The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence today finally released the final two reports of its investigation into pre-war intelligence on Iraq.

“Before taking the country to war, this Administration owed it to the American people to give them a 100 percent accurate picture of the threat we faced,” said Senator Jay Rockefeller in a news release.

“Unfortunately, our Committee has concluded that the Administration made significant claims that were not supported by the intelligence,” Rockefeller said. “In making the case for war, the Administration repeatedly presented intelligence as fact when in reality it was unsubstantiated, contradicted, or even non-existent. As a result, the American people were led to believe that the threat from Iraq was much greater than actually existed.”

A summary of the report’s conclusions, which would have been most useful about four years ago, is presented here, with links to the newly released reports.

The Pentagon should “monitor enemy activities in sleep research” says a newly disclosed report (pdf) from the elite defense science advisory panel known as JASON.

The JASONs were investigating the potential for U.S. adversaries “to exploit advances in Human Performance Modification, and thus create a threat to national security.”

Their report examined “the present state of the art in pharmaceutical intervention in cognition and in brain-computer interfaces, and considered how possible future developments might proceed and be used by adversaries.”

Among their findings was the underappreciated significance of sleep and the possibility of a “sleep gap” (a term not used in the report).

“The most immediate human performance factor in military effectiveness is degradation of performance under stressful conditions, particularly sleep deprivation.”

“If an opposing force had a significant sleep advantage, this would pose a serious threat.”

Fortunately, “the technical likelihood of such a development is small at present.” Just to be safe, however, the scientists recommended that the Pentagon “Monitor enemy activities in sleep research, and maintain close understanding of open source sleep research.”

In general, the JASONs went on to observe, “the publicity and scientific literature regarding human performance enhancement can easily be misinterpreted, yielding incorrect conclusions about potential military applications.”

See “Human Performance,” JASON, March 2008. Selected other reports from JASON are available here.

On the same day that he became the presumptive Democratic nominee for President, Sen. Barack Obama introduced new legislation to expand public access to information about government spending.

The bill (pdf), known as “The Strengthening Transparency and Accountability in Federal Spending Act of 2008,” was crafted on a bi-partisan basis with Sen. Tom Coburn (R-OK).

Sen. John McCain, the Republican presidential candidate, is also an original co-sponsor of the bill, as is Sen. Tom Carper (D-DE).

The new bill would build upon and improve previous efforts by Senators Obama and Coburn to provide public access to federal grant and contract information through the USASpending.gov web site. Among other things, it would require copies of each federal contract and details of the bidding process to be published online.

The provisions of the bill were outlined in a joint press release on June 3.

“People from every State in this great Nation sent us to Congress to defend their rights and stand up for their interests,” Sen. Obama said in a prepared floor statement. “To do that we have to tear down the barriers that separate citizens from the democratic process and to shine a brighter light on the inner workings of Washington. This bill helps to shine that light.”

While most government agencies have cooperated with the contracting transparency requirements that were adopted in 2006, some intelligence agencies have dragged their heels in opposition. The Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, which used to disclose their unclassified contracts, actually withheld such information from the USASpending.gov database in 2007 and 2008.

Dozens of countries are conducting research involving animal pox viruses, according to a descriptive survey (pdf) performed for the U.S. intelligence community’s Open Source Center.

There are various potential public health and security concerns associated with pox viruses (such as smallpox), the OSC report says in a background discussion.

“Naturally occurring smallpox disease was eliminated worldwide in 1977. Routine vaccination of US civilians against smallpox was discontinued in 1971, but allowed for travelers to endemic regions until the late 1970s. In most other countries, vaccination of the general population ended by 1982. As a result of this halt in vaccination, most of the US population could now become ill with smallpox disease should it be reintroduced by accident or intentionally.”

“In addition, humans are susceptible to several naturally occurring viruses related to smallpox, one of which could become a serious disease risk through natural evolution. Routine smallpox vaccination previously protected against these viruses. Finally, there is concern about the potential creation of a genetically engineered poxvirus that might be markedly pathogenic for humans.”

Like most finished intelligence products from the Open Source Center, the report on animal pox viruses has not been approved for public release. But a copy was obtained independently by Secrecy News.

See “Recent Worldwide Research on Animal Pox Viruses,” MITRE Corporation, January 2008.

Not even a valid intelligence requirement can be used to justify cruel treatment of a detained enemy combatant, according to Defense Department doctrine on “detainee operations” (pdf).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff last week issued a slightly revised version of that DoD doctrine on detainees (the second revision this year).

The document reaffirms that all detainees must be treated humanely.

“Inhumane treatment of detainees is prohibited by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, domestic and international law, and DOD policy. There is no exception to this humane treatment requirement.”

“Accordingly, the stress of combat operations, the need for intelligence, or deep provocation by captured and/or detained personnel does not justify deviation from this obligation.”

See Joint Publication 3-63, “Detainee Operations,” 30 May 2008.

Fusion centers are collaborative law enforcement and intelligence organizations that were established all over the country after 9/11 to share intelligence and counterterrorism information. But in the absence of a widespread domestic terrorist threat, they have not consistently demonstrated their value, according to a recent study.

“Fusion centers emerged almost spontaneously in response to a need by state and local law enforcement for useful and usable intelligence related to the evolving terrorist threat,” observed Milton Nenneman, a Sacramento police officer, in a master’s thesis (pdf) based on a survey of California fusion centers.

But the terrorist threat has turned out to be “insufficient” to justify or sustain the new fusion centers.

“There is, more often than not, insufficient purely ‘terrorist’ activity to support a multi-jurisdictional and multi-governmental level fusion center that exclusively processes terrorist activity,” Lt. Nenneman wrote.

As a result, “Fusion centers must consider analyzing or processing other criminal activity, in addition to terrorist activity, in order to maintain the skills and interest of the analysts, as well as the participation and data collection of the emergency responder community.”

Basic questions regarding who the fusion centers are supposed to serve and exactly what they are supposed to produce often lack satisfactory answers, Lt. Nenneman reported.

While there is little consensus about the precise mission or function of fusion centers, which vary widely, “the majority of fusion centers operate exclusively in an analytical capacity rather than as having any response or operational capacity.”

“It would seem prudent to make a concerted effort to seek out the emergency responder administrators and elected officials to given them regular threat assessments and situational awareness briefings to demonstrate the value and capability of the unit,” he suggested.

See “An Examination of State and Local Fusion Centers and Data Collection Methods” by Milton W. Nenneman, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2008.

Related issues were examined by the Congressional Research Service in “Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress” (pdf), updated January 18, 2008.

See also “Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers” (pdf), Government Accountability Office Report No. GAO-08-35, October 2007.

The Electronic Privacy Information Center recently won disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act of records documenting federal efforts to curtail public disclosure of fusion center information in the state of Virginia.

The U.S. Air Force last week issued revised procedures (pdf) for nuclear weapons maintenance and accounting. Meanwhile, the Air Force continues to suffer serious lapses in nuclear weapons security.

The new procedures include increased supervision and auditing requirements for weapon storage, handling and transport.

“Nuclear weapons require special consideration because of their political and military importance, destructive power, cost, and potential consequences of an accident or unauthorized act,” the Air Force reiterated.

See Air Force Instruction 21-204, Supplement 1, “Nuclear Weapons Maintenance Procedures,” updated 28 May 2008.

Recurring defects in nuclear weapons security were identified in a recent inspection at Minot Air Force Base, Air Force Times reported last week. Security “broke down on multiple levels during simulated attacks across the base, including against nuclear weapons storage areas,” the paper said, citing an undisclosed inspection report from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. See “5th Bomb Wing flunks nuclear inspection” by Michael Hoffman, Air Force Times, May 30.

The National Security Agency has released some additional declassified passages from its major historical study of Vietnam-era signals intelligence, “Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975.”

The large bulk of the 500-page report was declassified last December. But in response to a mandatory declassification review appeal from researcher Michael Ravnitzky, further declassifications on 90 pages (large pdf) were released last month, including disclosures authorized by “other government agencies.”

Most of the new disclosures appear to be insignificant, not to say tiresome. For example, several previously redacted references to the term “COMINT” (i.e., “communications intelligence”) have been approved for release. Numerous allusions to the French war in Indochina have been okayed too. And several mentions of the year 1959, which had been censored for reasons that are hard to fathom, have been restored.

Other newly declassified lines include these:

“With the deaths of Kennedy and Diem, the struggle in the South entered a period of enormous flux and instability. A plan developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under guidance from the Kennedy administration, to reduce American forces in Vietnam by the end of 1965 to one-quarter the 1963 level (25,000), was quietly scrapped.” (p. 171).

“There had always been a suspicion going back to the 1950s about the integrity of South Vietnamese security.” (page 463).

“Westmoreland called the battle in Kontum Province the ‘beginning of a great defeat of the enemy’.” (page 317).

“As for the Tet Offensive, despite official and personal claims, SIGINT did not deliver an adequate warning in January 1968.” (p. 465).

Perhaps most substantive is the brief discussion of a 1968 report of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board on the performance of intelligence in Vietnam (pp. 340-41).

The 90 pages that include newly declassified material are posted here.

The previously released body of the report (not yet including the newly disclosed passages) can be found here.

While U.S. intelligence operations are more controversial than ever, routine oversight of the Department of Defense’s massive and far-flung intelligence apparatus has been significantly reduced, according to a recent report to Congress from the DoD Inspector General.

Due to resource limitations, “We have not been able to perform planned audits and evaluations in key intelligence disciplines such as Imagery Intelligence, Measurement and Signature Intelligence and Open Source Intelligence,” the DoD Inspector General told Congress in a March 2008 report.

In addition, the report said, intelligence oversight has been cut back in areas such as: National Reconnaissance Office activities, especially major acquisitions; National Security Agency Operations Security and Information Security Programs; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency programs; National Intelligence Program/Military Intelligence Program funding; Service Intelligence Component activities; Operations and Support Special Access Programs; DoD Counterintelligence Field Activity Programs; and others.

See “Department of Defense Inspector General Growth Plan for Increasing Audit and Investigative Capabilities Fiscal Years 2008 – 2015,” March 31, 2008.

The report was first published by the watchdog Project on Government Oversight which is working to strengthen the authority and capacity of agency inspectors general.

The reduction in oversight by the DoD Inspector General would seem to provide further justification for a pending proposal to assign new intelligence oversight responsibilities to the Government Accountability Office, as discussed at a February 29 hearing of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee.

The textbooks that are used in Iranian elementary, middle and high schools “reveal a clear emphasis on Islam, as it has been interpreted by the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” according to a recent contractor study (pdf) performed for U.S. intelligence.

That rather banal observation is among “the most important conclusions” of the open source intelligence study.

The study culls tendentious statements from 85 Persian-language textbooks, and surveys them without much analytical insight or empathy.

Among its dubious verdicts: The schoolbooks “provide a distorted view of Shia Islam as the only true path in Islam, and among religions.”

The study, hosted by the DNI Open Source Center, was performed under government contract by Science Applications International Corporation.

Like most other finished intelligence from the Open Source Center, the study has not been approved for public release, but a copy was obtained by Secrecy News.

See “Iranian Textbooks: Content and Context,” SAIC Research Report, 31 December 2007.

Noteworthy new reports from the Congressional Research Service that have not been made readily available to the public include the following (all pdf).

“National Security Strategy: Legislative Mandates, Execution to Date, and Considerations for Congress,” May 28, 2008.

“Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy: Background and Issues for Congress,” May 22, 2008.

“Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress,” updated May 23, 2008.

“German Foreign and Security Policy: Trends and Transatlantic Implications,” updated April 29, 2008.

“The Army’s Future Combat System (FCS): Background and Issues for Congress,” updated May 12, 2008.

“American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics,” updated May 14, 2008.

A prior version of the CRS report on military casualties has been the subject of a widely reprinted spam email message that misrepresented casualties during the Clinton and Bush Administrations. A footnote in the latest CRS update states: “Distorted versions of Tables 4 and 5 have been circulating through the Internet. As the tables here and on the Department of Defense website show, total military deaths and hostile deaths increased from 2001 to 2005, and then decreased in 2006.” See also “E-mail on military deaths is shaky on facts” by Chuck Vinch, Army Times, March 27, 2008.

Government press releases could be temporarily marked as “controlled unclassified information” to protect them from premature disclosure, according to an official Background paper (pdf) on the new White House information security policy.

Controlled unclassified information, or CUI, refers to information that does not meet the standards for classification but that is considered too sensitive for unrestricted public disclosure. The new CUI policy was issued by President Bush on May 7.

While the precise definitions of CUI and the implementing policy directives remain to be written, there are indications that CUI could end up as a catch-all category for information that agencies wish to withhold.

Thus, “embargoed press releases” could be designated as CUI for at least a few hours, according to the newly released Background paper (at page 5, paragraph 8).

What if a member of the public wants to obtain information that some agency has marked as CUI? Well, he should file a Freedom of Information Act request, the Background paper says.

“The FOIA process will provide a straightforward way for anyone to seek public release of CUI and ensure that all CUI for which there is a demand will be carefully reviewed for release.” (at page 6).

But anyone who has filed a FOIA request knows that the FOIA process is not quite straightforward, nor does it produce a timely result.

The Background paper thus affirms a view that information deemed “sensitive” shall be presumptively withheld, and any exceptions shall be handled through the FOIA process.

In truth, this policy of presumptive withholding is pretty much how the Bush Administration currently operates. And it makes no tangible difference if agencies use 100 different terms for “sensitive” or replace them all with one term, “controlled unclassified information.”

But informal, discretionary disclosure was far more common in previous Administrations, and it could be once again in some future Administration. Institutionalizing presumptive withholding in a government-wide CUI policy could make it harder to overcome current secrecy practices when the opportunity to do so presents itself.

On the other hand, Allen Weinstein, the head of the National Archives (NARA), told agencies in a May 21 memorandum (pdf) that CUI would be narrowly construed.

“NARA, as the Executive Agent and consistent with the President’s direction, will ensure that only that information which truly requires the protections afforded by the President’s memorandum be introduced into the CUI Framework,” he wrote.

This implies that at least some information that is currently withheld as sensitive might not qualify for the new CUI marking. But if so, the criteria for excluding any existing sensitive information from the CUI category have not been identified.

William J. Bosanko, the Director of the CUI Office, told public interest groups at a May 27 meeting that he was committed to an open and accountable CUI policy process.

Various resources on CUI and sensitive information policy are available here.