The Biological Sciences Experts Group (BSEG) is a group of non-governmental scientists who advise the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) on activities to counter biological threats and weapons.  Aside from the fact of its existence, nearly everything about the group is classified, but a few details of the enterprise have lately emerged.

The BSEG is supposed to “provide technical advice and counsel on specific scientific and technical issues relevant to the IC’s mission to counter the threat posed by the potential proliferation of biological weapons and related technologies,” according to an internal account.  See “Biological Sciences Experts Group Concept Paper” (undated, probably 2006, FOUO).

The BSEG will “strengthen the integration of the life-science and intelligence communities and facilitate access of the IC to life-science experts outside of the Federal government.”  The BSEG is supposed to help intelligence agencies design experiments and collection methodologies, interpret results, and perform other kinds of technical assessments.  However, “the BSEG shall neither produce analytical intelligence products nor engage in collection.”

According to the original concept, the BSEG was to be comprised of 12 non-governmental individuals, supported by a larger network of experts.  The membership of the BSEG is not officially disclosed, unless the individual members choose to make themselves known.  The Group is managed by the National Counterproliferation Center of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and is subject to a steering committee of IC agency representatives.

It could not immediately be learned how active the BSEG has been, on what topics it was consulted, or what it may have accomplished.

For a previous account of the BSEG, see “Panel Provides Peer Review of Intelligence Research” by Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, Science, December 7, 2007, p. 1538 (sub. req’d).

The Federal Bureau of Investigation will co-host a conference (pdf) this month “to promote positive continuous dialogue between the U.S. Intelligence Community and the academic community.”  The conference will be held at the SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory on April 29.

Topics of discussion will include the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board, which “has been an invaluable tool in providing advice to the FBI on the culture of higher education, including the traditions of openness, academic freedom, and international collaboration, while serving as a forum for discussion of national security issues.”

In 2008, authors from the FBI and the Federation of American Scientists jointly reported on a survey of attitudes among scientists concerning interactions with the FBI.  “The attitudes of scientists toward law enforcement personnel are not vastly different from those of the general public. However, a larger percentage of scientists indicated cooler feelings towards the FBI than the general public, suggesting that these reservations are particular to the scientific community and require specific solutions with the scientific community in mind,” the survey found. “[S]cientists are suspicious of the FBI and feel that they do not work well with the scientific community.”

“By taking steps to address suspicions early in any interaction and by treating scientists respectfully and professionally, law enforcement representatives are more likely to build a foundation of respect with their interaction and displace existing hostility,” the authors suggested.  See “How Scientists View Law Enforcement” by Nathaniel Hafer, Cheryl J. Vos, Karen McAllister, Gretchen Lorenzi, Christopher Moore, Kavita M. Berger and Michael Stebbins, Science Progress, December 22, 2008.

A new report (pdf) from the DNI Open Source Center profiles Turkey’s subversive “Ergenekon” movement.

“‘Ergenekon’ is the name of an alleged illegal neonationalist organization accused of planning to oust the pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) government through a military coup. The organization, in turn, has been linked to the so-called ‘Deep State,’ alleged to be a vast, underground network of secular Turks plotting criminal acts to destabilize the government,” the OSC report said.

“Ergenekon’s leader, also referred to as ‘Number One,’ has not yet been identified,” the OSC remarked.

The OSC does not make its products freely available to the public even when they are unclassified and not copyrighted.  But a copy of this report was obtained by Secrecy News.  See “Turkey — Guide to Ergenekon,” Open Source Center, March 19, 2010.

Israeli Stores Stop Selling Book That Denounces Settlers by Robert Mackey, New York Times The Lede, April 12. “An Israeli bookstore chain announced on Sunday that it would stop selling ‘The National Left,’ a political manifesto by two Israeli authors.”

Who watches WikiLeaks? by Chris McGreal, The Guardian, April 9. “This week a classified video of a US air crew killing unarmed Iraqis was seen by millions on the internet. But for some, the whistleblowing website itself needs closer scrutiny.”

Inside WikiLeaks’ Leak Factory by David Kushner, Mother Jones, April 6. “WikiLeaks has revealed the secrets of the Pentagon, Scientology, and Sarah Palin—and the explosive video of a US attack on civilians and journalists in Iraq. Meet the shadowy figure behind the whistleblower site.”

The 9/14 Presidency by Eli Lake, Reason Magazine, April 6. “Barack Obama is operating with the war powers granted George W. Bush three days after the 9/11 attacks.”

In what may be the Obama Administration’s single most significant reduction in national security secrecy to date, the Department of Defense this week published the first unclassified Nuclear Posture Review.

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) defines U.S. nuclear weapons policy, strategy and force structure.  As such, it is one of the most important national security policy documents in government.  Two previous Reviews conducted by the Clinton and Bush Administrations in 1994 and 2001 were classified and were not meant to be made public.

When portions of the Bush NPR nevertheless leaked in 2002, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld furiously condemned the release.  “Whoever leaked it violated federal criminal law,” he said.  “It seems that there are some people who simply have a compulsion to seem important, so they take classified information which can damage U.S. national security and give it to people who aren’t cleared for it,” he added.  Even after the Bush NPR report leaked, another official said, “the last administration then found it difficult ever to talk about the results of the review, because it was talking about a leaked classified document.”

But this week, in a tangible sign of changing national security secrecy standards, Defense Secretary Robert Gates held a press conference to release the latest NPR document (pdf) himself.

“The report of the Nuclear Posture Review will exist only in unclassified form,” a Pentagon official said at a background briefing on April 6. “There will not be a classified Nuclear Posture Review from which we have redacted a lot of information and then just put forward an unclassified variant. This reflected a decision early in the process…. And in an effort to be fully transparent in our choices and the thinking behind them, we did not want to leave big open questions about what might be left unsaid because it’s in the classified domain.”

This is not the end of nuclear weapons secrecy, by any means.  For one thing, the exact size and composition of the U.S. nuclear arsenal remain classified (wrongly, we would say).  Also, “you know there are classified implementation processes, guidance processes,” the unnamed Pentagon briefer said. “So it’s not that it’s free of classified aspects, but the [NPR] report as such and all of the policy findings and recommendations and all of the logic behind them will be presented at the unclassified level.”

Incongruously, even the Obama Presidential Study Directive that initiated the latest NPR process a year ago remains classified and unavailable.  But with the release of the final Report, that seems like a mere bureaucratic absurdity of little consequence.

The public release of the NPR report does not guarantee a superior policy outcome.  But it does eliminate a longstanding hurdle to informed debate on nuclear weapons policy, and it permits the interested public to focus its attention on the substance of the policy, not on a tiresome pursuit of undisclosed records.

In December 1993, Secretary of Energy Hazel O’Leary undertook her Openness Initiative, releasing all kinds of previously secret records on nuclear weapons tests, historical production of nuclear materials, and many other important topics.  Borrowing a slogan from an old cigarette ad, a DOE spokesman at the time said that the Department’s new secrecy policy was to “classify less, and enjoy it more.”

In this instance, at least, the Obama Administration seems to be following the same joyful path.

The White House yesterday announced the release of dozens of executive branch agency Open Government Plans, which are supposed to guide the implementation of the President’s Open Government Directive.  Several of the Plans deal, directly or indirectly, with declassification of national security information and records.

In May 2009, North Korea announced that it had conducted its second nuclear explosive test.  Although the event generated a seismic signature consistent with a nuclear explosion, it produced no detectable release of radioactive gases or particulates (fallout).  This either means that North Korea actually conducted a non-nuclear simulation of a nuclear test, or else it managed to achieve complete containment of a real nuclear explosion.  Since detection of radioactive emissions provides the most unambiguous confirmation of a nuclear explosion, the successful containment of a nuclear test could be problematic for verification of a treaty banning such explosions.

This conundrum is explored in a new report from the Congressional Research Service.  See “North Korea’s 2009 Nuclear Test: Containment, Monitoring, Implications” (pdf), April 2, 2010.

Congress has refused to make reports like this directly available to the public.  Other noteworthy new CRS products obtained by Secrecy News that have not been publicly released include the following (all pdf).

“Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy Combatant Detainees: Major Court Rulings,” April 1, 2010.

“Federal Building and Facility Security,” March 24, 2010.

“The U.S. Motor Vehicle Industry: Confronting a New Dynamic in the Global Economy,” March 26, 2010.

“U.S. Initiatives to Promote Global Internet Freedom: Issues, Policy, and Technology,” April 5, 2010.

The Russian-language internet is increasingly subject to control by the Russian government and its allies in the private sector, according to a new report (pdf) from the DNI Open Source Center (OSC). Except for a vocal minority of bloggers and human rights activists, the Russian public is mostly indifferent to or even supportive of government controls on the internet, the OSC report said.

“Over the last several years, pro-government oligarchs have accumulated significant stakes in the leading portals of the Russian Internet [or Runet]. Between them, they own the majority of the most popular Russian social networking sites and the majority of the most popular Russian websites,” the OSC found.

“While media outlets owned by government companies have not yet shown signs of censorship, the leadership and owners of these Russian investment companies are close to the Kremlin and may be willing to cede their business interests to government priorities,” the OSC report said.

A copy of the OSC analysis was obtained by Secrecy News and posted on the website of the Federation of American Scientists. See “Kremlin Allies’ Expanding Control of Runet Provokes Only Limited Opposition,” OSC Media Aid, February 28, 2010.

“Although some independent bloggers and press sources raised concerns at the growing government presence in the Internet, the public is probably unaware of the extent to which the Runet is owned by Kremlin allies,” the report said. “Most buy-outs were not well publicized, appearing only in specialized business dailies that reported only the fact of the deal.”

The OSC itemized several of the most important private acquisitions of Russian websites and identified their proprietors.

So, for example, “Oligarch Mikhail Prokhorov, who is known to cooperate with the Kremlin, owns RosBiznesKonsalting (RBC), which has been quietly gobbling up Russian Internet (Runet) domains, holding 21% of the Runet’s sites, according to its last annual report in 2007, including Loveplanet.ru, the second-most popular online dating service in the Runet.”

In any case, “most Russians are not overly concerned about censorship in general or censorship of the Internet. Most actually support censoring the Internet,” according to the OSC. “Those who do react negatively to threats to Internet freedom tend to be opposition members or human rights activists who would be directly affected by censorship.”

Thus, opposition blogger Oleg Kozyrev and reporter Oleg Salmanov wrote in 2008, “The Russian Internet community is following with alarm the social networks passing under the control of those who are loyal to the authorities and responsive to their requests.”

The first criminal conviction in Russia for comments posted on a blog also took place in 2008, the OSC noted. Savva Terentyev received a one-year suspended prison sentence for describing police as “filth” and writing that “a corrupt cop should be ceremonially burnt daily” in every town square. He acknowledged writing the comments but pleaded not guilty to charges of extremism.

“The Russian Government does not need to own the Runet in order to monitor or control it,” the OSC concluded. “It has numerous laws and policies in place that allow it to limit or threaten open discussion on the Internet. Portals owned by Kremlin allies do not yet exhibit signs of censorship, but their acquisitions provide officials an additional lever to control the content of the Runet if the Kremlin feels threatened.”

An appendix to the OSC report, which was marked For Official Use Only, profiles the major private investors in the Russian internet. A second appendix lists the top 100 Russian websites, along with their owners.

The U.S. Army is still struggling to come to grips with the unusually high rate of suicide within its ranks.

“The Army ratios are above the national average and in some months recently, there have been more suicides in the Army than combat deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan,” observed Nancy Youssef of McClatchy News last week. “There is no pattern to suicides. One third who commit suicide have never served in combat; another third commit suicide while in combat; and yet another third do it once they return, according to Army statistics.”

Secretary of the Army John M. McHugh issued two directives on March 26 that are intended to further an understanding of the problem and to improve the availability of information to surviving family members.

Effectively immediately, all suspected suicides will be subject to an official (AR 15-6) investigation, the purpose of which is “to identify the circumstances, methods, and the contributing factors surrounding the event…. The completed investigation should provide clear, relevant, and practical recommendation(s) to prevent future suicides,” according to Army Directive 2010-01 (pdf).

A second Army directive (pdf) provided guidance for reporting (and redacting) information to be provided to family members, who are to be “kept fully informed while the investigation is underway.”

Although national security, third-person privacy and other FOIA-exempt information may be withheld, “the release authority cannot withhold information merely because it may be emotionally difficult for the surviving Family members to see or hear.”  However, “potentially upsetting information should be segregated from the body of the report and made available in a separate sealed envelope that is clearly marked as potentially upsetting information.”

An updated official account of the number of Army suicides through the end of March will be published on Thursday, reported Sig Christenson of the San Antonio Express-News on April 2.

The origins and development of North Korea’s military forces, from the vantage point of 1952, are described in a declassified U.S. Army intelligence report (large pdf).

“Although the North Korean Army was not officially activated until 8 February 1948, the backbone of the armed forces was forged in 1946 under the mask of Central Peace Preservation Units and Youth Training Organizations. Using battle-hardened Korean veterans of the Chinese Communist Forces as a core, the puppet government built a modern military force whose only glaring weakness was in a lack of air power. The striking comparison in organization, logistics and tactics of the North Korean Army with those of the Soviet ground forces is attributable to the influence of the Soviet occupation army and the multitude of advisors which were left behind upon the Red Army’s withdrawal.”

A digital copy of the report was made available by the Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth, KS.  See “History of the North Korean Army,” U.S. Army Far East Command, July 31, 1952.

Warrantless surveillance of an Islamic charity in Oregon in 2004 violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), a court ruled (pdf) on March 31.

In the culmination of a four-year lawsuit, Judge Vaughn Walker of the Northern District of California found that the government had unlawfully intercepted international telephone conversations of the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation without a warrant, as required by the FISA for intelligence and counterterrorism surveillance.  The government had contended that the state secrets privilege barred a resolution of the case, but the court found that the defendants were able to make their case without the use of state secrets.

At least by implication, the ruling means that aspects of President Bush’s Terrorist Surveillance Program were illegal.  Significantly, that determination was made by a court, based on a private complaint years after the fact, and not through congressional intelligence oversight.  While Congress did enact the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, which was the foundation of the court’s ruling, contemporary congressional oversight alone would have left the Al-Haramain violation (and untold others) undiscovered and unpunished.

The new ruling also leaves the state secrets privilege seemingly tarnished and in disrepute.  “The Government does not rely on an assertion of the [state secrets privilege] to coverup alleged unlawful conduct,” government attorneys told the court.  But had the Bush and Obama Administrations’ use of the privilege prevailed, that is exactly what would have happened– conduct that has now been found illegal would have been covered up.  To the extent that there is a legitimate role for a state secrets privilege, the government might now be motivated to bolster the legitimacy of the privilege, perhaps through enactment of the pending State Secrets Protection Act.  That bill would, among other things, provide for judicial review and validation of the substance of assertedly privileged evidence.

Finally, the ruling casts new light retrospectively on the December 2005 New York Times story that exposed the Bush Administration’s warrantless surveillance program.  A cogent case has been made by Gabriel Schoenfeld (in Commentary Magazine, March 2006, and in his forthcoming book Necessary Secrets) that the Times story violated a statute (18 USC 798) that clearly prohibits unauthorized disclosure and publication of classified communications intelligence information.  But it was the Times story that set the stage for the Al-Haramain lawsuit.  With a conclusive judicial ruling that the reported surveillance was in significant respects unlawful, the Times’ revelation of the classified surveillance program may more readily be seen as supporting and enabling the rule of law, not defying it.

New Congressional Research Service reports obtained by Secrecy News that have not been made readily available to the public include the following (all pdf):

“Federal Efforts to Address the Threat of Bioterrorism: Selected Issues for Congress,” March 18, 2010.

“Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,” March 30, 2010.

“Deforestation and Climate Change,” March 24, 2010.

“The Impact of Major Legislation on Budget Deficits: 2001 to 2009,” March 23, 2010.

“GAO Bid Protests: An Overview of Timeframes and Procedures,” March 15, 2010.

“GAO Bid Protests: Trends, Analysis, and Options for Congress,” February 11, 2009.

“The Future of U.S. Trade Policy: An Analysis of Issues and Options for the 111th Congress,” March 24, 2010.

“Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications,” March 22, 2010.

“F-35 Alternate Engine Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” March 22, 2010.

“Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive,” April 1, 2010.

A bill on government transparency that was introduced by Rep. Mike Quigley (D-IL) last week would finally make all non-confidential CRS reports publicly available online. There must have been a dozen such proposals that have been introduced in Congress over the last 15 years without effect, and it is not clear whether the latest iteration will fare any better.

“I believe that there is a discrepancy between what most Americans believe is legal and what the government is actually doing under the Patriot Act,” said Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) in a statement last week on the Senate floor regarding reform of the Patriot Act.

“In my view, any discrepancy of this sort is intolerable and untenable, and can only be fixed by greater transparency and openness.”

“Most members of the public do not expect to have detailed information about how intelligence collection is actually conducted,” Sen. Wyden said, “but they do expect to understand the boundaries of what the law does and does not allow, so that they can ratify or reject the decisions that public officials make on their behalf.”

Under present circumstances, Sen. Wyden said, Americans do not have an accurate perception of what the Patriot Act permits and how it is being used and, he said on Thursday, this is unacceptable.

“There is key information that is relevant to the debate on the Patriot Act that is currently classified.  Over the past two and a half years, I have pressed the executive branch to declassify this information in a responsible way, so that members of Congress and the public can have an informed debate about what the law should actually be.”

In partial response, he said, the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence have produced a classified account of the use of the Patriot Act that any member of Congress can now read in the intelligence committees’ secure offices.

“But by itself this step does not go nearly far enough,” he said.  “It is just as essential for the public to have this information as well.”

Among other things, Sen. Wyden noted that the so-called “business records” provision of the Patriot Act (Section 215) actually applies to collection of “any tangible thing,” which means that “it covers things like blood or tissue samples as well.”