The Obama administration gets a medal for disclosing its New START treaty numbers.

.
By Hans M. Kristensen [updated 12 Dec 2011 with new bomber information]

Anyone familiar with my writings knows that I don’t hand out medals to the nuclear weapon states very often. But the Obama administration deserves one after the U.S. State Department’s recent release of the full U.S. aggregate data under the New START treaty.

The release breaks with the initial practice under the treaty of only publishing overall nuclear force category numbers, and re-establishes the U.S. practice from the previous START treaty of providing maximum disclosure of the strategic forces counted by the treaty. This is a good development that has gone totally unnoticed in the news media.

The pressure is now squarely on Russia to follow suit and publish its New START aggregate data as well.

Overall Posture

The New START data attributes 1,790 warheads to 822 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers as of September 1, 2011. A large number of non-deployed missiles and launchers that could be deployed are not attributed warheads.

The data shows that the United States will have to eliminate 243 launchers over the next six years to be in compliance with the treaty by 2018. Fifty-six of these will come from reducing the number of launch tubes per SSBN from 24 to 20, roughly 80 from stripping B-52Gs and nearly half of the B-52Hs of their nuclear capability, and destruction of 100 ICBM launchers.

The released data does not contain a breakdown of how the 1,790 deployed warheads are distributed across the three legs of the Triad. But because the bomber number is now disclosed (each bomber counts as one warhead) and because roughly 500 warheads remain on the ICBMs, it is possible to make an estimate of the number of warheads deployed on the ballistic missile submarines: approximately 1,200 warheads, or two-thirds of the total count under New START.

Ballistic Missile Submarines

The New START data shows that the United States as of September 1, 2011, had 249 Trident II SLBMs onboard its SSBN fleet. Each SSBN has 24 missile tubes for a maximum loadout of 288 missiles, but at the time of the New START count three SSBNs were empty and one partially loaded. With an estimated 1,200 warheads on the SLBMs, that translates to an average of 4-5 warheads per missile.

The assumption is normally that 12 out of 14 SSBNs are deployed, with the remaining two in overhaul at any given time. But the New START data illustrates that the force ready for deployment sometimes is smaller, in this case only 10 SSBNs. Other information shows that this ratio fluctuates significantly, and in average 64 percent (8-9) of the SSBNs are at sea with roughly 920 warheads. Up to five of those subs are on alert with 120 missiles carrying an estimated 540 warheads. That’s enough to obliterate every major city on the face of the earth.

The SSBN fleet conducted 33 deterrent patrols last year, with each operational SSBN sailing on three patrols per year, each lasing 70-100 days. That’s a very high operational tempo, comparable to that of the Cold War.

The bulk of the SSBN fleet is based at Bangor (Kitsap) Submarine Base in Washington. Eight subs are homeported at this base, and the New START data shows that two were out of commission on September 11, 2011: one had empty missile tubes – possibly because it was in dry dock – and another was only partially loaded – possibly because it was in the middle of a missile exchange when the count occurred. This means that six of eight SSBNs at the base were loaded with Trident II D5 missiles at the time of the New START count.

A satellite image taken on August 20, 2011, only 11 days before the New START data count, shows three Ohio-class subs present at Bangor, including one in dry dock and another at the Explosives Handling Wharf. (see figure below).

Three SSBNs were present at Bangor Submarine Base on August 20, shortly before the New START count. Click on image for full size.

.
The same image also shows two Ohio-class subs at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard at Bremerton, Washington, only a few miles away. One of the two is an SSGN, a former SSBN stripped of its nuclear missiles and converted to carry cruise missiles and special forces. The other appears to be an SSBN. The New START data does not reflect two entirely empty SSBNs on the west coast, so either one of them was loaded with missiles between the time of the satellite image and the New START count, or the SSBN at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard is from Kings Bay.

The remaining five Bangor-based SSBNs that were at sea the day the image was taken carried 120 missiles with an estimated 540 warheads. Three of those were on alert with 72 missiles and roughly 325 warheads.

In the Atlantic, six SSBNs are based at Kings Bay Submarine Base in Georgia, a significant change from the Cold War when most U.S. SSBNs were homeported on the east coast. Two of the six subs did not carry missiles on September 1, 2011, leaving a deployable force of four SSBNs carrying 96 missiles with an estimated 430 warheads.

The New START data shows that the U.S. Navy has not yet begun to reduce the number of missile tubes on each SSBN. The Pentagon has stated that the number of missile tubes on each submarine will be reduced from 24 to 20 before the New START enters into force in 2018.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

The New START data shows that the United States deployed 448 Minuteman III ICBMs as of September 1, 2011. Most were at the three launch bases, but a significant number were in storage at maintenance and storage facilities in Utah. That included 58 MX Peacekeeper ICBMs retired in 2003-2005 but which have not been destroyed.

The New START data does not show how many warheads were loaded on the 448 deployed ICBMs, but the number is thought to be approximately 500. The 2010 NPR decided to “de-MIRV” the ICBM force, an unfortunately choice of words because the force will be downloaded to one warhead per missile, but retain the capability to re-MIRV if necessary.

Heavy Bombers [updated 12 Dec 2011 with new B-1 information]

The New START data shows that the U.S. Air Force possessed 152 B-2 and B-52 bombers as of September 1, 2011. Of these, 125 were counted as deployed. The disclosure of the bomber count breakdown is important because it has been unclear how many bombers were actually counted by the treaty.  The count includes B-52G bombers that are not used for nuclear missions, but still carry equipment that makes them accountable under the treaty. The last of the B-1s that were still nuclear capable when the treaty was signed were denuclearized in early 2011.

Of the 20 B-2s and 93 B-52s, 18 and 76 (a total of 94), respectively, are nuclear-capable. But only about 60 those are thought to be nuclear tasked at any given time. Stripping excess B-52Hs and the remaining B-52Gs of their nuclear equipment will be necessary to get down to 60 nuclear-capable bombers by 2018.

Heavy bombers do not carry nuclear weapons under normal circumstances, but a few hundred warheads are thought to be stored at the three bomber bases. In addition, hundreds of additional bomber warheads are in central storage. Overall, some 1,000 bombs and cruise missiles are thought to be earmarked for use by the bombers. The NPR states that bombers (along with SSBNs) play an important role in warhead upload scenarios.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The State Department’s release of the full U.S. aggregate data under the New START treaty deserves credit because it increases transparency of U.S. nuclear forces and restores the practice under the previous START treaty of disclosing such information to the public.

After the New START treaty was signed in April 2010 and entered into force in February 2011, it first appeared as if this information would not be released. I warned against this in March, and in May, three former U.S. officials joined FAS in urging the United States and Russia to disclose the full aggregate data.

The first New START aggregate data from February (released in June) did not follow the advice; only six overall numbers were disclosed. The new release of the full September data corrects that mistake.

In context, the data release is extra impressive because it follows the release of other important nuclear information by the United States over the past 18 months, most importantly the disclosure in May last year of the size and history of the total nuclear warhead stockpile and warhead dismantlement.

Following all of this, a clear responsibility now rests on Russia to follow suit and begin to lift the veil for its nuclear arsenal as well. Russia generally discloses very little about its nuclear forces and is falling behind Britain, France, and the United States in transparency. Andrei Nesterenko from the Russian foreign ministry stated in May 2010 that after the New START treaty “comes into force, we will also be able to consider practically the issue of publishing the total amount of deployed strategic carriers and…warheads.”

Well, now the treaty is in force, and with the Preparatory Committee for the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – the so-called NPT PREPCOM – coming up in early May 2012, the next few months would be a good time for Russia to follow the U.S. lead and release the full New START aggregate numbers.

After all, if the Kremlin can share this information with the Pentagon, what’s the point in denying it to the rest of the world?

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

A study from Georgetown University incorrectly suggests that China has 3,000 nuclear weapons.The estimate is off by an order of magnitude.

.
By Hans M. Kristensen

Only the Chinese government knows how many nuclear weapons China has. As in most other nuclear weapon states, the number is a closely held secret. Even so, it is possible to make best estimates of the approximate size that benefit the public debate.

A recent example of how not to make an estimate is the study recently published by the Asia Arms Control Project at Georgetown University. The study (China’s Underground Great Wall: Challenge for Nuclear Arms Control) suggests that China may have as many as 3,000 nuclear weapons.

Although we don’t know exactly how many nuclear weapons China has, we are pretty sure that it doesn’t have 3,000. In fact, the Georgetown University estimate appears to be off by an order of magnitude.

Fissile Material

The most fundamental problem with the 3,000-warhead estimate is that there is no evidence – at least in the public – that China has produced enough fissile material to build that many warheads. Not even close.

An arsenal of 3,000 two-stage thermonuclear warheads with yields of 300-500 kilotons would require 9-12 tons of weapon-grade plutonium and 45-75 tons of highly-enriched uranium (HEU).

Based on what is known about China’s inventory of fissile materials, how many nuclear weapons could it build?

According to the International Panel on Fissile Materials, China has produced an estimated 2 tons of plutonium for weapons. Some has been consumed in nuclear tests, leaving roughly 1.8 tons. The estimate is consistent with what the U.S. government has stated and theoretically enough for 450-600 warheads.

Total production of HEU is thought to have been approximately 20 tons. Some has been spent in nuclear tests and research reactor fuel, leaving a stockpile of some 16 tons. That’s theoretically enough for roughly 640-1,060 warheads.

Another critical material is Tritium, which is used in thermonuclear weapons. China probably only produces enough Tritium at its High-Flux Engineering Test Reactor (HFETR) in Jiajiang to maintain an arsenal of about 300 weapons.

The U.S. intelligence community concluded in 2009 that China likely has produced enough weapon-grade fissile material to meet its needs for the immediate future. In other words, no vast warhead expansion is in sight.

Nuclear Warheads

With this stockpile of fissile material on hand, how many nuclear weapons might China currently have?

First, it is important to keep in mind that nuclear weapon states do not convert all of their fissile material into nuclear weapons but use part of it for weapons and leave the rest as a reserve for future needs. Therefore, one cannot simply translate the amount of fissile material into weapons.

Second, nuclear warheads need nuclear-capable delivery vehicles, missiles and aircraft that can bring the warheads to their intended targets. Delivery vehicles can give a better idea of the size of a nuclear arsenal. Most of China’s ballistic missiles are conventional or dual-capable, but the Georgetown University study includes all missiles in its 3,000-warhead projection, including short-range DF-11 and DF-15 missiles and medium-range DF-21C missiles.

Taking those and other factors into account, our current estimate is that China has approximately 240 nuclear warheads for delivery by nearly 180 missiles and aircraft. Nearly 140 of the operational missiles are land-based. Less than 50 of those can reach the continental United States.

The 240-warhead estimate also includes warheads produced for China’s ballistic missile submarine force (which is not yet operational), weapons for bombers, and some weapons for spares.

Our estimate is consistent with the estimate made by  the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency in 2006: “China currently has more than 100 nuclear warheads.”

Modernization

With its ongoing modernization of its nuclear forces, which includes deployment of three new ICBMs, China will be placing a greater portion of its warheads on ICBMs. The portion of those that can strike the continental United States, according to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, “probably will more than double…by 2025.” That doesn’t mean the total warhead stockpile will “more than double,” only the portion that is on ICBMs. Only time will tell to what extent that happens, but the U.S. projection for Chinese nuclear weapons has been wrong before.

Indeed, the DIA estimated in 1984 that China had 360 warheads, including non-strategic warheads, and projected that the arsenal would grow to 592 warheads in 1989 and 818 warheads in 1994. This projection never materialized.

Analysis of projections made by the U.S. intelligence community during the past decade for the growth in Chinese ICBM warheads shows that they have so far been too much too soon (see figure below). The Central Intelligence Agency’s 2001 projection of 75-100 ICBM warheads deployed primarily against the United States by 2015 will not come true unless China increases its production and deployment of the DF-31A missile or begins to deploy multiple warheads on its ICBMs. China will probably only do so if the U.S. deploys a ballistic missile defense system that can nullify the Chinese deterrent.

U.S. projections for Chinese ICBM warheads have generally been too much too soon. Click image for larger version.

.
Satellite Imagery Interpretations

Another issue with the Georgetown University study concerns some of its analysis of commercial satellite imagery. One of the case studies is a series of buildings in a valley south of Kunming in southern China that the study concludes make up an underground deployment site for the DF-31 ICBM (see figure below).

The Georgetown University study suggests that this valley near Kunming in southern China is a DF-31 deployment site. The facility looks more like a munitions depot. It is located at these coordinates: 24.545262°, 102.584378°

.

No evidence is presented for this conclusion and the source appears to be a post on the Chinese language web site Sina Military Forum (the link to the story no longer works). “Tunnel portals” in the valley apparently are thought to be for use by DF-31 launchers hiding inside the mountain. Yet the facility does not have any of the characteristics of Chinese DF-31 deployment sites and a minimum of analysis indicates that the portals and roads are too narrow to be used by DF-31 launchers (see figure below). Instead, the buildings in the valley look more like a munitions depot.

This image shows two of the so-called “tunnel portals” identified by the Georgetown University report as being part of a DF-31 deployment site near Kunming. An image of a DF-31/DF-31A launcher is superimposed to illustrate the difficulty it would have turning at the site. The dimensions of the roads indicate that the facility is not for DF-31 launchers, but looks more like a munitions depot..

.
Conclusions

The Georgetown University study has collected an impressive amount of scattered information from the Internet about Chinese underground facilities. That is obviously interesting in and of itself, but in terms of assessing Chinese nuclear capabilities, it does the public debate a disservice by disseminating exaggerated and poorly analyzed information.

Readers can obviously read into the report what they want, but a quick Google search for news article headlines about the report shows the damage: “China may have 3000 n-warheads;” “China’s nuclear arsenal ‘many times larger’ than previously thought;” “China ‘hiding up to 3,000 nuclear warheads in secret tunnels.” Many people will not remember the details, but they tend to remember the headlines. A misperception will stick in the public consciousness that China has 3,000 nuclear weapons hidden in tunnels.

But China does not have 3,000 nuclear weapons. It neither has produced the fissile material needed to build that many, not does it have delivery vehicles enough to delivery that many warheads. The Georgetown University study warhead estimate appears to be off by an order of magnitude.

China is in the middle of a significant military modernization and it is important that it is not hyped or exaggerated but analyzed and understood for what is actually happening.

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

Today, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released a critical report that concluded while some of the suspected secret nuclear work by Iran may have peaceful purposes, others are specific to building nuclear weapons.

(more…)

New article published in Arms Control Today

.
By Hans M. Kristensen

The latest issue of Arms Control Today includes a new article by Robert Norris and myself about the nuclear targeting review that is currently underway in the Obama administration.

In ordering the review, formally known as the Post-NPR Review, President Obama has asked the military to review and revise U.S. nuclear strategy and guidance on the roles and missions of nuclear weapons, including potential changes in targeting requirements and alert postures, in preparation for the next round of nuclear reductions beyond the New START treaty with Russia.

Our article describes the bureaucratic labyrinth the review will go through before new presidential guidance emerges to change the U.S. nuclear war plan. To that end, we offer a wide range of suggestions for how the review could reduce the requirements for U.S. nuclear forces to “put an end to Cold War thinking,” as President Obama said in his Prague speech in 2009.

Note: accessing the article requires subscription to Arms Control Today.

Further information: Obama and the Nuclear War Plan (FAS, 2010).

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

By Katie Colten and Hans Kristensen

[Modifed] Today, one of the largest weapons in the United States nuclear weapons arsenal, the B53, will be dismantled at the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas. Developed during the Cold War and deployed in 1962, this bomb weighs as much as a minivan and has an explosive yield of nine megatons, equivalent to 750 Hiroshima bombs.

Retired from the arsenal in 1997, the dismantlement of the B53 marks the end of the era of large, multi-megaton bombs, a hallmark of the Cold War. The largest-yield warhead in the U.S. stockpile today is the B83 bomb, which has a maximum yield of 1.2 Megatons.

Administration officials have been busy spinning the dismantlement as proof of the administration’s commitment to nuclear disarmament and as vindication of its plan to spend billions of extra dollars to modernize the nuclear weapons production complex.

In a statement published on the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) web site, Daniel Poneman, the deputy secretary of energy, said that the B53 dismantlement “is a major accomplishment that has made the world safer,” and that “safely [sic] and securely dismantling surplus weapons is a critical step along the road to achieving President Obama’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons.”

“The elimination of the B53 is a significant milestone in our efforts to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and implement President Obama’s nuclear security agenda,” said Thomas D’Agostino, head of NNSA. “Today, we’re moving beyond the Cold War nuclear weapons complex that built it and toward a 21st century Nuclear Security Enterprise.”

If the B53 dismantlement indeed “is a major accomplishment that has made the world safer” and “a critical step along the road to achieving President Obama’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons,” as Boneman says, one might ask why it took 13 years to dismantle the weapon after it was retired in 1997? One reason is that dismantlement is not the priority at the Pantex Plant, which is busy with full-scale production of the W76-1 warhead for U.S. and British sea-launched ballistic missiles, as well as surveillance and repair of the warheads in the “enduring stockpile.”

Warhead Dismantlements

We certainly congratulate the administration on finally dismantling the old B53, but one should not over-spin the achievement. The B53 dismantlement involves less than 50 warheads; the U.S. has approximately 8,500 intact warheads (counting those in the stockpile and dismantlement queue). And warhead dismantling under the Obama administration continues to follow the low rate standard set by the Bush administration. The current dismantlement rate is secret (though past history has been declassified), but very low (only 300-400 warheads per year, according to my estimate) compared with the rate during the 1990s when more than 1,000 warheads were dismantled each year. And it’s not as if there is a lack of retired warheads waiting to be dismantled: more than 3,000 (according to my estimate; the official number is also secret). At the current rate, the backlog of warheads retired through 2009 will not be dismantled until 2022. Additional warheads retired after 2009 will push the completion date further into the future.

Dismantlement performance is an important way to demonstrate U.S. commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament, but the low rate and the secrecy undermine that important effort. And so does the spin. When D’Agostino said in May 2009 that the dismantlement rate had risen more than 150 percent since 2006, he didn’t say that it would drop by half in 2009. Nor did NNSA announce the reduction. Rather than cherry-picking the good news and hiding the bad behind secrecy, the administration should disclose the real numbers and let them speak for themselves.

Warhead Safety

We also agree that it is good to get rid of an unsafe weapon. But since NNSA points to the importance of safety, one should not gloss over the fact that consecutive administrations allowed the B53 to remain in the stockpile even though they knew full well that it was unsafe. The Reagan administration retired the B53 but then decided in 1987 to return the weapon to the stockpile to stand alert against Soviet underground facilities. After a review in 1991 found the B53 to be unsafe, DOE “strongly recommended” to DOD in 1993 that the weapon be retired at the “earliest possible date.” Yet the B53 war allowed to remain in the stockpile for another four years until 1997 when its mission was taken over by the new B61-11 nuclear earth penetrator.

The B53 is not the only case of safety being overruled by targeting requirements. The W62 warhead, the last of which was dismantled in August 2010, was deployed on the Minuteman III ICBMs through 2009, even though the warhead had a lower safety rating than the B53 (D versus C-, according to a 1991 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory study). The W62 safety exemption is all the more striking given that the ICBMs that carried the warhead were on high alert, something that ended for the B53 in 1991.

Even though it was found to be more unsafe than the B53 bomb, the W62 warhead (seen here at Warren Air Force Base in 2009) was allowed to continue to arm Minuteman III ICBMs on alert until 2009.

.
Nuclear Funding

As for the B53 dismantlement being used to justify funding the modernization of the nuclear weapons complex, that claim is certainly a stretch given the dismantlement was done using the “old” complex; the modernized complex is not scheduled to come online until the mid-2020s, at which point the current backlog of retired nuclear warheads will be gone. NNSA’s nuclear weapons budget has already been increased by 10 percent over the Bush administration, and the latest Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan shows that the administration plans another 10 percent increase. That funding level is incompatible with current fiscal realities, and no amount of B53 spin can change that fact.

News Clips:

Oct 26: USA Today, “U.S.-made ‘monster’ nuclear warhead B53 dismantled”
Oct 25: Associated Press, “US’s most powerful nuclear bomb being dismantled”
Oct 25: National Public Radio – All Things Considered, “Cold War Bomb to be Dismantled”
Oct 25: Agence France-Presse, “U.S. Dismantles Last Big Cold War Nuclear Bomb”
Oct 25: Wired UK, “Last Nuclear ‘Monster Weapon’ Gets Dismantled”
Oct 25: Daily Mail (UK), “Dismantling the mega-nuke: America begins to take apart B53 that was 600 times more powerful than bomb that flattened Hiroshima”
Oct 25: Gawker, “Goodnight Sweet ‘Monster Weapon'”

More Information:

October 2010: FAS Strategic Security Blog, “Scrapping the Unsafe Nuke”
2005: nukestrat.com, “Reagan Administration Decision to Retain the B53”
April 2005: nukestrat.com, “The Birth of a Nuclear Bomb: B61-11”
December 1991: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, “Assessment of the Safety of U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Related Nuclear Test Requirements: A Post-Bush Initiative Update”

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

New START aggregate numbers have been published by the United States and Russia.

.
By Hans M. Kristensen

The latest New START treaty aggregate numbers of strategic arms, which was quietly released by the State Department earlier last week, shows modest reductions and important changes in U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces.

Most surprisingly, the data shows that Russia has increased its number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads and is now again above the New START limit.

Because of the limited format of the released aggregate numbers, however, the changes are not explained or apparent. As a result, though not yet one year old, the New START treaty is already beginning to increase uncertainty about the status of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces.

Overall Changes

Combined, the data shows that the United States and Russia as of September 2011 deployed 3,356 nuclear warheads on 1,338 strategic delivery vehicles, down from 3,337 warheads on 1,403 delivery vehicles in February 2011.

A modest combined reduction of 65 delivery vehicles in seven months, but an increase of 19 warheads; apparently they two nuclear superpowers are not in a hurry to reduce.

The New START aggregate data shows modest reductions in strategic delivery vehicles and a Russian increase of deployed strategic warheads.

.
The aggregate numbers not include thousands of additional strategic and non-strategic warheads that are not counted by the treaty. To put things in perspective, the U.S. military stockpile includes nearly 5,000 warheads; the Russian stockpile probably about 8,000. In addition, thousands of retired, but still intact, warheads are in storage for a total combined U.S. and Russian inventory of perhaps 19,000 warheads.

Russia

Most surprising is that the New START data erases Russia’s achievement from earlier this year when its number of deployed strategic warheads temporarily dipped below the treaty limit of 1,550 warheads. According to the new data, Russia has slightly increased (by 29) the number of warheads deployed on its ballistic missiles and now stands 16 warheads above the treaty limit.

The warhead increase comes at the same time that the number of delivery vehicles has declined by five. But since the New START aggregate data – unlike the previous START treaty – does not include a breakdown of missile types, it is impossible to see where the change happened. As a result, transparency of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces is decreasing.

Part of the explanation is the deployment of additional RS-24 ICBMs, which carry three warheads each. But that’s a limited deployment that doesn’t account for all. Other parts of the puzzle include continued reduction of the single-warhead SS-25 ICBM force, the operational status of individual Delta IV SSBNs, and possibly retirement of one of the aging Delta III SSBNs.

The United States

The New START data shows that the United States only removed 10 warheads from its ballistic missiles during the previous seven months, down from 1,800 to 1,790 warheads.

The number of delivery vehicles declined by 60, from 882 to 822, a change that probably reflects the removal of nuclear-capable equipment from so-called “phantom” bombers. These bombers are counted under the treaty even though they are not actually assigned nuclear missions. The U.S. has not disclosed the number, but another 24, or so, “phantom” bombers probably need to be denuclearized. Stripping these aircraft of their leftover equipment reduces the number of nuclear delivery vehicles counted by the treaty, although it doesn’t actually reduce the nuclear force.

Later this decade will come a gradual reduction of the number of SLBMs deployed on SSBNs from 288 to 240. Likewise, if the bomber force is retained, the ICBM force might be reduced to 400 missiles from 450 today.

Conclusions

The New START data shows that Russia and the United States have gotten off to a slow start and excessive nuclear secrecy is reducing the international community’s ability to monitor and analyze the changes.

Russia essentially has seven and half years to offload 16 warheads from its force to be in compliance with New START by 2018. Not an impressive arms control standard. Instead, the task for Russian planners will be how to phase out old missiles and phase in new missiles. There will be no real constraint on the Russian force.

The United States ICBM force could be a big as Russia’s entire triad by the mid-2020s.

The new data underscores the substantial lead the United States has over Russia in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Even as Russia deploys the RS-24 ICBM and Bulava SLBM in the coming years, the gradual retirement of the SS-18, SS-19, SS-25 and SS-N-18 could reduce the total number of delivery vehicles to perhaps 400 by the time the New START treaty enters into force in 2018.

In contrast, under current plans, the United States intends to retain 700 strategic delivery vehicles by 2018. Without additional unilateral reductions, the United States could end up with 50 percent more strategic delivery vehicles than Russia in its triad by the turn of the decade. Indeed, the U.S. ICBM force alone could at that time include as many delivery vehicles as the entire Russian triad!

The U.S. force will retain a huge upload capability with several thousand non-deployed nuclear warheads that can double the number of warheads on deployed ballistic missiles if necessary. Russia’s ballistic missile force, which is already loaded to capacity, does not have such an upload capability.

This disparity creates fear of strategic instability and is fueling worst-case planning in Russia to deploy a new “heavy” ICBM later this decade.

To prevent a deepening of this trend, the Obama administration’s ongoing nuclear targeting review (see also forthcoming article in Arms Control Today) must significantly reduce the excessive nuclear posture currently planned under New START.

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

Iran’s controversial nuclear program has been front and center on the international stage for more than eight years. Despite negotiations, sanctions, and political tug-of-war, the United States and its allies have yet to tame Iran’s atomic phoenix. At the center of this nuclear standoff is Iran’s controversial uranium enrichment program and efforts to obtain full nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities. To alleviate concerns about the intended nature of these activities, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has demanded -through six resolutions – that Iran suspend enrichment activities as well as construction of a heavy-water research reactor. Yet, Iran has opted to pay no heed to these resolutions and despite numerous proposals from different sides, the stalemate persists.

Dr. Charles D. Ferguson and Dr. Ali Vaez, authored a FAS report (PDF) analyzing the outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program, and provide recommendations to the major stakeholders in this debate including Iran, the United States, Russia and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Additionally, the report proposes a multipronged approach to resolving this deadlock, including enhanced safeguards and positive-sum diplomacy with incentives for Iran and other aspiring nuclear states.

Download Full Report

FAS joined 48 organizations in signing a letter to United States Representatives asking them to cosign Representative Markey’s letter to members of the Super Committee. Markey’s letter urges Super Committee members to increase U.S. security by reducing spending on outdated and unaffordable nuclear weapons programs.

Additionally, this support letter offers specific suggestions to Congress on how to scale back new nuclear weapons programs and help close the budget deficit.

October 11, 2011

Dear Representative,

We, the undersigned organizations and experts, ask you to cosign Rep. Markey’s (D-MA) letter to members of the Super Committee urging them to reduce nuclear weapons spending and use the resulting savings to invest in higher priority programs.

There is broad bipartisan agreement that few national security issues are as critical as how to deal with America’s crippling debt.  Getting America’s fiscal house in order will require difficult budgetary choices.   This means that we need to make smart decisions about what is most needed to safeguard U.S. national security in the 21^st century.

The United States currently spends over $50 billion per year on maintaining and upgrading a nuclear weapons force of 5,000 nuclear weapons and weapons related programs.  These costs are expected to increase in light of the Obama administration’s plan to spend at least $200 billion over the next decade on new nuclear delivery systems and warhead production facilities.  Much of this spending is designed to confront Cold War-era threats that no longer exist while posing financial and opportunity costs that can no longer be justified.

In the current economic environment, it will be counterproductive to make unsustainable, open-ended commitments to hugely expensive programs that are irrelevant to the most likely threats we face. “We’re not going to be able to go forward with weapon systems that cost what weapon systems cost today,” Strategic Command chief Gen. Robert Kehler said recently “Case in point is [the] Long-Range Strike [bomber]. Case in point is the Trident [submarine] replacement. . . . The list goes on.”

Fiscally responsible Republicans are also proposing to rein in spending on nuclear weapons.  Sen. Tom Coburn (R-OK), who voted against the New START nuclear reductions treaty in December 2010, has proposed a deficit reduction plan that would cut $79 billion in spending on nuclear weapon systems over the next decade by reducing the U.S. nuclear arsenal to below the New START limit of 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and cutting the number of delivery systems and warheads in reserve and by delaying procurement of a new long-range bomber until the mid-2020s.

The United States could save billions by canceling or scaling back new nuclear weapons programs such as the plan to build 12 new nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines, which the Pentagon estimates could cost nearly $350 billion over their 50-year lifespan and new facilities to support the nuclear weapons force.  For example, by building and deploying no more than 8 new SSBN(X) nuclear-armed submarines, the United States could still deploy the same number of strategic nuclear warheads at sea as is currently planned (about 1,000) under New START and save roughly $26 billion over 10 years, $31 billion over 30 years, and $120 billion over the life of the program.

By responsibly pursuing further reductions in U.S. nuclear forces and scaling back plans for new and excessively large strategic nuclear weapons systems and warhead production facilities, the United States can help close its budget deficit. And by reducing the incentive for Russia to rebuild its arsenal, these budget savings will make America safer and more secure.

Please sign Rep. Markey’s letter calling on the Super Committee to increase U.S. security by reducing spending on outdated and unaffordable nuclear weapons programs.

Sincerely,*

 

Joni Arends, Executive Director,

Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety

 

David C. Atwood, Former Director and Representative

for Disarmament and Peace Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva

 

Mavis Belisle, Coordinator

JustPeace

 

Peter Bergel, Executive Director

Oregon PeaceWorks

 

Harry C. Blaney III, Senior Fellow, National Security Program

Center for International Policy

 

Beatrice Brailsford, Nuclear program director

Snake River Alliance, Idaho

 

Jay Coghlan, Executive Director

Nuclear Watch New Mexico

 

David Culp, Legislative Representative

Friends Committee on National Legislation (Quakers)

 

Jenefer Ellingston

Green Party delegate

 

Matthew Evangelista, President White Professor of History and Political Science

Cornell University

 

Honorable Don M. Fraser

Former Member of Congress from MN

 

Susan Gordon, Director

Alliance for Nuclear Accountability

 

Lt. Gen. Robert Gard, USA, Ret., Chairman

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

 

Jonathan Granoff, President

Global Security Institute

 

Ambassador Robert Grey

Former US Representative to the Conference on Disarmament

 

Don Hancock, Director, Nuclear Waste Program

Southwest Research and Information Center

 

William D. Hartung, Director, Arms and Security Project

Center for International Policy

 

Katie Heald, Coordinator

Campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Free World

 

Ralph Hutchison, Coordinator

Oak Ridge Environmental Peace Alliance

 

John Isaacs, Executive Director

Council for a Livable World

 

Marylia Kelley, Executive Director

Tri-Valley CAREs, Livermore

 

Daryl Kimball, Executive Director

Arms Control Association

 

Kevin Knobloch, President

Union of Concerned Scientists

 

Honorable Mike Kopetski

Former Member of Congress from OR

 

Don Kraus, Chief Executive Officer

Citizens for Global Solutions

 

David Krieger, President

Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

 

Hans M. Kristensen, Director, Nuclear Information Project

Federation of American Scientists

 

Jan Lodal

Former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

 

Paul Kawika Martin, Political Director

Peace Action (formerly SANE/Freeze)

 

David B. McCoy, Executive Director

Citizen Action New Mexico

 

Mark Medish

Former NSC Senior Director

 

Marian Naranjo, Director

Honor Our Pueblo Existence (H.O.P.E.)

 

Sister Dianna Ortiz, OSU, Deputy Executive Director

Pax Christi USA

 

Christopher Paine, Nuclear Program Director

Natural Resources Defense Council

 

Bobbie Paul, Executive Director

Georgia WAND

 

Jon Rainwater, Executive Director

Peace Action West

 

Taylor Reese

Pax Christi USA

 

Susan Shaer, Executive Director

Women’s Action for New Directions

 

Karen Showalter, Executive Director

Americans for Informed Democracy

 

Nancy E. Soderberg, former Ambassador to the United Nations

and Deputy National Security Advisor

 

David C. Speedie, Director, U.S. Global Engagement Program

Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs

 

Carla Mae Streeter, OP

Aquinas Institute of Theology

 

Ann Suellentrop, Director

Physicians for Social Responsibilities-KC

 

Gerald Warburg, Professor of Public Policy

and co-author of arms control initiatives

 

Paul Walker, Director, Security and Sustainability

Global Green USA

 

Peter Wilk, MD, Executive Director

Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR)

 

Michael J. Wilson, National Director

Americans for Democratic Action

 

James E. Winkler, General Secretary

General Board of Church and Society

The United Methodist Church

 

=====================

 

*Organizations listed for affiliation purposes only

 

By Darren Ruch, 1st Lt, MA ANG USAF*

In 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the United States was armed with a stockpile of over 18,300 nuclear weapons.[1]  Since then, the US Air Force (USAF) has conducted a range of military operations while maintaining a nuclear deterrence capability.  Due to a nuclear warhead mishap in 2007, the Air Force reshaped its nuclear deterrence mission and created Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC).  While the establishment of AFGSC streamlined the effectiveness of US nuclear deterrence, Air Force doctrine still has failed to articulate its leadership requirements at the Non-Commissioned Officer and Company Grade Officer levels to successfully accomplish its mission.

Deterrence is defined as “the prevention from action by fear of the consequences.”[2]  Nuclear weapons are not the only deterrent that the US maintains, but it does underpin all other deterrent elements.[3]  In order for the nuclear strategic forces to employ an effective mission of deterrence, adversaries and allies must have a fundamental belief that the US has a credible nuclear capability.[4]  The US forwards its credibility by maintaining a modified nuclear triad, which includes strike capabilities, active and passive defenses, and responsive infrastructure.[5]

Accidents are inevitable in the military, and the handling and transporting of nuclear weapons is no exception.  During the Cold War, with the possibility of a nuclear-tipped missile launch at any given moment, the USAF experienced a number of accidents involving its arsenal.[6]  Since the Cold War, the USAF continues to experience occasional mishaps.

The most notable post-Cold War incident occurred in August 2007. A B-52 crew at Minot AFB was tasked to ferry AGM-129 cruise missiles 1,000 miles to Barksdale AFB for terminal storage.  Because of an ad hoc change, lack of communication, and failure to follow published procedures, some cruise missiles mistakenly contained W80-1 nuclear warheads.[7]  These warheads went unreported missing for nearly 36 hours.[8]  This was the first time in over 40 years that a nuclear weapon was flown over US airspace without special high-level authorization.[9]

This incident violated the principals of deterrence, specifically the passive defense corner of the triad mentioned above.  The warheads were vulnerable because of deficiencies to physical security and mobility.[10]  The credibility of the US’ ability to conduct nuclear operations was negatively impacted, and the Department of Defense (DOD) reacted with reforms.

The DOD and USAF conducted a series of reports, independent assessments, and studies into its ability to conduct nuclear deterrence.  One finding on the nuclear enterprise read: “The nuclear mission…has been dispersed from a single-focused strategic command to three operational commands that have had little or no focus on the nuclear mission.”[11]  Based on these and other findings, the USAF established AFGSC, a new Major Command under Strategic Command.

The principal mission of AFGSC is nuclear deterrence and global strike operations. Its assets include intercontinental ballistic missiles and B-52 and B-2 bombers.  Today, the USAF allocates about 23,000 personnel and $5.2B for nuclear deterrence operations, just over 3% of the FY12 USAF budget.[12][13]

Overseas, the deterrent impacts of AFGSC were nearly immediate and universal.  In August 2009, North Korean radio propagated, “the United States is heated up…a command in charge of nuclear forces was newly established.”[14]  Also, in the same month, a main Russian national press headlined, “Russia to Create New Strike Systems in Response to US Air Force Activity.”[15]  Adversarial states took note of the revamped US deterrence mission and responded to it.

The Air Force’s senior executives, however, did not address the fundamental problem from the 2007 incident: failure of low-level leadership.  A series of low-level leadership failures leading up to the mishap, rather than high-level leadership failures, led to the B-52 crew mistakenly ferrying a nuclear warhead over the US.[16]  The first error occurred when personnel of the Minot Munitions Maintenance Squadron made a last minute change of which cruise missiles were to be transported and failed to note this change in documents from the internal coordination process.[17]  After this first oversight, the breakout crew failed to notice that nuclear warheads were aboard one of the pylons of missiles.  The aircrew also failed to conduct a thorough pre- and post-flight inspection of their aircraft, as mandated in standard operating procedures, that would have revealed the presence of nuclear warheads.  Inspections of the bomber’s payload failed at three independent and subsequent steps.[18]  This series of incidents, all of which stemmed from a failure to follow standard operating procedures, occurred at or below the Squadron level, not because of actions taken by anyone at the General or Senior Executive Service corps.

This incident prompted resignations up the chain of command, from Squadron Commanders to the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force.  But the central failure, which has yet to be addressed in nuclear doctrine or other studies, occurred because of the lack of leadership at the Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) and Company Grade Officer (CGO) levels.  Lieutenant General Frank Klotz, Commander of AFGSC, joked, “the newest B-52 is older than the pilots who fly it, and in some cases twice their age.”[19]  Nuclear doctrine, however, centralizes on executive leaders and others who are as old as the B-52.  Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 3-72, Nuclear Operations, does not make a single mention of leadership below the national level.  The AFDD references a wide range of doctrinal documents, from Basic Doctrine (AFDD 1) to Joint Targeting (JP 3-60), but fails to refer to AFDD 1-1, Leadership and Force Development.[20]

In the first paragraph of its first page, AFDD 1-1 reads, “[there are] two fundamental elements of leadership: the mission, objective, or task to be accomplished, and the people who accomplish it.”[21]  While all supporting documentation that drive the deterrence mission is composed at senior executive levels, NCOs and CGOs are the Airmen who accomplish it.  Until doctrine addresses this actuality, billions of dollars can continue to reform structures but the US nuclear deterrence strategy will continue to operate at a deficit.

The principal functions of doctrine are to provide an analysis of past experiences, to forward lessons learned and best practices, and to provide a basis of knowledge and understanding that can provide guidance for actions.[22]  In the last week of August 2007, there were many lessons that should be passed on to the succeeding generations to provide a common basis of knowledge because of failures at the NCO and CGO levels.  By excluding the critical function of the NCO and CGO corps in the AFDD 3-72, the deterrence doctrine document sends a message to General Officers, Senior Executives, and subsequent ranks that the deterrence strategy is accomplished solely at the mission and objective level, not at the operational level.  As demonstrated by the August incident, this is inaccurate.

The Air Force underwent a major reshaping effort following the 2007 incident in which a B-52 mistakenly carried nuclear weapons across the country.  Assessments from this mishap culminated in the creation of AFGSC, a new Major Command.  Responses to those reports and studies failed to modify doctrine to address the critical importance of the NCOs and CGOs carrying out the deterrence mission.  Until AFDD 3-72 includes the importance of CGO and NCO leadership, US deterrence will not function at its true potential.

* Darren Ruch works at the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) and is a reservist in the US Air Force. As a homemade explosive specialist at JIEDDO, he primarily assists military units deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Also, Ruch serves as a traditional reservist in the Massachusetts Air National Guard as an Officer in their Air Operations Center, a unit that falls under Air Force Global Strike Command. He can be contacted at darren.ruch@ang.af.mil.

 

.

Back in the late-1970s, U.S. nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines suddenly started conducting port visits to South Korea. For a few years the boomers arrived at a steady rate, almost every month, sometimes 2-3 visits per month. Then, in 1981, the visits stopped and the boomers haven’t been back since.

At the time the visits began, the United States also had several hundred nuclear weapons deployed on land in South Korea, but the submarine visits apparently were needed to further demonstrate that the United States was prepared to defend the south against an attack from the north.

After North Korea’s nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, shelling of South Korean territory and the sinking of one of its warships, there have been reports recently that an increasing number of South Koreans want the United States to deploy nuclear weapons in South Korea again, after the last such weapons were withdrawn in 1991. They think it is necessary to deter North Korea.

Some analysts have even suggested that the United States should develop an improved nuclear earth penetrator to better threaten North Korean deeply buried targets, an idea that was previously proposed the Bush administration but rejected by Congress.

Boomers in Chinhae

The SSBN visits to South Korea are unique; the United States normally does not send SSBNs into foreign ports. But there are exceptions. In 1963, the USS Sam Houston (SSBN-609) sailed into Izmir in Turkey on a mission to assure the Turkish government that the United States still had the nuclear capability to defend Turkey even after Jupiter missiles were withdrawn from bases in Turkey following the Cuban missile crisis. The Izmir visit was a one-time event, however, and no SSBN visited foreign ports for the next 12 years.

Between December 1976 and March 1981, nine U.S. ballistic missile submarines conducted 35 port visits to South Korea

Then, on December 19, 1976, the USS Sam Houston suddenly arrived in Chinhae, South Korea. The ship was under order to “surface in Korea for 3 days to ‘rattle the saber,” according to a former crew member. This was the first foreign port visit of a U.S. SSBN in the Pacific.

Two visits followed in 1978 but in 1979 the operations expanded with 14 visits conducted by eight SSBNs. In October that year, three SSBNs made three visits for a combined presence of 15 days.

The following year, in 1980, the number of visits expanded to 15, in June with three visits for a combined 17 days in port. In 1981, coinciding with the phase-out of the Polaris SLBM, the visits dropped to only two.

The Political Context

The 35 port visits conducted by nine SSBNs to Chinhae were a powerful message to South Korea and its potential adversaries about the U.S. nuclear capabilities in the area. But exactly what the reasons for the visits were remain unclear.

The visits took place in a complex political situation. South Korea had started a program to develop nuclear weapons technology, President Carter wanted to withdraw U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea, and North Korea was building up its military forces backed by China and the Soviet Union.

Ironically, South Korea had started a nuclear weapons technology program in 1974 not because of doubts about the U.S. nuclear umbrella per ce, but because, according to the CIA, of doubts about the reliability of the overall U.S. security commitment. The program reportedly was terminated in 1976 after U.S. and French pressure. [See here for an insightful analysis]

At the same time, newly elected president Jimmy Carter wanted to withdraw U.S. nuclear weapons from bases in South Korea. At the time the SSBN visits began, the U.S. had approximately 500 ground-launched nuclear weapons at bases in South Korea – roughly the same number of warheads as onboard the missiles of the nine visiting SSBNs. [For a brief history of U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons in South Korea, go here]. In the end, Carter’s withdrawal didn’t happen but the land-based weapons were significantly reduced (see below).

During the time of the SSBN visits, the number of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea was reduced from roughly 500 to 150. The last were withdrawn in 1991.

.
The SSBN visits might also have been designed to remind China about the U.S. military presence in the region, despite its defeat in Vietnam. The end of the SSBN visits to South Korea in 1981 and the phase-out of the Polaris SSBNs fleet in the Pacific coincided with China’s removal from the U.S. strategic war plan as part of the Reagan administration’s efforts to recruit China as a partner against the Soviet Union. (China was later reinstated in the war plan in 1997 by the Clinton administration.)

In September 1982, the first new Ohio-class SSBN deployed on its first patrol in the Pacific and over the next five years it was followed by seven other boats, each loaded with 24 longer-range and more accurate Trident I C-4 missiles. (All have since been upgraded to the even more capable Trident II D-5 missile). None of the Trident SSBNs have ever visited South Korea, even after the withdrawal of the last land-based nuclear weapons from the country in 1991.

Implications

The SSBN visits to South Korea are a curious but little noticed footnote in the Cold War history. More research is needed to better describe exactly why they happened, but the visits seemed intended to signal assurance to South Korea and deterrence to its adversaries.

As such the visits have potential implications for today. North Korea has since crossed the nuclear threshold, support seems to be growing in South Korea for returning U.S. nuclear weapons to the peninsula, and some argue that better nuclear capabilities are needed to deter Pyongyang.

But the visits are a reminder of the already considerable nuclear capabilities in the region that could be used to signal. Nuclear-capable bombers routinely forward deploy to Guam, and the eight SSBNs patrolling in the Pacific could surface again and visit South Korea if necessary.

Nearly 30,000 U.S. troops in South Korea, large-scale conventional exercises such as the three-carrier battlegroup Valiant Shield (image) and the half-a-million-man Ulchi Freedom Guardian, as well as forward operations of nuclear-capable forces in the region provide a powerful deterrent.

.
The question is whether it is necessary. The nuclear capabilities the United States operates in the Pacific region today are far more capable than in the 1970s, and the combined conventional forces of South Korea and the United States enjoy a significant advantage over North Korea’s aging conventional forces. To the extent that anything can, these forces should be sufficient to deter large-scale North Korean attacks against the south.

Indeed, Pyongyang’s obsession with the U.S. nuclear capabilities – even its misperception that Washington still deploys nuclear weapons in South Korea – strongly suggests that the current nuclear umbrella has Pyongyang’s full attention and that nuclear redeployment or nuclear bunker busters are not needed. After all, the objective is to move forward toward a denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, not return to the past.

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

FAS published a new Issue Brief, “A Nuclear-Free Mirage? Obstacles to President Obama’s Goal of a Nuclear Weapons Free World.” Dr. Robert Standish Norris, Senior Fellow for Nuclear Policy at FAS was interviewed by Charles Blair, Director of FAS’s Terrorism Analysis Project, about the obstacles to the implementation of the Obama administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). After twenty years since the end of the Cold War, how far down the path are we toward a nuclear weapons free world? Despite President Obama’s goal of eventual nuclear disarmament, Dr. Norris explains why the latest effort to alter the role of nuclear weapons—a necessity if we seek to eliminate them—is likely to falter. Listen to the FAS Podcast here.

Almost two decades have passed since the United States seriously considered reducing the role of its nuclear weapons. The earlier effort—the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review—failed to narrow the broad array of missions assigned to U.S. nuclear forces. Thus, despite significant decreases in the numbers of nuclear weapons, the end of the Cold War precipitated no net downsizing of the U.S. nuclear infrastructure; indeed its collective budget continues to exceed Cold War spending levels. However, President Obama’s 2009 Prague speech harkened back to the halcyon early days of the Post-Cold War world; the President promised to “take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons.”[1]  One year later, In April 2010, the Obama Administration released its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), formally articulating a strategy toward a “world free of nuclear weapons.”

Today’s interview with Robert Norris explores the 2010 NPR. Specifically, it addresses how the NPR seeks to achieve President Obama’s vision of a nuclear weapon free world. Unfortunately, Dr. Norris concludes that the NPR is “not up to the task of bringing about this goal.” Why? Dr. Norris argues that a sine qua non to lower levels of nuclear weapons and their eventual elimination is an immediate reduction in their missions. Dr. Norris argues that today “there is only one job left for nuclear weapons: to deter the use of nuclear weapons.”[2] As the NPR goes through its implementation process, Dr. Norris explains, opposition to the types of changes envisioned by the President Obama mount.  “It has to do with constituencies and bureaucracies and careers and budgets and a whole host of things that were the driving forces behind the arms race to begin with,” Dr. Norris explains, adding that, “many of those things are still in place, still operative, [and] resistant to radical kinds of changes.

Alarmingly, listeners should be mindful that these obstacles to President Obama’s vision toward a nuclear weapons free world have gone largely unreported by the media and unexplored by most policy-based non-profit think-tanks. In this regard, FAS stands virtually alone in its exploration of the implementation of the 2010 NPR and its increasingly ephemeral vision of a world free from nuclear weapons.

To read the podcast transcript, click here (PDF).

Charles P. Blair, Senior Fellow on State and Non-State Threats, interviewed Federation of American Scientists’ Senior Fellow for Nuclear Policy Dr. Robert Standish Norris. The report takes a deeper look at the nuclear policies of the Obama administration—polices that Dr. Norris terms “radical” with regard to their vision of a nuclear weapon free world.

Download Full Brief