In April 2006, Iran successfully test-fired a new high-speed torpedo called Hoot.  It was test-fired again last July, along with various other missiles.

“The torpedo is capable of destroying the largest warships and any other vessel on the surface or beneath the water, and split it into two parts,” according to an Iranian Naval Forces official.

Technical specifications (pdf) for components of the Hoot torpedo are presented in an Iranian document (in Farsi) that was provided to Secrecy News.  The document appears to have been produced by a subunit of Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization, according to a colleague who reviewed it.

“Only Iran and another country possess the technology to build this [torpedo],” the Iranian press reported after last July’s test, apparently referring to Russia and its Shkval torpedo.  On  4 April 2006, Izvestiya Moscow said that the Hoot resembles the Shkval technically and in appearance, and that Shkval torpedoes may have found their way to Iran via China, where they were delivered in the mid-1990s.  But Iranian officials insist the Hoot is a completely original production.

“From a tactical point of view,” said Rear Admiral Morteza Safari of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps naval forces, “what is of critical importance is that we are everywhere, while we are nowhere!”  (Fars News Agency, July 10, 2008, via OSC).

“Let me briefly say that the intelligence that the Americans have about us is very different from the intelligence that they do not have about us,” he went on.  “What I mean is that they have only little information, and there is a lot of intelligence that they are not aware of.”

Despite compulsory legislative reforms and multiple executive orders intended to streamline the granting of security clearances for access to classified information, the process remains “cumbersome,” according to a new House Intelligence Committee report.

While backlogs and processing time have been reduced since enactment of the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act, overall “progress over the past five years has been disappointing,” the report said.

Among other things, the executive branch has failed to establish an integrated database of all security clearance authorizations.  As a consequence, “no one knows how many people in the U.S. Government hold security clearances.”  (It is more than 2.5 million and probably around 3 million people in government, military and industry.)

Government agencies have also failed to fulfill a requirement for security clearance “reciprocity,” referring to the acceptance by one agency of a security clearance granted by another agency.  This is in spite of an explicit statutory requirement that “all security clearance background investigations and determinations… shall be accepted by all agencies.”

The House Committee found that “In practice, security clearance adjudications are not fully accepted reciprocally across the U.S. Government, and anecdotal information shows that even among the elements of the Intelligence Community there are impediments and sometimes lengthy delays in granting clearances to employees detailed from one agency to another.”

See “Security Clearance Reform — Upgrading the Gateway to the National Security Community,” House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House Report 110-916, November 20, 2008.

One U.S. intelligence community employee told Secrecy News that reciprocity had improved in recent years thanks to new databases and other tools that make it possible to rapidly confirm an individual’s clearance status.  But the employee said that full clearance of employees who are detailed from another agency often lags while the employee’s hardcopy adjudicative file is physically transferred to his or her new place of employment.

More fundamentally, the statutory requirement for reciprocity “contains some ambiguity,” the Committee report acknowledged, and could be interpreted in one of at least three different ways. The report said the Committee would seek to clarify the matter in the 111th Congress.

The November 20 Committee report mistakenly said that the new Intelligence Community Directive 704 on security clearance standards “has still not been issued.”  ICD 704 (pdf) went into effect on October 1, 2008.

The report also said that intelligence community personnel “hold approximately 10 percent of the total number of security clearances.”  But this would imply that there are approximately 300,000 cleared intelligence community employees, roughly twice the usual estimate.

Andrei Soldatov, the Russian journalist who runs the independent web site Agentura.ru that reports on Russian intelligence and security services, was the subject of a profile last week prepared by the DNI Open Source Center.

“Soldatov has regularly highlighted the increasing influence of the special services in Russian government, reported on the security services’ efforts to limit journalistic freedoms, followed spy cases, interviewed defectors, and chronicled personnel appointments and reorganizations of the special services,” the OSC profile stated.

“Despite being questioned and charged by the FSB [Russian Federal Security Service] on several occasions, Soldatov has continued to cover hot-button issues such as corruption, security service defectors, and the increasing role of the special services in limiting free speech in Russia.”

See “Profile of Prominent Russian Security Services Commentator Andrey Soldatov,” Open Source Center Media Aid, November 25, 2008.

The OSC write-up presents numerous interesting details about Soldatov’s career, many of which are rather obscure and bound to be unfamiliar to anyone who does not follow the Russian press closely.  But since the open source information it relies upon is “collected” rather than “reported” — where reporting means confirmation of facts and hypotheses, reconciliation of conflicting accounts, and discovery of previously undisclosed information — it also contains some significant omissions.

The OSC speculates that “Perhaps Soldatov has enjoyed protection because of his father’s position and ties to the security services.”  But Relcom, the Internet Service Provider of which the senior Soldatov was then president, decisively terminated its support of the Agentura.ru web site in 2006.

The OSC writes that “To those following the increasingly hostile environment for journalists in Russia, Soldatov’s career is a curiosity. In an era where journalists are regularly threatened or even killed for their reporting, Soldatov has [suffered] relatively few consequences.”  But on November 12, Soldatov’s employer Novaya Gazeta fired him and Agentura.ru colleague Irina Borogan “without explanation” (noted by Maria Eismont in Index on Censorship on November 27).  The “curiosity” of Soldatov’s career is thus diminishing and the Agentura.ru project may be in jeopardy.

In happier times, Soldatov was featured in “A Web Site That Came in From the Cold to Unveil Russian Secrets” by Sally McGrane, New York Times, December 14, 2000.

Charles Homans considers “The Last Secrets of the Bush Administration” in the latest Washington Monthly.  “An accounting of the Bush years is a less daunting prospect than it seems from the outset,” he says. “If the new president and leaders on Capitol Hill act shrewdly, they can pull it off while successfully navigating the political realities and expectations they now face. A few key actions will take us much of the distance between what we know and what we need to know.”

A review of the White House website reveals unacknowledged modifications to White House press releases and suggests an unwholesome willingness to distort the public record, the authors of a recent study contend.  See “History Reloaded: Changing The Past To Suit The Present” by Thomas Claburn, Information Week, November 26.

“President-elect Barack Obama’s top pick to head the CIA blamed his sudden withdrawal from consideration on critics who blamed him for harsh Bush administration policies on interrogations, detentions and secret renditions.”  See “Potential CIA chief cites critics in ending bid” by Pamela Hess, Associated Press, November 26.

“The next White House Web site should tell us a lot about whether Obama believes what he has said about bringing transparency and accountability to the government,” writes Dan Froomkin in the Nieman Watchdog.  See “It’s time for a Wiki White House,” November 25.

Government officials were reminded recently that as they depart from government service with the end of the current Administration, they are not permitted to take classified information with them.

“Classified information is not personal property and may not be removed from the Government’s control by any departing official or employee. This includes ‘extra’copies.”

That timely warning (pdf) was issued by William J. Bosanko, the director of the Information Security Oversight Office, which oversees the national security classification system.

“This prohibition applies to all cleared officials and employees, regardless of type or level of position,” Mr. Bosanko wrote in a November 17 ISOO memorandum to senior executive branch agency officials.

Document removal is among the most pernicious forms of secrecy, as it is often undetected and irreversible.

The United States Special Operations Command has published a newly updated handbook for use by special operations forces medics in the field.

“It emphasizes acute care in all its forms (including gynecology, general medicine, dentistry, poisonings, infestations, parasitic infections, acute infections, hyper and hypothermia, high altitude, aerospace, dive medicine, and sanitation.)”

The document, which is not yet available in soft copy, replaces a 2001 edition (large pdf) and may be purchased from the Government Printing Office Bookstore.

An earlier Army special forces medical handbook (large pdf) dated 1982 and obtained by Secrecy News is now “a relic of sentimental and historical interest only,” wrote Dr. Warner Anderson, a U.S. Army Colonel (ret.) and former associate dean of the Special Warfare Medical Group.  It advocates “treatments that, if used by today’s medics, would result in disciplinary measures,” he told us last year.  These include such unlikely remedies as drinking kerosene, eating cigarettes, and using live maggots to consume rotting tissue.

Slightly related is this report from the Congressional Research Service on “Military Medical Care: Questions and Answers” (pdf), updated October 31, 2008.

Newly published congressional reports and hearing volumes that caught our eye include the following (mostly pdf).

“Misleading Information from the Battlefield: The Tillman and Lynch Episodes,” Report of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, September 16, 2008.

“Restoring the Rule of Law,” hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Senate Judiciary Committee, September 16, 2008 (a second volume is to follow).

“An Amendment and Three Protocols to the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention,” Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, September 11, 2008.

“Argentina: Rudderless,” Report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, September 9, 2008:

Some more reports from the Congressional Research Service that have not been made readily available to the public include the following (all pdf).

“The U.S. Financial Crisis: The Global Dimension with Implications for U.S. Policy,” November 18, 2008.

“China and the Global Financial Crisis: Implications for the United States,” updated November 17, 2008.

“Reporting Requirements in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008,” updated November 13, 2008.

“The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act and Current Financial Turmoil: Issues and Analysis,” October 31, 2008.

“Russia’s Economic Performance and Policies and Their Implications for the United States,” updated November 5, 2008.

“‘Political’ Activities of Private Recipients of Federal Grants or Contracts,” October 21, 2008.

“Defense: FY2009 Authorization and Appropriations,” updated November 3, 2008.

“Federal Evacuation Policy: Issues for Congress,” November 12, 2008.

“Homeland Emergency Preparedness and the National Exercise Program: Background, Policy Implications, and Issues for Congress,” November 10, 2008.

“Midnight Rulemaking: Considerations for Congress and a New Administration,” November 18, 2008.

Scattered details of a little-known U.S. government database containing the DNA of suspected terrorists were gathered and reported today in the Financial Times.  See “Fears over Covert DNA Database” by Stephen Fidler.

The Joint Federal Agencies [or more often: Antiterrorism] Intelligence DNA Database (JFAIDD) is described in a 2007 briefing slide (pdf) as “a searchable database of DNA profiles from detainees and known or suspected terrorists.”

The JFAIDD contains 15,000 DNA profiles, according to a 2007 report of the Defense Science Board, with “a queue of 30,000 new samples in the laboratory and 400 [pending] requests for DNA profiles, searches, or comparisons.”  See “Defense Biometrics” (pdf, at page 32).

The collection of the DNA samples was described in a 2006 Army document.  “U.S. military units shall collect two buccal [intra-oral cheek] swabs from each person.”  See “Biometric Collection, Transmission and Storage Standards” (pdf), U.S. Army Biometrics Task Force, July 24, 2006 (at pp. 21-22).

“The FBI has been collecting biological evidence from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) removed from Iraq and Afghanistan and databasing the mtDNA profiles from this evidence since February 2004,” the Justice Department said in its 2009 budget justification book for the FBI (pdf).  “Only occasionally can these profiles be compared to reference samples from suspected terrorists or their maternal relatives.”

“Collecting DNA from detainees and obtaining the mtDNA profiles from these samples has the potential to provide excellent actionable intelligence in the Global War on Terror through comparison with evidence already analyzed…”

But “The FBI can process [only] two samples every three days using manual methods.  Given this rate, the DNA Analysis Unit… cannot keep up with the collection of these samples and would likely lose valuable intelligence from the lag time required to analyze these samples.”

The Justice Department therefore requested funding to automate the DNA analysis process, to permit analysis of 40 samples a day, five days a week so as to keep pace with the anticipated delivery of “approximately 9,000 samples per year from detainees of the U.S. government.”  See the 2009 FBI budget justification (at page 6-112).

There were 5,023 invention secrecy orders in effect at the end of FY 2008, up slightly from last year’s total of 5,002.

Under the Invention Secrecy Act of 1951, secrecy orders are applied by government agencies to patent applications that may be “detrimental to national security.”  The patent is withheld, and the invention described in the application is subject to various degrees of restriction, depending on its sensitivity, from export controls to national security classification.

Last year, 68 new secrecy orders were imposed, while 47 were rescinded, according to statistics released by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in response to a Freedom of Information Act request from the Federation of American Scientists.

The specific nature of the currently restricted inventions is, of course, not published.  But it is possible to get information about dozens of patent applications that were formerly subject to secrecy orders that were later rescinded.

A list of secrecy orders rescinded in 2005-2006 (pdf), by application number, was released in response to a FOIA request from researcher Michael Ravnitzky.

A description of each formerly restricted application can be found by searching the application number on the Patent Office web site.  Thus, the first invention on the list was described as a “rocket engine chamber with layered internal wall channels.”

Expectations of significant changes in government information policy continue to grow as more and more groups and individuals offer their recommendations for reform to the next administration and its transition team.

Proposals for change concerning classification, freedom of information, and presidential records were developed by a cross-section of interested organizations convened by the National Security Archive and published here.

A catalog of proposals affecting a broad range of national security and civil liberties issues, including secrecy, was compiled by the Constitution Project.

Under the Freedom of Information Act, one need not be a lawyer to file a lawsuit.  A clever, committed advocate can sometimes defeat a team of government lawyers and win disclosure of denied documents.  On the other hand, an inept, overzealous or unlucky litigant can leave a trail of legal wreckage that will make the lives of other FOIA requesters more difficult.

A newly updated guidebook will help any would-be litigant, whether a lawyer or not, to avoid many of the pitfalls of FOIA litigation and to realistically assess the chances of success.  Don’t file suit without it.

“Litigation Under the Federal Open Government Laws 2008” was edited by Harry A. Hammitt, Marc Rotenberg, John A. Verdi, and Mark S. Zaid.  It can be purchased from Harry Hammitt’s web site or from the Electronic Privacy Information Center.