The Department of Justice Inspector General released a newly declassified version of its 2004 audit of the FBI’s handling of intelligence information related to the September 11 attacks, including a newly disclosed chapter (large pdf) on the case of Zacarias Moussaoui.

In a previously released version of the report, the entire chapter 4 on Moussaoui had been withheld by court order because of Moussaoui’s ongoing trial. With the conclusion of that trial last month, the suppressed chapter was approved for release.

See “A Review of the FBI’s Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks,” as released June 16, 2006.

Al Qaeda terrorists contemplated an attack on New York subways in 2003 using an “easily constructed” device called a “mubtakkar” to release cyanide gas, according to a story in Time Magazine this week.

But there are reasons to question the reliability and significance of the story, suggested chemist George Smith of GlobalSecurity.org.

For one thing, “why, if the mubtakkar of death is so easy to make has it not been seen since, or employed in Iraq, or used anywhere there have been other terror attacks?”

See Smith’s skeptical account on his new blog Dick Destiny here and here.

An overview of chemical warfare agents and analytical methods for their identification was prepared this year by Defence Research and Development Canada.

See “Analysis of Chemical Warfare Agents: General Overview, LC-MS Review, In-House LC-ESI-MS Methods and Open Literature Bibliography” (pdf), Defence Research and Development Canada, March 2006.

“The alteration of official DoD imagery by persons acting for or on behalf of the Department of Defense is prohibited,” advises a new Pentagon Instruction. See “Alteration of Official DoD Imagery” (pdf), DoD Instruction 5040.05, June 6, 2006.

“The days of total air superiority by friendly forces are over. Our potential enemies now may have as many or more aircraft than we do,” according to a new Army correspondence course on defending against attacks from the air. “Our potential enemies will gain air superiority over sectors of the battlefield for certain periods…. Successful small arms defense against air attack is an essential element of survival on the battlefield.” See “Small Arms Defense Against Air Attack” (pdf), US Army Air Defense Artillery School, May 2006.

Some recent Congressional Research Service items include:

“Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement” (pdf), updated May 18, 2006.

“Periods of War” (pdf) (on the official beginning and ending dates of war), May 1, 2006.

And for no extra charge: “Net Neutrality: Background and Issues” (pdf), May 16, 2006.

The National Security Archive filed suit against the Central Intelligence Agency after the CIA began imposing costs to process Freedom of Information Act requests that it said were not “newsworthy” and therefore not entitled to a fee waiver. By interposing its own editorial judgment in the FOIA process, the CIA in effect is “trying to close off use of the FOIA by journalists,” said Archive General Counsel Meredith Fuchs. See “CIA Claims the Right to Decide What is News,” June 14.

The ACLU filed suit against the Pentagon seeking disclosure of information about the TALON (Threat and Local Observation Notice) database, which has been used improperly to store information on domestic political activities. See “ACLU tries to force Pentagon to turn over records on peace groups” by Drew Brown, Knight Ridder Newspapers, June 14.

In almost every lawsuit against the government in which an agency invokes the “state secrets” privilege, the courts end up dismissing the entire case. “But that’s not the way it has to be,” wrote constitutional scholar Louis Fisher of the Law Library of Congress in a new op-ed. “Judges have a constitutional duty to function as neutral referees to allow each side to present its case fairly.” See “Give judges a peek at secrets” by Louis Fisher, Los Angeles Times, June 14.

“The Pentagon has stopped releasing its assessment of the number of Iraqi army units deemed capable of battling insurgents without U.S. military help,” in what appears to be a clear instance of politically-motivated secrecy. “The decision to stop making the information public came after reports showed a steady decline in the number of qualified Iraqi units.” See “U.S. mum on strength of Iraqi troops” by Eric Rosenberg, Hearst Newspapers, June 12.

The organization and management of U.S. Air Force space activities from pre-launch to post-operational disposal are described in a new AF Space Command Instruction (pdf) on “satellite operations.”

“The objective of satellite disposal is to reduce the potential for spacecraft collisions and frequency interference, to mitigate the creation of additional space debris and to open orbital slots to newer SVs [satellite vehicles].”

“Therefore, de-orbiting or removing a non-mission capable satellite from its operational orbit and placing it into an established disposal region is of paramount importance.”

See “Satellite Operations,” U.S. Air Force Space Command Instruction 10-1204, 1 June 2006.

Some random reports of the Congressional Research Service that are not otherwise readily available in the public domain include the following:

“Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) Education Issues and Legislative Options” (pdf), May 22, 2006.

“Australia: Background and U.S. Relations” (pdf), April 20, 2006.

“China’s Impact on the U.S. Automotive Industry” (pdf), April 4, 2006.

“The Congressional Charter of the American National Red Cross: Overview, History, and Analysis” (pdf), March 15, 2006.

An interagency report on proposals to streamline controls on so-called “sensitive but unclassified” (SBU) information is due to be presented to the White House this month.

Efforts to promote information sharing among government agencies and others involved in homeland security have been stymied by the growing use of over sixty different types of access controls on unclassified information, such as For Official Use Only, Law Enforcement Sensitive, Limited Official Use, and many more. Such controls are often poorly defined and mutually incompatible.

Last December 16, the White House initiated an ongoing review that began with preparation of an inventory of all of the various SBU access controls used in the federal government, which was completed in March. The next step was to formulate recommendations for standardizing SBU policies related to terrorism, homeland security and law enforcement, which are now due.

See Guideline 3, “Standardize Procedures for Sensitive But Unclassified Information,” in the December 16 White House memo.

As of last week, a report to the President on those recommendations was awaiting the signatures of the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security.

The pending report sets forth principles upon which SBU policy should be based, but stops short of the crucial task of defining exactly how those principles ought to be implemented, government officials said.

One of those principles is that each type of control on unclassified information should have a uniform, public and government-wide definition so that it is employed the same way by all agencies. That is not the case today.

The proposed principles include provisions for oversight of how SBU controls are used, officials told Secrecy News.

They also include a proposed moratorium on the creation of new SBU categories.

The new report to the President has not been released. But a 2005 report prepared for the Department of Homeland Security provides one detailed perspective on the complexity of the information sharing problem and some options for addressing it.

See “Information Sharing and Collaboration Business Plan,” Institute for Defense Analyses, June 2005 (205 pages, 1.5 MB PDF).

Some agencies treat oversight of their programs as a burden or a threat to be avoided or evaded. But that is a shortsighted view.

The paradox of oversight is that when properly performed it actually serves the interests of the overseen program by building confidence in its legitimacy and integrity.

Perhaps with that in mind, U.S. Army Secretary Francis J. Harvey recently issued a memo (pdf) to senior Army leaders stressing the importance of effective oversight, especially when it comes to classified “sensitive” activities.

“I expect my oversight team to have an informed understanding of the Army’s conduct of, or support to, sensitive activities,” Secretary Harvey wrote.

“Sensitive activities may include intelligence activities and military operations, organizational relationships or processes, and technological capabilities or vulnerabilities.”

See “Oversight of Sensitive Activities,” May 18, 2006.

“The National Security Agency is committed to declassifying national security information as instructed in Executive Order 12958, as amended,” the NSA declared in a 2005 declassification plan (pdf).

“The Agency will use all available resources to successfully accomplish the provisions of the E.O. within the required time.”

See “NSA Declassification Plan for Executive Order 12958, as Amended,” January 13, 2005 (obtained by Michael Ravnitzky).

“The fact that the U.S. Army and Navy mounted a [World War II] effort called Project BOURBON against certain Soviet cryptosystems can be released,” according to a newly disclosed 2001 NSA notice on declassification policy.

“Most details beyond this statement, as well as the cooperation with the British in this effort, remain classified.”

See selected NSA declassification guidance (pdf), released June 2006.

Other agency declassification plans, including newly posted plans of the Army and Navy, may be found here.

“Is New York City adequately prepared for a ‘dirty bomb’ attack?” asked John Sudnik, a deputy chief at the New York Fire Department in a recent master’s thesis (pdf) on the prospects of a terrorist incident involving a radiological weapon.

In response to this question, the author provided an assessment of the threat, the consequences of an attack, and the possibilities of mitigating such consequences.

See “‘Dirty Bomb’ Attack: Assessing New York City’s Level of Preparedness from a First Responder’s Perspective” by John Sudnik, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2006.

“Why does The Washington Post willingly publish ‘classified’ information affecting national security?” wrote former Post editor Robert G. Kaiser in a Sunday Outlook piece.

“Should Post journalists and others who reveal the government’s secrets be subject to criminal prosecution for doing so? These questions, raised with new urgency of late, deserve careful answers.”

He proposed some thoughtful answers in “Public Secrets,” Washington Post, June 11.

U.S. Navy Admiral (ret.) William O. Studeman was appointed this week by Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert (R-IL) to serve on the Public Interest Declassification Board.

Adm. Studeman is a former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and a former Director of the National Security Agency. As a member of the Board, he is now supposed to represent the public interest in declassification of government records.

Adm. Studeman is currently vice president and deputy general manager for intelligence and information superiority at Northrop Grumman Mission Systems.

He is the eighth member of the nine-person Board named to date. The Board is chaired by former CIA Inspector General L. Britt Snider.

The Public Interest Declassification Board advises the President on declassification policies and priorities. The Board will hold a public meeting on June 23 at the National Archives.