come from the $96 million recently allocated by DOE to advance carbon capture technology and/or from funding allocated in the IIJA allocation. Implementation funding could be secured in part or in whole from private investors or other external industry partners.

Pillar 3. Create a private-facing CCS Innovation Connector (CIC) to increase stability and investment. 

The uncertainty and risk that discourages private investment in CCS must be addressed. Many oil and gas companies such as ExxonMobil have called for a more predictable policy landscape and increased funding for CCS projects. Creating a framework for a CCS Innovation Connector (CIC) within the DOE OCED based on a similar fund in the European Union would decrease the perceived risks of CCS technologies emerging from MCIP. The CIC would work as follows: first, a company would submit a proposal relating to point-source carbon capture. DOE technical experts would perform an initial quality-check screening and share proposals that pass to relevant corporate investors. Once funding from investors is secured, the project would begin. CIC staff (likely two to three full-time employees) would monitor projects to ensure they are meeting sponsor goals and offer technical assistance as necessary. The CIC would serve as a liaison between CCS project developers and industrial sponsors or investors to increase investment in and implementation of nascent CCS technologies. While stability in the CCS sector will require policies such as increasing carbon tax credits or creating a global carbon price, the CIC will help advance such policies by funding important American CCS projects. 

Conclusion

CO₂ emissions will continue to rise as U.S. energy demand grows. Many existing federal policies target these emissions through clean energy or DAC projects, but more can and should be done to incentivize U.S. innovation in point-source CCS. In particular, increased federal support is needed for small-scale and modular carbon capture technologies that target complex areas of U.S. industry and avoid the high costs and risks of large-scale infrastructure installations. This federal support should involve improving CCS education and training, accelerating the development and commercialization of modular CCS technologies for the industrial sector, and connecting startup CCS projects to private funding. Biden Administration policies — coupled with growing public and industrial support for climate action — make this the ideal time to expand the reach of our climate strategy into an “all of the above” solution that includes CCS as a core component.

Summary

The scale of mobilization and technological advancement required to avoid the worst effects of climate change has recently led U.S. politicians to invoke the need for a new, 21st century “moonshot.” The Obama Administration launched the SunShot Initiative to dramatically reduce the cost of solar energy and, more recently, the Department of Energy (DOE) announced a series of “Earthshots” to drive down the cost of emerging climate solutions, such as long-duration energy storage.

While DOE’s Earthshots to date have been technology-specific and sector-agnostic, certain heavy industrial processes, such as steel and concrete, are so emissions- intensive and fundamental to modern economies as to demand an Earthshot unto themselves. These products are ubiquitous in modern life, and will be subject to increasing demand as we seek to deploy the clean energy infrastructure necessary to meet climate goals. In other words, there is no reasonable pathway to preserving a livable planet without developing clean steel and concrete production at mass scale. Yet the sociotechnical pathways to green industry – including the mix of technological solutions to replace high-temperature heat and process emissions, approaches to address local air pollutants, and economic development strategies – remain complex and untested. We urgently need to orient our climate innovation programs to the task.

Therefore, this memo proposes that DOE launch a Steel Shot to drive zero-emissions iron, steel, and aluminum production to cost-parity with traditional production within a decade. In other words, zero dollar difference for zero-emissions steel in ten years, or Zero for Zero in Ten.

Challenge and Opportunity

As part of the Biden-Harris Administration’s historic effort to quadruple federal funding for clean energy innovation, DOE has launched a series of “Earthshots” to dramatically slash the cost of emerging technologies and galvanize entrepreneurs and industry to hone in on ambitious but achievable goals. DOE has announced Earthshots for carbon dioxide removal, long-duration storage, and clean hydrogen. New programs authorized by the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, such as hydrogen demonstration hubs, provide tools to help DOE to meet the ambitious cost and performance targets set in the Earthshots. The Earthshot technologies have promising applications for achieving net-zero emissions economy-wide, including in sectors that are challenging to decarbonize through clean electricity alone.

One such sector is heavy industry, a notoriously challenging and emissions-intensive sector that, despite contributing to nearly one-third of U.S. emissions, has received relatively little focus from federal policymakers. Within the industrial sector, production of iron and steel, concrete, and chemicals are the biggest sources of CO2 emissions, producing climate pollution not only from their heavy energy demands, but also from their inherent processes (e.g., clinker production for cement). 

Meanwhile, global demand for cleaner versions of these products – the basic building blocks of modern society – is on the rise. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that CO2 emissions from iron and steel production alone will need to fall from 2.4 Gt to 0.2 Gt over the next three decades to meet a net-zero emissions target economy-wide, even as overall steel consumption increases to meet our needs for clean energy buildout. Accordingly, by 2050, global investment in clean energy and sustainable infrastructure materials will grow to $5 trillion per year. The United States is well-positioned to seize these economic opportunities, particularly in the metals industry, given its long history of metals production, skilled workforce, the initiation of talks to reach a carbon emissions-based steel and aluminum trade agreement, and strong labor and political coalitions in favor of restoring U.S. manufacturing leadership.

“The metals industry is foundational to economic prosperity, energy infrastructure, and national security. It has a presence in all 50 states and directly employs more than a half million people. The metals industry also contributes 10% of national climate emissions.”

Department of Energy request for information on a new Clean Energy Manufacturing Institute, 2021

However, the exact solutions that will be deployed to decarbonize heavy industry remain to be seen. According to the aforementioned IEA Net-Zero Energy (NZE) scenario, steel decarbonization could require a mix of carbon capture, hydrogen-based, and other innovative approaches, as well as material efficiency gains. It is likely that electrification – and in the case of steel, increased global use of electric arc furnaces – will also play a significant role. While technology research funding should be increased, traditional “technology-push” efforts alone are unlikely to spur rapid and widespread adoption of a diverse array of solutions, particularly at low-margin, capital-intensive manufacturing facilities. This points to the potential for creative technology-neutral policies, such as clean procurement programs, which create early markets for low-emissions production practices without prescribing a particular technological pathway.

Therefore, as a complement to its Earthshots that “push” promising clean energy technologies down the cost curve, DOE should also consider adopting technology-neutral Earthshots for the industrial sector, even if some of the same solutions may be found in other Earthshots (e.g., hydrogen). It is important for DOE to be very disciplined in identifying one or two essential sectors, where the opportunity is large and strategic, to avoid creating overly balkanized sectoral strategies. In particular, DOE should start with the launch of a Steel Shot to buy down the cost of zero-emissions iron, steel, and aluminum production to parity with traditional production within a decade, while increasing overall production in the sector. In other words, zero dollar difference for zero-emissions steel in ten years, or Zero for Zero in Ten.

The Steel Shot can bring together applied research and demonstration programs, public-private partnerships, prizes, and government procurement, galvanizing public energy around a target that enables a wide variety of approaches to compete. These efforts will be synergistic with technology-specific Earthshots seeking dramatic cost declines on a similar timeline.

Plan of Action

Develop and launch a metals-focused Earthshot: 

• Design and announce the Steel Shot in close partnership with industry, labor, and communities. DOE should hold a series of roundtables with industry, labor, and communities to define and calculate the gap between zero-emissions and traditional production, often called the “green premium,” for clean steel and aluminum. This should incorporate measures to achieve near-zero carbon dioxide emissions as well as deep reductions in other harmful air and water pollutants to achieve a “Zero for Zero in Ten” goal – zero dollar difference for zero emissions steel within one decade. DOE should launch the Steel Shot with pledges from major steelmakers and steel purchasers, such as automakers.

• Calculate targets along the way to the decadal goal and define how success will be measured. After launching the new Earthshot, DOE should release a Request for Information (RFI) and use an initial Steel Shot Summit to compile projections for anticipated cost parity milestones along the way to the decadal target. DOE should plan to update assessments of the current “green premium” on a regular basis to ensure that research, development, and demonstration efforts are targeted at continued reductions in the cost of clean steel – not just improvements over the original baseline. To assess the emissions footprint of various steel production processes, DOE should work closely with the White House’s Buy Clean Task Force, which was tasked with developing recommendations for improving transparency and reporting around embodied emissions, particularly through environmental product declarations.

• Hold an annual Steel Shot Summit to bring together technologists, industry, and financiers to share solutions and develop projects. DOE should hold an annual Steel Shot event to help to highlight existing innovation efforts underway and connect stakeholders. This summit will build on existing Eartshot stakeholder gathering efforts underway, such as the Hydrogen Shot Summit and the Long Duration Storage Shot Summit.

Invest in domestic clean steelmaking capacity:

• Stand up the seventh Clean Energy Manufacturing Institute with funding for cooperative applied R&D and a demonstration facility. Last year, AMO put out a Request for Information on the establishment of a seventh Manufacturing USA institute on industrial decarbonization. The RFI had a particular focus on metals manufacturing. In 2022, DOE should formally issue a funding opportunity for the institute, with a requirement that the institute conduct cooperative R&D in industrial decarbonization practices and operate a manufacturing demonstration and workforce development facility for low- and zero-emissions manufacturing processes.

• Launch an annual competition for entrepreneurs and companies demonstrating low- and zero-emissions processes that reduce the green premium. Modeled after the SunShot’s American Made Solar Prize, AMO could issue a series of smaller-scale prize competitions targeted at challenges for clean metals. Prizes are particularly effective for challenges where the desired end target is defined and clearly measurable, but the optimal solution to achieve this target is not yet known. The variety of potential solutions for steel decarbonization makes the sector an excellent candidate for a prize program with multiple rounds and awardees. DOE could consider subprograms within the Steel Shot prize that align with reducing key sources of emissions – EPA identifies the three sources of emissions as 1) process emissions, 2) direct fuel combustion, and 3) indirect emissions from electricity consumption.

• Pass legislation to directly invest in deployment of commercial-scale solutions. While a prize program can promote prototype and pilot-stage technologies, real-world demonstration and deployment will buy down the cost of clean steel. These investments should pursue a range of decarbonization opportunities across blast-oxygen furnaces, electric arc furnaces, and emerging direct reduction approaches. They should also ensure that federal funds go to projects with strong labor standards, building on a long legacy of quality U.S. steelmaking jobs. The original American Jobs Plan released by President Biden proposed ten “pioneer facilities” to demonstrate clean industrial processes, including steel. Several proposals included in House-passed bills, such as the Build Back Better Act and the America COMPETES Act, would provide new authorities to DOE to fund commercial-scale retrofits and first-of-a-kind facilities employing clean steelmaking technologies. For instance, an amendment to America COMPETES expands the industrial decarbonization RD&D program authorized in the Energy Act of 2020 to include “commercial deployment projects.” Should these provisions pass, they can be leveraged to rapidly retrofit facilities and achieve the goals of the Steel Shot.

Create demand for “green steel” through market pull mechanisms:

• Match innovators and steelmakers with private purchasers to generate demand for clean metals. Demand-pull incentives can reduce risk for U.S. steelmakers and move the innovations that emerge from DOE R&D and prize programs into commercial adoption, which is critical for additional “learning-by-doing” at scale. DOE can work with domestic industries that are major purchasers of steel to develop sector-based advanced market commitments as part of the Earthshot launch. For instance, DOE should leverage its relationships with major automakers with ambitious climate goals, such as Ford and GM, to spur auto sector commitments to purchasing clean steel. In developing these advanced market commitments, DOE can work with the First Movers Coalition, a consortium of private sector buyers of innovative, clean products, launched by the State Department and the World Economic Forum in Glasgow in 2021. They included both steel and aluminum in their initial round of target products. 

• Use federal procurement power to favor “green steel” for government-funded projects, including infrastructure and defense. AMO and DOE’s Federal Energy Management Program should advise the General Services Administration, Department of Defense, Department of Transportation, and other major federal procurers as they execute federal sustainability plans and procurement working groups, including the Buy Clean Task Force announced in December 2021. For instance, DOE can utilize the Earthshot to provide recommendations on reasonable costs for steel included in a Buy Clean program, and provide technical assistance to innovators to access federal clean procurement efforts.

Summary

The Biden-Harris Administration has made revitalization of U.S. manufacturing a key pillar of its economic and climate strategies. On the campaign trail, President Biden pledged to do away with “invent it here, make it there,” alluding to the long-standing trend of outsourcing manufacturing capacity for critical technologies — ranging from semiconductors to solar panels —that emerged from U.S. government labs and funding. As China and other countries make major bets on the clean energy industries of the future, it has become clear that climate action and U.S. manufacturing competitiveness are deeply intertwined and require a coordinated strategy.

Additional legislative action, such as proposals in the Build Back Better Act that passed the House in 2021, will be necessary to fully execute a comprehensive manufacturing agenda that includes clean energy and industrial products, like low-carbon cement and steel. However, the Department of Energy (DOE) can leverage existing authorities and assets to make substantial progress today to strengthen the clean energy manufacturing base. 

This memo recommends two sets of DOE actions to secure domestic manufacturing of clean technologies:

1. Foundational steps to successfully implement the new Determination of Exceptional Circumstances (DEC) issued in 2021 under the Bayh-Dole Act to promote domestic manufacturing of clean energy technologies.
2. Complementary U.S.-based manufacturing investments to maximize the DEC’s impact and to maximize the overall domestic benefits of DOE’s clean energy innovation programs.

Challenge and Opportunity

Recent years have been marked by growing societal inequality, a pandemic, and climate change-driven extreme weather. These factors have exposed the weaknesses of essential supply chains and our nation’s legacy energy system. 

Meanwhile, once a reliable source of supply chain security and economic mobility, U.S. manufacturing is at a crossroads. Since the early 2000s, U.S. manufacturing productivity has stagnated and five million jobs have been lost. While countries like Germany and South Korea have been doubling down on industrial innovation — in ways that have yielded a strong manufacturing job recovery since the Great Recession — the United States has only recently begun to recognize domestic manufacturing as a crucial part of a holistic innovation ecosystem. Our nation’s longstanding, myopic focus on basic technological research and development (R&D) has contributed to the American share of global manufacturing declining by 10 percentage points, and left U.S. manufacturers unprepared to scale up new innovations and compete in critical sectors long-term.

The Biden-Harris administration has sought to reverse these trends with a new industrial strategy for the 21^st century, one that includes a focus on the industries that will enable us to tackle our most pressing global challenge and opportunity: climate change. This strategy recognizes that the United States has yet to foster a robust manufacturing base for many of the key products —ranging from solar modules to lithium-ion batteries to low-carbon steel — that will dominate a clean energy economy, despite having funded a large share of the early and applied research into underlying technologies. The strategy also recognizes that as clean energy technologies become increasingly foreign-produced, risks increase for U.S. climate action, national security, and our ability to capture the economic benefits of the clean energy transition. 

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has a central role to play in executing the administration’s strategy. The Obama administration dramatically ramped up funding for DOE’s Advanced Manufacturing Office (AMO) and launched the Manufacturing USA network, which now includes seven DOE-sponsored institutes that focus on cross-cutting research priorities in collaboration with manufacturers. In 2021, DOE issued a Determination of Exceptional Circumstances (DEC) under the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980¹ to ensure that federally funded technologies reach the market and deliver benefits to American taxpayers through substantial domestic manufacturing. The DEC cites global competition and supply chain security issues around clean energy manufacturing as justification for raising manufacturing requirements from typical Bayh-Dole “U.S. Preference” rules to stronger “U.S. Competitiveness” rules across DOE’s entire science and energy portfolio (i.e., programs overseen by the Under Secretary for Science and Innovation (S4)). This change requires DOE-funded subject inventions to be substantially manufactured in the United States for all global use and sales (not just U.S. sales) and expands applicability of the manufacturing requirement to the patent recipient as well as to all assignees and licensees. Notably, the DEC does allow recipients or licensees to apply for waivers or modifications if they can demonstrate that it is too challenging to develop a U.S. supply chain for a particular product or technology.

The DEC is designed to maximize return on investment for taxpayer-funded innovation: the same goal that drives all technology transfer and commercialization efforts. However, to successfully strengthen U.S. manufacturing, create quality jobs, and promote global competitiveness and national security, DOE will need to pilot new evaluation processes and data reporting frameworks to better assess downstream impacts of the 2021 DEC and similar policies, and to ensure they are implemented in a manner that strengthens manufacturing without slowing technology transfer. It is essential that DOE develop an evidence base to assess a common critique of the DEC: that it reduces appetite for companies and investors to engage in funding agreements. Continuous evaluation can enable DOE to understand how well-founded these concerns are.

Yet, the new DEC rules and requirements alone cannot overcome the structural barriers to domestic commercialization that clean energy companies face today. DOE will also need to systematically build domestic manufacturing efforts into basic and applied R&D, demonstration projects, and cross-cutting initiatives. DOE should also pursue complementary investments to ensure that licensees of federally funded clean energy technologies are able and eager to manufacture in the United States. Under existing authorities, such efforts can include: 

• Elevating and empowering AMO and Manufacturing USA to build a competitive U.S. workforce and regional infrastructure for clean energy technologies.
• Directly investing in domestic manufacturing capacity through DOE’s Loan Programs Office and through new authorities granted under the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law.
• Market creation through targeted clean energy procurement.
• Coordination with place-based and justice strategies. 

These complementary efforts will enable DOE to generate more productive outcomes from its 2021 DEC, reduce the need for waivers, and strengthen the U.S. clean manufacturing base. In other words, rather than just slow the flow of innovation overseas without presenting an alternative, they provide a domestic outlet for that flow. Figure 1 provides an illustration of the federal ecosystem of programs, DOE and otherwise, that complement the mission of the DEC.

Figure 1

Programs are arranged in rough accordance to their role in the innovation cycle. TRL and MRL refer to technology and manufacturing readiness level, respectively. Proposed programs, highlighted with a dotted yellow border, are either found in the Build Back Better Act passed by the House in 2021 or the Bipartisan Innovation Bill (USICA/America COMPETES)

Figure 1Programs are arranged in rough accordance to their role in the innovation cycle. TRL and MRL refer to technology and manufacturing readiness level, respectively. Proposed programs, highlighted with a dotted yellow border, are either found in the Build Back Better Act passed by the House in 2021 or the Bipartisan Innovation Bill (USICA/America COMPETES).

Plan of Action

While further Congressional action will be necessary to fully execute a long-term national clean manufacturing strategy and ramp up domestic capacity in critical sectors, DOE can meaningfully advance such a strategy now through both long-standing authorities and recently authorized programs. The following plan of action consists of (1) foundational steps to successfully implement the DEC, and (2) complementary efforts to ensure that licensees of federally funded clean energy technologies are able and eager to manufacture in the United States. In tandem, these recommendations can maximize impact and benefits of the DEC for American companies, workers, and citizens.

Part 1: DEC Implementation

The following action items, many of which are already underway, are focused on basic DEC implementation.

• Develop and socialize a draft reporting and data collection framework. The Office of the Under Secretary for Science and Innovation should work closely with DOE’s General Counsel and individual program offices to develop a reporting and data collection framework for the DEC. Key metrics for the framework should be informed by the Science and Innovation (S4) mission, and capture broader societal benefits (e.g., job creation). DOE should target completion of a draft framework by the end of 2022, with plans to socialize, pilot, and finalize the framework in consultation with the S4 programs and key external stakeholders.
• Identify pilots for the new data reporting framework in up to five Science and Innovation programs. Since the DEC issuance, Science and Innovation (S4) funding opportunity announcements (FOAs) have been required to include a section on “U.S. Manufacturing Commitments” that states the requirements of the U.S. Competitiveness Provision. FOAs also include a section on “Subject Invention Utilization Reporting,” though the reporting listed is subject to program discretion. By early 2023, DOE should identify up to five program offices in which to pilot the data reporting framework referenced above. The Office of the Under Secretary for Science and Innovation (S4) should also consider coordinating with the Office of the Under Secretary for Infrastructure (S3) to pilot the framework in the Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations. Pilot programs should build in opportunities for external feedback and continuous evaluation to ensure that the reporting framework is adequately capturing the effects of the DEC.
• Set up a DEC implementation task force. The DEC requires quarterly reporting from program offices to the Under Secretary for Science and Innovation. The Under Secretary’s office should convene a task force — comprising representatives from the Office of Technology Transitions (OTT), the General Counsel’s office (GC), the Office of Manufacturing and Energy Supply Chains, and each of DOE’s major R&D programs — to track these reports. The task force should meet at least quarterly, and its findings should be transmitted to the DOE GC to monitor DEC implementation, troubleshoot compliance issues, and identify challenges for funding recipients and other stakeholders. From an administrative standpoint, these activities could be conducted under the Technology Transfer Policy Board.
• Incorporate domestic manufacturing objectives into all technology-specific roadmaps and initiatives, including the Earthshots. DOE and the National Labs regularly track the development and future potential of key clean energy technologies through analysis (e.g., the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL)’s Future Studies). DOE also has developed high-profile cross-cutting initiatives, such as the Grid Modernization Initiative and the “Earthshots” initiative series, aimed at achieving bold technology targets. OTT, in concert with the Office of Policy and individual program offices, should incorporate domestic manufacturing into all technology-specific roadmaps and cross-cutting initiatives. Specifically, technology-specific roadmaps and initiatives should (i) assess the current state of U.S. manufacturing for that technology, and (ii) identify key steps needed to promote robust U.S. manufacturing capabilities for that technology. ARPA-E (which has traditionally included manufacturing in its technology targets and been subject to a DEC since 2013)and the supply chain recommendations in the Energy Storage Grand Challenge Roadmap may provide helpful models.
• Support the White House and NIST on the iEdison rebuild. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is currently revamping the iEdison tool for reporting federally funded inventions. The coincident timing of this effort with the DOE’s DEC creates an opportunity to align data and waiver processes across government. DOE should work closely with NIST to understand new features being developed in the iEdison rebuild, offer input on manufacturing data collection, and align DOE reporting requirements where appropriate. Data reported through iEdison will help DOE evaluate the success of the DEC and identify areas in need of support. For instance, if iEdison data shows that a certain component for batteries becomes an increasing source of DEC waivers, DOE and the Department of Commerce may respond with targeted actions to remedy this gap in the domestic battery supply chain. Under the pending Bipartisan Innovation Bill, the Department of Commerce could receive funding for a new supply-chain monitoring program to support these efforts, as well as $45 billion in grants and loans to finance supply chain resilience. iEdison data could also be used to justify Congressional approval of new DOE authorities to strengthen domestic manufacturing.

Part 2: Complementary Investments

Investments to support the domestic manufacturing sector and regional innovation infrastructure must be pursued in tandem with the DEC to translate into enhanced clean manufacturing competitiveness. The following actions are intended to reduce the need for waivers, shore up supply chains, and expand opportunities for domestic manufacturing:

• Elevate and empower DOE’s AMO to serve as the hub of U.S. clean manufacturing strategy. Under the Obama administration, recognition that the U.S. was underinvesting in manufacturing innovation led to a dramatic expansion of the Advanced Manufacturing Office (AMO) and the launch of the Manufacturing USA institutes, modeled on Germany’s Fraunhofer institutes. DOE has begun to add a seventh institute focused on industrial decarbonization to the six institutes it already manages, and requested funding to launch an eighth and ninth institute in FY22. While both AMO and Manufacturing USA have proven successful through an array of industry-university-government partnerships, technical assistance, and cooperative R&D, neither are fully empowered to serve as hubs for U.S. clean manufacturing strategy. AMO currently faces bifurcated demands to implement advanced manufacturing practices (cross-sector) and promote competitiveness in emerging clean industries (sector-specific). The Manufacturing USA institutes have also been limited by their narrow, often siloed mandates and the expectation of financial independence after five years; under the Trump Administration, DOE sought to wind down the institutes rather than pursue additional funding. DOE should reinvest in establishing AMO and the institutes as the “tip of the spear” for a domestic clean manufacturing strategy and seek to empower them in four ways: 
• Institutional structure. AMO should be elevated to the Deputy Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary level, as has been recommended by recent DOE Chief of Staff Tarak Shah in a 2019 report, the House Select Committee on the Climate Crisis, the National Academies, and many others. This combination of enhanced funding and authority would empower DOE to pursue a more holistic clean manufacturing strategy, commensurate with the scale of the climate and industrial challenges we face.
• Mission focus. It is critical that AMO continue to work on both advanced manufacturing practices (cross-sector) and competitiveness in emerging clean energy industries (sector-specific), but this bifurcated mission does present challenges. As alluded to in a January 2022 RFI, AMO is attempting to pursue both goals in tandem. With the structural elevation proposed above, there is an opportunity for AMO’s clean energy manufacturing mission to be clarified, with a subset of staff and programs specifically dedicated to competitiveness in these emerging sectors. 
• Regional infrastructure and workforce development. AMO’s authority already extends beyond applied R&D, providing technical assistance, workforce development, and more. The Manufacturing USA institutes provide regional support for early prototyping efforts, officially operating up to Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 7. However, these programs should be granted greater authority and budget to foster regional demonstration and workforce development centers for low-carbon and critical clean energy manufacturing technologies. These activities create the infrastructure for constant learning that is necessary to entice manufacturers to remain in the U.S. and reduce the need for waivers, even when foreign manufacturers present cost advantages. To start, DOE should establish a regional demonstration and workforce development facility operated by the new clean manufacturing institute for industrial decarbonization (similar in nature to Oak Ridge’s Manufacturing Demonstration Facility (MDF)) to accelerate domestic technology transfer of clean manufacturing practices, and consider additional demonstration and workforce development facilities at future institutes.
• Scale. Despite accounting for roughly one-third of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions and 11% of GDP, manufacturing receives less than 10% of DOE energy innovation funding. Additionally, the Manufacturing USA institutes have roughly one-fourth of the budget, one-fifth of the institutes, and one-hundredth of the employees of the Fraunhofer institutes in Germany, a much smaller country that has nevertheless managed to outpace the United States in manufacturing output. To align with climate targets and the administration’s goal to quadruple innovation budgets, DOE manufacturing RD&D would need to grow to roughly $2 billion by 2025.
• Deploy at least $20 billion in grants, loans, and loan guarantees to support solar, wind, battery, and electric vehicle manufacturing and recycling by 2027. Not only is financial support to expand domestic clean manufacturing capacity critical for energy security, innovation clusters, and economic development, but it can also alleviate the barriers for innovators to manufacture in the U.S. and reduce the need for DEC waivers. Existing DOE authorities include the $7 billion for battery manufacturing provided in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and $17 billion in existing direct loan authority at the Loan Programs Office’s Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing unit. DOE’s technology roadmaps can help these programs to be coordinated with earlier stage RD&D efforts by anticipating emerging manufacturing needs, so that S4 funding recipients who are subject to U.S. manufacturing requirements have more confidence in their ability to find ample domestic manufacturing capacity. The same entities that receive R&D funds also should be eligible for follow-on manufacturing incentives. The pending Bipartisan Innovation Bill and Build Back Better Act may also provide $3 billion for solar manufacturing, renewal of the 48C advanced manufacturing investment tax credit, and a new advanced manufacturing production tax credit. While these funding mechanisms have already been identified in response to the battery supply chain review, they should be applied beyond the battery sector. 
• Leverage DOE procurement authority and state block grant programs to drive demand for American-made clean energy. Procurement is a key demand-pull lever in any coordinated industrial strategy, and can reinforce the DEC by assuring potential applicants that American-made clean energy products will be rewarded in government purchasing. This administration’s Executive Order (EO) on federal sustainability calls for 100% carbon-free electricity by 2030 and “net-zero emissions from overall federal operations by 2050, including a 65 percent emissions reduction by 2030.” The Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP), noted in the EO and the federal government’s accompanying sustainability plan as one of the hubs of clean-energy procurement expertise, will play a key role in providing technical support and progress measurement for all government agencies as they pursue these goals, including by helping agencies to identify U.S. suppliers. For instance, in response to the battery supply chain review, FEMP was tasked with conducting a diagnostic on stationary battery storage at federal sites. DOE also delivers substantial funding and technical assistance to help states and localities deploy clean energy through the Weatherization Assistance Program and State Energy Program. These programs are now consolidated under a new Under Secretary for Infrastructure. DOE should build on these efforts by leveraging DOE’s multi-billion dollar state block grant and competitive financial assistance programs, including the recently-authorized State Manufacturing Leadership grants, to support states and communities in planning to strengthen local and regional manufacturing capacity to make progress on sustainability targets (see Updating the State Energy Program to Promote Regional Manufacturing and Economic Revitalization).
• Align the above activities with DOE’s place-based strategies for advancing environmental justice and supporting fossil fuel-centered communities in their clean energy transition. Throughout U.S. history, manufacturing has fostered rich local cultures and strong regional economies. Domestic manufacturing of clean energy technologies and clean industrial materials represents a major opportunity for economic revitalization, job growth, and pollution reduction. DOE also has a major role in executing President Biden’s environmental justice agenda, including as chair of the Interagency Working Group (IWG) on Coal and Power Plant Communities. As noted in the IWG’s initial report, investments in manufacturing have the potential to provide pollution relief to frontline communities and also retain the U.S. industrial workforce from high-carbon industries. Indeed, this is one reason why NIST’s Manufacturing Extension Partnerships played a significant role in the POWER Initiative under the Obama administration. The domestic clean energy manufacturing investments detailed above — including expansion of AMO, new grant programs, and procurement —should all be executed in close coordination with DOE’s place-based strategies to deliver benefits for environmental justice and legacy energy communities and to foster regional cultures of innovation. Finally, DOE should coordinate with other regional development efforts across government, such as the EDA’s Build Back Better Regional Challenge and USDA’s Rural Development programs.

Summary

Congress, the White House, and federal agencies are growing increasingly concerned about the decline in U.S. industrial leadership. The emergence of China’s industrial dominance and the supply chain challenges exacerbated by the Covid pandemic have opened a political window of opportunity. With the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, as well as pending U.S. competitiveness legislation, Congress and the White House are poised to direct significant investments to regions that have suffered from the decline of legacy industries, ranging from the Rust Belt to coal communities. Innovative energy technologies are at the center of this effort. Not only will clean energy supply chains be necessary for the U.S. to rise to the climate challenge, but they have emerged as the main battleground in global industrial competitiveness, as major economies around the world make significant investments in renewables, electric vehicles, and emerging technologies like clean hydrogen. 

There are a range of interventions underway across federal agencies to strengthen U.S. manufacturing and promote regional economic and workforce development. The Department of Energy (DOE) is a key player in fostering innovative manufacturing ecosystems around clean energy technologies and low-carbon industries. 

For nearly half a century, DOE’s State Energy Program (SEP) has supported state leaders as they plan for a clean energy future. However, a resilient, secure, and prosperous clean energy economy increasingly demands investments in advanced energy manufacturing and supply chains. This memo proposes that the Administration update SEP to the State Energy and Manufacturing Program (SEMP), and outlines a specific set of reforms — many of which fall within existing program authorities — that will empower states and regions to foster a strong clean energy manufacturing base and enhance U.S industrial leadership.

Challenge and Opportunity

This Administration and Congress have identified regional innovation as a critical area to advance U.S. competitiveness and economic revitalization. This regional approach is woven throughout the bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), which includes regional hubs for clean hydrogen and other emerging technologies; the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act (and its House companion, the America COMPETES Act), which includes funding for regional innovation clusters; the Build Back Better Regional Challenge funded under the American Rescue Plan, which devotes $1 billion to revitalizing regions suffering from disinvestment; the Interagency Working Group on Coal and Power Plant Communities and Economic Revitalization; and the White House’s supply chain and industrial decarbonization efforts.

These investments also recognize that global growth sectors align with decarbonization. Despite U.S. leadership in R&D for solar photovoltaics, electric vehicles, advanced nuclear reactors, and more, the U.S. has failed to retain significant domestic manufacturing capacity for the energy technologies of the future, posing risks to middle-class jobs, energy security, and climate action in the years ahead. 

Today, China owns 80 percent of the solar supply chain, produces roughly half the globe’s electric vehicles, and leads the world in clean energy investments, spending more than double that of the U.S. While major announcements from U.S. automakers in the past year have brought hope of American electric vehicle leadership, other clean energy industries are struggling in the absence of U.S. manufacturing incentives. 

DOE’s recent supply chain report highlights the need to “leverage regional assets, including resources and workforce development, to support the creation and expansion of industrial clusters” and identifies a range of avenues to provide regional technical assistance. It also states that DOE should “consider whether new authority is needed to enable federal awards, matching grants, direct loan, and loan guarantees to support creation of these clean energy manufacturing clusters and leverage existing public programs (federal, state, local) for regional innovation and manufacturing ecosystems.”

One existing program which could be leveraged in this effort is the State Energy Program (SEP). SEP was authorized by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, passed in response to the energy crises of the 1970s. The program has historically provided cost-shared technical assistance to states to aid in energy conservation planning, as well as some limited financial assistance (i.e., revolving loan funds) for states to increase energy efficiency and clean energy in public operations, such as municipal buildings and schools. The program has five goals:

• Increase the energy efficiency of the U.S. economy; 

• Implement energy security, resiliency, and emergency preparedness plans;

• Reduce energy costs and energy waste;

• Increase investments to expand the use of energy resources abundant in states; and

• Promote economic growth with improved environmental quality.

SEP is considered highly effective, with a leverage ratio of 1:11 between federal and non-federal (including private) funds, annual energy cost savings of $7 for every $1 spent, and hundreds of thousands of students educated in energy efficiency.

Congress and DOE have proposed expansions to the scope, scale, and targeting of SEP in the past (see FAQ #2). These increases in funding and prioritization for low-income and environmental justice communities are well-warranted given the SEP’s strong track record and high return-on-investment, but so too should the scope of funds be updated to reflect our modern supply chain challenges. Energy supply chains and clean U.S. manufacturing have become bipartisan priorities and critical elements of meeting U.S. climate goals.

In the absence of additional support for regional clean energy supply chains, it is highly likely that the U.S. will continue to cede ground to foreign competitors in the energy technologies of the future and grow increasingly reliant on materials manufactured abroad. This poses risks to our ability to mitigate climate change, ensure energy security and national security, and capture the economic benefits of the clean energy revolution. It also is likely to inhibit energy innovation, as regional manufacturing clusters promote “learning-by-doing” and drive advances in material sciences and processes that are simply not possible to achieve in the lab. Finally, maintaining a narrow focus on energy conservation could limit the ability for all states to plan effectively for the clean energy future and develop comparative advantages; even after accounting for population, states do not participate evenly in all aspects of the program based on their needs, interests, and capabilities (see ORNL program evaluation, Figures 3-32). An expanded mandate could increase uptake of the program among states that may have a strong manufacturing base but have been unable to maximize the benefits of a program with a more narrow scope.

Therefore, DOE should leverage its existing authority to rename the program to the State Energy and Manufacturing Program (SEMP) and expand technical and financial assistance to include clean energy supply chain planning. At the same time, Congress should reauthorize, update, and increase funding for the program to ensure states have the ability to develop robust regional clean manufacturing hubs. As domestic clean energy supply chains emerge as a critical element of the national climate, manufacturing, and jobs agenda, this remains pursuant to the program’s goals of promoting energy security, resilience, and economic growth.

Plan of Action

The following action plan includes both executive and legislative actions to update SEP to enable states to plan for and develop a strong U.S. manufacturing base for clean energy. These actions should be implemented in Program Year 2023, with new program guidance issued in early 2023.

Recommendation 1. Make manufacturing an explicit goal of SEP and begin providing technical assistance for clean energy supply chain and manufacturing planning.

Manufacturing is critical to the program goals of energy security, resilience, and economic growth. To indicate its expanded mission, DOE should update the name of SEP to the “State Energy and Manufacturing Program (SEMP)” and begin providing technical assistance to support local and state clean energy supply chains and manufacturing capacity. While Congress should codify this goal, DOE can begin today by leveraging existing authorities like the Energy Technology Commercialization Services Program (42 U.S. Code § 6322(f)). This optional program helps small businesses and start-ups manufacture clean energy technologies (see FAQ #1). DOE can also consider whether to reinstate Renewable Energy Market Development programs, which under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) covered efforts to “develop or expand existing manufacturing capacity for renewable energy equipment and components and support development of specific renewable energy facilities.” 

Recommendation 2. Extend eligibility of technical assistance to consortia of states to support regional planning. 

SEP is an arrangement between DOE and designated state energy offices. DOE should foster regional clean manufacturing ecosystems by issuing new program guidance that enables states to submit collaborative energy plans, particularly for optional plan components. 

Recommendation 3. Increase scale of funding and expand funding mechanisms. 

To enable more robust utilization of existing programs and expansion to manufacturing activities, Congress should increase overall funding for core SEMP activities to roughly $400 million per year (not including additional funding for challenge grants), commensurate with levels proposed by Congress in the CLEAN Future Act (see FAQ #2). Additionally, Congress should explicitly include clean energy and low-carbon manufacturing planning within the core SEMP planning and technical assistance process, and create a new revolving loan fund, the State Advanced Energy Manufacturing Fund, to provide additional financial support to states to use on manufacturing projects. As with SEP’s existing revolving loan fund for building efficiency, these funds could be distributed once the state has “demonstrated a commitment” to promoting clean energy manufacturing through state and private efforts.

Recommendation 4. Direct states to consider opportunities to coordinate with the Department of Commerce, Regional Commissions, and other DOE-led manufacturing initiatives. 

Several federal government programs, including the Economic Development Administration and Appalachian Regional Commission, already focus heavily on regional development strategies, which tend to consider advanced manufacturing opportunities. There are several existing DOE-led and DOE-adjacent initiatives that contribute to this mission as well, including DOE’s Advanced Manufacturing Office, the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s Manufacturing Extension Program (MEP), the Manufacturing USA institutes, and DOE battery manufacturing grants and hydrogen hubs authorized in IIJA. IIJA also authorized a new State Manufacturing Leadership program to provide competitive financial assistance to states that develop smart manufacturing programs.¹ This program is fundamentally different from SEP – it provides short-term competitive assistance rather than long-term block grants, and focuses on advanced manufacturing techniques regardless of sector rather than clean energy supply chains specifically. However, it could be merged with an expanded SEMP, or at least closely coordinated. Additional legislation, such as the COMPETES Act — which contains funding for regional innovation hubs, microelectronics research centers, and direct grants for solar and semiconductor manufacturing — could build upon these regional ecosystems.

SEMP can and should complement these efforts by providing consistent, long-term support directly to state governments, rather than specific projects or companies, to effectively plan and coordinate regional development strategies focused on clean energy technologies. This will enable states to develop and execute on regional manufacturing roadmaps over the course of decades. To do so effectively, SEMP should coordinate with related programs and agencies to identify strategic opportunities for clean energy manufacturing, particularly during the guidance development process.

Recommendation 5. Direct states to dedicate at least forty percent of funds to low-income, environmental justice, and energy communities. 

Under the Biden-Harris Administration’s Justice 40 commitment, forty percent of DOE funds are to be directed to underserved communities. Clean manufacturing can be a crucial tool for promoting economic revitalization and environmental justice in these communities, including those that have historically hosted emissions-intensive manufacturing facilities or fossil fuel production. DOE’s Office of Economic Impact and Diversity should help to connect states with tools, such as its energy justice dashboard and the funding clearinghouse from the Interagency Working Group on Coal & Power Plant Communities, and provide technical assistance to identify and prioritize these communities in SEMP-supported initiatives.