Upon publication this month, “Legacy of Ashes” by Tim Weiner of the New York Times has all at once become the best single source on the history of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The book synthesizes entire shelves of prior studies, and surpasses them with the fruits of deep archival research and two decades of on-the-record interviews. The detailed endnotes provide pointers for further investigation.

Somewhat oddly, the book is framed as a “warning.”

“It describes how the most powerful country in the history of Western civilization has failed to create a first-rate spy service. That failure constitutes a danger to the national security of the United States,” Mr. Weiner writes.

The implication here is that the standard for excellence has been set by another intelligence agency, one that unlike CIA is “first rate.” If so, it would be interesting to know which agency that is. (Not the KGB, certainly, nor the SIS or Mossad.)

If not, and if there is no consistently “first rate” intelligence service, then the problem may lie in an exaggerated expectation that any secret intelligence service can reliably “see things as they are in the world.”

A pending Senate bill would suspend funding for the Office of Vice President next year unless Vice President Cheney agrees to comply with the oversight provisions of the executive order on classification, something he claims he is not obliged to do.

Sen. Dick Durbin (D-IL), chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services, included language in the pending appropriations bill to suspend the funding after the Vice President failed to respond to the Senator’s June 25 letter (pdf) urging compliance with the executive order.

A similar measure to cut funding for the Office of Vice President, introduced in the House last month by Rep. Rahm Emanuel, was narrowly defeated on June 28 by a vote of 209-217.

J. William Leonard, the Information Security Oversight Office director whose oversight activities were rebuffed by the Office of Vice President, will testify tomorrow, July 12, at a House Intelligence Subcommittee hearing on classification policy. I will also be among the witnesses at the 1 PM hearing in Rayburn 2216.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence endorsed a statutory prohibition that prevents the Department of Defense from granting security clearances to former convicts who have served a year or more in jail, individuals who are mentally incompetent, are drug addicts, or have been dishonorably discharged from the military.

The Pentagon had requested a repeal of that provision, first enacted in 2000, and the request was approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee.

“The [Intelligence] Committee understands DoD’s desire to have more flexibility to give clearances to otherwise qualified individuals who are currently barred from receiving or renewing their security clearances.”

“Because of the extremely sensitive nature of DoD’s military and intelligence activities, however, the Committee is concerned that a blanket repeal of section 986 could lead to unintended compromises or mishandling of classified information. Further, the Committee believes that the waiver authority that is currently provided in section 986 is sufficient to give DoD the flexibility and discretion it needs in handling cases involving convictions or dishonorable discharges.”

In a dissenting view (favoring the Pentagon proposal to repeal), Committee Chairman Rockefeller and Senators Wyden and Feingold said they had “no reason to question the adequacy of the security clearance process established under presidential order, nor to question the joint assessment of DoD and the Armed Services Committee that national security can be protected without this one DoD-specific statute.”

See the Senate Intelligence Committee report on the FY 2008 Defense Authorization Act, Senate Report 110-125, June 29.

The dispute was first reported in “Ex-convicts and addicts may get DoD clearance” by Elana Schor and Roxana Tiron, The Hill, July 10.

Writing in the Danger Room blog, Sharon Weinberger correctly noted that someone like Scooter Libby (mentioned by me in The Hill article) would not technically be subject to the statutory prohibition since he is not going to spend a year or more in jail.

A federal appeals court yesterday heard oral arguments in a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit seeking disclosure of two Vietnam-era editions of the President’s Daily Brief.

The Central Intelligence Agency refused to disclose the two PDBs to University of California professor Larry Berman, who filed the lawsuit in cooperation with the lawfirm Davis Wright Tremaine and the National Security Archive.

The July 10 hearing was reported in “Federal Court Skeptical of CIA Bid for Secrecy” by Josh Gerstein, New York Sun, July 11.

An audio recording of the fairly technical court session can be downloaded from this site. Click on “Audio Files” on the left side of the page and then enter case number 05-16820.

Additional background on the case is available from the National Security Archive.

Recent Congressional Research Service reports on Navy acquisition programs and related topics include these (all pdf).

“Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” updated June 12, 2007.

“Navy DDG-1000 (DD(X)) and CG(X) Ship Acquisition Programs: Oversight Issues and Options for Congress,” updated June 11, 2007.

“Navy CG(X) Cruiser Design Options: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress,” updated June 13, 2007.

“Navy Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal and Procurement Rate: Background and Issues for Congress,” updated June 11, 2007.

“Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ship Programs: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress,” updated June 12, 2007.

Some other recently updated Congressional Research Service reports that have not been made freely available to the public include these (all pdf).

“China’s Currency: Economic Issues and Options for U.S. Trade Policy,” updated June 28, 2007.

“Military Airlift: C-17 Aircraft Program,” updated June 5, 2007.

“Indonesia: Domestic Politics, Strategic Dynamics, and American Interests,” updated June 20, 2007.

“The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress,” updated June 11, 2007.

“Conventional Warheads For Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues for Congress,” updated June 19, 2007.

“War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance,” updated June 12, 2007.

One of the few comparatively new features in the post-cold war landscape of U.S. intelligence is the emergence of dozens of domestic intelligence “fusion centers.”

These are state and local offices across the country that are supposed to integrate (or “fuse”) multiple information streams from national intelligence sources together with local law enforcement and other data in order to enhance homeland security and increase preparedness against terrorism or natural disasters.

A major new report (pdf) from the Congressional Research Service finds that this aspect of the domestic intelligence and homeland security infrastructure is still far from mature.

“It is unclear if a single fusion center has successfully adopted a truly proactive prevention approach to information analysis and sharing. No state and its local jurisdictions appear to have fully adopted the intelligence cycle.”

In principle, fusion centers represent a conduit “through which federal intelligence can flow across the country.”

But “numerous fusion center officials claim that although their center receives a substantial amount of information from federal agencies, they never seem to get the ‘right information’ or receive it in an efficient manner,” the CRS report stated.

“It could be argued that if information flow into fusion centers is limited, the quality of the information is questionable, and the center doesn’t have personnel with the appropriate skill sets to understand the information, then the end result may not provide value.”

At the same time, “the potential fusion center use of private sector data, the adoption of a more proactive approach, and the collection of intelligence by fusion center staff and partners has led to questions about possible civil liberties abuses,” the report noted.

There are now more than 40 intelligence fusion centers around the country. The 100-page CRS report includes a map and a list of these centers. A copy was obtained by Secrecy News.

See “Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress,” July 6, 2007.

Some recently updated reports of the Congressional Research Service that have not been made readily available to the public include the following (all pdf).

“Statutory Offices of Inspector General: Past and Present,” updated June 21, 2007.

“Medal of Honor Recipients: 1979-2007,” updated May 29, 2007.

“GAO: Government Accountability Office and General Accounting Office,” updated June 22, 2007.

“Digital Surveillance: The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act,” updated June 8, 2007.

“Tactical Aircraft Modernization: Issues for Congress,” updated June 8, 2007.

“Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements,” updated June 1, 2007.

Some of the most important news in Department of Defense information policy has to do with what did not happen.

Earlier this year, the Pentagon asked Congress to enact two new provisions that would have restricted public access to broad swaths of unclassified information. But Congress declined to approve either one.

One provision would have created a new exemption for unclassified information regarding weapons of mass destruction. The other proposed provision would have established civil and criminal penalties for unauthorized publication or sale of “geodetic products” (i.e. maps and images) that the Secretary of Defense had designated for “limited distribution.”

Neither provision survived in either the House or Senate versions of the FY 2008 Defense Authorization Act and, barring extraordinary developments, will not be enacted into law.

Also this year, a Freedom of Information Act exemption for “operational files” of the Defense Intelligence Agency is set to expire. DIA did not request, and will not receive, an extension of the controversial exemption, which was adopted in the 2006 Defense Authorization Act with a “sunset” date of December 31, 2007.

Last week, the Department of Defense issued a final rule setting forth “the policies and procedures … that permit U.S. citizens to perform historical research in records created by or in the custody of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).”

The extensive reliance by the U.S. government on private security contractors to support military forces in Iraq poses numerous policy and legal questions that are explored in a new report (pdf) from the Congressional Research Service.

“The use of armed contractors raises several concerns for many Members, including transparency and accountability,” the report begins. “Transparency issues include the lack of public information on the terms of their contracts, including their costs and the standards governing their hiring and performance, as well as the background and training of those hired under contract.”

“The apparent lack of a practical means to hold contractors accountable under U.S. law for abuses and other transgressions, and the possibility that they could be prosecuted by foreign courts, is also a source of concern.”

“Contractors working with the U.S. military (or with any of the coalition forces) in Iraq are non-combatants who have no combat immunity under international law if they engage in hostilities, and whose conduct may be attributable to the United States.”

“This report summarizes what is currently known about companies that provide personnel for security missions in Iraq and some sources of controversy surrounding them.”

A copy of the report was obtained by Secrecy News.

See “Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues,” updated June 21, 2007.

The Los Angeles Times reported on July 4 that “The number of U.S.-paid private contractors in Iraq now exceeds that of American combat troops… More than 180,000 civilians — including Americans, foreigners and Iraqis — are working in Iraq under U.S. contracts, according to State and Defense department figures obtained by the Los Angeles Times.”

Some other new reports of the Congressional Research Service that have not been made readily available to the public include the following (all pdf).

“Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges in Federal Court,” updated June 26, 2007.

“Defense Procurement: Full Funding Policy — Background, Issues, and Options for Congress,” updated June 15, 2007.

“Data Mining and Homeland Security: An Overview,” updated June 5, 2007.

“Coast Guard Deepwater Program: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress,” updated June 22, 2007.

“Recess Appointments Made by President George W. Bush, January 20, 2001-June 4, 2007,” updated June 14, 2007.

National security information sharing between the executive branch and Congress is examined in a recent law review article by Heidi Kitrosser. The author suggests that legitimate executive branch secrecy concerns can be addressed by limiting disclosure of certain information to selected congressional committees or other subsets of Congressional membership, which she calls “information funnels.” See “Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities: Improving Information Funnels” by Heidi Kitrosser, Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 29, 2007.

Intelligence oversight in democratic societies is the subject of a new book from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. For more information and selected excerpts from the book, see “Democratic Control of Intelligence Services : Containing Rogue Elephants” by Hans Born and Marina Caparini, July 2007.