The Obama administration gets a medal for disclosing its New START treaty numbers.

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By Hans M. Kristensen [updated 12 Dec 2011 with new bomber information]

Anyone familiar with my writings knows that I don’t hand out medals to the nuclear weapon states very often. But the Obama administration deserves one after the U.S. State Department’s recent release of the full U.S. aggregate data under the New START treaty.

The release breaks with the initial practice under the treaty of only publishing overall nuclear force category numbers, and re-establishes the U.S. practice from the previous START treaty of providing maximum disclosure of the strategic forces counted by the treaty. This is a good development that has gone totally unnoticed in the news media.

The pressure is now squarely on Russia to follow suit and publish its New START aggregate data as well.

Overall Posture

The New START data attributes 1,790 warheads to 822 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers as of September 1, 2011. A large number of non-deployed missiles and launchers that could be deployed are not attributed warheads.

The data shows that the United States will have to eliminate 243 launchers over the next six years to be in compliance with the treaty by 2018. Fifty-six of these will come from reducing the number of launch tubes per SSBN from 24 to 20, roughly 80 from stripping B-52Gs and nearly half of the B-52Hs of their nuclear capability, and destruction of 100 ICBM launchers.

The released data does not contain a breakdown of how the 1,790 deployed warheads are distributed across the three legs of the Triad. But because the bomber number is now disclosed (each bomber counts as one warhead) and because roughly 500 warheads remain on the ICBMs, it is possible to make an estimate of the number of warheads deployed on the ballistic missile submarines: approximately 1,200 warheads, or two-thirds of the total count under New START.

Ballistic Missile Submarines

The New START data shows that the United States as of September 1, 2011, had 249 Trident II SLBMs onboard its SSBN fleet. Each SSBN has 24 missile tubes for a maximum loadout of 288 missiles, but at the time of the New START count three SSBNs were empty and one partially loaded. With an estimated 1,200 warheads on the SLBMs, that translates to an average of 4-5 warheads per missile.

The assumption is normally that 12 out of 14 SSBNs are deployed, with the remaining two in overhaul at any given time. But the New START data illustrates that the force ready for deployment sometimes is smaller, in this case only 10 SSBNs. Other information shows that this ratio fluctuates significantly, and in average 64 percent (8-9) of the SSBNs are at sea with roughly 920 warheads. Up to five of those subs are on alert with 120 missiles carrying an estimated 540 warheads. That’s enough to obliterate every major city on the face of the earth.

The SSBN fleet conducted 33 deterrent patrols last year, with each operational SSBN sailing on three patrols per year, each lasing 70-100 days. That’s a very high operational tempo, comparable to that of the Cold War.

The bulk of the SSBN fleet is based at Bangor (Kitsap) Submarine Base in Washington. Eight subs are homeported at this base, and the New START data shows that two were out of commission on September 11, 2011: one had empty missile tubes – possibly because it was in dry dock – and another was only partially loaded – possibly because it was in the middle of a missile exchange when the count occurred. This means that six of eight SSBNs at the base were loaded with Trident II D5 missiles at the time of the New START count.

A satellite image taken on August 20, 2011, only 11 days before the New START data count, shows three Ohio-class subs present at Bangor, including one in dry dock and another at the Explosives Handling Wharf. (see figure below).

Three SSBNs were present at Bangor Submarine Base on August 20, shortly before the New START count. Click on image for full size.

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The same image also shows two Ohio-class subs at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard at Bremerton, Washington, only a few miles away. One of the two is an SSGN, a former SSBN stripped of its nuclear missiles and converted to carry cruise missiles and special forces. The other appears to be an SSBN. The New START data does not reflect two entirely empty SSBNs on the west coast, so either one of them was loaded with missiles between the time of the satellite image and the New START count, or the SSBN at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard is from Kings Bay.

The remaining five Bangor-based SSBNs that were at sea the day the image was taken carried 120 missiles with an estimated 540 warheads. Three of those were on alert with 72 missiles and roughly 325 warheads.

In the Atlantic, six SSBNs are based at Kings Bay Submarine Base in Georgia, a significant change from the Cold War when most U.S. SSBNs were homeported on the east coast. Two of the six subs did not carry missiles on September 1, 2011, leaving a deployable force of four SSBNs carrying 96 missiles with an estimated 430 warheads.

The New START data shows that the U.S. Navy has not yet begun to reduce the number of missile tubes on each SSBN. The Pentagon has stated that the number of missile tubes on each submarine will be reduced from 24 to 20 before the New START enters into force in 2018.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

The New START data shows that the United States deployed 448 Minuteman III ICBMs as of September 1, 2011. Most were at the three launch bases, but a significant number were in storage at maintenance and storage facilities in Utah. That included 58 MX Peacekeeper ICBMs retired in 2003-2005 but which have not been destroyed.

The New START data does not show how many warheads were loaded on the 448 deployed ICBMs, but the number is thought to be approximately 500. The 2010 NPR decided to “de-MIRV” the ICBM force, an unfortunately choice of words because the force will be downloaded to one warhead per missile, but retain the capability to re-MIRV if necessary.

Heavy Bombers [updated 12 Dec 2011 with new B-1 information]

The New START data shows that the U.S. Air Force possessed 152 B-2 and B-52 bombers as of September 1, 2011. Of these, 125 were counted as deployed. The disclosure of the bomber count breakdown is important because it has been unclear how many bombers were actually counted by the treaty.  The count includes B-52G bombers that are not used for nuclear missions, but still carry equipment that makes them accountable under the treaty. The last of the B-1s that were still nuclear capable when the treaty was signed were denuclearized in early 2011.

Of the 20 B-2s and 93 B-52s, 18 and 76 (a total of 94), respectively, are nuclear-capable. But only about 60 those are thought to be nuclear tasked at any given time. Stripping excess B-52Hs and the remaining B-52Gs of their nuclear equipment will be necessary to get down to 60 nuclear-capable bombers by 2018.

Heavy bombers do not carry nuclear weapons under normal circumstances, but a few hundred warheads are thought to be stored at the three bomber bases. In addition, hundreds of additional bomber warheads are in central storage. Overall, some 1,000 bombs and cruise missiles are thought to be earmarked for use by the bombers. The NPR states that bombers (along with SSBNs) play an important role in warhead upload scenarios.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The State Department’s release of the full U.S. aggregate data under the New START treaty deserves credit because it increases transparency of U.S. nuclear forces and restores the practice under the previous START treaty of disclosing such information to the public.

After the New START treaty was signed in April 2010 and entered into force in February 2011, it first appeared as if this information would not be released. I warned against this in March, and in May, three former U.S. officials joined FAS in urging the United States and Russia to disclose the full aggregate data.

The first New START aggregate data from February (released in June) did not follow the advice; only six overall numbers were disclosed. The new release of the full September data corrects that mistake.

In context, the data release is extra impressive because it follows the release of other important nuclear information by the United States over the past 18 months, most importantly the disclosure in May last year of the size and history of the total nuclear warhead stockpile and warhead dismantlement.

Following all of this, a clear responsibility now rests on Russia to follow suit and begin to lift the veil for its nuclear arsenal as well. Russia generally discloses very little about its nuclear forces and is falling behind Britain, France, and the United States in transparency. Andrei Nesterenko from the Russian foreign ministry stated in May 2010 that after the New START treaty “comes into force, we will also be able to consider practically the issue of publishing the total amount of deployed strategic carriers and…warheads.”

Well, now the treaty is in force, and with the Preparatory Committee for the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – the so-called NPT PREPCOM – coming up in early May 2012, the next few months would be a good time for Russia to follow the U.S. lead and release the full New START aggregate numbers.

After all, if the Kremlin can share this information with the Pentagon, what’s the point in denying it to the rest of the world?

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

New article published in Arms Control Today

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By Hans M. Kristensen

The latest issue of Arms Control Today includes a new article by Robert Norris and myself about the nuclear targeting review that is currently underway in the Obama administration.

In ordering the review, formally known as the Post-NPR Review, President Obama has asked the military to review and revise U.S. nuclear strategy and guidance on the roles and missions of nuclear weapons, including potential changes in targeting requirements and alert postures, in preparation for the next round of nuclear reductions beyond the New START treaty with Russia.

Our article describes the bureaucratic labyrinth the review will go through before new presidential guidance emerges to change the U.S. nuclear war plan. To that end, we offer a wide range of suggestions for how the review could reduce the requirements for U.S. nuclear forces to “put an end to Cold War thinking,” as President Obama said in his Prague speech in 2009.

Note: accessing the article requires subscription to Arms Control Today.

Further information: Obama and the Nuclear War Plan (FAS, 2010).

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

By Katie Colten and Hans Kristensen

[Modifed] Today, one of the largest weapons in the United States nuclear weapons arsenal, the B53, will be dismantled at the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas. Developed during the Cold War and deployed in 1962, this bomb weighs as much as a minivan and has an explosive yield of nine megatons, equivalent to 750 Hiroshima bombs.

Retired from the arsenal in 1997, the dismantlement of the B53 marks the end of the era of large, multi-megaton bombs, a hallmark of the Cold War. The largest-yield warhead in the U.S. stockpile today is the B83 bomb, which has a maximum yield of 1.2 Megatons.

Administration officials have been busy spinning the dismantlement as proof of the administration’s commitment to nuclear disarmament and as vindication of its plan to spend billions of extra dollars to modernize the nuclear weapons production complex.

In a statement published on the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) web site, Daniel Poneman, the deputy secretary of energy, said that the B53 dismantlement “is a major accomplishment that has made the world safer,” and that “safely [sic] and securely dismantling surplus weapons is a critical step along the road to achieving President Obama’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons.”

“The elimination of the B53 is a significant milestone in our efforts to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and implement President Obama’s nuclear security agenda,” said Thomas D’Agostino, head of NNSA. “Today, we’re moving beyond the Cold War nuclear weapons complex that built it and toward a 21st century Nuclear Security Enterprise.”

If the B53 dismantlement indeed “is a major accomplishment that has made the world safer” and “a critical step along the road to achieving President Obama’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons,” as Boneman says, one might ask why it took 13 years to dismantle the weapon after it was retired in 1997? One reason is that dismantlement is not the priority at the Pantex Plant, which is busy with full-scale production of the W76-1 warhead for U.S. and British sea-launched ballistic missiles, as well as surveillance and repair of the warheads in the “enduring stockpile.”

Warhead Dismantlements

We certainly congratulate the administration on finally dismantling the old B53, but one should not over-spin the achievement. The B53 dismantlement involves less than 50 warheads; the U.S. has approximately 8,500 intact warheads (counting those in the stockpile and dismantlement queue). And warhead dismantling under the Obama administration continues to follow the low rate standard set by the Bush administration. The current dismantlement rate is secret (though past history has been declassified), but very low (only 300-400 warheads per year, according to my estimate) compared with the rate during the 1990s when more than 1,000 warheads were dismantled each year. And it’s not as if there is a lack of retired warheads waiting to be dismantled: more than 3,000 (according to my estimate; the official number is also secret). At the current rate, the backlog of warheads retired through 2009 will not be dismantled until 2022. Additional warheads retired after 2009 will push the completion date further into the future.

Dismantlement performance is an important way to demonstrate U.S. commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament, but the low rate and the secrecy undermine that important effort. And so does the spin. When D’Agostino said in May 2009 that the dismantlement rate had risen more than 150 percent since 2006, he didn’t say that it would drop by half in 2009. Nor did NNSA announce the reduction. Rather than cherry-picking the good news and hiding the bad behind secrecy, the administration should disclose the real numbers and let them speak for themselves.

Warhead Safety

We also agree that it is good to get rid of an unsafe weapon. But since NNSA points to the importance of safety, one should not gloss over the fact that consecutive administrations allowed the B53 to remain in the stockpile even though they knew full well that it was unsafe. The Reagan administration retired the B53 but then decided in 1987 to return the weapon to the stockpile to stand alert against Soviet underground facilities. After a review in 1991 found the B53 to be unsafe, DOE “strongly recommended” to DOD in 1993 that the weapon be retired at the “earliest possible date.” Yet the B53 war allowed to remain in the stockpile for another four years until 1997 when its mission was taken over by the new B61-11 nuclear earth penetrator.

The B53 is not the only case of safety being overruled by targeting requirements. The W62 warhead, the last of which was dismantled in August 2010, was deployed on the Minuteman III ICBMs through 2009, even though the warhead had a lower safety rating than the B53 (D versus C-, according to a 1991 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory study). The W62 safety exemption is all the more striking given that the ICBMs that carried the warhead were on high alert, something that ended for the B53 in 1991.

Even though it was found to be more unsafe than the B53 bomb, the W62 warhead (seen here at Warren Air Force Base in 2009) was allowed to continue to arm Minuteman III ICBMs on alert until 2009.

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Nuclear Funding

As for the B53 dismantlement being used to justify funding the modernization of the nuclear weapons complex, that claim is certainly a stretch given the dismantlement was done using the “old” complex; the modernized complex is not scheduled to come online until the mid-2020s, at which point the current backlog of retired nuclear warheads will be gone. NNSA’s nuclear weapons budget has already been increased by 10 percent over the Bush administration, and the latest Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan shows that the administration plans another 10 percent increase. That funding level is incompatible with current fiscal realities, and no amount of B53 spin can change that fact.

News Clips:

Oct 26: USA Today, “U.S.-made ‘monster’ nuclear warhead B53 dismantled”
Oct 25: Associated Press, “US’s most powerful nuclear bomb being dismantled”
Oct 25: National Public Radio – All Things Considered, “Cold War Bomb to be Dismantled”
Oct 25: Agence France-Presse, “U.S. Dismantles Last Big Cold War Nuclear Bomb”
Oct 25: Wired UK, “Last Nuclear ‘Monster Weapon’ Gets Dismantled”
Oct 25: Daily Mail (UK), “Dismantling the mega-nuke: America begins to take apart B53 that was 600 times more powerful than bomb that flattened Hiroshima”
Oct 25: Gawker, “Goodnight Sweet ‘Monster Weapon'”

More Information:

October 2010: FAS Strategic Security Blog, “Scrapping the Unsafe Nuke”
2005: nukestrat.com, “Reagan Administration Decision to Retain the B53”
April 2005: nukestrat.com, “The Birth of a Nuclear Bomb: B61-11”
December 1991: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, “Assessment of the Safety of U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Related Nuclear Test Requirements: A Post-Bush Initiative Update”

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

New START aggregate numbers have been published by the United States and Russia.

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By Hans M. Kristensen

The latest New START treaty aggregate numbers of strategic arms, which was quietly released by the State Department earlier last week, shows modest reductions and important changes in U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces.

Most surprisingly, the data shows that Russia has increased its number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads and is now again above the New START limit.

Because of the limited format of the released aggregate numbers, however, the changes are not explained or apparent. As a result, though not yet one year old, the New START treaty is already beginning to increase uncertainty about the status of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces.

Overall Changes

Combined, the data shows that the United States and Russia as of September 2011 deployed 3,356 nuclear warheads on 1,338 strategic delivery vehicles, down from 3,337 warheads on 1,403 delivery vehicles in February 2011.

A modest combined reduction of 65 delivery vehicles in seven months, but an increase of 19 warheads; apparently they two nuclear superpowers are not in a hurry to reduce.

The New START aggregate data shows modest reductions in strategic delivery vehicles and a Russian increase of deployed strategic warheads.

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The aggregate numbers not include thousands of additional strategic and non-strategic warheads that are not counted by the treaty. To put things in perspective, the U.S. military stockpile includes nearly 5,000 warheads; the Russian stockpile probably about 8,000. In addition, thousands of retired, but still intact, warheads are in storage for a total combined U.S. and Russian inventory of perhaps 19,000 warheads.

Russia

Most surprising is that the New START data erases Russia’s achievement from earlier this year when its number of deployed strategic warheads temporarily dipped below the treaty limit of 1,550 warheads. According to the new data, Russia has slightly increased (by 29) the number of warheads deployed on its ballistic missiles and now stands 16 warheads above the treaty limit.

The warhead increase comes at the same time that the number of delivery vehicles has declined by five. But since the New START aggregate data – unlike the previous START treaty – does not include a breakdown of missile types, it is impossible to see where the change happened. As a result, transparency of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces is decreasing.

Part of the explanation is the deployment of additional RS-24 ICBMs, which carry three warheads each. But that’s a limited deployment that doesn’t account for all. Other parts of the puzzle include continued reduction of the single-warhead SS-25 ICBM force, the operational status of individual Delta IV SSBNs, and possibly retirement of one of the aging Delta III SSBNs.

The United States

The New START data shows that the United States only removed 10 warheads from its ballistic missiles during the previous seven months, down from 1,800 to 1,790 warheads.

The number of delivery vehicles declined by 60, from 882 to 822, a change that probably reflects the removal of nuclear-capable equipment from so-called “phantom” bombers. These bombers are counted under the treaty even though they are not actually assigned nuclear missions. The U.S. has not disclosed the number, but another 24, or so, “phantom” bombers probably need to be denuclearized. Stripping these aircraft of their leftover equipment reduces the number of nuclear delivery vehicles counted by the treaty, although it doesn’t actually reduce the nuclear force.

Later this decade will come a gradual reduction of the number of SLBMs deployed on SSBNs from 288 to 240. Likewise, if the bomber force is retained, the ICBM force might be reduced to 400 missiles from 450 today.

Conclusions

The New START data shows that Russia and the United States have gotten off to a slow start and excessive nuclear secrecy is reducing the international community’s ability to monitor and analyze the changes.

Russia essentially has seven and half years to offload 16 warheads from its force to be in compliance with New START by 2018. Not an impressive arms control standard. Instead, the task for Russian planners will be how to phase out old missiles and phase in new missiles. There will be no real constraint on the Russian force.

The United States ICBM force could be a big as Russia’s entire triad by the mid-2020s.

The new data underscores the substantial lead the United States has over Russia in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Even as Russia deploys the RS-24 ICBM and Bulava SLBM in the coming years, the gradual retirement of the SS-18, SS-19, SS-25 and SS-N-18 could reduce the total number of delivery vehicles to perhaps 400 by the time the New START treaty enters into force in 2018.

In contrast, under current plans, the United States intends to retain 700 strategic delivery vehicles by 2018. Without additional unilateral reductions, the United States could end up with 50 percent more strategic delivery vehicles than Russia in its triad by the turn of the decade. Indeed, the U.S. ICBM force alone could at that time include as many delivery vehicles as the entire Russian triad!

The U.S. force will retain a huge upload capability with several thousand non-deployed nuclear warheads that can double the number of warheads on deployed ballistic missiles if necessary. Russia’s ballistic missile force, which is already loaded to capacity, does not have such an upload capability.

This disparity creates fear of strategic instability and is fueling worst-case planning in Russia to deploy a new “heavy” ICBM later this decade.

To prevent a deepening of this trend, the Obama administration’s ongoing nuclear targeting review (see also forthcoming article in Arms Control Today) must significantly reduce the excessive nuclear posture currently planned under New START.

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

By Darren Ruch, 1st Lt, MA ANG USAF*

In 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the United States was armed with a stockpile of over 18,300 nuclear weapons.[1]  Since then, the US Air Force (USAF) has conducted a range of military operations while maintaining a nuclear deterrence capability.  Due to a nuclear warhead mishap in 2007, the Air Force reshaped its nuclear deterrence mission and created Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC).  While the establishment of AFGSC streamlined the effectiveness of US nuclear deterrence, Air Force doctrine still has failed to articulate its leadership requirements at the Non-Commissioned Officer and Company Grade Officer levels to successfully accomplish its mission.

Deterrence is defined as “the prevention from action by fear of the consequences.”[2]  Nuclear weapons are not the only deterrent that the US maintains, but it does underpin all other deterrent elements.[3]  In order for the nuclear strategic forces to employ an effective mission of deterrence, adversaries and allies must have a fundamental belief that the US has a credible nuclear capability.[4]  The US forwards its credibility by maintaining a modified nuclear triad, which includes strike capabilities, active and passive defenses, and responsive infrastructure.[5]

Accidents are inevitable in the military, and the handling and transporting of nuclear weapons is no exception.  During the Cold War, with the possibility of a nuclear-tipped missile launch at any given moment, the USAF experienced a number of accidents involving its arsenal.[6]  Since the Cold War, the USAF continues to experience occasional mishaps.

The most notable post-Cold War incident occurred in August 2007. A B-52 crew at Minot AFB was tasked to ferry AGM-129 cruise missiles 1,000 miles to Barksdale AFB for terminal storage.  Because of an ad hoc change, lack of communication, and failure to follow published procedures, some cruise missiles mistakenly contained W80-1 nuclear warheads.[7]  These warheads went unreported missing for nearly 36 hours.[8]  This was the first time in over 40 years that a nuclear weapon was flown over US airspace without special high-level authorization.[9]

This incident violated the principals of deterrence, specifically the passive defense corner of the triad mentioned above.  The warheads were vulnerable because of deficiencies to physical security and mobility.[10]  The credibility of the US’ ability to conduct nuclear operations was negatively impacted, and the Department of Defense (DOD) reacted with reforms.

The DOD and USAF conducted a series of reports, independent assessments, and studies into its ability to conduct nuclear deterrence.  One finding on the nuclear enterprise read: “The nuclear mission…has been dispersed from a single-focused strategic command to three operational commands that have had little or no focus on the nuclear mission.”[11]  Based on these and other findings, the USAF established AFGSC, a new Major Command under Strategic Command.

The principal mission of AFGSC is nuclear deterrence and global strike operations. Its assets include intercontinental ballistic missiles and B-52 and B-2 bombers.  Today, the USAF allocates about 23,000 personnel and $5.2B for nuclear deterrence operations, just over 3% of the FY12 USAF budget.[12][13]

Overseas, the deterrent impacts of AFGSC were nearly immediate and universal.  In August 2009, North Korean radio propagated, “the United States is heated up…a command in charge of nuclear forces was newly established.”[14]  Also, in the same month, a main Russian national press headlined, “Russia to Create New Strike Systems in Response to US Air Force Activity.”[15]  Adversarial states took note of the revamped US deterrence mission and responded to it.

The Air Force’s senior executives, however, did not address the fundamental problem from the 2007 incident: failure of low-level leadership.  A series of low-level leadership failures leading up to the mishap, rather than high-level leadership failures, led to the B-52 crew mistakenly ferrying a nuclear warhead over the US.[16]  The first error occurred when personnel of the Minot Munitions Maintenance Squadron made a last minute change of which cruise missiles were to be transported and failed to note this change in documents from the internal coordination process.[17]  After this first oversight, the breakout crew failed to notice that nuclear warheads were aboard one of the pylons of missiles.  The aircrew also failed to conduct a thorough pre- and post-flight inspection of their aircraft, as mandated in standard operating procedures, that would have revealed the presence of nuclear warheads.  Inspections of the bomber’s payload failed at three independent and subsequent steps.[18]  This series of incidents, all of which stemmed from a failure to follow standard operating procedures, occurred at or below the Squadron level, not because of actions taken by anyone at the General or Senior Executive Service corps.

This incident prompted resignations up the chain of command, from Squadron Commanders to the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force.  But the central failure, which has yet to be addressed in nuclear doctrine or other studies, occurred because of the lack of leadership at the Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) and Company Grade Officer (CGO) levels.  Lieutenant General Frank Klotz, Commander of AFGSC, joked, “the newest B-52 is older than the pilots who fly it, and in some cases twice their age.”[19]  Nuclear doctrine, however, centralizes on executive leaders and others who are as old as the B-52.  Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 3-72, Nuclear Operations, does not make a single mention of leadership below the national level.  The AFDD references a wide range of doctrinal documents, from Basic Doctrine (AFDD 1) to Joint Targeting (JP 3-60), but fails to refer to AFDD 1-1, Leadership and Force Development.[20]

In the first paragraph of its first page, AFDD 1-1 reads, “[there are] two fundamental elements of leadership: the mission, objective, or task to be accomplished, and the people who accomplish it.”[21]  While all supporting documentation that drive the deterrence mission is composed at senior executive levels, NCOs and CGOs are the Airmen who accomplish it.  Until doctrine addresses this actuality, billions of dollars can continue to reform structures but the US nuclear deterrence strategy will continue to operate at a deficit.

The principal functions of doctrine are to provide an analysis of past experiences, to forward lessons learned and best practices, and to provide a basis of knowledge and understanding that can provide guidance for actions.[22]  In the last week of August 2007, there were many lessons that should be passed on to the succeeding generations to provide a common basis of knowledge because of failures at the NCO and CGO levels.  By excluding the critical function of the NCO and CGO corps in the AFDD 3-72, the deterrence doctrine document sends a message to General Officers, Senior Executives, and subsequent ranks that the deterrence strategy is accomplished solely at the mission and objective level, not at the operational level.  As demonstrated by the August incident, this is inaccurate.

The Air Force underwent a major reshaping effort following the 2007 incident in which a B-52 mistakenly carried nuclear weapons across the country.  Assessments from this mishap culminated in the creation of AFGSC, a new Major Command.  Responses to those reports and studies failed to modify doctrine to address the critical importance of the NCOs and CGOs carrying out the deterrence mission.  Until AFDD 3-72 includes the importance of CGO and NCO leadership, US deterrence will not function at its true potential.

* Darren Ruch works at the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) and is a reservist in the US Air Force. As a homemade explosive specialist at JIEDDO, he primarily assists military units deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Also, Ruch serves as a traditional reservist in the Massachusetts Air National Guard as an Officer in their Air Operations Center, a unit that falls under Air Force Global Strike Command. He can be contacted at darren.ruch@ang.af.mil.

 

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Back in the late-1970s, U.S. nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines suddenly started conducting port visits to South Korea. For a few years the boomers arrived at a steady rate, almost every month, sometimes 2-3 visits per month. Then, in 1981, the visits stopped and the boomers haven’t been back since.

At the time the visits began, the United States also had several hundred nuclear weapons deployed on land in South Korea, but the submarine visits apparently were needed to further demonstrate that the United States was prepared to defend the south against an attack from the north.

After North Korea’s nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, shelling of South Korean territory and the sinking of one of its warships, there have been reports recently that an increasing number of South Koreans want the United States to deploy nuclear weapons in South Korea again, after the last such weapons were withdrawn in 1991. They think it is necessary to deter North Korea.

Some analysts have even suggested that the United States should develop an improved nuclear earth penetrator to better threaten North Korean deeply buried targets, an idea that was previously proposed the Bush administration but rejected by Congress.

Boomers in Chinhae

The SSBN visits to South Korea are unique; the United States normally does not send SSBNs into foreign ports. But there are exceptions. In 1963, the USS Sam Houston (SSBN-609) sailed into Izmir in Turkey on a mission to assure the Turkish government that the United States still had the nuclear capability to defend Turkey even after Jupiter missiles were withdrawn from bases in Turkey following the Cuban missile crisis. The Izmir visit was a one-time event, however, and no SSBN visited foreign ports for the next 12 years.

Between December 1976 and March 1981, nine U.S. ballistic missile submarines conducted 35 port visits to South Korea

Then, on December 19, 1976, the USS Sam Houston suddenly arrived in Chinhae, South Korea. The ship was under order to “surface in Korea for 3 days to ‘rattle the saber,” according to a former crew member. This was the first foreign port visit of a U.S. SSBN in the Pacific.

Two visits followed in 1978 but in 1979 the operations expanded with 14 visits conducted by eight SSBNs. In October that year, three SSBNs made three visits for a combined presence of 15 days.

The following year, in 1980, the number of visits expanded to 15, in June with three visits for a combined 17 days in port. In 1981, coinciding with the phase-out of the Polaris SLBM, the visits dropped to only two.

The Political Context

The 35 port visits conducted by nine SSBNs to Chinhae were a powerful message to South Korea and its potential adversaries about the U.S. nuclear capabilities in the area. But exactly what the reasons for the visits were remain unclear.

The visits took place in a complex political situation. South Korea had started a program to develop nuclear weapons technology, President Carter wanted to withdraw U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea, and North Korea was building up its military forces backed by China and the Soviet Union.

Ironically, South Korea had started a nuclear weapons technology program in 1974 not because of doubts about the U.S. nuclear umbrella per ce, but because, according to the CIA, of doubts about the reliability of the overall U.S. security commitment. The program reportedly was terminated in 1976 after U.S. and French pressure. [See here for an insightful analysis]

At the same time, newly elected president Jimmy Carter wanted to withdraw U.S. nuclear weapons from bases in South Korea. At the time the SSBN visits began, the U.S. had approximately 500 ground-launched nuclear weapons at bases in South Korea – roughly the same number of warheads as onboard the missiles of the nine visiting SSBNs. [For a brief history of U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons in South Korea, go here]. In the end, Carter’s withdrawal didn’t happen but the land-based weapons were significantly reduced (see below).

During the time of the SSBN visits, the number of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea was reduced from roughly 500 to 150. The last were withdrawn in 1991.

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The SSBN visits might also have been designed to remind China about the U.S. military presence in the region, despite its defeat in Vietnam. The end of the SSBN visits to South Korea in 1981 and the phase-out of the Polaris SSBNs fleet in the Pacific coincided with China’s removal from the U.S. strategic war plan as part of the Reagan administration’s efforts to recruit China as a partner against the Soviet Union. (China was later reinstated in the war plan in 1997 by the Clinton administration.)

In September 1982, the first new Ohio-class SSBN deployed on its first patrol in the Pacific and over the next five years it was followed by seven other boats, each loaded with 24 longer-range and more accurate Trident I C-4 missiles. (All have since been upgraded to the even more capable Trident II D-5 missile). None of the Trident SSBNs have ever visited South Korea, even after the withdrawal of the last land-based nuclear weapons from the country in 1991.

Implications

The SSBN visits to South Korea are a curious but little noticed footnote in the Cold War history. More research is needed to better describe exactly why they happened, but the visits seemed intended to signal assurance to South Korea and deterrence to its adversaries.

As such the visits have potential implications for today. North Korea has since crossed the nuclear threshold, support seems to be growing in South Korea for returning U.S. nuclear weapons to the peninsula, and some argue that better nuclear capabilities are needed to deter Pyongyang.

But the visits are a reminder of the already considerable nuclear capabilities in the region that could be used to signal. Nuclear-capable bombers routinely forward deploy to Guam, and the eight SSBNs patrolling in the Pacific could surface again and visit South Korea if necessary.

Nearly 30,000 U.S. troops in South Korea, large-scale conventional exercises such as the three-carrier battlegroup Valiant Shield (image) and the half-a-million-man Ulchi Freedom Guardian, as well as forward operations of nuclear-capable forces in the region provide a powerful deterrent.

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The question is whether it is necessary. The nuclear capabilities the United States operates in the Pacific region today are far more capable than in the 1970s, and the combined conventional forces of South Korea and the United States enjoy a significant advantage over North Korea’s aging conventional forces. To the extent that anything can, these forces should be sufficient to deter large-scale North Korean attacks against the south.

Indeed, Pyongyang’s obsession with the U.S. nuclear capabilities – even its misperception that Washington still deploys nuclear weapons in South Korea – strongly suggests that the current nuclear umbrella has Pyongyang’s full attention and that nuclear redeployment or nuclear bunker busters are not needed. After all, the objective is to move forward toward a denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, not return to the past.

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

Click on image to download document.

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By Nickolas Roth, Hans M. Kristensen and Stephen Young

Note: This is the fourth of four posts analyzing the FY 2012 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, each jointly produced by the Federation of American Scientists and Union of Concerned Scientists. See previous posts: 1, 2, 3.

The FY2012 SSMP repeats the promise made in numerous previous government documents and official statements: construction of new factories with greater warhead production capability might enable retirement of some “hedge” warheads after the “responsive complex” has come online in the early-2020s and thereby reduce the overall size of the stockpile.

Today, the United States has approximately 2,150 operational warheads and another 2,850 in the hedge, for a stockpile total of 5,000. The FY2011 SSMP stated (Annex D, p. 2) that the planned production complex would be able to support a stockpile of 3,000-3,500 warheads, a level 1,500-2,000 warheads below today’s stockpile. However, it did not provide a timetable or strategy for any such reductions.

The FY2012 SSMP does, however, place conditions on further reductions. The report states that the number of nuclear weapons in the nation’s stockpile “may be reduced…if planned LEPs are completed successfully, the future infrastructure of the NNSA enterprise is achieved, and geopolitical stability permits” (emphasis added). The first two items on this list will not be accomplished for at least twenty years, but the plan shows that production of “hedge” warheads will continue even after that.

Specifically, the FY2012 SSNP states that this new production capacity is required “regardless of the size of stockpile” and shows that NNSA now plans to produce W78 hedge warheads during the 2021-2024 W78 LEP and even “continue production of additional hedge warheads” through 2035.

NNSA Plans Production of More Hedge Warheads

Despite a promise that construction of new warhead production facilities will permit a reduction of the “hedge” of non-deployed warheads in the stockpile, the FY2012 SSMP shows that the new facilities will be used to produce “additional hedge warheads.” The key phrase is enlarged above. Click on image to see the original.

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The chart hints that hedge warhead production might also be part of the other warhead LEPs in the NNSA plan. The reason for the additional W78 hedge production in 2025-2035 is not stated. Right now, there are approximately 600 W78s in the stockpile, of which 350 are in the hedge. Are they planning to increase the latter number? Or is that simply continuing production of the “common or adaptable” warhead that would be actually used in the W88 LEP later on? Have other LEPs not been performed on warheads in the hedge, but they will here? The answer is a mystery.

Yet the use of new warhead production facilities to produce additional hedge warheads undermines the administration’s message that the new facilities are needed to allow a reduction of the stockpile. It suggests that even with a new “responsive” warhead production complex, the future stockpile will still include a sizeable hedge of reserve warheads.

Additionally, although the SSMP states that these facilities are needed to “maintain a safe, secure, and reliable arsenal over the long term,” these facilities will not be operational until most of the currently planned Life Extension Programs are either completed or well underway. That makes the plan to use the new facilities to produce additional hedge warheads particularly problematic.

About the authors: Nickolas Roth is Policy Fellow for the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation and a graduate student at the University of Maryland, Hans M. Kristensen is the Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, and Stephen Young is a Senior Analyst at Union of Concerned Scientists.

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

Click on image to download document.

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By Nickolas Roth, Hans M. Kristensen and Stephen Young

Note: This is the third of four posts analyzing the FY 2012 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, each jointly produced by the Federation of American Scientists and Union of Concerned Scientists. See previous posts: 1, 2, 4.

Since the 1950s, the performance of U.S. nuclear warheads has been successfully validated using a wide range of simulation experiments, such as the compression of fissile material in hydrodynamic tests. And as the stockpile ages “and modernization design options become more complex,” the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) states, “subcritical experiment that include special nuclear material will become more important” (emphasis added). (Special nuclear material refers to highly enriched uranium and plutonium, which are key components of a nuclear weapon.)

The SSMP and other documents describe an interest in a type of hydrodynamic test called a “scaled experiment,” which uses more special nuclear material and more closely resembles actual warhead designs. The public justification is to “improve confidence in predictive capabilities and help validate simulation codes,” but part of the reason is also that those codes will become less reliable if NNSA changes the warhead designs by adding new safety and security features during the Life Extension Programs.

Hydrodynamic Experiments

Every year, the United States conducts “hydrodynamic” experiments designed to mimic the first stages of a nuclear explosion. In tests, conventional high explosives are set off to study the effects of the explosion on specific materials. The term “hydrodynamic” is used because material is compressed and heated with such intensity that it begins to flow and mix like a fluid, and “hydrodynamic equations” are used to describe the behavior of fluids. In one type of hydrodynamic test, researchers build a full-scale primary—the first stage of a modern nuclear weapon—but the plutonium is replaced with a metal that has similar density and weight, but is not fissionable. The device is then fired, revealing information on the design’s behavior from the high-explosive detonation to the beginning of the nuclear chain reaction.

A hydrodynamic test of the W76 warhead design is conducted at the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory in 2005.

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Hydrodynamic tests using small amounts of plutonium are conducted underground at the U1a facility at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly the Nevada Test Site), while others using surrogate materials occur at the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, and the Contained Firing Facility at Site 300 of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California. The tests vary greatly in scale and purpose (and there is some overlap) but fall into two overall categories: Integrated Weapons Experiments (IWEs) and Focused Experiments (FEs).

A model of a pin shot hydrodynamic experiment.

Integrated Weapons Experiments (IWEs) use a rough approximation of an actual War Reserve warhead configuration, minus the special nuclear material. They can address many performance-related questions in one test. IWEs are used to validate modern weapon baseline models (the tested warhead designs) and are the most comprehensive tool for validating computer codes based on past nuclear weapon tests. Some IWEs involve “core punches” that use powerful radiographic imaging equipment to photograph the interior of nuclear weapon or surrogates’ components. Others are “pin shot” experiments that use hundreds of fiber optic, electrical or other types of “pins” emanating from a center to determine features of the plutonium pit or a surrogate pit as it implodes (see image). In 2007, NNSA estimated that it needed to conduct approximately 10 IWEs annually to meet its programmatic needs. However, at the time, part of its program included development of the Reliable Replacement Warhead, which Congress cancelled in 2008.

Focused Experiments (FEs) are smaller and less costly experiments than IWEs and are used to study and isolate issues related to specific components or materials used in nuclear weapons. FEs can be used to help validate computer codes and aid in advanced diagnostic development. In 2007, NNSA estimated that it needed approximately 50 focused experiments annually to meet its programmatic needs.

When IWEs, FEs or small-scale experiments involve use of special nuclear material, usually plutonium, they are called “subcritical” tests. “Subcritical” refers to the fact that the amount of special nuclear material used is not enough to initiate a chain reaction. These tests are conducted at the underground U1a facility in Nevada.

According to the nuclear weapons laboratories, hydrodynamic tests “provide essential data in developing and modifying weapons; such as Life Extension Programs” (emphasis added).

Scaled Experiments

The FY2012 SSMP refers to so-called “scaled experiments” as part of the hydrodynamic testing program. In older documents, NNSA describes scaled experiments as imploding “a primary using Pu-239 that is small enough (scaled) so that it remains sub-critical and core punch radiography can be used to validate modeling its gas cavity shape.” Unfortunately, NNSA doesn’t describe what scaled experiments are in its more recent documents or why they are needed, other than noting they “could improve the predictive capability of numerical calculations by providing data on plutonium behavior under compression by high explosives.” (FY12 SSMP, p. 62)

As far as we can gauge, scaled experiments are subcritical, core-punch, hydrodynamic tests designed to conduct experiments in an implosion geometry that is essentially identical to an actual warhead design, but reduced in size. Rather than a full-scale warhead with the plutonium replaced by other material, a one-third to one-half scale model is built that does use plutonium. At a half-scale size, only one-eighth of the plutonium in an actual warhead is required. The smaller amount of plutonium keeps the explosion from beginning a nuclear chain reaction. Eventually, NNSA wants to build scaled experiments to almost three-quarters (0.7) the size of a full primary.

Some NNSA officials claim to have conducted a scaled experiment in 2005, a claim that is disputed by others, including Administrator Tom D’Agostino.  Some recent hydrodynamic experiments have involved scaled technologies. Since 2008, for example, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has carried out several experiments to study the size at which conventional high explosive boosters could ignite the main conventional high explosive that compresses the plutonium. The experiments have used half-scale IWE primaries to better understand how boosting of the warhead yield works as the gas cavity is compressed during implosion.

One interesting note is that the push for scaled experiments is coming from NNSA officials, not the nuclear weapons laboratories. The labs have resisted because they are overburdened by the increasingly ambitious Life Extension Programs. NNSA officials claim that scaled experiments could yield ten times more data points and save money because one large scaled experiment could replace twenty of the smaller hydrodynamic experiments conducted today. Lab scientists maintain that scaled experiments would require major new equipment investments that are not currently planned. At present, U1a in Nevada apparently does not have the diagnostic equipment needed to harvest the additional data generated by scaled experiments.

Little additional information is available about scaled experiments, but more may be on the way, at least in classified settings. Congress has asked the independent technical expert group JASON to conduct a study to assess the benefits of these experiments. And NNSA is also conducting a review to better define what it wants from these (and other) tests. But just last week, the Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee barred funding for scaled experiments, stating they “may not be needed for annual assessments of the current stockpile” and “may interfere with achieving the Nuclear Posture Review’s goals and schedule.”

The NNSA was directed by the appropriators to await the results of the JASON study and, if the agency wants to move forward, to “submit a plan explaining the scientific value of scaled experiments for stockpile stewardship and meeting the goals of the Nuclear Posture Review, the costs of developing the capabilities for and conducting scaled experiments, and the impact on other stockpile stewardship activities under constrained budgets.”

That sounds like a reasonable requirement to us.

About the authors: Nickolas Roth is Policy Fellow for the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation and a graduate student at the University of Maryland, Hans M. Kristensen is the Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, and Stephen Young is a Senior Analyst at Union of Concerned Scientists.

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

Click on image to download document.

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By Nickolas Roth, Hans M. Kristensen and Stephen Young

Note: This is the second of four posts analyzing the FY 2012 Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan, each jointly produced by the Federation of American Scientists and Union of Concerned Scientists. See the other posts: 1, 3, 4.

According to the FY2012 Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan (SSMP), from 2011 to 2031, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) plans to spend almost $16 billion on Life Extension Programs (LEPs) to extend the service life and significantly modify almost every warhead in the enduring stockpile. This includes an estimated $3.7 billion on the W88 warhead, $3.9 billion on the B61 bomb, $4.2 billion on the W78 warhead, $1.7 billion on the W76 warhead, and $2.3 billion on the W80-1 warhead.

These figures do not include almost $11 billion in additional NNSA expenses simply to maintain the stockpile, outside of the LEP programs. This brings total spending on nuclear warheads over the next twenty years to $27 billion. These budget figures reflect a significant investment in maintaining and modifying the nuclear stockpile.

The FY2012 SSMP contains a large number of graphs including this one, which adopts the style from the graph FAS and UCS produced in our analysis of the FY2011 plan.

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The FY2012 SSMP provides one possible indication that LEP programs are becoming more ambitious and will incorporate more intrusive changes to the warheads. For each weapon type, different variants are designated by a modification, or “Mod” number, as indicated by a hyphen followed by a number at the end of the warhead type, e.g., B61-7 is the “B61 Mod 7.” Only significant changes would result in a new Mod number. For example, the W87 warhead underwent a LEP a decade ago that fixed several structural issues but did not receive a new Mod number. The original warhead designs did not used to have a Mod designation, but the FY12 SSMP lists all the existing warhead types that did not previously have a Mod designation with a “-0” extension. This seems to indicate that all LEPs will now produce warheads with new Mod numbers, apparently in anticipation of significant modifications.

These increasingly intrusive modifications are driven by a stated requirement to improve the safety, security and reliability of the warhead designs. Up to a point, this effort enjoys widespread congressional and White House support—after all, who can be against increasing the safety, security and reliability of nuclear weapons? NNSA and the labs are using these requirements as a primary justification for creating wide-ranging simulation, design, engineering, and production programs that, while smaller in output capacity than those during the Cold War, will be exponentially more technically capable.

The SSMP describes how this capability will provide a “comprehensive science basis underpinning deployment of new safety technologies in the stockpile.” This goal also improves the justification of existing facilities—and those still coming on-line—such as DARHT, NIF, Omega, and the Z machine. NNSA’s goal is to incorporate an enormous array of new safety, security, and use control features in almost the entire stockpile by 2031.

The details of these technologies, their justifications, and costs are largely hidden from public scrutiny. A table listing the safety, security, and reliability features of existing warhead types—and of “an ‘Ideal’ System” (warhead)—is contained in the classified Annex B to the SSMP. (For a list of safety and security features probably installed on U.S. warheads, see here.) While some enhancements may be warranted, the justification for all these new features appears to be based on an open-ended development of new technologies for the incorporation of enhanced surety features into warheads independent of any threat scenario.

This pursuit of a wide range of surety improvements justifies the need for substantial warhead modifications and additional production and simulation capabilities. Yet there must be a point of diminishing returns, where the potential improvements are not justified by the monetary costs or the risks to the reliability of the stockpile.

Indeed, stockpile managers and designers used to warn against modifying warheads, noting that doing so could undermine the confidence in reliably predicting the performance of the weapons without nuclear testing. But warhead modification is now a central goal of the stockpile stewardship management program. Indeed, the goal of the LEPs, the FY2012 SSMP states, it to provide options for “maintaining and modifying the future stockpile” (emphasis added). Modification—not just maintenance—of the enduring stockpile has become a core objective. Interestingly, the SSMP bluntly acknowledges that such modifications of the warheads will reduce confidence in the reliability of the stockpile by changing warheads from the designs that were tested:

“An aggressive ST&E [Science, Technology and Engineering] program is replacing…empirical factors [used to calibrate simulation codes based on underground nuclear tests] with scientifically validated fundamental data and physical models for predicting capability. As the stockpile continues to change due to aging and through the inclusion of modernization features for the enhanced safety and security, the validity of the calibrated simulations decreases, raising the uncertainty and need for predictive capability. Increased computational capability and confidence in the validity of comprehensive science-based theoretical and numerical models will allow assessments of weapons performance in situations that were not directly tested.” (Emphasis added).

However, NNSA’s enthusiasm for extensively modifying all warheads may be going beyond what Congress and the Obama administration as a whole will support. The foundation for such objections is clearly laid out in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, which states explicitly that the United States “will study options for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of nuclear warheads on a case-by-case basis.” (p. xiv). This seems to contradict NNSA’s pursuit of every available surety feature for every warhead.

In an example of rising concerns, the May 2011 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the B61 LEP raised red flags about the NNSA’s proposed changes to the bomb. The report expressed concern about the scope of the LEP, noting that it was the first ever that sought to simultaneously refurbish multiple components, enhance safety and surety, and make other design changes. The report noted that some of the proposed new surety features, such as multipoint safety, have never been used in existing stockpile weapons.

Multipoint safety seeks to lessen the chance of an accidental nuclear explosion if the conventional explosive accidentally ignites at more than one point nearly simultaneously. The current one-point safety requirement mandates that the risk of a nuclear detonation be no greater than one in a million if the conventional explosive accidentally ignites at one point, which the SSMP acknowledges is an “extraordinarily high reliability requirement.” As the GAO notes, warheads in the current stockpile do not have multi-point safety, and even the NNSA does not consider the technology mature.

Because of these issues, the Senate appropriations committee recently expressed its concern about the B61 LEP. The committee’s report notes that “NNSA plans to incorporate untried technologies and design features to improve the safety and security of the nuclear stockpile” (emphasis added). While expressing support for improved surety, the report states that it “should not come at the expense of long-term weapon reliability.” Due to this concern, the committee reduced funding for the B61 LEP by almost 20% and called for both an independent assessment of the proposed safety and security features and a cost-benefit analysis of them.

One gets the sense that, since Congress stopped the Reliable Replacement Warhead, NNSA has seized on safety and security as the sure-fire cause to allow major warhead modifications and win significant funding. Based on the new Senate findings, NNSA may discover there are limits to how far Congress will go down the modification path and what it will spend, even on the golden ticket of improved safety.

About the authors: Nickolas Roth is Policy Fellow for the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation and a graduate student at the University of Maryland, Hans M. Kristensen is the Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, and Stephen Young is a Senior Analyst at Union of Concerned Scientists.

See also: FY2011 Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan | Previous blog in this series

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

Click on image to download document.

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By Nickolas Roth, Hans M. Kristensen and Stephen Young

Note: This is the first of four posts analyzing the FY 2012 Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan, each jointly produced by the Federation of American Scientists and Union of Concerned Scientists. See the other posts here: 2, 3, 4.

A new nuclear weapons plan from the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which seeks further increases in spending over the next decade for nuclear weapons and for weapons production and simulation facilities, will face real challenges in the new budget environment.

The FY2012 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP), which was sent to Congress in April, is NNSA’s outline of its near- and long-term plans and associated costs for the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and supporting infrastructure. However, with national security spending facing real cuts below FY2011 levels for the next two years at a minimum, either the NNSA must overcome that trend or cut back on its plans.

The FY2012 SSMP is unclassified but has two secret annexes. The new plan updates, with input from Congress, the FY2011 SSMP published last year, and is the first plan to fully incorporate the recommendations of the Obama administration’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review.

Increased Nuclear Weapon Spending

The Obama administration has significantly increased the amount of money the United States spends on nuclear weapons, and had planned further increases before the Budget Control Act of 2011 was passed last month. The FY2011 budget proposed in early 2010 increased NNSA’s spending on Weapons Activities by nearly 10 percent relative to the previous year, and the administration later added another $5.4 billion for the 2011-2015 future years nuclear security program. According to the FY2011 SSMP, NNSA planned to spend about $80 billion from 2011 through 2020—or an average of $8 billion per year. In comparison, nuclear weapons budgets in the last years of the Bush administration were around $6.7 billion annually in inflation-adjusted dollars.

The FY2012 SSMP shows that the NNSA plans additional funding increases, beginning with an additional $4 billion for the 2012-2016 future years nuclear program. The NNSA now plans to spend $88 billion on nuclear weapons and the nuclear weapons complex from 2012 to 2021, for a yearly average of $8.8 billion. This is another 10% increase on top of the FY11 SSMP increase.

However, those budget levels may be less than what is required if NNSA’s plans do not change. In particular, cost estimates for two major facilities—the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement-Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) in Los Alamos, New Mexico—are a cause for concern. The NNSA estimates that the UPF could cost $4.2 billion to $6.5 billion, and the CMRR $3.7 billion to $5.8 billion. The FY12 SSMP hints that the total for both might reach $12 billion, but a footnote in Table 6 on page 67 explains that the ten-year budgets above are based on those facilities coming in at the low end of the current cost estimates. Yet a recent independent estimate by the Army Corps of Engineers concluded that the cost of the UPF alone would be between $6.5 and $7.5 billion, which puts the low end equal to the high end of NNSA’s current estimate.

NNSA Nuclear Weapons Budget Projection 2012-2031

Click on image for larger version. Source: U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, FY 2012 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan Report to Congress, April 15, 2011, April 2011, p. 68.

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The  budget requirements projection for FY12-31 above (Figure 12, taken directly from the FY12 SSMP) provides a budget estimate based on the high end of NNSA’s assumptions for all its costs. The chart indicates that the NNSA plans to spend over $120 billion between FY12 and FY24, when the CMRR and UPF are scheduled to be completed. Based on NNSA’s history, using these high end figures is probably a safe assumption, if not an underestimate.

Gone from the FY2012 SSMP is the controversial statement made in the previous SSMP that “the costs to maintain capabilities necessary to support the stockpile are essentially independent of the size of the stockpile.” (Annex D, p. 2.) Yet it is clear from the new plan and other documents that the significant reduction of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile since 2004 has not resulted in any savings in NNSA’s budget, which will continue to increase due to more ambitious warhead modernization plans, cost overruns for the construction of new production facilities, and new simulation and testing facilities. The FY2012 SSMP shows that NNSA would like this trend to continue through the 2020s. See the chart below.

While the size of the nuclear weapons stockpile has declined significantly since 2004, NNSA’s nuclear weapons budget has increased and is projected to grow considerably through the next two decades. Source: NNSA FY12 SSMP; Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists.

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That desire conflicts with the realities of the Budget Control Act. Rather than a second 10% budget increase as laid out in the FY12 SSMP, the Act calls for a half-percent decrease in national security spending across the board. The House has already passed its version of the key appropriations bill that provides NNSA funding, exacting roughly a 7% cut below the administration’s request for FY2012, leaving a budget less than 3% greater than the FY11 level. The version passed by the Senate appropriations committee was approximately 6% below the request, modestly higher than the House. Because of the Act’s limits, for at least the next several years, NNSA is likely to maintain that level of funding rather than the increased budgets it proposes in the FY12 SSMP.

In short, to live within the new budget priorities that Congress and the administration agreed to in August, NNSA must make significant changes in the timing, scale, and extent of several major projects. Delays, downsizing and perhaps even cancellation of some current priorities seem almost inevitable. The question is: who will make these choices? Will it be the NNSA, the White House, or Congress? And how soon will these decisions be made?

About the authors: Nickolas Roth is Policy Fellow for the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation and a graduate student at the University of Maryland, Hans M. Kristensen is the Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, and Stephen Young is a Senior Analyst at Union of Concerned Scientists.

See also FY2011 Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan analysis

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

How will Obama reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the strategic war plan?

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By Hans M. Kristensen

The Obama administration has begun a review of the president’s guidance to the military for how they should plan for the use of nuclear weapons. The review, which was first described in public by National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, is the ultimate test of President Obama’s nuclear policy; the rest is just words: to what extent will the new guidance reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the war plan?

Although the administration’s Nuclear Posture Review is widely said to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, it doesn’t actually reduce the role that nuclear weapons have today because all the adversaries in the current strategic nuclear war plan are exempt from the reduction. They are either nuclear weapon states, not members of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or are in violation of their NPT obligations and have chemical or biological weapons. The new guidance would have to remove some of these adversaries from the war plan to reduce the role, or reduce the role that nuclear weapons are required to play against each of them. There are many ways this could be done:

• Reduce the numer of target categories that are held at risk with nuclear weapons.
• Reduce the damage expectancy to be a achieved against individual targets.
• Reduce the number of adversaries in the plan.
• Reduce the number and types of strike options against each adversary.
• Remove the requirement to plan for prompt launch of nuclear forces.
• Remove any requirement to plan for damage limitation strikes.
• End counterforce nuclear planning.
• End the requirement to maintain standing fully operational strike plans.

Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the war plan requires direct and continuous presidential attention to avoid that the commitments to reducing the number and role of nuclear weapons are watered down by bureaucrats and cold warriors in the National Security Council, Department of Defense, military commands and Services, as well as former officials who are busy lobbying against a reduction.

To support president Obama’s vision of dramatically reduced nuclear arsenals and a reduced role of nuclear weapons on the way to deep cuts of nuclear weapons and eventually disarmament, we published a study in 2009 that proposed a transition from counterforce planning to what we called a minimal deterrent. A study from 2010 further described the current strategic nuclear war plan (OPLAN 8010-08 Change 1 from February 1, 2009 – this plan is still in effect). Building on those two studies, we have a new op-ed in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that describes what a new presidential directive could look like: A Presidential Policy Directive for a new nuclear path.

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

July 31^st is the 20-year anniversary of signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the United States and the Soviet Union. The treaty, also known as START I, marked the beginning of a treaty-based reduction of U.S. and Soviet (later Russian) strategic nuclear forces after the end of the Cold War.

START I required each country to limit its number of accountable strategic delivery vehicles (ballistic missiles and long-range bombers) to no more than 1,600 with no more than 6,000 accountable warheads. The treaty came with a unique on-site inspection regime where inspectors from the two countries would inspect each other’s declared force levels. Thousands of other warheads were not affected and the treaty did not require destruction of a single nuclear warhead. START I entered into effect on December 5^th, 2001, and expired on December 4, 2009.

Twenty years after the signing of START I, the United States and Russia are still in the drawdown phase of their strategic nuclear forces: START II followed in 1993, limiting the force levels to 3,500 accountable warheads by 2007 with no multiple warheads on land-based missiles; START II was never ratified by the U.S. Senate but surpassed by the Moscow Treaty in 2002, limiting the number of operationally deployed strategic warheads to 2,200 by 2012; The Moscow Treaty was replaced by the New START treaty signed in 2010, which limits the number of accountable strategic warheads to 1,550 on 700 deployed ballistic missiles and long-range bombers by 2018. Like its predecessors, New START does not limit thousands of non-deployed and non-strategic nuclear warheads and does not require destruction of a single warhead.

The Obama administration has stated that the next treaty must also place limits on non-deployed and non-strategic nuclear warheads.

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.