An earlier FAS blog entry analyzed, and criticized, proposed legislation that grants the Bush Administration pre-approval of the details of an eventual nuclear trade deal with India. FAS has also organized a petition campaign to encourage members of Congress to vote against the legislation. (And blog readers are encouraged to sign the petition.) The Times of India picked up on the petition. The Times piece was, in my view, pretty good and fair. They did not agree entirely with the FAS position but I think the article did a good job of representing the FAS position.

Nevertheless, with the Times article, many in India learned of FAS involvement in the issue, resulting in a lot of emails to FAS and almost all of the letters were negative, specifically saying that the FAS position is anti-Indian. I can imagine that if all anyone knew about FAS was its position on the Indian nuclear deal, it might somehow appear that we have some gripe against India. And for those people, I simply ask that they view all of the work of the Federation. We have worked hard against what we believe is an oversized U.S. arsenal. We worked against the RNEP, or nuclear bunker buster. We are working now against the U.S. Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, or GNEP, that will restart plutonium reprocessing in the United States after a three decade hiatus. We have publicized the inflation of the Chinese threat and the growing importance of tactical nuclear weapons in military planning. (Once we figure out what the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program actually is, we might work against that, too, but we don’t think anyone is absolutely certain what the program is yet.)

The point is that FAS works to reduce the number and salience of U.S. nuclear weapons. We want to reduce the world’s nuclear weapons and fully realize that most of those are in the United States and Russia. We also oppose the Indian deal but not because we are anti-Indian but because we are anti-proliferation.

One of the tragedies of the Cold War is that a confrontation between the United States and Russia sucked in other “balancing” powers like China, India, and Pakistan. Due to circumstances that had little to do with India and the United States directly, the world’s two largest democracies ended up, certainly not enemies, but suspicious of one another looking across that divide. FAS, and we suspect an overwhelming majority of Americans, strongly support closer ties with India. India has some of the best scientists in the world and there are a hundred different ways that the United States and India could work together. Even in the area of energy research, programs in clean coal, carbon dioxide sequestration, wind and solar power, improved efficiency in buildings, transportation, and electricity transmission, could benefit from close U.S.-Indian collaboration. But not nuclear power, not with an agreement that critically undermines the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Update (February 22, 2007): DTRA announces that Divine Strake has been canceled.

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) today confirmed to FAS that the upcoming Divine Strake test widely reported in the media to be a non-nuclear event is in fact a low-yield nuclear weapons calibration simulation against an underground target.

A few, including Albuquerque Journal and disarmamentactivist.org, have speculated that Divine Strake was a nuclear-related event, but DTRA has up till now declined to confirm or deny the nuclear connection.

In response to an email earlier today, a DTRA spokesperson confirmed that Divine Strake is the same event that is described in DTRA budget documents as being a low-yield nuclear weapons shock simulation designed to allow the warfighters to fine-tune the yield of nuclear weapons in strikes on underground facilities.

It also turns out that Divine Strake is “an integral part” of STRATCOM’s new Global Strike mission, which is normally reported to develop mainly non-nuclear capabilities against time-urgent targets. Global Strike is one of the pillars of the Bush administration’s so-called New Triad which is said to be reducing the role of nuclear weapons.

According to a Department of Energy document associated with Divine Strake, the event comes only two years after President George W. Bush in Summer 2004 signed a presidential decision directive that ordered STRATCOM to “extend Global Strike to counter all [Hard and Deeply Buried Targets] to include both tactical and strategic adversarial targets.”

Divine Strake was not mentioned during last week’s Senate hearing on the Global Strike mission.

More: Divine Strake Background | Global Strike Chronology

Hans M. Kristensen and two analysts from the Natural Resources Defense Council examine the debate over China’s modernization of its nuclear forces, review the composition and possible future development of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, describe past and current U.S. nuclear targeting of China, and use government software to simulate the effects of Chinese and U.S. of nuclear attacks. The report (PDF) concludes that both countries use the other as an excuse to modernize their nuclear forces, and recommends that urgent steps are needed by both sides to halt and reverse a nuclear arms race.

Download Full Report

Will the New Triad of nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities reduce or increase the role of U.S. nuclear weapons? To get an answer to that question I went to a hearing the Senate Armed Services Committee held earlier today on the Pentagon’s new Global Strike mission. But instead of giving a clear answer, the Pentagon muddled the issue by saying that it is reducing its dependence on nuclear weapons while at the same time increasing the nuclear strike options.

Four officials were lined up to explain the Global Strike mission to the Senate Armed Services Committee’s Strategic Forces Subcommittee: Peter C. W. Flory, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, General James E. Cartwright, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, Rear Admiral Charles B. Young, Director of the Navy’s Strategic Systems Programs, and Major General Stanley Gorenc, Director of Air Force Operational Capabilities and Requirements and Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations. These guys ought to know what the nuclear policy is.

STRATCOM Commander General Cartwright explained to the Subcommittee that the New Triad provides increased flexibility in dealing with a wider range of contingencies, “while reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons….” Although he mentioned that the President has committed the United States to sustaining a credible nuclear deterrent capability “to ensure our nuclear force remains ready to meet any contingency,” Gen. Cartwright only mentioned non-nuclear weapons when describing the new capabilities of the New Triad, and he never explicitly stated that the Global Strike mission also includes nuclear weapons.

Secretary Flory described the role of nuclear weapons very differently. Although his testimony echoed Cartwright’s statement about reducing the role of nuclear weapons, Flory described an important role for nuclear weapons in Global Strike. In fact, his prepared statement appears to suggest that the nuclear role is increasing. In three consecutive paragraphs describing the continued “critical role” of nuclear weapons, Flory stated that flexible and credible nuclear forces will provide the President with “a broader range of options” that will make it possible to “tailor deterrence” against adversaries armed with “chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons….” “What we need is not a smaller version of the Cold War-era nuclear stockpile; we need capabilities appropriate for 21st Century threats,” he advocated. “Making tailored deterrence a reality…will require us to make adjustments in our force posture, in our residual nuclear stockpile, and in our thinking,” Flory explained.

Will the right nuclear policy please stand up! Is there a nuclear option in Global Strike or is there not? Is the range of options broadening or is it not? Why does STRATCOM gloss over the nuclear option while the Office of the Secretary of Defense emphasizes it? Three years after Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld assigned a new Global Strike mission to STRATCOM, 18 months after the first Global Strike plan became operational, and six months after the new Space and Global Strike component command stood up at Offutt Air Force Base, one would have hoped that Congress could have gotten a more coherent account of the role of nuclear weapons in this critical new mission.

This is serious stuff. Embedded in Global Strike is preemption against proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. Try adding nuclear weapons to those scenarios, and the ramifications become truly immense. Several countries, including Russia and North Korea, have already referred to the Bush administration’s preemption doctrine to justify their own preemptive strikes if necessary. Moreover, if we can preempt with nuclear weapons, why can’t terrorists?

A clear account of how U.S. nuclear weapons could potentially be used under Global Strike should have been part of today’s Congressional hearing. After all, if the Pentagon cannot articulate a coherent nuclear policy to the Senate, how does it expect to communicate the policy to the countries it is trying to deter?

More: Global Strike background | Not Just A Last Resort?

The Senate Armed Services Committee plans to hold a hearing on Wednesday, March 29th, on the Pentagon’s new offensive Global Strike mission. The Committee has asked the following officials to testify:

* Peter C. W. Flory, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy
* General James E. Cartwright, USMC, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command
* Rear Admiral Charles B. Young, USN, Director Strategic Systems Programs, Department of the Navy
* Major General Stanley Gorenc, USAF, Director, Operational Capabilities and Requirements, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force

This is Congress’ first hearing on this critical new mission, which includes strike options that span from information warfare to preemptive nuclear attacks against weapons of mass destruction targets around the world.

The long-overdue hearing comes three and a half years after the White House published the so-called preemption doctrine (National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction), three years after STRATCOM was tasked to prepare strike plans against WMD targets around the world, nineteen months after Rumsfeld signed the Alert Order that directed STRATCOM to put Global Strike into effect, and six months after the new Joint Functional Component Command for Space and Global Strike became operational at Offutt Air Force Base.

More: Hearing Page | Global Strike Chronology

President Bush has submitted an amazing piece of legislation to Congress that essentially strips Congress of its authority to evaluate and limit nuclear exports to India and asks Congress to approve whatever trade deal the Administration develops, that is, to approve the Indian nuclear deal months in advance, sight unseen.

Much was made of the nuclear “deal” arrived at by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh during Bush’s recent trip to India. But there really isn’t any deal, yet. What the President and Prime Minister really did was agree in principle to develop nuclear technology trade. The actual trade package will be a complex technical business arrangement. It will take at least months, perhaps a year or more, to work out all the details.

When the trade agreement is all spelled out, it must, under current law, be submitted to Congress for evaluation and, under some circumstances, approval. This is all spelled out in the Atomic Energy Act. The key section is 123, Cooperation with Other Nations. (Find it on page 1-52 of the linked document.) Section 123 lays out the requirement for sharing nuclear technology with another country. There are basically four sets of requirements set out in four paragraphs. (And bear with me, I am not a lawyer, so I too was a bit surprised to find a “paragraph” that was two and a half pages long.)

The first, paragraph 123(a), lists nine conditions that must be met. Most have to do with securing material and technology transferred under any agreement. All of these should be met but they can be waived if the President judges that requiring compliance would harm non-proliferation or national security. (Keep that in mind, we come back to it later.)

Paragraphs (b) and (c) describe reports that the administration must submit to Congress.

Paragraph (d) says that if all the reports are in order and have been sent to the right offices, then Congress has sixty days to disapprove the agreement by joint resolution. That is, the default is approval: if the Congress does nothing the deal goes through; Congress has to actively intervene.

Except, if the President invoked his waiver power up in paragraph (a). If there is a waiver, then the burden of proof is completely reversed. Now the deal does not go through unless the Congress explicitly accepts the waiver and approves the deal.

Bush wants this deal, whatever it turns out to be, to go through regardless of what Congress thinks. So the Administration would much prefer to have the default be that the deal goes through unless Congress specifically objects. Then Congressional allies can simply stall, never vote, and tacitly approve the deal.

There are two ways to deal with this. Bush could not invoke the waiver clause of paragraph 123(a), simply asserting that India has met all the conditions. This might not pass the “laugh test.” Subparagraph 123(a) (2), for example, states that for “non-nuclear weapon states” that all “peaceful” nuclear sites anywhere in the country be under IAEA surveillance. Ironically, part of the India deal is that, for NPT purposes, India will remain a “non-nuclear weapon state.” In any case, by not invoking the waiver when a reasonable person thinks it should be invoked, the President lays himself open to court challenge by members of Congress.

Thus, the second approach. Bush has submitted to Congress H.R. 4974. The bill is very short and simply states that the President can, at his discretion and only in the case of India, waive the requirements of 123(a) without activating the approval requirements of 123(d). With this legislation, whatever the India deal eventually turns out to be, it will be approved unless a majority of both houses of Congress disapprove the deal within sixty days by joint resolution, meaning they have to agree on identical language. Moreover, since the President can be expected to veto any attempt to block the deal that he just submitted, disapproval will in practice require a two thirds majority of both houses.

What this amounts to is that the Administration is asking the Congress to approve the India nuclear technology transfer deal in advance, sight unseen. Not even the President now knows what will eventually be included in the package but once this legislation is passed, the Administration can promise India essentially anything it wants with little to no concern about Congressional interference. The President does not have this authority with Britain or Canada. This bill constitutes a major attack on Congressional oversight prerogatives.

The Congressional Research Service has prepared an excellent issue paper on a possible Indian nuclear deal. Sam Nunn was cited in the Washington Post as saying a nuclear deal with India should be examined carefully.

A few months ago, physicist Jorge Hirsch [jhirsch@ucsd.edu] of the University of California, San Diego, and others, organized a petition signed by an impressive array of notable scientists. The petition condemns the administration’s new national security strategy for its over-emphasis on nuclear weapons. The petition also emphasized that just using the term “WMD” blurs the distinction between non-nuclear and nuclear weapons, which are in a class of their own. You can see the petition and a partial list of signatories here.

Nuclear weapons are surprisingly prominent in the Pentagon’s new offensive Global Strike mission, according to the new FAS report Global Strike: A Chronology of the Pentagon’s New Offensive Strike Plan. The 250-page report traces the development of Global Strike through a comprehensive compilation of guidance documents, public statements, budget program descriptions, contracts, and declassified military documents obtained under the FOIA.

One of the FOIA documents is the Concept of Operations for the Joint Functional Component Command for Space and Global Strike, the new organization established in 2005 at U.S. Strategic Command to prepare and execute the Global Strike mission. The mission is normally portrayed as a conventional mission, but the Concept of Operations reveals the prominent nuclear role the command has.

Publication of the FAS report coincides with a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Global Strike on March 16. [Update: Hearing postponed. Check link for details.]

Download: The full report | Background information and FOIA documents.

Charles D. Ferguson, Preventing Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism, Council Special Report No. 11, Council on Foreign Relations, March 2006.

This report examines options for the United States and other countries to secure and eliminate nuclear weapons and dangerous fissile materials. Despite many national and international programs to secure these materials, there are large security gaps that remain.

View Full Article

A new review of Russian nuclear forces published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists says that the Kremlin appears to be attempting to reassert its nuclear strength after years of decline in order to underscore Russia’s status as a powerful nation. Large-scale exercises have been reinstated and modernizations of nuclear forces continue with reports about a new maneuverable warhead and the mobile version of the SS-27 (Topol-M) expected to become operational later this year.

Yet the reassertion is done with fewer strategic warheads than at any time since the mid-1970s, approximately 3,500 operational strategic warheads. The number of operational non-strategic nuclear weapons has been cut by more than half to approximately 2,300 warheads.

Moreover, during 2005, Russia’s 12 nuclear ballistic missile submarines only conducted three deterrent patrols. This is a slightly better performance than in 2002 when no patrols were made, but a far cry from the 1980s when Soviet ballistic missile submarines conducted 50-100 deterrent patrols each year.

Article: Russian Nuclear Forces, 2006
Background: Russian Submarine Patrols

A long-rumored but never before seen Chinese underground submarine base is shown for the first time in a new article written by analysts from the Federation of American Scientists and Natural Resources Defense Council. The article, published in Imaging Notes, shows newly acquired satellite images of the submarine base, three air bases, and China’s nuclear weapons lab at Mianyang.

A front page article in Washington Times was headlined “Commercial photos show Chinese nuke buildup,” but both the cave and submarines have existed for nearly three decades. Only now, thanks to commercial satellites, can the public see them.

The Imaging Notes article is a snapshot from a larger FAS/NRDC report on US-Chinese nuclear relations scheduled for publication later this spring.

More: Article in Imaging Notes | Analysis and background

The US Chief of Naval Operations has publicly issued an Instruction that orders US Navy personnel not to tell anyone that US warships do not carry nuclear weapons. Yet the same Instruction states that it is US policy not to deploy nuclear weapons on the ships.

The new Instruction, “Release of Information on Nuclear Weapons and on Nuclear Capabilities of U.S. Forces,” was published on February 6 and updates a previous version from 1993. Both versions state that nuclear weapons were offloaded from the ships in 1992.

The reason for updating the Instruction is to incorporate four guided missile submarines (SSGNs) that are being converted from ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The SSBNs carry nuclear weapons, but the SSGNs will carry conventional weapons, the publicly available Instruction helpfully informs (!).

Background and analysis here.