A new report describes U.S. and Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons

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By Hans M. Kristensen

A new report estimates that Russia and the United States combined have a total of roughly 2,800 nuclear warheads assigned to their non-strategic nuclear forces. Several thousands more have been retired and are awaiting dismantlement.

The report comes shortly before the NATO Summit in Chicago on 20-21 May, where the alliance is expected to approve the conclusions of a year-long Deterrence and Defense Posture Review that will, among other things, determine the “appropriate mix” of nuclear and non-nuclear forces in Europe. It marks the 20-year anniversary of the Presidential Unilateral Initiatives in the early 1990s that resulted in sweeping reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Twenty years later, the new report Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons estimates that U.S. and Russian non-strategic nuclear forces are deployed at nearly 100 bases across Russia, Europe and the United States. The nuclear warheads assigned to these forces are in central storage, except nearly 200 bombs that the U.S. Air Force forward-deploys in almost 90 underground vaults inside aircraft shelters at six bases in five European countries.

The report concludes that excessive and outdated secrecy about non-strategic nuclear weapons inventories, characteristics, locations, missions and dismantlements have created unnecessary and counterproductive uncertainty, suspicion and worst-case assumptions that undermine relations between Russia and NATO.

Russia and the United States and NATO can and should increase transparency of their non-strategic nuclear forces by disclosing overall numbers, storage locations, delivery vehicles, and how much of their total inventories have been retired and are awaiting dismantlement.

The report concludes that unilateral reductions have been, by far, the most effective means to reducing the number and role of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Yet now the two sides appear to be holding on to the remaining weapons to have something to bargain with in a future treaty to reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons.

NATO has decided that any further reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe must take into account the larger Russian arsenal, and Russia has announced that it will not discuss reductions in its non-strategic nuclear forces unless the U.S. withdraws its non-strategic nuclear bombs from Europe. Combined, these positions appear to obstruct reductions rather facilitate reductions. Russian reductions should be a goal, not a precondition, for further NATO reductions.

Download the full report here: /_docs/Non_Strategic_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf

Slides from briefing at U.S. Senate are here: /programs/ssp/nukes/publications1/Brief2012_TacNukes.pdf

See also our Nuclear Notebooks on the total nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States.

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

On May 20-21, 28 NATO member countries will convene in Chicago to approve the conclusions of a year-long Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR). Among other issues, the review will determine the number and role of the U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and how NATO might work to reduce its nuclear posture as well as Russia’s inventory of such weapons in the future.

Lack of transparency fuels mistrust and worst-case assumptions and the concerns some eastern NATO countries have about Russia have been used to prevent a withdrawal of the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe. The DDPR is expected to endorse the current deployment in Europe.

A new FAS report (PDF) concludes that non-strategic nuclear weapons are neither the reason nor the solution for Europe’s security issues today but that lack of political leadership has allowed bureaucrats to give these weapons a legitimacy they don’t possess and shouldn’t have.

Download Full Report

By Hans M. Kristensen

The organization Reaching Critical Will has published a collection of articles about the nuclear weapons modernization programs that are underway in the various nuclear weapons states around the world.

My modest contribution is the chapter on France (pages 27-33).

The report – Assuring Destruction Forever – illustrates that although the Cold War nuclear arms race has ended, a global effort to modernize and improve nuclear weapons is in full swing. For some regions (India-Pakistan and India-China) this effort has elements of an arms race, but for most countries it is about extending and improving a nuclear weapons capability indefinitely.

This should remind us why it is increasingly meaningless to assess nuclear arms control progress in numerical terms by comparing the sizes of today’s arsenals with those of the Cold War. Progress increasingly must be measured in constraint: yes, by reducing arsenals further, but perhaps more importantly by curtailing deployments, operations, missions, life-extensions, modernizations and improvements.

Otherwise, the dynamic efforts to extend and modernize the remaining nuclear arsenals may end up working against the nuclear arms control process. Because life-extension and modernization efforts are accompanied by declarations by the nuclear weapon states and alliances about the continued importance of nuclear weapons to national and international security, there is a risk that they will combine to reaffirm and prolong the nuclear weapons era instead of delegitimizing and shortening it.

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

More than two-thirds of Russia’s current ICBM force will be retired over the next 10 years, a reduction that will only partly be offset by deployment of new road-mobile RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2) ICBMs such as this one near Teykovo northeast of Moscow.

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By Hans M. Kristensen

Russia is planning to retire more than two-thirds of its current arsenal of nuclear land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles by the early 2020a. That includes some of the most iconic examples of the Soviet threat against the United States: SS-18 Satan, SS-19 Stiletto, and the world’s first road-mobile ICBM, the SS-25.

The plan coincides with the implementation of the New START treaty but significantly exceeds the reductions required by the treaty.

During the same period, Russia plans to deploy significant numbers of new missiles, but the production will not be sufficient to offset the retirement of old missiles. As a result, the size of Russia’s ICBM force is likely to decline over the next decade – with or without a new nuclear arms control treaty.

This and much more is described in our latest Nuclear Notebook published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

Road-mobile DF-31/31A ICBM launchers deploying to Central China are visible on new commercial satellite images. Click on image for larger version.

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By Hans M. Kristensen

Recent satellite images show that China is setting up launch units for its newest road-mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) in central China. Several launchers of the new DF-31/31A appeared at two sites in the eastern part of the Qinghai province in June 2011. This is part of China’s slow modernization of its small (compared with Russia and the United States) nuclear arsenal.

An image taken on June 27, 2011 (see above), shows two DF-31/31A launchers on the launch pads of a small launch unit near Haiyan (36°49’37.12″N, 101° 6’22.97″E). One is positioned in a circular pad with support vehicles surrounding it. The circular pad was added to the facility sometime between 2005 and 2010. The other launcher is on a pad to the north, located next to an x-shaped launch pad and a missile garage. The layout of the Haiyan launch site is similar, yet not identical, to the DF-31 launch unit of the 813 Brigade at Nanyang.

Another image taken on June 6, 2011 (see below), shows six DF-31/31A launchers lined up on the parade ground at the 809 Brigade base in Datong about 50 kilometers (32 miles) to the east (36°56’57.67″N, 101°40’2.63″E). The brigade has been thought to be equipped with the DF-21 medium-range missile, but might be under conversion to the longer range DF-31/31A. It is unclear if the launchers are permanently based in the area or temporarily deployed from the 812 Brigade some 500 kilometers (290 miles) to the southeast.

Six mobile DF-31/31A launchers seen on display at a launch brigade in Datong, Qinghai, in central China in June 2011. Click image for larger version.

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With an estimated range of 7,200-plus kilometers (4,470 miles), the DF-31 cannot target the continental United States from Central China. But the modification known as DF-31A can with its estimated range of 11,200-plus kilometers (6,960 miles), reach most of the continental United States from Central China. The DF-31/31A missiles can target all of Russia and India from Central China.

Slow Deployment

Deployment of the DF-31 has been slow since it first entered service in 2006. Less than 10 missiles had been deployed with as many launchers by 2010, and not many more were added in 2011.

The DF-31A began deployment in 2007 with about a dozen missiles on as many launchers by 2010. Also counting 20 silo-based DF-5As, the U.S. intelligence community estimates that China currently has “fewer than 50” missiles that can target the continental United States, suggesting that less that 25 DF-31As are currently deployed. (The number is a little more uncertain now after the Pentagon in 2011 started supporting Chinese nuclear secrecy by no longer providing a breakdown of Chinese missile forces in its annual report on Chinese military power).

As older missiles with shorter range are retired and replaced by the DF-31/31A over the next decade, a greater portion of the Chinese missile force will be able to target the continental United States, perhaps twice as many by 2025.  But even then, the Chinese force will be small compared with that of Russia and the United States.

Also visit: IMINT & Analysis and Project 2049

Analysis made possible by generous grants from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Ploughshares Fund.

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

For most of human existence, people were unaware of the powerful nuclear forces deep inside atoms, although they were exposed to natural background radiation derived from these forces. Not until the end of the 19th century did the first “nuclear scientists,” notably Henri Becquerel and Marie and Pierre Curie, discover energetic rays emanating from certain types of atoms due to these forces. Because of its relative natural abundance and its powerful radiation, radium became a workhorse radioactive substance for the first half of the 20th century.

In this report, FAS President Charles Ferguson examines the national and international efforts to control and secure radioactive materials. He provides background on the basic principles of the science of ionizing radiation and radioactive materials; a risk assessment of the safety and security of these materials; a discussion of various pathways for malicious use of commercial radioactive sources; and an analysis of the many efforts underway to reduce the risk of radiological terrorism with recommendations for the inclusion of this issue at the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit (“Seoul Summit”) and beyond.

A full PDF version of the report can be found here.

DIA threat assessment shows slower Chinese nuclear modernization.

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By Hans M. Kristensen

At about the same time nuclear arms reduction opponents last week incorrectly accused the Obama administration of considering “reckless” cuts in nuclear forces that would leave the United States “with fewer warheads than China,” Congress received its annual threat assessment from the U.S. intelligence community.

China’s nuclear arsenal is at a size that makes comparison with U.S. nuclear force level meaningless – even at the lowest level feared by the critics – but the threat assessment showed that China’s nuclear force modernization has been slower than predicted during the Bush administration.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)

Back in December 2001, the Central Intelligence Agency predicted that China’s ICBM force “deployed primarily against the United States” would increase to “75 to 100 warheads” by 2015. At the time, China had 20 single-warhead DF-5A ICBMs with a range to strike the continental United States.

Last week’s threat assessment by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) repeats the assessment from last year that China currently has “fewer than 50 ICBMs that can strike the United States, but that it probably will more than double that number by 2025.” The expected increase refers to the addition of the DF-31A, a single-warhead mobile ICBM that was first deployed in 2007 after more than two decades of development.

But while the 2001 prediction implied deployment of 55-80 DF-31As by 2015, the number by now is less than 30 (tracking the precise number has become a little harder after the United States last year started to assist Chinese secrecy by no longer providing a breakdown of the missile force in the Pentagon’s annual Chinese military power report).

Moreover, the projection for when the portion of the ICBM force that can strike the continental United States will reach close to 100 has slipped by a decade, from 2015 to 2025.

US Projections For Chinese Long-Range ICBMs

US projections for Chiese ICBMs that can strike the continental United States have slipped by a decade between 2001 and 2012.                                  Click graph for larger version.

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Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs)

Last week’s threat assessment also showed that China’s modernization of its sea-launched ballistic missile force has been slower than projected a few years ago. China is developing the Julang-2 (JL-2) sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) for deployment on its new Jin-class SSBNs. Two submarines have been delivered and a couple more may be under construction.

Development of the JL-2, a sea-based version of the land-based DF-31, has been troubled by setbacks. After projecting in 2006 that the JL-2 would reach initial operational capability in 2007-2010, the Pentagon last year said it was uncertain when the missile would become fully operational on the Jin SSBN. And despite unconfirmed Internet-rumors last year about a JL-2 test launch, the DIA told Congress last week that the JL-2 “may reach initial operational capability by 2014.”

So three decades after China launched its first SSBN – the Xia (Type 092), and nearly a decade after launching the first Jin-class (Type 094) SSBN, it still doesn’t have an operational sea-based nuclear force.

Chinese Jin-Class SSBNs

After more than two decades in development, China’s new Jin-class SSBNs – see here Xiaopingdao in March 2011 – are still awaiting their loadout of JL-2 missiles.  Image: Google

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That’s not to say they’re not trying but development of advanced weapons like the JL-2 is difficult (just look a Russia’s problems with its Bulava SLBM), and predictions have been too optimistic.

Once the Jin/JL-2 weapon system becomes operational, the Chinese military will have to figure out how to operate the force; Chinese SSBNs have never conducted a deterrent patrol, they’re noisy, and would need to hide to provide a real secure second-strike capability.

Implications

The point is not that China is not modernizing its nuclear forces (like the other nuclear weapon states, it unfortunately is) or that the intelligence community makes mistakes. The point is to remind that projections like these always tend to promise too much too soon.

Last week’s threat assessment is probably no different but it is interesting because it shows, when compared with previous assessments, that China’s nuclear modernization has been slower than anticipated a decade ago. And there is no indication that China has embarked upon a nuclear build-up intended to “sprint to parity” with the United States or Russia.

That at least ought to be taken into account by those who use China’s nuclear modernization to argue against deeper U.S. (and, by implication, Russian) nuclear reductions.

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

Despite an outcry from congressional republicans and conservatives against the Obama administration’s plans to reduce nuclear weapons, Republican presidents have been the big disarmers in the post-Cold War era.                                        Click graph for larger version

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By Hans M. Kristensen

A recent report by the Associated Press that the administration is considering deep cuts in U.S. nuclear forces has Congressional Republicans and frequent critics of nuclear reductions up in arms.

The AP report quoted “a former government official and a congressional staffer” saying the administration is studying options for the next round of arms control talk with Russia that envision reducing the number of deployed strategic warheads to 1,000-1,100, 700-800, and 300-400.

Congressional Republicans and right-wing institutions have criticized the administration for preparing reckless unilateral cuts that jeopardize U.S. security.

As it turns out, Republican presidents have been the biggest nuclear reducers in the post-Cold War era. Republican presidents seem to have a thing for 50 percent nuclear reductions.

During the George H.W. Bush presidency from 1989-1993, the size of the U.S. nuclear stockpile was cut by nearly 50 percent from 22,217 to 11,511 warheads. The number of deployed strategic warheads dropped from 12,300 to 7,114, or 42 percent, during the same period.

Likewise, during the George W. Bush presidency from 2001-2009, the stockpile was cut by nearly 50 percent from 10,526 to 5,113 warheads. The number of deployed strategic warheads was cut by 65 percent from 5,668 to 1,968 warheads.

A reduction to 1,000-1,100 would be about 30 percent below the New START treaty limit, a drop similar to the 30 percent reduction between the New START treaty and the Moscow Treaty ceiling of 2,200 warheads. A reduction to 300-400 would be a reduction of approximately 77 percent – right up there with the Bush cuts of the past two decades.

Those Bushies must have been reckless liberals in disguise.

Outside Congress, conservative institutions and analysts rally against the administration’s nuclear review saying it’s done in the wrong way, no one will follow, and the U.S. is not modernizing its nuclear forces like other nuclear powers.

A Heritage Foundation blog post mischaracterizes the reduced force levels being studied as “unilateral” cuts and says “there is ample historical evidence” that unilateral reductions will not cause other nuclear powers to follow.

But while there may be no guarantee that other nuclear powers will follow, there certainly is ample historical evidence that they have done so in the past. The unilateral presidential initiative by president George H.W. Bush in 1991 canceled nuclear modernizations, withdrew nonstrategic nuclear weapons from overseas locations and the fleet, retired strategic weapon systems, and stood down bombers from alert with nuclear weapons onboard. The Soviet Union and later Russia followed with significant reductions of their own – reductions that directly benefitted U.S. national security and that of its allies. Britain and France later followed with their own unilateral reductions.

Although I don’t think the current review is about unilateral reductions but about developing potential options for the next round of negotiations with Russia, unilateral initiatives can jumpstart a process by cutting through the fog of naysayers.

The Heritage blog also mischaracterizes the United States as “the only country without a substantial nuclear weapons modernization program.” That’s quite a stretch given that the U.S. has recently converted four SSBNs to carry the Trident II D5 SLBM, has just finished modernizing its Minuteman III ICBM force and replacing the W62 warhead with the more powerful W87, has full-scale production underway of the W76-1 warhead, is preparing full-scaled production of the new B61-12 bomb, is producing a nuclear-capable F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, is studying a new common warhead for ICBMs and SLBMs, is designing a new class of 12 SSBNs, is designing a new long-range bomber, is studying a replacement for the Minuteman III ICBM, and is building new or modernized nuclear weapons production facilities.

That looks like a pretty busy modernization effort to me.

Similarly, an article in The Washington Free Beacon warns that the deepest cut being considered “would leave Pentagon with fewer warheads than China.” Not so. The 300-400 option is for deployed strategic warheads, not the total arsenal. China’s total arsenal includes about 240 warheads, none of which are deployed.

The same article also quotes an unnamed congressional official saying that no president in the past ever told the Pentagon to conduct a review based on specific numbers of warheads. “In the past, the way it worked was, ‘tell me what the world is like and then tell me what the force should be,’” the official said. “That is not happening in this review.”

Well, in this review, as in other reviews intended to reduce nuclear forces, the process begins with the White House asking the Pentagon to examine the options for lower levels. Of course the military is asked to examine implications of a certain range of options; Pentagon reviews have a tendency to be worst-case and the force levels higher than strictly needed. The nice round numbers of arms control treaties are shaped by 1) presidential intent, 2) force structure analysis, and 3) they have to be lower than the previous treaty limit.

During the 1990s, for example, STRATCOM conducted a series of force structure studies in response to – and in anticipation of – future reductions. STRATCOM was created partly to get around the Air Force-Navy rivalry and create a single voice for nuclear force structure analysis. But STRATCOM’s analysis obviously is focused on the needs of the warfighter to meet presidential guidance. As such, there is a tendency to protect force structure and avoid cutting too much too fast. That’s to be expected but it shows that one cannot simply leave it to the military to define what the force should be; it should be an interactive and inter-agency process because the proper nuclear posture is not – and should not be – simply a military matter.

So even if the United States were to cut it’s number of deployed strategic warheads to the lowest number said to be under consideration, those 300-400 warheads would be still more than enough to threaten destruction of Russia. Thousands of additional non-deployed warheads would be in reserve to upload if necessary. Requirements for greater numbers of deployed warheads only emerge when warfighters are asked to use them to hold at risk other nuclear forces, command and control facilities, political and military leadership targets, and war-supporting industry in a myriad of different strike scenarios.

If the administration could convince the Kremlin that it is in Russia’s interest to reduce as well, both countries would be better off.

Further reading:

• “Perspectives on the 2013 Budget Request and President Obama’s Guidance on the Future of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Program,” briefing to the Fourth Nuclear Deterrence Summit, February 15, 2011.
• “Reviewing Nuclear Guidance: Putting Obama’s Words Into Action,” Arms Control Today, November 2011.

See also: Ivan Oelrich, “Obama’s ‘Radical’ Option for America’s Nuclear Future,” The Atlantic, February 20, 2012.

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

By Hans M. Kristensen

It is worth your time reading Joe Cirincione’s article in Foreign Affairs: Obama’s Turn on Nuclear Weapons.

And I’m not just saying this because Joe is president of the Ploughshares Fund, one of my funders. He does a great job in describing the Obama administration’s ongoing nuclear targeting review and its place in the life of the administration with the myriads of policy issues and special interests that limit the president’s options in fulfilling the nuclear disarmament vision he presented in Prague in 2009.

That vision, as I wrote last week, was not visible in the Pentagon’s preview of it FY2013 defense budget request. It is an oversight that must be fixed. The defense budget must be in sync with U.S. nuclear policy, which now requires concrete steps to reduce the numbers and role of nuclear weapons.

For more background on the targeting review and the strategic nuclear war plan, see:

* Reviewing Nuclear Guidance: Putting Obama’s Words Into Action (November 2011)
* Obama and the Nuclear War Plan (February 2010)

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

The new defense budget has “no cuts” in nuclear forces.

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By Hans M. Kristensen

“There are no cuts made in the nuclear force in this budget.” That clear statement was made yesterday by deputy defense secretary Ashton Carter during the Pentagon’s briefing on the defense budget request for Fiscal Year 2013.

We’ll have to see what’s hidden in the budget documents once they are released next month, but the statement is disappointing for anyone who had hopes that the administration’s promises about “concrete steps” to reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons and to “put an end to Cold War thinking” would actually be reflected in the new defense budget.

Not so for the FY13 budget. Other than a decision to delay work for two years on the next generation ballistic missile submarine, the Defense Budget Priorities and Choices report released yesterday does not list any nuclear reductions; neither previously announced nor new ones.

But one year after the New START treaty entered into effect and 18 months after the Nuclear Posture Review was completed, it would have made sense to include some nuclear cuts in this budget – especially because this budget includes programming for future budget years through 2017, only one year before the New START treaty has to be implemented. Specifically, the Pentagon should have explained how (and how soon) it will achieve the previously announced plans to:

• Reduce the number of nuclear bombers to 60 deployed aircraft;
• Reduce the number of ICBMs to no more than 420 deployed missiles;
• Reduce the number of SLBMs to no more than 240 deployed missiles;
• Retire the nuclear Tomahawk cruise missile.

Why wait? Demonstrating that the U.S. is not only talking about reducing its nuclear forces but also doing so through near term defense budget cuts would have been an important signal to other nuclear weapon states whose militaries are waiting to see what has changed in the U.S. nuclear posture. It would also have been an important signal to the countries in the international nuclear nonproliferation regime that will convene in May to prepare for the next review of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, countries whose support we need to strengthen the nonproliferation regime.

Instead, the administration might now have to spend a good part of the next year saying: “Trust us, we’re working on it.”

And it is working on it. The most important effort is the review currently underway within the administration of the requirements for targeting and alert levels of nuclear forces – requirements that determine the force level. The review may well decide additional reductions beyond New START.

In a hint to what might come, the new defense strategic guidance published in early January stated: “It is possible that our deterrence goals can be achieved with a smaller nuclear force, which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons in our inventory as well as their role in U.S. national security strategy.” (Emphasis in original.)

The Defense Budget Priorities and Choices document appears to reaffirm this by stating that the White House review “will address the potential for maintaining our deterrent with a different nuclear force.”

Once the deterrence review is completed, it is important that the White House explains to the world what it has decided and doesn’t leave it to leaks and vague comments by anonymous officials to determine what the international perception of the direction of the U.S. nuclear posture will be.

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

Gen. V.K. Singh

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By Hans M. Kristensen

India’s nuclear weapons “are not for warfighting,” the chief of India’s army said Sunday at the Army Day Parade. The weapons have “a strategic capability and that is where it should end,” General V. K. Singh declared.

The rejection of nuclear warfighting ideas is a welcoming development in the debate over the role of nuclear weapons in South Asia. Pakistan’s military’s description of its new snort-range NASR missile as a “shoot and scoot…quick response system” has rightly raised concerns about the potential early use of nuclear weapons in a conflict.

NASR is one of several new nuclear weapon systems that are nearing deployment with warheads from a Pakistani stockpile that has nearly doubled since 2005.

India is also increasing its arsenal and already has short-range missiles with nuclear capability: the land-based Prithvi has been in operation for a decade, and a naval version (Dhanush) is under development. But India’s posture seems focused on getting its medium-range Agni II in operation, developing longer-range versions to target China, and building a limited submarine-based nuclear capability.

If Gen. Singh’s rejection of nuclear warfighting is reflected in India’s future nuclear posture, two important things will have been achieved: rejection of the mindless tit-for-tat philosophy that otherwise dominates nuclear posturing; and limiting the scenarios where nuclear weapons otherwise could come into use. The rejection also has importance for other nuclear weapon states, where some have called for making nuclear weapons more “tailored” to limited regional scenarios.

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

By Hans M. Kristensen

The Obama administration today presented a new defense strategy that it says is needed to realign U.S. military forces and doctrine with the reductions in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the new fiscal constraints created by the financial crisis.

There are few details in the new strategy for how this will be done but more will come in the Fiscal Year 2013 defense budget request expected in early February.

On nuclear forces the new strategy reaffirms the commitment to maintain a “safe, secure, and effective” nuclear arsenal as long as nuclear weapons exist. “We will field nuclear forces that can under any circumstances confront an adversary with the prospect of unacceptable damage, both to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America’s security commitments.” The strategy appears heavily focused on the Pacific region and the Middle East. China and Iran, more so than North Korea, appear to be the primary potential adversaries, although Russian is by far the largest potential nuclear adversary.

In Prague in 2009, President Obama forcefully committed the United States “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons,” that it was necessary to “ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change,” that the “United States will take concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons,” and that “To put and end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy….” The New START treaty requires some reductions in deployed strategic forces, and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reaffirmed the commitment to nuclear disarmament and further reducing the role of nuclear weapons.

The new defense strategy language comes across as somewhat timid, stating only: “It is possible that our deterrence goals can be achieved with a smaller nuclear force, which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons in our inventory as well as their role in U.S. national security strategy.” This language presumably reflects the preliminary findings of the administration’s so-called Post-NPR Analysis, an ongoing effort within the administration to make “preparations for the next round of nuclear reductions” with Russia through “potential changes in targeting requirements and alert postures.”

FAS has long argued that U.S. nuclear forces can and should be reduced further and that a sufficient nuclear deterrent can be maintained with far fewer weapons, lower operational readiness, and by changing the presidential guidance for how the military is required to plan for the potential use of nuclear weapons.

In Europe, which was the focus of U.S. strategy during the Cold War, FAS has argued that the demise of the Soviet threat and the fundamentally different security challenges requiring NATO’s attention today permit the withdrawal of the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe. The new U.S. defense strategy concludes that the changed security landscape allows changes in the European posture that, while maintaining the US security commitment to NATO, require development of a smarter posture that is better suited to meet the challenges of today’s world. Whether this language envisions a withdrawal of non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe remains to be seen, but it appears to make make it harder to justify continued deployment.

It is important that the commitment in the new defense strategy to maintaining a nuclear deterrent does not overshadow the equally important commitment to reducing the size and role of nuclear forces. The clear message to other nuclear weapons states must be that the emphasis of U.S. policy is the nuclear disarmament trajectory described in Prague and that it is in their interest to follow the lead. Billions of dollars can be saved over the next decade by reducing the nuclear forces and removing nuclear doctrine further from the warfighting thinking that characterized the Cold War and which is still prevalent in today’s planning. That, not indefinite nuclear modernizations, ought to be the priority for the 21st century.

Further reading: “Reviewing Nuclear Guidance: Putting Obama’s Words Into Action,” Arms Control Today, November 2011

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.