China’s Science of Military Strategy (2013)
Updated below
In 2013, the Academy of Military Sciences of the People’s Liberation Army of China issued a revised edition of its authoritative, influential publication “The Science of Military Strategy” (SMS) for the first time since 2001.
“Each new edition of the SMS is closely scrutinized by China hands in the West for the valuable insights it provides into the evolving thinking of the PLA on a range of strategically important topics,” wrote Joe McReynolds of the Jamestown Institute.
A copy of the 2013 edition of the Science of Military Strategy — in Chinese — was obtained by Secrecy News and is posted on the Federation of American Scientists website (in a very large PDF).
“The availability of this document could be a huge boon for young China analysts who have not yet had the chance to buy their own copy in China or Taiwan,” said one China specialist.
An English translation of the document has not yet become publicly available.
But an overview of its treatment of nuclear weapons policy issues was provided in a recent essay by Michael S. Chase of the Jamestown Institute.
“Compared to the previous edition of SMS, the 2013 edition offers much more extensive and detailed coverage of a number of nuclear policy and strategy-related issues,” Mr. Chase wrote.
In general, SMS 2013 “reaffirms China’s nuclear No First Use policy…. Accordingly, any Chinese use of nuclear weapons in actual combat would be for ‘retaliatory nuclear counterstrikes’.”
With respect to deterrence, SMS 2013 states that “speaking with a unified voice from the highest levels of the government and military to the lowest levels can often enhance deterrence outcomes. But sometimes, when different things are said by different people, deterrence outcomes might be even better.”
SMS 2013 also notably included the first explicit acknowledgement of Chinese “network attack forces” which perform what the U.S. calls “offensive cyber operations.”
In a separate essay on “China’s Evolving Perspectives on Network Warfare: Lessons from the Science of Military Strategy,” Joe McReynolds wrote that the SMS authors “focus heavily on the central role of peacetime ‘network reconnaissance’ — that is, the technical penetration and monitoring of an adversary’s networks — in developing the PLA’s ability to engage in wartime network operations.”
On July 28, the Congressional Research Service updated its report on China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress.
Update: The Union of Concerned Scientists has published a detailed review of the 2013 Science of Military Strategy, including translations of some key passages.
US Nuclear Weapons Base In Italy Eyed By Alleged Terrorists
Italian security forces practice protection of US nuclear weapons at Ghedi Air Base in 2014.
By Hans M. Kristensen
Two suspected terrorists arrested by the Italian police allegedly were planning an attack against the nuclear weapons base at Ghedi.
The base stores 20 US B61 nuclear bombs earmarked for delivery by Italian PA-200 Tornado fighter-bombers in war. Nuclear security and strike exercises were conducted at the base in 2014. During peacetime the bombs are under the custody of the US Air Force 704th Munitions Support Squadron (MUNSS), a 130-personnel strong units at Ghedi Air Base.
The Italian police said at a press conference today that the two men in their conversations “were referring to several targets, particularly the Ghedi military base” near Brescia in northern Italy.
Ghedi Air Base is one of several national air bases in Europe that a US Air Force investigation in 2008 concluded did not meet US security standards for nuclear weapons storage. Since then, the Pentagon and NATO have spent tens of millions of dollars and are planning to spend more to improve security at the nuclear weapons bases in Europe.
There are currently approximately 180 US B61 bombs deployed in Europe at six bases in five NATO countries: Belgium (Kleine Brogel AB), Germany (Buchel AB), Italy (Aviano AB and Ghedi AB), the Netherlands (Volkel AB), and Turkey (Incirlik AB).
Over the next decade, the B61s in Europe will be modernized and, when delivered by the new F-35A fighter-bomber, turned into a guided nuclear bomb (B61-12) with greater accuracy than the B61s currently deployed in Europe. Aircraft integration of the B61-12 has already started.
Read also:
– Italy’s Nuclear Anniversary: Fake Reassurance For a King’s Ransom
– B61 LEP: Increasing NATO Nuclear Capability and Precision Low-Yield Strikes
This publication was made possible by a grant from the New Land Foundation and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.
Iran Nuclear Deal: What’s Next?
By Muhammad Umar,
On July 14, 2015, after more than a decade of negotiations to ensure Iran only use its nuclear program for peaceful purposes, Iran and the P5+1 (US, UK, Russia, China, France + Germany) have finally agreed on a nuclear deal aimed at preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons.
Iran has essentially agreed to freeze their nuclear program for a period of ten years, as in there will be no new nuclear projects or research related to advanced enrichment processes. In exchange the West has agreed to lift crippling economic sanctions on Iran that have devastated the country for over a decade.
President Barack Obama said this deal is based on “verification” and not trust. This means that the sanctions will only be lifted after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has verified that Iran has fulfilled the requirements of the deal. Sanctions can be put back in place if Iran violates the deal in any way.
All though the details of the final agreement have not yet been released, based on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed to in April, some of the key parameters the IAEA will be responsible for verifying are that Iran has reduced the number of centrifuges currently in operation from 19,000 to 6,140, and does not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years. The IAEA will also verify that Iran has reduced its current stockpile of low enriched uranium (LEU) from ~10,000 kg to 300 kg and does not build any new enrichment facilities. According to the New York Times, most of the LEU will be shipped to Russia for storage. Iran will only receive relief in sanctions if it verifiably abides by its commitments.
Even after the period of limitations on Iran’s nuclear program ends, it will remain a party to the NPT, its adherence to the Additional Protocol will be permanent, and it will maintain its transparency obligations.
The President must now submit the final agreement to the US Congress for a review. Once submitted, the Congress will have 60 days to review the agreement. There is no doubt that there will be plenty of folks in Congress who will challenge the agreement. Most of their concerns will be unwarranted because they lack a basic understanding of the technical details of the agreement.
The confusion for those opposing the deal on technical grounds is simple to understand. Iran had two paths to the bomb. Path one involved enriching uranium by using centrifuges, and path two involved using reactors to produce plutonium. The confusion is that if Iran is still allowed to have enriched uranium, and keep centrifuges in operation, will it not enable them to build the bomb?
The fact is that Iran will not have the number of centrifuges required to enrich weapons grade uranium. It will only enrich uranium to 3.7 percent and has a cap on its stockpile at 300 kilograms, which is inadequate for bomb making.
Again, the purpose of the deal is to allow greater access to the IAEA and their team of inspectors. They will verify that Iran complies with the agreement and in exchange sanctions will be lifted.
Congress does not have to approve the deal but can propose legislation that blocks the execution of the deal. In a public address, the President vowed to “veto any legislation that prevents the successful implementation of the deal.”
The deal will undergo a similar review process in Tehran, but because it has the support of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khameeni, there will be no objection.
Those opposing the deal in the United States fail to understand that although the deal is only valid for 10 to 15 years, the safeguards being put in place are permanent. Making it impossible for Iran to secretly develop a nuclear weapon.
This deal has potentially laid down a blueprint for future nuclear negotiations with countries like North Korea. Once the deal is implemented, it will serve as a testament for diplomacy. It is definitely a welcome change from the experience of failed military action in Iraq, a mess we cannot seem to get out of to this day.
A stable Iran with a strong economy will not only benefit the region but the entire world. The media as well as Congress should keep this fact in mind as they begin to review the details of the final deal.
This is a tremendous victory for the West as well as Iran. This deal has strengthened the non-proliferation regime, and has proven the efficacy of diplomacy.
The writer is a visiting scholar at the Federation of American Scientists. He tweets @umarwrites.
The Risk of Nuclear Winter
Since the early 1980s, the world has known that a large nuclear war could cause severe global environmental effects, including dramatic cooling of surface temperatures, declines in precipitation, and increased ultraviolet radiation. The term nuclear winter was coined specifically to refer to cooling that result in winter-like temperatures occurring year-round. Regardless of whether such temperatures are reached, there would be severe consequences for humanity. But how severe would those consequences be? And what should the world be doing about it?
To the first question, the short answer is nobody knows. The total human impacts of nuclear winter are both uncertain and under-studied. In light of the uncertainty, a risk perspective is warranted that considers the breadth of possible impacts, weighted by their probability. More research on the impacts would be very helpful, but we can meanwhile make some general conclusions. That is enough to start answering the second question, what we should do. In regards to what we should do, nuclear winter has some interesting and important policy implications.
Today, nuclear winter is not a hot topic but this was not always the case: it was international headline news in the 1980s. There were conferences, Congressional hearings, voluminous scientific research, television specials, and more. The story is expertly captured by Lawrence Badash in his book A Nuclear Winter’s Tale.1Much of the 1980s attention to nuclear winter was driven by the enthusiastic efforts of Carl Sagan, then at the height of his popularity. But underlying it all was the fear of nuclear war, stoked by some of the tensest moments of the Cold War.
When the Cold War ended, so too did attention to nuclear winter. That started to change in 2007, with a new line of nuclear winter research2 that uses advanced climate models developed for the study of global warming. Relative to the 1980s research, the new research found that the smoke from nuclear firestorms would travel higher up in the atmosphere, causing nuclear winter to last longer. This research also found dangerous effects from smaller nuclear wars, such as an India-Pakistan nuclear war detonating “only” 100 total nuclear weapons. Two groups—one in the United States3 and one in Switzerland4 — have found similar results using different climate models, lending further support to the validity of the research.
Some new research has also examined the human impacts of nuclear winter. Researchers simulated agricultural crop growth in the aftermath of a 100-weapon India-Pakistan nuclear war.5 The results are startling- the scenario could cause agriculture productivity to decline by around 10 to 40 percent for several years after the war. The studies looked at major staple crops in China and the United States, two of the largest food producers. Other countries and other crops would likely face similar declines.
Following such crop declines, severe global famine could ensue. One study estimated the total extent of the famine by comparing crop declines to global malnourishment data.6 When food becomes scarce, the poor and malnourished are typically hit the hardest. This study estimated two billion people at risk of starvation. And this is from the 100-weapon India-Pakistan nuclear war scenario. Larger nuclear wars would have more severe impacts.
This is where the recent research stops. To the best of my knowledge there are no recent studies examining the secondary effects of famines, such as disease outbreaks and violent conflicts. There are no recent studies examining the human impacts of ultraviolet radiation. That would include an increased medical burden in skin cancer and other diseases. It would also include further loss of agriculture ecosystem services as the ultraviolet radiation harms plants and animals. At this time, we can only make educated guesses about what these impacts would be, informed in part by what research was published 30 years ago.
When analyzing the risk of nuclear winter, one question is of paramount importance: Would there be permanent harm to human civilization? Humanity could have a very bright future ahead; to dim that future is the worst thing nuclear winter could do. It is vastly worse than a few billion deaths from starvation. Not that a few billion deaths is trivial—obviously it isn’t—but it is tiny compared to the loss of future generations.
Carl Sagan was one of the first people to recognize this point in a commentary he wrote on nuclear winter for Foreign Affairs.7 Sagan believed nuclear winter could cause human extinction, in which case all members of future generations would be lost. He argued that this made nuclear winter vastly more important than the direct effects of nuclear war, which could, in his words, “kill ‘only’ hundreds of millions of people.”
Sagan was however, right that human extinction would cause permanent harm to human civilization. It is debatable whether nuclear winter could cause human extinction. Alan Robock, a leader of the recent nuclear winter research, believes it is unlikely. He writes: “Especially in Australia and New Zealand, humans would have a better chance to survive.”8 This is hardly a cheerful statement, and it leaves open the chance of human extinction. I think that’s the best way of looking at it. Given all the uncertainty and the limited available research, it is impossible to rule out the possibility of human extinction. I don’t have a good answer for how likely it is. But the possibility should not be dismissed.
Even if some humans survive, there could still be permanent harm to human civilization. Small patches of survivors would be extremely vulnerable to subsequent disasters. They also could not keep up the massively complex civilization we enjoy today. It would be a long and uncertain rebuilding process and survivors might never get civilization back to where it is now. More importantly, they might never get civilization to where we now stand poised to take it in the future. Our potentially bright future could be forever dimmed.9 Nuclear winter is a very large and serious risk. But that on its own doesn’t mean much—just another thing to worry about. What’s really important are the implications of nuclear winter for public policy and private action.
In some ways, nuclear winter doesn’t change nuclear weapons policy all that much. Everyone already knew that nuclear war would be highly catastrophic. Nuclear winter means that nuclear war is even more catastrophic, but that only reinforces policies that have long been in place, from deterrence to disarmament. Indeed, military officials have sometimes reacted to nuclear winter by saying that it just makes their nuclear deterrence policies that much more effective.10 Disarmament advocates similarly cite nuclear winter as justifying their policy goals. But the basic structure of the policy debates is unchanged.
In other ways, nuclear winter changes nuclear weapons policy quite dramatically. Because of nuclear winter, noncombatant states may be severely harmed by nuclear war. Nuclear winter gives every country great incentive to reduce tensions and de-escalate conflicts between nuclear weapon states. Thankfully, this point has not gone unnoticed at recent international conferences on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons, such as the December 2014 conference in Vienna, which I spoke at.11These conferences are led by, and largely aimed at, non-nuclear weapon states.
Nuclear weapon states should also take notice. Indeed, the biggest policy implication of nuclear winter could be that it puts the interests of nuclear weapon states in greater alignment. Because of nuclear winter, a nuclear war between any two major nuclear weapon states could severely harm each of the other six. (There are nine total nuclear-armed states, and North Korea’s arsenal is too small to cause any significant nuclear winter.) This multiplies the risk of being harmed by nuclear weapons, while only marginally increasing the benefits of nuclear deterrence. By shifting the balance of harms vs. benefits, nuclear winter can promote nuclear disarmament.
Additional policy implications come from the risk of permanent harm to human civilization. If society takes this risk seriously, then it should go to great lengths to reduce the risk. It could stockpile food to avoid nuclear famine, or develop new agricultural paradigms that can function during nuclear winter.12 It could abandon nuclear deterrence, or shift deterrence regimes to different mixes of weapons.13 And it could certainly ratchet up its efforts to improve relations between nuclear weapon states. These are things that we can do right now, even while we await more detailed research on nuclear winter risk.
Seth Baum is Executive Director of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (gcrinstitute.org), a nonprofit think tank that he co-founded in 2011. His research focuses on risk, ethics, and policy questions for major risks to human civilization including nuclear war, global warming, and emerging technologies. The aim of this research is to characterize the risks and develop practical, effective solutions for reducing them. Dr. Baum received a Ph.D. in geography from Pennsylvania State University with a dissertation on climate change policy. He then completed a post-doctoral fellowship with the Columbia University Center for Research on Environmental Decisions. Prior to that, he studied engineering, receiving an M.S. in electrical engineering from Northeastern University with a thesis on electromagnetic imaging simulations. He also writes a monthly column for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
His research has appeared in many journals including Ecological Economics, Science and Engineering Ethics, Science and Global Security, and Sustainability. He is currently co-editor of a special issue of the journal Futures titled “Confronting future catastrophic threats to humanity.” He is an active member of the Society for Risk Analysis and has spoken at venues including the United Nations, the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, and the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University.
Mind the Empathy Gap
Here is some news from recent research in neuroscience that, I think, is relevant for FAS’s mission to prevent global catastrophes. Psychologists Dacher Keltner of the University of California, Berkeley, and Jonathan Haidt of New York University, have argued that feelings of awe can motivate people to work cooperatively to improve the collective good.1Awe can be induced through transcendent activities such as celebrations, dance, musical festivals, and religious gatherings. Prof. Keltner and Prof. Paul Piff of the University of California, Irvine, recently wrote in an opinion article for the New York Times that “awe might help shift our focus from our narrow self-interest to the interests of the group to which we belong.”2 They report that a forthcoming peer reviewed article of theirs in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, “provides strong empirical evidence for this claim.”
Their research team did surveys and experiments to determine whether participants who said they experienced awe in their lives regularly would be more inclined to help others. For example, one study at UC, Berkeley, was conducted near a spectacular grove of beautiful, tall Tasmanian blue gum eucalyptus trees. The researchers had participants either look at the trees or stare at the wall of the nearby science building for one minute. Then, the researchers arranged for “a minor accident” to occur in which someone walking by would drop a handful of pens. “Participants who had spent the minute looking up at the tall trees—not long, but long enough, we found, to be filled with awe—picked up more pens to help the other person.”
Piff and Keltner conclude their opinion piece by surmising that society is awe-deprived because people “have become more individualistic, more self-focused, more materialistic and less connected to others.” My take away is that this observation has ramifications for whether people will band together to tackle the really tough problems confronting humanity including: countering and adapting to climate change, alleviating global poverty, and preventing the use of nuclear weapons. I find it interesting that Professors Piff and Keltner have mentioned shifting individuals’ interest to the group to which those people belong.
What about bringing together “in groups” with “out groups”? Can awe help or harm? Here’s where, I believe, the geopolitical and neuroscience news is mixed. First, let’s look at the bad news and then finish on a positive message of recent psychological research showing interventions that might alleviate the animosity between groups who are in conflict.
While awe can be inspiring, a negative connotation toward out groups is implicit in the phrase “shock and awe” in the context of massive demonstration of military force to try to influence the opponent to not resist the dominant group. Many readers will recall attempted use of this concept in the U.S.-led military campaign against Iraq in March and April 2003. U.S. and allied forces moved rapidly with a demonstration of impressive military might in order to demoralize Iraqi forces and thus result in a quick surrender. While Baghdad’s political power center crumbled quickly, many Iraqi troops dispersed and formed the nuclei of the insurgency that then opposed the occupation for many years to come.3 Thus, in effect, the frightening awe of the invasion induced numerous Iraqis to band together to resist U.S. forces rather than universally shower American troops with garlands.
Nuclear weapons are also meant to shock and awe an opponent. But the opponent does not have to be cowed into submission. To deter this coercive power, the leader of a nation under nuclear threat can either decide to acquire nuclear weapons or form an alliance with a friendly nation that already has these weapons. Other nations that do not feel directly threatened by another nation’s nuclear weapons can ignore these threats and tend to other priorities. This describes the world we live in today. Most of the world’s nations in Central Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia are in nuclear-weapon-free-zones and have opted out of nuclear confrontations. But in many countries in Europe, North America, East Asia, South Asia, and increasingly the Middle East, nuclear weapons have influenced decision makers to get their own weapons and increase reliance on them (for example, China, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia), acquire a latent capability to make these weapons (for example, Iran), or request and receive protection from nuclear-armed allies (for example, non-nuclear countries of NATO, Japan and South Korea).
Is this part of the world destined to always figuratively sit on a powder keg with a short fuse? Perhaps if people in these countries can close the empathy gap, they might reduce the risk of nuclear war and eventually find cooperative security measures that do not require nuclear weapons. Empathy is the ability to understand and share the feelings of others. Empathy is a natural human capacity especially when dealing with people who share many common bonds.
If we can truly understand someone we now perceive to be an enemy, would we be less likely to want to do harm to that person or other members of his or her group? Empathic understanding between groups is not a guarantee of conflict prevention, but it does appear to offer a promising method for conflict reduction. However, as psychological research has shown, failures of empathy often occur between groups that are socially or culturally different. People in one group can also feel pleasure in the suffering of those in the different group, especially if that other group is dominant. The German word schadenfreude captures this delight in others’ suffering. Competitive groups especially exhibit schadenfreude; for example, Boston Red Sox fans experience glee when the usually dominant New York Yankees lose to a weaker opponent.4
Are there interventions that can disrupt this negative behavior and feelings? Cognitive scientists Mina Cikara, Emile Bruneau and Rebecca Saxe point out that “historical asymmetries of status and power between groups” is a key variable.5 If the same intervention method such as asking participants to take the perspective of the other into account is used for both groups, different effects are observed. For example, the dominant group tends to respond most positively to perspective taking in which members of that group would listen attentively to the perspective or views of the other group. A positive response means that people’s attitude toward the other group becomes favorable. In contrast, the non-dominant group’s members often experience a deepening of negative attitudes toward the dominant group if they engage in perspective taking. Rather, members of the non-dominant group show a favorable change in attitude when they perform perspective giving toward the dominant group. Importantly, they have to know that members of the dominant group are being attentive and really listening to the non-dominant group’s perspective. In other words, the group with less or no political power needs to be heard for positive change to occur. While these results seem to be common sense, Bruneau and Saxe point out that almost always perspective taking is used in interventions intended to bring asymmetric groups together and often this conflict resolution method fails. Their research underscores the importance of perspective giving, especially for non-dominant groups.6
This research shows promising results that could have implications for bridging the divide between Americans and Iranians on the different views on nuclear power, for example, or the gap between Americans and Chinese on the implications of the U.S. pivot toward East Asia and the Chinese rise in economic, military, and political power. I conclude this president’s message with encouragement to cognitive scientists in the United States and other nations to apply these and other research techniques to the grand social challenges such as how to get people across the globe to work together to mitigate the effects of climate change and to achieve nuclear disarmament through cooperative security.
Who was Willy Higinbotham?
Editor’s note: The following is a compilation of letters by Dr. William Higinbotham, a nuclear physicist who worked on the first nuclear bomb and served as the first chairman of FAS. His daughter, Julie Schletter, assembled these accounts of Higinbotham’s distinguished career.
Thank you for this opportunity to share with you my father’s firsthand accounts of the inception of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). After my father died in November 1994, I inherited a truly intimidating treasure of letters, correspondence and most importantly a nearly complete manuscript (mostly on floppy disks) of his unpublished memoirs. Over the last couple of decades, I have read widely and deeply, collected resources, transcribed and sorted through this material and am planning to publish a personal history of Willy in the near future.
William Higinbotham
Having studied this man from a more distant perspective, I am sure about certain things. Willy was at his heart an optimist, a democrat, a child of liberal New England Protestants during the Great Depression, and a man who didn’t mind doing a lot of behind the scenes dirty work to make things happen. He did this with self-deprecating humor, confidence in the humanity of others, a terrific sense of play, music, camaraderie, and most importantly a deep respect for the opinions of everyone. He was humble, incredibly brilliant and could recall details from meetings many years in the past as well as lyrics to jazz standards and sea chanties not sung in a while.
Dad was a terrific story teller. This is his version of how he came to Washington, DC to serve as the first chairman of FAS. These are mostly his words with some additional anecdotes from colleagues and friends who knew him well during the war years and after.
In a letter to his daughter Julie in April 1994, Willy began his account with his parents, a beloved Presbyterian minister and wife:
“It is from them and their example that I have been inspired to do something for humanity. In my case, the opportunity did not arise until I was 30 and the Second World War had started. As a graduate student at Cornell I was too poor to consider marriage and had no prospects for a reasonable job. As soon as Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany, I knew that the US should prepare to go to war with our European allies. However, the vast majority of US citizens and Congressmen believed that we should have nothing to do with any European conflicts. It was only with difficulty that President Roosevelt was able to provide some assistance to the UK by “Lend Lease.” I was delighted to be invited to go to MIT in Jan. 1941, as Hitler’s Luftwaffe was bombing London and other British cities.
The US finally initiated the draft in March or April and (my brother) Robert was one of the first to be called up. When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor that fall, we were in the war for good. (My brother) Freddy was the next to be drafted. By the summer of 1943 he was a navigator on a small C47 transport plane that dropped parachuters on Sicily, and then (my brother) Philip was drilling with the Army Engineers. I had strong reasons to develop technology that would speed defeat of Germany and Japan.
As you know, it was when I saw the first nuclear test on July 16, 1945, that I determined to do what I could to prevent a nuclear arms race.”
Willy and his wife Julie
From his unpublished memoirs, Willy described the Trinity test:
“Until the last moment, it was not clear if the implosion design [which used plutonium] would actually work. Everyone was confident that the gun design [which used highly enriched uranium] would work, but Hanford was producing plutonium at a good rate while Oak Ridge was producing highly enriched uranium with great difficulty. Consequently, the Trinity test was planned for early in 1945.
Almost everyone in Los Alamos was involved in constructing the implosion weapon or in designing and installing measurement instruments for the test. Most of my group was involved in the latter. Sometimes I drove, with others, to the site to install and test various devices. Many of the instruments were to be turned on minutes or seconds before the bomb was to be triggered. Joe McKibben, of the Van de Graff group, designed the alarm-clock and relay system which was to send out signals for the last ten minutes. I designed the electronic circuit which was to send out the signals during the last second and then to send the signal to the tower. Some of my scientists and many of my technicians spent many days at the site. By test day, we had done all that was requested and I was prepared to await the results of the test, at Los Alamos.
At the last minute, I had a call from Oppie [Scientific Director J. Robert Oppenheimer], asking me to bring a radio to the test site for a number of special observers who were to be at 18 miles from the tower. We had an all-wave Halicrafters receiver which needed a storage battery for the filaments and a stack of big 45 volt B-batteries for the plates. We also had several cheap loud speakers. So, I grabbed several of the remaining technicians and had them check the equipment and pack it into a small truck. They drove the truck to the site. I went with some of the special guests by bus to Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, whence a military bus took us to the place reserved for us, near where the road to the test site leaves the main highway north of it.
We arrived there in the evening. As has been reported often, the weather clouded over and there was some rain. So we waited. The radio worked although the sound was rather weak. The Halicrafter had less than a watt of output and the speakers were not very efficient. Eventually, the countdown began. We were issued slabs of very dark glass, used by welders. I couldn’t see the headlights on the truck through it. I only remember one of the others who was in our select group, Edward Teller. As the countdown approached the last 10 seconds, he began to rub sun screen on his face, which rather shook me. I had been assured that the bomb, if it worked, would not ignite the atmosphere or the desert. At 18 miles it seemed incredible to me that we might get scorched.
At T = 0, we saw a brilliant white flash of light through our dark glass filters, and the hills around us were suddenly brightly lit. Immediately, the point of light expanded to a white sphere and then to a redder inverted bowl shaped object which began to be surrounded with eddies and then rose up into the air and climbed rapidly to the sky, where a clear space suddenly opened in the high thin cloud layer and finally ended as an ugly white cap. All up and down the smoky column there were bluish sparks due to the radioactivity and electric discharges. It must have been more than a minute before the shock wave came through the ground, followed shortly by the sharp air-wave blast, which rumbled off the hills for another minute or so. It was clear that the bomb worked as predicted. I had hoped that the physicists might have been wrong and for many reasons I figured that this test would not be successful. Now I had to face the existence of nuclear weapons. It was a paralyzing realization.
As I recall, no one said anything. My boys packed up the radio equipment and headed home. I got into a bus with about fifteen others and we started for Albuquerque. I had saved one of the bottles of scotch, which my MIT friends had given me in 1943, and had it with me, in case. I pulled it out, opened it, and passed it around. The others on the bus, scientists and military types, quietly sipped it and passed it along until it was empty. No one said anything.
Several hours later we arrived at Kirtland and those of us from Los Alamos transferred to another bus to return there. I was paralyzed. I went back to the Lab and doodled there until closing time. I had supper and went to my room. I didn’t sleep. All I could think of was that the Soviet Union would surely develop nuclear weapons and might blow us off the map. I knew about radar and anti-aircraft and that a bomb, such as the one I had seen, would wipe out any city. The best defense against bombers in Europe had been to shoot down ten percent of the attackers. Ninety percent would not save us.
After agonizing for a day or more, I finally began to think about why Stalin might attempt to destroy the US. It was quite possible that Soviet aircraft could cross the oceans and attack the US. However, it would do them no good to just destroy cities. They would have to occupy us to gain any advantage. The more I thought about this, the more I came to believe that attacking the US with nuclear weapons would not make sense even to an evil man like Stalin. What might make more sense would be to use nuclear weapons to attack our allies in Europe. By then it was clear that Stalin intended to continue to occupy Poland, Hungary and other previously free countries that surrounded the Soviet Union. (In my mind) at least the US did not seem to be threatened. There would be time to see if the Soviet Union was going to threaten the other nations beyond those it now controlled. (Eventually) I got some sleep and went back to work on the new jobs which faced the Lab.
I had no intention of taking a major role in this effort. As soon as Japan surrendered, many of the scientists at Los Alamos began to discuss this subject. When General Groves said that we could keep the secret for 15 years, and Congressmen told scientists to design a defense, we held a big meeting and started to draft a statement for the public.”
In a letter Dad wrote to his mother from Los Alamos:[ref]Jungk, Robert. Brighter Than a Thousand Suns. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1958 p 223.[/ref]
“I am not a bit proud of the job we have done . . . the only reason for doing it was to beat the rest of the world to a draw . . . perhaps this is so devastating that man will be forced to be peaceful. The alternative to peace is now unthinkable. But unfortunately there will always be some who don’t think. . . . I think I now know the meaning of “mixed emotions.” I am afraid that Gandhi is the only real disciple of Christ at present . . . anyway it is over for now and God give us strength in the future. Love, Will.”
From his memoirs, Willy described how he came to Washington, DC in the fall of 1945:
“Strangely, I don’t remember many discussions of the implications of nuclear weapons at Los Alamos before the end of the war. My friends and I had some scattered discussions about how Nazism had taken hold, and of what the world might face after Hitler was defeated. I was invited a few times to sit in Oppie’s living room as Niels Bohr discussed his thoughts about the future control of atomic energy. Bohr was almost impossible to understand because he had an accent and because he always spoke several decibels below the audible threshold. Much later I would understand how wise he was, but at the time the whole subject seemed confusing and not very important to me.
Then came Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the Japanese surrender. We had a big party the night the surrender was announced. I sat on the hood of a jeep, playing my accordion, as we paraded around town. Immediately after that, the discussions began in earnest. A number of them were held in my office in the Tech area in the evenings. The public response to the development of atomic weapons was discouraging. General Groves asserted that it would take the Soviets fifteen years to develop an atomic weapon. Congressmen began talking about defenses. Scientists at Oak Ridge and Chicago were organizing and we began to hear from them.
The first large meeting was attended by about sixty people on August 20th. All agreed that we should form an organization and the question of whether it should consider scientists’ welfare as well as the social implications of nuclear energy, was discussed. A committee was appointed to make arrangements for a meeting for all of the scientists and engineers.
On August 23rd, a nine member committee issued an invitation to attend a meeting for all scientists and engineers on August 30th for the following purpose:
“Many people have expressed a desire to form an organization of progressive scientists which has as its primary object to see that the scientific and technological advancements for which they are responsible are used in the best interests of humanity.
Most scientists on this project feel strongly their responsibility for the proper use of scientific knowledge. At present, recommendations for the future of this project and of atomic power are being made. It would be the immediate purpose of this society to examine our own views on these questions and take suitable action. However, the future will hold more problems and scientists will feel the need of a more general organization to express their views.
Before the next meeting had been held it was clear to everyone that the international control of atomic energy was the vital issue and should be the only issue with which the organization was concerned.”
The meeting on August 30th was attended by about five hundred individuals. They overwhelmingly approved the following motion by Joe Keller:
- We hereby form an organization of scientists, called temporarily, the Association of Los Alamos Scientists (ALAS).
- The object of this organization is to promote the attainment and use of scientific and technological advances in the best interests of humanity. We recognize that scientists, by virtue of their special knowledge, have, in certain spheres, special social responsibilities beyond their obligations as individual citizens. The organization aims to carry out these responsibilities by keeping its members informed and by providing a forum through which their views can be publicly and authoritatively expressed.
We discussed what our statement should say to the President and to the public. Except for Edward Teller, we all agreed that the message was that (1) there is no secret (scientists anywhere could figure out how to make atomic weapons now that we had demonstrated that they are possible). In addition, (2) there is no defense that can prevent great devastation by atomic weapons, and (3) we must have “world control.” Edward Teller would not agree with the latter because that was a political and not a technical conclusion. Leo Szilard’s counter to this, we later heard, was that you don’t shout “fire” in a crowded theater without telling people where the exits are. Anyway, the three phrases became our policy.
To my great surprise, I was elected the first chairman of the Association of Los Alamos Scientists. Later, I went to Washington and offered to spend a year managing the scientists’ office. Then I was elected the first chairman of the Federation of American Scientists in January, 1946. I was surprised and hoped that I would not let people down. I think that I understand this. I do not have strong beliefs as did Leo Szilard and many others. I was not a Nobel laureate. I was a team worker. I sought to unite people on positions that they could agree to. People trusted me.
The first executive committee was composed of David Frisch, Joseph Keller, David Lipkin, John Manley, Victor Weisskopf, Robert Wilson, William Woodward, and myself (chairman).
From the beginning, we were aware that the scientific and military success of our work would bring both new dangers and new possibilities of human benefits to the world.
We posed and answered five questions:
- What would the atomic bomb do in the event of another war?
- Use of such bombs would quickly and thoroughly annihilate the important cities in all countries involved. We must expect that bombs will be developed which will be many times more effective and which will be available in large numbers.
- What defense would be possible? One hundred percent interception should be considered impossible. Therefore, were there a possibility of attack we could not gamble on defenses alone and would have to make drastic changes such as abandoning cities and decentralizing communications. How long would it take for any other country to produce as atomic bomb? Within a few years.
- What would be the effect of an atomic arms race on science and technology? Emphasis on the development of more weapons would interfere with developments for peaceful applications.
- Assuming that international control of the bomb is agreed upon, is such control technically feasible? From a scientific point of view we assert that international control of the atomic bomb is feasible and that such control need not interfere with free and profitable peacetime research and development.
Like everyone else, I visited congressmen, talked to reporters, lectured to local organizations and answered phone calls. A large part of the public was interested in atomic energy. A number of the leaders of major national organizations visited us or asked us to meet with them.
When the Soviets fired their first nuclear test in 1949, the President and the Congress pushed for development of the H bomb, which stimulated the nuclear arms race. It was a sad story after that. Edward Teller was convinced that the Soviets would blow up the US if it ever had the opportunity to do so without suffering much retaliation. More rational people felt that the Soviets would have enough trouble keeping on top of their people and satellites, especially after Stalin died in 1970. I could go on. The US became paranoid about communists. Joseph McCarthy lied but many innocent people lost their jobs. Oppenheimer was publicly disgraced. The US continued to accelerate the nuclear arms race. By good luck, the US and USSR agreed to halt tests in the atmosphere in 1963 and the Cuban missile crisis did not lead to the Apocalypse, though that was close. I have spent a lot of my time and effort trying to influence US policy in this area. A lot of that was spent talking to the already converted. My friends and I have had some minor successes. But we never could convince our government that the nuclear arms race was unnecessary and that the Soviets would respond favorably if we were to suggest winding it down. It was the Soviet leaders, with Gorbachev, who realized that the arms race was a waste of effort and who were willing to take the risk of offering to reduce their deployed nuclear weapons and go further if the US agreed.
If we and others are to survive, we must understand the present situation and try to find new and better ways to deal with international problems. The development of nuclear weapons means that the traditional policies will probably fail. I have had a few opportunities to discuss this with some of the doubters. Most of the time, however, the people that I talked to were sympathetic to our attempts at developing a new approach.
So, the objective that I devoted so much time, effort, and thought to was finally attained by the Soviets. Most of the time I was discouraged but did not give up. A number of the scientists who were active at the start gave up. Some of the scientists that I have worked with thought that I was crazy — but they never took the trouble to find out what I knew about what was going on or what I was really doing. There were many distinguished scientists who thought as I did, and we encouraged each other. They have been a great help to me.”
These last few anecdotes come from the many letters that were sent to my father on the occasion of his 80th birthday. I believe they speak to the qualities that made Dad so incredibly successful at ALAS, FAS, and then on to Brookhaven National Laboratory where he worked on an astounding number of projects and committees, and where he established the Technical Support Organization Library. During his tenure at BNL he attended some of the Pugwash meetings, SALT talks and traveled extensively all over the world to communicate honestly with scientists and policy makers regarding atomic energy and nuclear safeguards.
He also built the prototype for Pong in the mid-fifties as a demonstration exhibit for the public and guests at the summer open lab events. He was “discovered” by computer gamers all over the world by around 1972. Dad was mortified by this! He thought anyone with a simple understanding of electronics could have invented that sort of game just as easily as he did! He bemoaned the idea that he would be remembered not for his life’s work on nuclear non-proliferation, but on a silly computer game. And (regrettably) he was right about that.
Willy on Long Island with his beloved accordion around 1951
Jim de Montmollin, colleague from the Manhattan Project:
“I think the most important thing to me is your sensitivity and selflessness. In an era when people seek to project an image of sophistication through a cynical and ‘me first’ attitude toward everything, I especially value knowing people like you. I think of myself also as a sort of pragmatic idealist, and I consider you to be the ultimate model. Far more than I, you have worked tirelessly toward unselfish objectives, always seeking practical and feasible steps toward getting there.
I also admire your tolerance. You don’t hesitate to call it like you see it, but neither are you ever hesitant to defend any cause or individual, however unpopular or unfashionable they may be. That is what has always made it such a pleasure to discuss anything with you: it [is] rare to know people who think for themselves, who absorb new information and develop their thoughts from it, who are more than carriers of the conventional wisdom, and who are so well—informed on so many things as you. What I refer to as your tolerance is both an openness toward new facts and ideas and a lack of animosity toward those who differ in any way.
Your dedication and drive over at least the last 50 years toward objectives that are not self-seeking or necessarily fashionable is another aspect that makes you so outstanding to me. Long before I knew you, you did it at no small personal sacrifice. When you became too old to meet the bureaucratic rules for continued work, you have worked as hard as ever, taking advantage of the freedom to apply yourself wherever you could be the most effective. If you ever have any private doubts about what you may have sacrificed, let me assure you that I appreciate and admire you for it.
I remember you commenting on more than one occasion that you regarded George Weiss as a ‘real gentleman.’ I agree, but that also applies to you even more so. It is your sensitivity to others’ feelings, your tolerance of their shortcomings, and your efforts to point out their good qualities that mark you as a gentleman to me, in the finest sense of the word.”
From Freeman Dyson, English-born American theoretical physicist and mathematician:
“I am delighted to hear that the FAS headquarters building is to be named in your honor. In this way we shall celebrate the historic role that you played in the beginnings of FAS. And we make sure that future generations did not forget who you were and what you did.
I remember vividly the day I joined FAS, soon after I arrived in the USA as a graduate student in 1947. Gene Lochlin, who was a fellow student at Cornell, took me to an FAS meeting and I was immediately hooked. One of the things that attracted me most strongly to FAS was the spontaneous and un-hierarchical way in which [it] should function. Coming fresh from England, I found it amazing that the leader of FAS was not Sir Somebody-Something, but this young fellow Willy Higinbotham who had grabbed the initiative in 1945 and organized the crucial dialogue between scientists and congressmen.
And [by] 1947 you were already a legendary figure, a symbol of the ordinary guy who changes history by doing the right thing at the right time. To me you were also a symbol of the good side of America, the open society where everyone is free to make a contribution. You just happen to make one of the biggest contributions. I am proud now to join and honoring your achievement.”
The world has certainly changed since the atomic bomb first exploded over the white sands of New Mexico in July 1945, yet it is clear that in regard to nuclear non-proliferation and world peace we have a mighty long way to go. William Higinbotham served as the first chairman of FAS in 1945; the mission and objectives were clear and imperative. The work he began now continues 70 years later. On behalf of my father, thank you for your most noble efforts to make our world a safer and saner place for all of humanity.
Julie Schletter retired in 2013 after almost forty years working in education as a school counselor. Her recent project has been completing a book about her father, Accordion to Willy: A Personal History of William Higinbotham the Man who Helped Build the Atom Bomb, Launched the Federation of American Scientists and Invented the First Video Game.
The False Hope of Nuclear Forensics? Assessing the Timeliness of Forensics Intelligence
Nuclear forensics is playing an increasing role in the conceptualization of U.S. deterrence strategy, formally integrated into policy in the 2006 National Strategy on Combatting Terrorism (NSCT). This policy linked terrorist groups and state sponsors in terms of retaliation, and called for the development of “rapid identification of the source and perpetrator of an attack,” through the bolstering of attribution via forensics capabilities.12 This indirect deterrence between terrorist groups and state sponsors was strengthened during the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit when nuclear forensics expanded into the international realm and was included in the short list of priorities for bolstering state and international capacity. However, while governments and the international community have continued to invest in capabilities and databases for tracking and characterizing the elemental signatures of nuclear material, the question persists as to the ability of nuclear forensics to contribute actionable intelligence in a post-detonation situation quickly enough, as to be useful in the typical time frame for retaliation to terrorist acts.
In the wake of a major terrorist attack resulting in significant casualties, the impetus for a country to respond quickly as a show of strength is critical.3 Because of this, a country is likely to retaliate based on other intelligence sources, as the data from a fully completed forensics characterization would be beyond the time frame necessary for a country’s show of force. To highlight the need for a quick response, a quantitative analysis of responses to major terrorist attacks will be presented in the following pages. This timeline will then be compared to a prospective timeline for forensics intelligence. Fundamentally, this analysis makes it clear that in the wake of a major nuclear terrorist attack, the need to respond quickly will trump the time required to adequately conduct nuclear forensics and characterize the origins of the nuclear material. As there have been no instances of nuclear terrorism, a scenario using chemical, biological, and radiological weapons will be used as a proxy for what would likely occur from a policy perspective in the event a nuclear device is used.
This article will examine existing literature, outline arguments, review technical attributes,4 examine the history of retaliation to terrorism, and discuss conclusions and policy recommendations. This analysis finds that the effective intelligence period for nuclear forensics is not immediate, optimistically producing results in ideal conditions between 21 and 90 days, if at all. The duration of 21 days is also based on pre-detonation conditions, and should be considered very, if not overly, optimistic. Further, empirical data collected and analyzed suggestions that the typical response to conventional terrorism was on average 22 days, with a median of 12 days, while terrorism that used chemical, biological, or radiological materials warranted quicker response – an average of 19 days and a median of 10 days. Policy and technical obstacles would restrict the effectiveness of nuclear forensics to successfully attribute the origin of a nuclear weapon following a terrorist attack before political demands would require assertive responses.
Literature
Discussions of nuclear forensics have increased in recent years. Non-technical scholarship has tended to focus on the ability of these processes to deter the use of nuclear weapons (in particular by terrorists), by eliminating the possibility of anonymity.5 Here, the deterrence framework is an indirect strategy, by which states signal guaranteed retribution for those who support the actions of an attacking nation or non-state actor. This approach requires the ability to provide credible evidence both as to the origin of material and to the political decision to transfer material to a non-state actor. As a result of insufficient data available on the world’s plutonium and uranium supply, as well as the historical record of the transit of material, nuclear forensics may not be able to provide stand-alone intelligence or evidence against a supplying country. However, scholars have largely assumed that the ‘smoking gun’ would be identifiable via nuclear forensics. Michael Miller, for example, argues that attribution would deter both state actors and terrorists from using nuclear weapons as anyone responsible will be identified via nuclear forensics.6 Keir Lieber and Daryl Press have echoed this position by arguing that attribution is fundamentally guaranteed due to the small number of possible suppliers of nuclear material and the high attribution rate for major terrorist attacks.7 There is an important oversight from both a technical and policy perspective in these types of arguments however.
First, the temporal component of nuclear forensics is largely ignored. The processes of forensics do not produce immediate results. While the length of time necessary to provide meaningful intelligence differs, it is unlikely that nuclear forensics will provide information as to the source of the device in the time frame required by policymakers, who in the wake of a terrorist attack will need to respond quickly and decisively. This is likely to decrease both the credibility of forensics information and its usefulness if the political demand requires a leader to act promptly.
Secondly, the existence and size of a black-market for nuclear and radiological material is generally dismissed as a non-factor as it is assumed that a complex weapon provided by a state with nuclear weapon capacity is necessary. While it is acknowledged that a full-scale nuclear device capable of being deployed on a delivery device certainly requires advanced technical capacity that a terrorist organization would likely not have, a very crude weapon is possible. Devices such as a radiological dispersal device or a low yield nuclear device, or even a failed (fizzle) nuclear weapon, would still create a desirable outcome for a terrorist group in that panic, death, and devastating economic and societal consequences would ensue. Further, black market material could the ideal method of weaponization, as its characterization and origin-tracing would prove nearly impossible due to decoupling, and thus confusion, between perpetrator and originator.
It is evident that there is a gap between a robust technical understanding and arguments as to the viability and speed of nuclear forensics in providing actionable intelligence. This gap could lead to unrealistic expectations in times of crisis.
Technical Perspective
This section will outline the technologies, processes, and limitations of forensics in order to better inform its potential for contributing meaningful data in a crisis involving nuclear material. It should be noted that most open-source literature on the processes and capabilities of nuclear forensics come from a pre-detonation position, as specifics on post-denotation procedures and timelines are classified.8 This has resulted in the technical difficulties and inherent uncertainties in the conduct of forensic operations in a post-detonation situation being ignored. The following will attempt to extrapolate the details of the pre-detonation procedures into the post-detonation context in order to posit a potential time frame for intelligence retrieval.
Fundamentally, nuclear forensics is the analysis of nuclear or radiological material for the purposes of documenting the material’s characteristics and process history. With this information, and a database of material to compare the sample to, attribution of the origin of the material is possible.9 Following usage or attempted usage of a nuclear or radiological device, nuclear forensics would examine the known relationships between material characteristics and process history, seeking to correlate characterized material with known production history. While forensics encompasses the processes of analysis on recovered material, nuclear attribution is the process of identifying the source of nuclear or radioactive material, to determine the point of origin and routes of transit involving such material, and ultimately to contribute to the prosecution of those responsible.
Following a nuclear detonation, panic would likely prevail among the general populace and some first responders charged with helping those injured. Those tasked with collecting data from the site for forensic analysis would take time to deploy.10 While National Guard troops are able to respond to aid the population, specialized units are more dispersed throughout the country.11 Nuclear Emergency Support Teams, which would respond in the wake of a nuclear terror attack, are stationed at several of the national laboratories spread around the country. Depending on the location of the attack, response times may vary greatly. The responders’ first step would be to secure the site, as information required for attribution comes from both traditional forensics techniques (pictures, locating material, measurements, etc.) and the elemental forensics analysis of trace particles released from the detonation. At the site, responders would be able to determine almost immediately if it was indeed a full-scale nuclear detonation, a fizzle, or a radiological dispersal device. This is possible by assessing the level of damage and from the levels of radiation present, which can be determined with non-destructive assay techniques and dosimetry. Responders (through the use of gamma ray spectrometry and neutron detection) will be able to classify the type of material used if it is a nuclear device (plutonium versus uranium). With these factors assessed, radiation detectors would need to be deployed to carefully examine the blast site or fallout area to catalogue and extricate radioactive material for analysis. These materials would then need to be delivered to a laboratory capable of handling them.
Once samples arrive at the laboratories, characterization of the material will be undertaken to provide the full elemental analysis (isotopic and phase) of the radioactive material, including major, minor and trace constituents, and a variety of tools that can help classify into bulk analysis, imaging techniques, and microanalysis. Bulk analysis would provide elemental and isotopic composition on the material as a whole, and would enable the identification of trace material that would need to be further analyzed. Imaging tools capture the spatial and textural heterogeneities that are vital to fully characterizing a sample. Finally, microanalysis examines more granularly the individual components of the bulk material.
The three-step process described above is critical to assessing the processes the material was exposed to and the origin of the material. The process, the tools used at each stage, and a rough sequencing of events is shown in Figure 1.12 This table, a working document produced by the IAEA, presents techniques and methods that would be used by forensics analysts as they proceed through the three-step process, from batch analysis to microanalysis. Each column represents a time frame in which a tool of nuclear forensics could be utilized by analysts. However, this is a pre-detonation scenario. While it does present a close representation of what would happen post-detonation, some of the techniques listed below would be expected to take longer. This is due to several factors such as the spread of the material, vaporization of key items, and safety requirements for handling radioactive material. These processes take time and deal with small amounts of material at a time which would require a multitude of microanalysis on a variety of elements.
IAEA Suggested Sequence for Laboratory Techniques and Methods
It should also be noted that while nuclear forensics does employ developed best practices, it is not an exact science in that a process can be undertaken and definitive results. Rather, it is an iterative process, by which a deductive method of hypothesis building, testing, and retesting is used to guide analysis and extract conclusions. Analysts build hypotheses based on categorization of material, test these hypotheses against the available forensics data and initiate further investigation, and then interpret the results to include or remove actors from consideration. This can take several iterations. As such, while best practices and proven science drive analysis, the experience and quality of the analyst to develop well-informed hypotheses which can be used to focus more on the investigation is critical to success. A visual representation of the process is seen in Figure 2 below.13
IAEA forensic analysis process
A net assessment by the Joint Working Group of the American Physical Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science of the current status of nuclear forensics and the ability to successfully conduct attribution concluded that the technological expertise was progressing steadily, but greater cooperation and integration was necessary between agencies.14 They also provided a simplified timeline of events following a nuclear attack, which is seen in Figure 3.15 Miller also provides a more nuanced breakdown of questions that would arise in a post-detonation situation; however, it is the opinion of the author that his table overstates technical capacity following a detonation and uses optimistic estimates for intelligence.16
Nuclear forensics activities following a detonation
Many of the processes that provide the most insight simply take time to configure, run, and rerun. Gas chromatography-mass spectrometry, for instance, is able to detect and measure trace organic elements in a bulk sample, a very useful tool in attempting to identify potential origin via varying organics present.17 However, when the material is spread far (mostly vaporized or highly radioactive), it can take time to configure and run successfully. Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry (TIMS) allows for the measuring of multiple isotopes simultaneously, enabling ratios between isotope levels to be assessed.18 While critically important, this process takes time to prepare each sample, requiring purification in either a chemical or acid solution.
With this broad perspective in mind, how long would it take for actionable intelligence to be produced by a nuclear forensics laboratory following the detonation of a nuclear weapon? While Figure 1 puts output being produced in as little as one week, this would be high-level information and able to eliminate possible origins, but most likely not able to come to definitive conclusion. The estimates of Figure 3 (ranging from a week to months), are more likely as the iterative process of hypothesis testing and the obstacles leading up to the point at which the material arrives at the laboratory, would slow and hamper progress. Further, if the signatures of the material are not classified into a comprehensive database, though disperse efforts are underway, the difficulty in conclusively saying it is a particular actor increases.19 As such, an estimate of weeks to months, as is highlighted in Figures 4 and 5, is an appropriate time frame by which actionable intelligence would be available from nuclear forensics. The graphics below show the likely production times for definitive findings by the forensics processes and outlines a zone of effective intelligence production. How does this align with the time frame of retribution?
Nuclear forensics timeline (author-created figure, compiled from above cited IAEA reports and AAAS report}
Effective Intelligence Zone (author-created figure, compiled from above cited IAEA reports and AAAS report.)
Retaliation Data
How quickly do policymakers act in the wake of a terrorist attack? This question is largely unexplored in the social science literature. However, it is critical to establishing a baseline period in which nuclear forensics would likely need to be able to provide actionable intelligence following an attack. As such, an examination of the retaliatory time to major terrorist attacks will be examined to understand the time frame likely available to forensics analysts to contribute conclusions on materials recovered.
Major terrorist attacks were identified using the Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database.20 As such, the database was selected to return events that resulted in either 50 or more fatalities or over 100 injured. Also removed were cases occurring in Afghanistan or Iraq after 2001 and 2003 due to the indistinguishability of responses to terror attacks and normal operations of war within the data. This yielded 269 observations between 1990 and 2004. Cases that had immediate responses (same day) were excluded as this would indicate an ongoing armed conflict. Summary statistics for this data are as follows:
The identified terrorist events were then located in Gary King’s 10 Million Events data set21, which uses a proven data capture and classification method to catalogue events between 1990 and 2004. Government responses following the attack were then captured. Actions were restricted to only those where the government engaged the perpetrating group. This was done by capturing events classified as the following: missile attack, arrest, assassination, unconventional weapons, armed battle, bodily punishment, criminal arrests, human death, declare war, force used, artillery attack, hostage taking, torture, small arms attack, armed actions, suicide bombing, and vehicle bombing. This selection spans the spectrum of policy responses available to a country following a domestic terror attack that would demonstrate strength and resolve. Additionally, by utilizing a range of responses, it is possible to examine terrorism levied from domestic and international sources, thus enabling the consideration of both law enforcement and military actions. Speech acts, sanctions, and other policy actions that do not portray resolve and action were excluded, as they would typically occur within hours of an attack and would not be considered retaliation.
Undertaking this approached yielded retaliation dates for all observations. The summary statistics and basic outline of response time by tier of causalities are as follows:
Table 2: Summary Statistics Table 3: Casualties by Retaliation Quartile
Immediately, questions arise as to the relationship between retaliation time and destruction inflicted, as well as the time frame available to nuclear forensics analysts to provide intelligence before a response is required. With an average retaliation time of 22 days, this would fall within the 1-2 month time frame for complete analysis. Further, a median retaliation time of 12 days would put most laboratory analysis outside the bounds of being able to provide meaningful data. Figure 6 further highlights this by illustrating that within 30 days of a terrorist attack, 80 percent of incidents will have been responded to with force.
Response Time
One of the fundamental graphics presented in the Lieber and Press article shows that as the number of causalities in a terror attack increases, the likelihood of attribution increases correspondingly. This weakens their arguments for two reasons. First, forensics following a conventional attack would have significantly more data available than in the case of a nuclear attack, due to the destructive nature of the attack and the inability of responders to access certain locales. Secondly, a country that is attacked via unconventional means could arguably require a more resolute and quicker response. In looking at the data, the overall time to retaliation is 21.66 days. This number is significantly smaller when limited to unconventional weapons (19.04 days) and smaller still when the perpetrators are not clearly identified (18.8 days). This highlights the need for distinction between unconventional and conventional attacks, which Lieber and Press neglected in their quantitative section.
To further highlight the point that nuclear forensics may not meet the political demands put upon it in a post-detonation situation, Table 4 highlights the disconnect between conventional and unconventional attacks and existing threats. To reiterate, the term unconventional is used colloquially here as a substitute for CBRN weapons, and not unconventional tactics. In only 37 percent of the cases observed was the threat a known entity or attributed after the fact. This compares to 85 percent for conventional. In all of these attacks, retaliation did occur; allowing the conclusion that with the severity of an unconventional weapon and the unordinary fear that is likely to be produced that public outcry and a prompt response would be warranted regardless of attribution.
As the use of a nuclear weapon would result in a large number of deaths, the question as to whether or not higher levels of casualties influence response time is also of importance. However, no significant correlation is present between retaliation time and any of the other variables examined. Here, retaliation time (in days) was compared with binary variables for whether or not the perpetrators were known, if the facility was a government building or not, if the device used was a bomb or not, and if an unconventional device was used or not. Scale variables used include number of fatalities, injured, and the total casualties from the attack. Of particular note here is the negative correlation between unconventional attacks and effective attribution at time of response; this reemphasizes the above point on attribution prior to retaliation as being unnecessary following an unconventional attack.
Assessment
From this review, the ability of nuclear forensics to provide rapid, actionable intelligence in unlikely. While it is acknowledged that the process would produce gains along the way, an effective zone of intelligence production can be assumed between 21-90 days optimistically. This is highlighted in Figure 5 above, which aligns the effective zone with the processes that would likely provide definitive details. However, this does not align with the average (22 days) and median (12 days) time of response for conventional attacks. More importantly, unconventional attack responses fall well before this effective zone, with an average of 19 days and a median of 10. While the effective intelligence zone is close to these averages of these data points, the author remains skeptical that the techniques to be performed would produce viable data in a shorter time frame presented given the likely condition of the site and the length of time necessary for each run of each technique.22 This woasuld seem to support an argument that the working timelines for actionable data being outside the boundary of average retaliatory time. More examination is necessary to further narrow down the process times, a task plagued with difficulties due to material classification.ass
A secondary argument that can be made when thinking about unattributed terror attacks is that even without complete attribution, a state will retaliate against a known terror, cult, or insurgent organization following a terror attack to show strength and deter further attacks. This was shown to be the case in 34 of 54 observations (63 percent unattributed). While this number is remarkably high, all states were observed taking decisive action against a group. This would tend to negate the perspective that forensics will matter following an attack, as a state will respond more decisively to unconventional attacks than conventional whether attribution has been established or not.
There are also strategic implications for indirect deterrent strategies as well. Indirect deterrence offers a bit more flexibility in the timing of results, but less so in the uncertainty of results, as it will critical in levying guilty claims against a third-party actor. Thus, nuclear forensics can be very useful, and perhaps even necessary, in indirect deterrent strategies if data is available to compare materials and a state is patient in waiting for the results; however, significant delays in intelligence or uncertainty in results may reduce the credibility of accusations and harm claims of guilt in the international context. From a strategic perspective, the emphasis in the United States policy regarding rapid identification that was discussed at the outset of the paper reflects optimism rather than reality.
Policy Recommendations
While nuclear forensics may not be able to contribute information quickly enough to guide policymakers in their retaliatory decision-making following terrorist attacks, nuclear forensics does have significant merit. Nuclear forensics will be able to rule people out. It will be able to guide decisions for addressing the environmental disaster. Forensics also has significant political importance, as it can be used in a post-hoc situation following retaliation to possibly justify any action taken. It will also continue to be important in pre-detonation interdiction situations, where it has been advanced and excelled to-date, providing valuable information on the trafficking of illicit materials.
However, realistic expectations are necessary and should be made known so that policymakers are able to plan accordingly. The public will demand quick action, requiring officials to produce tangible results. If delay is not possible, attribution may not be possible. To overcome this, ensuring policymakers are aware of the technical limitations and hurdles that are present in conducting forensics analysis of radioactive material would help to manage expectations.
To reduce analytical time and improve attribution success rates, further steps should be taken. Continuing to enlarge the IAEA database on nuclear material signatures is critical, as this will reduce analytical time and uncertainty, making more precise attribution possible. Additional resources for equipment, building up analytical capacity, and furthering cooperation among all states to ensure that signatures are catalogued and accessible is critical. The United States has taken great steps in improving the knowledge base on how nuclear forensics is conducted with fellowships and trainings available through the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). While funding constraints are tight, expansion of these programs and targeted recruitment of highly-qualified students and individuals is key. Perhaps, these trainings and opportunities could be expanded to cover individuals that are trained to do analytical work, but is not their primary tasking – like a National Guard for nuclear forensics. DOE and other agencies have similar programs for response capacity during emergencies; bolstering analytical capacity for rapid ramp-up in case of emergency would help to reduce analytical time. However, while these programs may reduce time, some of the delay is inherent in the science. Technological advances in analytics may help, but in the short-term are unavailable. In sum, further work in developing the personnel and technological infrastructure for nuclear forensics is needed; in the meantime, prudence is necessary.
Philip Baxter is currently a PhD Candidate in the International Affairs, Science, and Technology program in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech. He completed his BA in political science and history at Grove City College and a MA in public policy, focusing on national security policy, from George Mason University. Prior to joining the Sam Nunn School, Phil worked in international security related positions in the Washington, DC area, including serving as a researcher at the National Defense University and as a Nonproliferation Fellow at the National Nuclear Security Administration. His dissertation takes a network analysis approach in examining how scientific cooperation and tacit knowledge development impacts proliferation latency. More broadly, his research interests focus on international security issues, including deterrence theory, strategic stability, illicit trafficking, U.S.-China-Russia relations, and nuclear safeguards.
Nuclear Information Project: External Publications and Briefings
This chronology lists selected external publications and briefings by the staff of the Nuclear Information Project. External links might go dead over time; if you need assistance to locate missing items, please contact individual project staff via the “About” page. To search for publications on the FAS Strategic Security Blog, see our Publications page.
2023
- “Strategic Arms Control after the New START Treaty”, Presentation to the Princeton Program on Science and Global Security, April 12, 2023.
- “Chinese nuclear weapons, 2023,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 2023.
- “Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor 2022,” March 2023.
- “China’s Nuclear Buildup: Projections And Observations,” briefing by Hans Kristensen to webinar organized by the Committee for a Sane U.S.-China Policy and the Campaign for Peace, Disarmament and Common Security, February 2, 2023. Briefing slides here.
- “Challenges and Prospects for Further U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control,” briefing by Matt Korda (begins at 42 minutes of recording) to webinar organized by Arms Control Association, February 1, 2023.
- “North Korea’s Nuclear Arsenal,” Presentation to the Bullis School, January 18, 2023.
- “Why US policy on North Korea should prioritize nonproliferation, not denuclearization,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 13, 2023.
- “United States nuclear weapons, 2023,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 2023.
- “Could a Chatbot Teach You How to Build a Dirty Bomb?” Outrider, January 30, 2023.
2022
- “The Long View: Strategic arms control after the New START Treaty,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 9, 2023.
- “2022 Nuclear Posture Review Force Structure Decisions,” briefing to Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation brief to Congressional staffers, November 3, 2022.
- “Nuclear Weapons Operations and Risks in Europe, 2022,” briefing to PUGWASH-USPID conference Nuclear Weapons: New Risks, Castiglioncello, Italy, October 21, 2022.
- Using Open-Source Intelligence to Collect Data on Global Nuclear Arsenals,” Briefing to the Nuclear Policy Working Group, October 17, 2022.
- “Increased Nuclear Secrecy Makes Us All Less Safe,” Outrider, October 17, 2022.
- “NATO and Russia Exercises Rattle Nuclear Swords Amid Ukraine War,” Russia Matters, October 14, 2022.
- “North Korean nuclear weapons, 2022,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 2022.
- “Nuclear Arsenals and Cyber Vulnerabilities: The State of Play”, Briefing to Swedish Pugwash, September 15, 2022.
- “Threats and Opportunities? Arms Control and Emerging Technologies,” Presentation to the Arms Control Negotiation Academy, August 18, 2022.
- “US Missile Defence: Capabilities and Trends”, Presentation for Win Without War, August 11, 2022.
- “Why did NYC’s nuclear warning fall on deaf ears?” Outrider, August 2, 2022.
- “Challenging Assumptions About Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles,” Presentation to Global Zero event, “Building A Movement for Nuclear and Economic Justice,” June 29, 2022.
- “Indian nuclear weapons, 2022,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 2022.
- “China’s Nuclear Weapons Modernization and US-Chinese Military Rivalry,” briefing to Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, June 1, 2022.
- “United States nuclear weapons, 2022,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 2022.
- “The Big Business of Nuclear Weapons,” Presentation to the Norwegian Peace Council, May 25, 2022.
- “Joining the U.S. missile defence program would be a big mistake,” Toronto Star, May 20, 2022.
- “Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons,” presentation to Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (CACNP) Hill staff briefing, April 28, 2022. Higher resolution slides available upon request.
- “The Evolution of Air and Missile Technologies”, Briefing at the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence Conference, 29-30 March 2022.
- “China’s Nuclear Weapons Modernization,” (download slides here) briefing (virtual) to Institute of Chinese Studies Delhi seminar on China’s Nuclear Modernization and Implications for India, March 9, 2022.
- “Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor, 2021,” March 2022.
- “Russian Nuclear Weapons, 2022,” Briefing to International Colloquium on Security Threats in Europe, March 4, 2022.
- “Nuclear Arsenal Overviews: UK & France“, Briefing to the Odesa Winter School, February 18, 2022.
- “Russian nuclear weapons, 2022,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 2022.
- “Israeli nuclear weapons, 2022,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 2022.
2021
- “Nuclear Disarmament and Arms Control: The State of Play,” SIPRI webinar, December 14, 2021.
- “Influence of the Defense Industry on US National Security Strategy,” Russia Matters, November 12,2021.
- “China’s Changing Nuclear Posture,” Presentation at the Santa Fe World Affairs Forum, November 10, 2021.
- “China and Russia: A Nuclear Lay of the Land,” Lecture at American University’s School of International Studies, October 20, 2021.
- “Time to factor missile defence into nuclear arms control talks,” SIPRI, September 30, 2021.
- “A Closer Look at the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent,” Presentation to the Princeton Program on Science and Security, September 29, 2021.
- “China’s new nuclear silo fields: Negotiating card of arms race catalyst?“, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ virtual program, September 22, 2021.
- “Pakistani nuclear forces, 2021,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 2021.
- “China’s nuclear missile expansion: From minimum deterrence to medium deterrence,’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1, 2021.
- “North Korean nuclear weapons, 2021,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 2021.
- “World Nuclear Forces, 2021” in SIPRI Yearbook 2021 (Oxford University Press: July 2021), pp. 333-412.
- Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Commission on China’s Nuclear Forces, June 10, 2021.
- “United Kingdom Nuclear Weapons, 2021,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 2021.
- “China’s Strategic Systems and Programs,” in James Smith and Paul Bolt (ed.), China’s Strategic Arsenal: Worldview, Doctrine, and Systems (Georgetown University Press: April 2021), pp. 93-124.
- “Russian nuclear forces, 2021,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 2021.
- “Baby Nukes: When A Little Boom Is All You Need,” Things That Go Boom Podcast, March 1, 2021.
- “Policymaking and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Presentation to Girl Security, February 15, 2021.
- “US nuclear forces, 2021,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 2021.
2020
- “ICBM Advocates Say US Missile Subs Are Vulnerable. It Isn’t True,” Defense One, December 10, 2020.
- “Chinese nuclear forces, 2020,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 2020.
- “USAF Plans To Expand Nuclear Bomber Bases,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 17, 2020.
- “Nuclear War in Northeast Asia: Nuclear Forces and Nuclear War Planning,” with Matthew McKinzie, briefing to Nagasaki University, November 14, 2020.
- “Dangerous Developments: New Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” briefing to IPPNW (Norway), November 12, 2020.
- “World Nuclear Arsenals, Modernization Programs, and Employment Doctrines and Policies,” briefing to New York State Bar Association, November 12, 2020.
- “World Nuclear Arsenals, Naval Nuclear Weapons, and Challenges for Nuclear Arms Control,” briefing to Illinois University, November 4, 2020.
- “Does Socioeconomic Status Affect How Young People Think About Nuclear Weapons?” UK PONI Papers, October 2020.
- “Trump Is A Hypocrite, But He’s Right About The Military-Industrial Complex,” Forbes, September 10, 2020.
- “Documenting Nuclear Arsenals: The Work of the Federation of American Scientists’ Nuclear Information Project,” briefing to American University, September 10, 2020.
- “Democrats And Republicans Agree: Phase Out Land-Based Nuclear Missiles,” Forbes, August 12, 2020.
- “Nuclear Tallies, Nuclear Trends,” Briefing to the Berkeley Nuclear Policy Working Group, April 20, 2020.
- “Indian nuclear forces, 2020,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 2020.
- “World nuclear forces,” with Shannon Kile, in SIPRI Yearbook 2020 (Oxford University Press).
- “Democrats May Fund Trump’s Nuclear Modernization Plan Without A Fight,” Forbes, June 30, 2020.
- “The Trump Administration Is Using The Pandemic To Ignite The Arms Race,” Forbes, June 22, 2020.
- “China-US-Russia Competition: Modernizations and Arms Racing,” briefing to Reaching Critical Will, June 3, 2020.
- “Congress Should Hit Pause On The New Intercontinental Ballistic Missile,” Forbes, April 21, 2020.
- “Nuclear Tallies, Nuclear Trends,” Lecture at Boise State University, April 20, 2020.
- “The U.S. Nuclear Deterrent Is Not Prepared For Climate Catastrophe,” Forbes, March 16, 2020.
- “The Humanitarian Consequences and Risks of Nuclear Weapons,” briefing to the International Committee of the Red Cross, March 2, 2020.
- “Russian nuclear forces, 2020,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 2020.
- “Do Young People Care About Nuclear Weapons?” Inkstick, February 27, 2020.
- “United States Nuclear Strategy: From Cold War, Nuclear Detente, to Great Power Competition, briefing to George Washington University, February 27, 2020.
- “United States nuclear forces, 2020,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 2020.
- “How Young People Will Change the Direction of U.S. Foreign Policy in the New Decade,” Responsible Statecraft, January 1, 2020.
2019
- “Censoring Geospatial Imagery,” Presentation at the CSIS-CNS Conference on Open-Source Analysis, December 12, 2019.
- “The New START Treaty Keeps Nuclear Arsenals In Check And President Trump Must Act To Preserve It,” Forbes, December 10, 2019.
- “U.S. Nuclear Weapons In Europe,” briefing to Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation luncheon for Congressional staffers, November 1, 2019.
- “How an India-Pakistan nuclear war could start—and have global consequences,” with Alan Robock, Owen Brian Toon, Charles G. Bardeen, Lili Xia, Matthew McKinzie, R. J. Peterson, Cheryl S. Harrison, Nicole S. Lovenduski, and Richard P. Turco, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 31, 2019.
- “US ballistic missile defenses, 2019,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 2019.
- “Narrowing the Policy-Academia Gap: Dialogue, Diversity, and Collaboration in Early-Career Nuclear Scholarship”, Presentation at the International Studies Association ISSS Conference, October 19, 2019.
- “When Talking About Climate Change, We Can’t Forget Nuclear Weapons.” The Nation, October 14, 2019.
- “Rapidly expanding nuclear arsenals in Pakistan and India portend regional and global catastrophe,” Science Advances, October 2, 2019.
- “We Need a Green New Deal for Nuclear Weapons,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 11, 2019.
- “Tactical nuclear weapons, 2019,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 2019.
- “In Memoriam: The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Dies at 32.” The Nation, August 2, 2019.
- “Five Questions about Nukes to Ask At the Next Debate.” Defense One, July 31, 2019.
- “Chinese nuclear forces, 2019,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 2019.
- SIPRI Yearbook 2019: “Modernization of world nuclear forces continues despite overall decrease in number of warheads: New SIPRI Yearbook out now,” June 17, 2019.
- “Is The Pentagon Exaggerating Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons?,” Forbes, May 7, 2019.
- “US nuclear forces, 2019,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 2019.
- “Let’s Get Rid of the National Security ‘Expert’“, Inkstick, April 24, 2019.
- “At #Nukefest, We Asked All The Wrong Questions,” Inkstick, March 19, 2019.
- “House Armed Services Committee Members Show Alarmingly Poor Knowledge On Nuclear Weapons,” Forbes, March 6, 2019.
- “Russian nuclear forces, 2019,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 2019.
2018
- “INF Weapons: Status Modernizations and Arms Control Prospects,” Toda Peace Institute, Policy Brief No. 25, November 2018.
- “Indian nuclear forces, 2018,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 2018.
- “Trump falls on sword for Putin’s treaty violation”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 29, 2018.
- “Putin Deepens Confusion About Russian Nuclear Policy”, Russia Matters, October 25, 2018.
- “Pakistani nuclear forces, 2018,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 2018.
- “Chinese nuclear forces, 2018,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 2018.
- “Russian nuclear forces, 2018,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 2018.
- “United States nuclear forces, 2018,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 2018.
- “Expert Commentary: The Nuclear Posture Review and the US nuclear arsenal,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 2, 2018.
- “B61-12 Integration on Allied Aircraft,” chapter 5 in Steve Andreasen, et al, Building a Safe, Secure, and Credible NATO Nuclear Posture, Nuclear Threat Initiative, January 2018.
- “Supporting the DCA Mission,” chapter 4 in Steve Andreasen, et al, Building a Safe, Secure, and Credible NATO Nuclear Posture, Nuclear Threat Initiative, January 2018.
- “B61-12 Guided Nuclear Bomb,” chapter 3 in Steve Andreasen, et al, Building a Safe, Secure, and Credible NATO Nuclear Posture, Nuclear Threat Initiative, January 2018.
- “North Korean nuclear capabilities, 2018,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 2018.
2017
- “A History of US Nuclear Weapons In South Korea,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 2017.
- “Deter, don’t provoke, North Korea,” CNN, October 11, 2017.
- “The Status of Nuclear Weapons: Arsenals, Modernizations, and Operations,” briefing to Pugwash-USPID conference on international security in the Trump era, Castiglioncello, Italy, September 22, 2017.
- “Russian Nuclear Forces: Buildup or Modernization,” Russia Matters, September 14, 2017.
- “Worldwide deployment of nuclear weapons, 2017,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 2017.
- “Trends in world nuclear forces, 2017,” with Shannon Kile, SIPRI, July 2017. Link to full PDF format.
- Briefing at United Nations Nuclear Ban Treaty Conference side event in New York on status and trends in nuclear forces, June 21, 2017. Event was hosted by the Austrian delegation and organized by the Nuclear Information Resource Service (NIRS) and co-sponsored by the Physicians for Social Responsibility. Briefing slides from the event are available here.
- “Alert Status of Nuclear Weapons,” briefing to George Washington University Elliott School’s Short Course on Nuclear Weapons and Related Security Issues, April 21, 2017.
- “The Quest for More Useable Nuclear Weapons,” in John Borrie, Tim Caughley and Wilfred Wan (Ed.), Understanding Nuclear Weapon Risks, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, April 2017, pp. 33-44. The report culminated in a conference with the recordings of the various presentations (mine included) available here.
- “How US nuclear force modernization is undermining strategic stability: The burst-height compensating super-fuze,” with Matthew McKinzie and Theodore A. Postol, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1, 2017.
- “Russian nuclear forces, 2017,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 2017.
- “Beyond U.S.-Russian Arms Control,” speech at the Nuclear Deterrence Summit, Washington, D.C.
- “INF, New START and What Really Matters for US-Russian Nuclear Arms Control,” Russia Matters, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School, February 24, 2017.
- “United States nuclear forces, 2017,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 2017.
2016
- “Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2016,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2016.
- “The Growing Threat of Nuclear War and the Role of the Health Community,” World Medical Journal, Vol. 62, No. 3, October 2016. A single file copy is available here.
- “Taking Stock: New START Implementation and Outlook,” briefing to Nuclear Threat Initiative, Washington, DC, August 24, 2016.
- “Nuclear arsenals: Current developments, trends and capabilities” (with Matthew McKinzie), in International Review of the Red Cross, Issue 899 (The Human Cost of Nuclear Weapons).
- “New START Implementation and Future: An Assessment of US Progress and Outlook,” briefing to Deep Cuts Commission workshop Restraint and Dialogue: Improving European Security and Arms Control, held at IMEMO, Moscow, June 20, 2016.
- “Chinese nuclear forces, 2016,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2016.
- “Trends in World Nuclear Forces, 2016,” SIPRI, June 13, 2016.
- “Nuclear Modernization, Enhanced Military Capabilities, and Strategic Stability,” briefing to Arms Control Association annual meeting, Washington, D.C., June 6, 2016.
- “Russian nuclear forces, 2016,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 2015.
- “United States nuclear forces, 2016,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 2016.
- “Nuclear Force Modernizations: Russia, China and the United States,” briefing to School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, February 9, 2016.
- “The Basics of Nuclear Weapons: Physics, Fuel Cycles, Effects and Arsenals,” briefing to Introduction to WMD Nonproliferation Course, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Washington, D.C., February 8, 2016.
- “Declassified: US nuclear weapons at sea during the Cold War,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2016.
2015
- “NATO Nuclear Operations: Management, Escalation, Balance of Power,” briefing to course on nuclear weapons policy and arms control, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, October 27, 2015.
- “Pakistani nuclear forces, 2015,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 22, 2015.
- “European Nuclear Forces, Operations, and Modernization,” briefing to FAS-BASIC roundtable on the state of the UK and European debates on nuclear weapons, Washington, D.C., October 15, 2015.
- “Indian nuclear forces, 2015,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 2015.
- “Nuclear Weapons in NATO’s Deterrence Posture: Status Quo or Change?,” in Stefanie von Hlatky and Andreas Wenger, The Future of Extended Deterrence: The United States, NATO, and Beyond (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, September 2015), pp. 135-151.
- “The meaning of Russia’s nuclear threats,” Brookings Institution panel event, July 8, 2015.
- “Chinese nuclear forces, 2015,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 2015.
- “Russian nuclear forces, 2015,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 2015.
- “Worldwide Nuclear Weapon Modernization Programs,” briefing to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference side-event on nuclear modernizations, United Nations, New York, April 28, 2015.
- “France,” chapter in Assuring Destruction Forever: 2015 EDITION, Reaching Critical Will, 2015, pp. 30-37. A copy of the chapter is available here.
- “US Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Japan’s Nuclear Policy,” briefing to GENSUIKIN, Tokyo, March 6, 2015.
- “China’s Nuclear Modernization: Implications for Nuclear Arms Control, US-Chinese Strategic Stability, and Asia-Pacific Security,” briefing to Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Japanese Institute for International Affairs (JIIA), Tokyo, March 6, 2015.
- “Civilian Research of the Status of Worldwide Nuclear Forces,” briefing to the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (RECNA), Nagasaki University, March 4, 2015.
- “US nuclear forces, 2015,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 2015.
- “Counting nuclear warheads in the public interest,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 2015.
2014
- “Nuclear Deterrence, Nuclear War Planning, and Scenarios of Nuclear Conflict,” briefing (with Matthew McKinzie) to international Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons, Vienna, Austria, December 8, 2014.
- “Nuclear Weapons in a Nutshell,” briefing to ICAN Civil Society Forum, Vienna, Austria, December 6, 2014.
- “Russian and NATO Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces,” briefing to NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Preparedness for Nuclear Radiological Threats, Los Angeles, November 18, 2014.
- “Israeli nuclear forces, 2014,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 2014.
- “Russian Nuclear Weapons Modernization: Status, Trends, and Implications,” briefing to Workshop on Russia Nuclear Posture and Policy, Foundation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris, September 29, 2014.
- “Why NATO should eliminate it tactical nukes, despite Russian belligerence,” (with Adam Mount), Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 3, 2014.
- “Worldwide deployment of nuclear weapons, 2014,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 2014.
- “Slowing nuclear weapon reductions and endless nuclear weapons modernization: A challenge to the NPT,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 2014.
- “Nuclear Weapons Trends: Numbers, Owners, Locations, Modernizations,” briefing to Red Cross working group, Hague, June 16, 2014.
- “Nuclear Weapons Modernization: A Threat to the NPT?,” Arms Control Today, May 2014.
- “B61-12: The Guided Standoff Nuclear Bomb,” briefing to NGO side event at PREPCOM 2014, May 2, 2014.
- “Nuclear Weapon Modernization Programs of Nuclear-Armed States,” briefing to NGO side event at PREPCOM 2014, May 1, 2014.
- “Nuclear Weapons Modernization: A Threat to the NPT?,” Arms Control Today, May 2014.
- “US Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Number Declassified: Only 309 Warheads Cut by Obama
- “The B61 Family of Nuclear Bombs,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 2014.
- “Nuclear Weapons Base Visits: Accident and Incident Exercises as Confidence-Building Measures,” briefing to Workshop on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Practice, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, 27-28 March 2014.
- “Russian nuclear forces, 2014,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 2014.
- “B61-12: NATO’s New Guided Standoff Nuclear Bomb,” briefing to the Dutch and Belgian parliament’s foreign and defense committees, January 2014.
- “US nuclear forces, 2014,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 2014.
2013
- “Chinese nuclear forces, 2013,” FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 2013.
- “Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control: Modernizing Nuclear Arsenals,” briefing to Nuclear Weapons Issues in the 21st Century, George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, November 2, 2013. (Warning: 10 MB file).
- “Nuclear Warhead Stockpiles and Transparency” (with Robert Norris), in Global Fissile Material Report 2013, International Panel on Fissile Materials, October 2013, pp. 50-58.
- “The U.S. Nuclear Posture After the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and 2013 Nuclear Employment Strategy,” briefing to Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, September 25, 2013.
- “Falling Short of Prague: Obama’s Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy,” Arms Control Today, September 2013.
- “Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945-2013,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2013.
- “British nuclear stockpile, 1953-2013,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2013.
- “New Nuclear Weapons Employment Guidance Puts Obama’s Fingerprint on Nuclear Weapons Policy and Strategy,” FAS Strategic Security Blog, June 20, 2013.
- “De-alerting nuclear forces,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 19, 2013.
- “World Nuclear Forces,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2013 (Oxford University Press, 2013).
- “US Nuclear Policy: A Mixed Message,” The Monthly Komei (Japan), June 2013. Japanese version here.
- “B61-12: America’s New Guided Standoff Nuclear Bomb,” briefing to WAND, May 30, 2013. Recording of briefing is available on YouTube.
- “Russian nuclear forces, 2013,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2013.
- “US nuclear forces, 2013,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2013.
- “Unilateral Versus Bilateral Nuclear Reductions,” prepared remarks to CSIS PONI Debate, February 27, 2013.
- Reducing Alert Rates of Nuclear Weapons, UNIDIR.
2012
- “Cuban Missile Crisis: a nuclear order of battle, October and November 1962,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2012.
- “U.S. Nuclear Strategy After the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review,” briefing to graduate seminar on nuclear policy at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, October 2012.
- “China’s Nuclear Forces and Potential Vulnerabilities: Potential Implications for Posture and Strategy,” briefing to Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs workshop on Mitigating U.S. and Chinese Concerns About Each Other’s Nuclear Offensive and Defense Programs, Princeton University, September 24, 2012.
- “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, 2012,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2012.
- “U.S. Nuclear Strategy After the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review,” briefing to the Public Policy and Nuclear Threats “boot camp” workshop at the University of California San Diego, August 10, 2012.
- Speech: “Will Advanced Conventional Capabilities Undermine or Enhance Deterrence?,” USSTRATCOM Deterrence Symposium, Omaha, NE, August 9, 2012. Video is available here.
- “Indian Nuclear Forces, 2012,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July-August 2012. See also blog here.
- “Event: Conference on Using Satellite Imagery to Monitor Nuclear Forces and Proliferators,” June 7, 2012. Briefing slides are here.
- “U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2012,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May-June 2012.
- “FAS Report on Status and Trends of U.S. and Russian Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons,” briefing held in the U.S. Senate, May 3, 2012.
- Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons, FAS, May 2012.
- “France,” chapter in Assuring Destruction Forever, Reraching Critical Will, April 2012, pp. 27-33.
- “Russian nuclear forces, 2012,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March-April 2012.
- Briefing: Perspectives on the 2013 Budget Request and President Obama’s Guidance on the Future of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Program, presented to the Fourth Nuclear Deterrence Summit, Arlington, VA, February 15, 2012.
- “Nuclear Pursuits, 2012,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January-February 2012.
2011
- “Reviewing Nuclear Guidance: Putting Obama’s Words Into Action,” Arms Control Today, November 2011.
- “Chinese nuclear forces, 2011,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2011.
- “British nuclear forces, 2011,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2011.
- “A Presidential Policy Directive for a new nuclear path,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 10, 2011.
- “NATO’s Posture Review and Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons,” prepared remarks for Brookings panel on NATO’s nuclear policy, July 19, 2011.
- “Pakistani Nuclear Forces 2011,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July-August 2011. See also blog with briefing slide.
- “B61 LEP: Increasing NATO Nuclear Capability and Precision Low-Yield Strikes.” Available as an Issue Brief.
- “World nuclear forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2011, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, June 2011.
- “Russian nuclear forces, 2011,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2011.
- “U.S. nuclear forces, 2011,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2011.
- “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons After the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives,” briefing to panel at Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C., March 1, 2011.
- “Creating Nuclear Transparency Through Science, Technology and Collaboration,” briefing to AAAS Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., February 20, 2011.
- “U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, 2011,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2011.
2010
- “Maintaining and Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Delivery Vehicles,” briefing to Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Luncheon, United States Senate Visitor Center, November 19, 2010.
- “Policy Responses to Nuclear Threats: Nuclear Posturing after the Cold War,” briefing to Global Threat Lector Series, International Studies Institute, University of New Mexico, November 4, 2010.
- “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2010,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2010. (PDF-version here)
- “U.S. and Russian Nuclear Forces; Status and Trends in Light of Smaller and Safer Article,” briefing to Panel on Smaller and Safer Article and De-Alerting of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, October 13, 2010.
- “Indian Nuclear Forces, 2010,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2010. Now published by Sage Publications (html format / pdf format).
- “NATO Nuclear Weapons Policy: Mission and Forces at the Crossroads,” briefing to IGCC Public Policy and Nuclear Threats Program, University of California, San Diego, August 4, 2010.
- “Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945-2010,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2010.
- “World Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook, June 2010.
- “U.S. nuclear forces, 2010,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May-Jun 2010.
- Obama and the Nuclear War Plan, Federation of American Scientists, February 2010.
- “What if the Obama Administration Changes US Nuclear Policy: Potential Effects on the Strategic War Plan,” briefing to Quinnipiac University School of Law Center, February 19, 2010.
- “The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review 2010: Policy and Force Structure Issues,” briefing to the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, January 26, 2010.
- “Russian nuclear forces, 2010,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2010. A facility profile is available on the FAS Strategic Security Blog.
2009
- “Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2009“, Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2009. An accompanying blog is on the FAS Strategic Security Blog.
- “Japan’s Nuclear Secrets,” SEKAI Magazine, Tokyo, November 2009. English version here.
- “Pakistani Nuclear Forces 2009,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2009.
- “U.S. Nuclear Warheads 1945-2009,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2009.
- “Counter-Proliferation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy,” in David S. McDonough (ed.), US Nuclear Strategy and the Implications for Global Security (Dalhouse University: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2009), pp. 13-34.
- “Lots of Hedging, Little Leading: An Analysis of the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission Report,” Arms Control Today, June 2009.
- “From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence,” joint FAS-NRDC briefing to the MORS (Military Operations Online Society) Nuclear Online Workshop, May 5, 2009.
- “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2009,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2009.
- “Nuclear Weapons Status and Options Under a START Follow-On Agreement,” briefing to ACA meeting held at Carnegie, April 27, 2009.
- From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons, FAS/NRDC, April 8, 2009.
- “U.S. Nuclear Forces 2009,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2009.
- “Reviewing NATO’s Strategic Concept: Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” briefing to the Middle Powers Initiative Article VI Forum, Berlin, January 29, 2009.
- “Nuclear U.S. and Soviet/Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles, 1959–2008,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2009.
2008
- “Indian Nuclear Forces 2008,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2008.
- “Trends in Nuclear Forces and Doctrine,” presentation to Pugwash conference on Strengthening the Nonproliferation Treaty, Danish Parliament, November 17, 2008.
- “The Nuclear Posture of the United States,” in Magnus Eriksson and Kari M. Osland [eds.], Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century: Old Players, New Game – New Players, Old Game (Norwegian Defence Command & Staff College/Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, October 2008), pp. 53-66.
- “Nuclear Weapons Life Extension Programs and Modifications,” presentation to strategy meeting at Union of Concerned Scientists, October 16, 2008.
- “The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Counterproliferation and Global Strike Scenarios,” presentation to the workshop What Role, If Any, For Nuclear Weapons, New Mexico Nuclear Study Group, Center for Science, Technology, and Policy, University of New Mexico, September 11, 2008.
- “French Nuclear Forces 2008,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 2008.
- “Chinese Nuclear Forces 2008,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 2008.
- “World Nuclear Forces 2008,”in SIPRI Yearbook 2008.
- “Russian Nuclear Forces 2008,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 2008.
- “U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2008,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2008.
- Toward True Security, FAS/NRDC/UCS, February 2008.
2007
- “Nuclear Cruise Missiles,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2007.
- “A Rebuttal of the U.S. Statement on Nuclear Weapons Alert, Dismantlements and Reductions,” October 19, 2007. Available via Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy.
- U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe After the Cold War, briefing to Nuclear Proliferation: History and Current Problems conference, Florence University, October 4-5, 2007
- “The U.S. nuclear stockpile, today and tomorrow,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2007.
- “U.S. Strategic War Planning After 9/11,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, July 2007.
- “World Nuclear Forces, 2007,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2007, Swedish International Peace and Research Institute, July 2007,
- “Indian Nuclear Forces, 2007,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2007.
- “Dismantling fewer, not more, nukes,” Los Angeles Times (letter to the editor), June 11, 2007.
- “Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2007,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2007.
- “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2007,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2007.
- “U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2007,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2007.
2006
- “Nuclear Missile Testing Galore,” FAS Strategic Security Blog, December 22, 2006.
- “Where the Bombs are, 2006,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2006.
- Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning, FAS/NRDC, November 2006.
- New and Traditional Security Threats to Russia, and the Utility of Nuclear Weapons, briefing to WSI-ISS meeting Emerging Nuclear Weapons Policies: An Opportunity to Increase Dialogue, Washington, D.C., October 12-13, 2006 (NOTE: PDF, 0.86 MB)
- “Nuclear Threats: Then and Now,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2006.
- “World Nuclear Forces,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2006, Swedish International Peace Research Institute, July 2006.
- “U.S. National Security Strategy and Pre-emption,” Défense Nationale (France), No. 7, July 2006. (English version is free but French version requires password.)
- “Global Nuclear Stockpiles, 2006,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the American Scientists, July/August 2006.
- “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2006,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the American Scientists, May/June 2006.
- Global Strike: A Chronology of the Pentagon’s New Offensive Strike Plan, FAS, March 15, 2006.
- “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2006,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2006.
- “Chinese Nuclear Forces,” Imaging Notes, Winter 2006.
- “US Nuclear Forces, 2006,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February, 2006.
2005
- “Preparing for the Failure of Deterrence,” Royal Canadian Military Institute SITREP, Vol. 65, No. 6, November/December 2005.
- “British Nuclear Forces, 2005,” Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December, 2005.
- “New Doctrine Falls Short of Bush Pledge,” Arms Control Today, September 2005.
- “Indian Nuclear Forces, 2005,” NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October, 2005.
- “French Nuclear Forces, 2005,” NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2005.
- “World Nuclear Forces,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2005, Swedish International Peace and Research Institute, Stockholm, June 7, 2005.
- Nuclear Mission Creep, Briefing to Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University, May 11, 2005.
- “Who’s Keeping the Nuclear Weapons in Europe?,” armscontrolwonk.com, May 2, 2005.
- “North Korea’s Nuclear Program, 2005,” NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2005.
- Briefing to members of the Belgian and Dutch Parliaments on the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, March 1, 2005.
- Briefing to members of the German Parliament (Bundestag) on the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, February 25, 2005.
- “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2005,” NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2005.
- U.S. Nuclear Weapons In Europe, Natural Resources Defense Council, February 2005.
- Missions for Nuclear Weapons After the Cold War, FAS, February 28, 2005.
- “U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2005,” NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2005.
2004
- “U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1954-2004,” NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2004.
- “What’s Behind Bush’s Nuclear Cuts,” Arms Control Today, October 2004.
- Nuclear Insecurity: A Critique of the Bush Administration’s Nuclear Weapons Policies, Natural Resources Defense Council, September 2004.
- “World Nuclear Forces,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2004, Swedish International Peace Research Institute, September 2004.
- “U.S. nuclear reductions,” NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August/September 2004.
- Briefing: “US Nuclear Policy and World Nuclear Situation,” presented to the 59th Gensuikin conference in Tokyo, August 1, 2004.
- Briefing: “U.S. Nuclear Posture in Korea,” presented to the 59th Gensuikin conference in Tokyo, August 1, 2004.
- “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2004,” NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2004.
- “Too Many, Too Slow: The Bush administration’s stockpile reduction plan,” Natural Resources Defense Council, Fact Sheet, June 2004.
- “U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2004,” NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2004.
- “Nuclear Disclosure: A Danger to National Security?,” PRIME No. 19, (PRIME, International Peace Research Institute, Meiji Gakuin University, Tokyo), March 2004 (see PDF-version).
- “The Protection Paradox,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2004.
- “Dismantling U.S. Nuclear Warheads,” NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2004.
2003
- “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2003,” NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2003.
- “Nuclear Pursuits,” NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2003.
- “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2003,” NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2003.
- “World Nuclear Forces as of January 2003,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2004, Swedish International Peace Research Institute, July 2003. (Full pdf-version available here).
- “U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2003,” NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2003.
- “North Korea’s Nuclear Program, 2003,” NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2003.
- Changing Targets II, Greenpeace International, April 2003.
- “The B61 Family of Bombs,” NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2003.
2002
- “Global Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945-2002,” NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2002.
- “Israeli Nuclear Forces, 2002,” NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2002.
- “Preemptive Posturing,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2002.
- “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2002,” NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2002.
- “Nuclear arms agreement is step backward,” Oakland Tribune, May 26, 2002.
- “U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2002,” NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2002.
- “India’s Nuclear Forces, 2002,” NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2002.
- “Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2001,” NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2002.
2001
- “British Nuclear Forces, 2001,” NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2001.
- “The Unruly Hedge: Cold War Thinking at the Crawford Summit,” Arms Control Today, December 2001.
- “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2001,” NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2001.
- “French Nuclear Forces, 2001,” NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2001.
- “U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2001,” NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2001.
- The Matrix of Deterrence: U.S. Strategic Command Force Structure Studies, The Nautilus Institute, Berkeley, CA, May 2001.
2000 and Earlier
- U.S. Nuclear Strategy Reform in the 1990s, The Nautilus Institute, Berkeley, CA, March 2000. This report was also translated and published by the International Peace Research Institute at the Meiji Gakuin University in Tokyo.
- “Secrecy on a Sliding Scale,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 1999, p. 33.
- “NATO Nuclear Policy: Back To The Future,” The Monitor, Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia, September 1999.
- Japan Under the Nuclear Umbrella: U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War Planning in Japan During the Cold War, The Nautilus Institute, Berkeley, CA, July 1999.
- The Post Cold War SIOP and Nuclear Warfare Planning: A Glossary, Abbreviations, and Acronyms, Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington, DC, January 1999.
- “Dangerous Directions,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 1998.
- Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and U.S. Nuclear Strategy, British American Security Information Council (BASIC), Washington, DC, March 1998.
- “Targets of Opportunity,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1997.
- “The USA and Counter-Proliferation: A New and Dubious Role for U.S. Nuclear Weapons,” Security Dialogue, Oslo, Norway, December 1996.
- The 520 Forgotten Bombs: How U.S. and British Nuclear Weapons in Europe Undermine the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Greenpeace International, April 18, 1995.
- Changing Targets: Nuclear Doctrine from the Cold to the Third World, Greenpeace International, March 1, 1995.
- Aircraft Carriers: The Limits of Nuclear Power, Neptune Papers No. 7, Greenpeace, Washington, D.C., June 1994 (pdf 1.9 MB).
- U.S. Naval Nuclear Weapons in Sweden, Neptune Papers No. 6, Greenpeace, Washington, D.C., October 1990 (pdf 3.4 MB).
- William M. Arkin and Joshua Handler, Naval Accidents 1945-1988, Neptune Papers No. 3, Greenpeace/Institute for Policy Studies, June 1989 (0.6 MB).
Pentagon Report: China Deploys MIRV Missile
By Hans M. Kristensen
The biggest surprise in the Pentagon’s latest annual report on Chinese military power is the claim that China’s ICBM force now includes the “multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV)-equipped Mod 3 (DF-5).”
This is (to my knowledge) the first time the US Intelligence Community has made a public claim that China has fielded a MIRVed missile system.
If so, China joins the club of four other nuclear-armed states that have deployed MIRV for decades: Britain, France, Russia and the United States.
For China to join the MIRV club strains China’s claim of having a minimum nuclear deterrent. It is another worrisome sign that China – like the other nuclear-armed states – are trapped in a dynamic technological nuclear arms competition.
A Little Chinese MIRV History
There have been rumors for many years that China was working on MIRV technology. Some private analysts have even claimed – incorrectly – that China had developed MIRV for the DF-31 ICBM and JL-2 SLBM.
Fifteen years ago, CIA’s National Intelligence Estimate on foreign missile developments concluded that “China has had the technical capability to develop multiple RV payloads for 20 years. If China needed a multiple-RV (MRV) capability in the near term, Beijing could use a DF-31-type RV to develop and deploy a simple MRV or multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) for the CSS-4 in a few years.” (For a review of earlier information and assessments, see here.)
The Pentagon echoed this conclusion in July 2002, when it stated that any Chinese multiple warhead capability will “most likely [be] for the CSS-4.”
Chinese MIRVing of a mobile ICBM such as the DF-31 “would be many years off” the CIA told Congress. This was also the conclusion of the CIA’s National Intelligence Estimate in 2001, which concluded that “Chinese pursuit of a multiple RV capability for its mobile ICBMs and SLBMs would encounter significant technical hurdles and would be costly.”
A DF-5 ICBM is launched from a silo. The Pentagon says China has equipped some of its DF-5s with MIRV.
In an exchange with Senator Cochran in 2002, CIA’s Robert Walpole explained that MIRVing a mobile ICBM would require a much smaller warhead and possibly require nuclear testing:
Sen. Cochran. How many missiles will China be able to place multiple reentry vehicles on?
Mr. Walpole. In the near term, it would be about 20 CSS-4s that they have, the big, large ICBMs. The mobile ICBMs are smaller and it would require a very small warhead for them to put multiple RVs on them.
Sen. Cochran. … [D]o you think that China will attempt to develop a multiple warhead capability for its new missiles?
Mr. Walpole. Over time they may look at that. That would probably require nuclear testing to get something that small, but I do not think it is something that you would see them focused on for the near term.
What makes the Pentagon’s report on the MIRVed DF-5A payload noteworthy is that it was not included in several other intelligence assessments published in the past few months: the prepared threat assessment by the Director of National Intelligence; the prepared threat assessment by the Defense Intelligence Agency; and STRATCOM’s prepared testimony.
Nor were a MIRVed DF-5A mentioned in the Pentagon’s report from 2014 or the Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) report from July 2013.
The Pentagon report also repeats an earlier assertion that “China also is developing a new road-mobile ICBM, the CSS-X-20 (DF-41), possibly capable of carrying MIRVs.” STRATCOM commander Admiral Cecil Haney also mentioned this, saying China is “developing a follow-on mobile system capable of carrying multiple warheads.”
“Possibly capable of” and “capable of” are not equal assessments; the first includes uncertainty, the second does not. Assuming CIA’s prediction from 15 years ago is correct, the DF-5 MIRV payload might consist of three warheads developed for the DF-31/31A.
Whatever the certainty, the MIRVed version of the DF-5 – which I guess we could call DF-5B – is not thought to be loaded with warheads under normal circumstances. In a crisis, the warheads would first have to be brought out of storage and mated with the missile.
Moreover, The Pentagon lists two versions of the DF-5 deployed: the DF-5A (CSS-4 Mod 2) and the new DF-5 MIRV (CSS-4 Mod 3). So only a portion of the 20 missiles in as many silos apparently have been equipped for MIRV.
Why Chinese MIRV?
The big question is why the Chinese leadership has decided to deploy MIRV on the silo-based, liquid-fuel DF-5A.
Chinese officials have for many years warned, and US officials have predicted, that advanced US non-nuclear capabilities such as missile defense systems could cause China to deploy MIRV on some of its missiles. The Pentagon report repeats this analysis by stating that China’s “new generation of mobile missiles, with warheads consisting of MIRVs and penetration aids, are intended to ensure the viability of China’s strategic deterrent in the face of continued advances in U.S. and, to a lesser extent, Russian strategic ISR, precision strike, and missile defense capabilities.”
Conclusions
Chinese MIRV on the DF-5 ICBM is a bad day for nuclear constraint.
Seen in the context of China’s other ongoing nuclear modernization programs – deployment of several types of mobile ICBMs and a new class of sea-launched ballistic missile submarines – the deployment of a MIRVed version of the DF-5 ICBM reported by the Pentagon’s annual report strains the credibility of China’s official assurance that it only wants a minimum nuclear deterrent and is not part of a nuclear arms race.
MIRV on Chinese ICBMs changes the calculus that other nuclear-armed states will make about China’s nuclear intensions and capacity. Essentially, MIRV allows a much more rapid increase of a nuclear arsenal than single-warhead missile. If China also develops MIRV for a mobile ICBM, then it would further deepen that problem.
To its credit, the Chinese nuclear arsenal is still much smaller than that of Russia and the United States. So this is not about a massive Chinese nuclear buildup. Yet the development underscores that a technological nuclear competition among the nuclear-armed states is in full swing – one that China also contributes to.
Although it is still unclear what has officially motivated China to deploy a MIRVed version of the DF-5 ICBM now, previous Chinese statements and US intelligence assessments indicate that it may be a reaction to the US development and deployment of missile defense systems that can threaten China’s ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons.
If so, how ironic that the US missile defense system – intended to reduce the threat to the United States – instead would seem to have increased the threat by triggering development of MIRV on Chinese ballistic missiles that could destroy more US cities in a potential war.
The deployment of a MIRVed DF-5 also raises serious questions about China’s strategic relationship with India. The Pentagon report states that in addition to US missile defense capabilities, “India’s nuclear force is an additional driver behind China’s nuclear force modernization.” There is little doubt that Chinese MIRV has the potential to nudge India into the MIRV club as well.
Indian weapons designers have already hinted that India may be working on its own MIRV system and the US Defense Intelligence Agency recently stated that “India will continue developing an ICBM, the Agni-VI, which will reportedly carry multiple warheads.”
If Chinese MIRV triggers Indian MIRV it would deepen nuclear competition between the two Asian nuclear powers and reduce security for both. This calls for both countries to show constraint but it also requires the other MIRVed nuclear-armed states (Britain, France, Russia and the United States) to limit their MIRV and offensive nuclear warfighting strategies.
This publication was made possible by a grant from the New Land Foundation and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.
Obama Administration Releases New Nuclear Warhead Numbers
By Hans M. Kristensen
In a speech to the Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in New York earlier today, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry disclosed new information about the size of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.
Updated Stockpile Numbers
First, Kerry updated the DOD nuclear stockpile history by declaring that the stockpile as of September 2014 included 4,717 nuclear warheads. That is a reduction of 87 warheads since September 2013, when the DOD stockpile included 4,804 warheads, or a reduction of about 500 warheads retired since President Obama took office in January 2009.
The September 2014 number of 4,717 warheads is 43 warheads off the estimate we made in our latest FAS Nuclear Notebook in March this year.
Disclosure of Dismantlement Queue
Second, Kerry also announced a new number we have never seen in public before: the official number of retired nuclear warheads in line for dismantlement. As of September 2014, the United States had approximately 2,500 additional warheads that have been retired (but are still relatively intact) and awaiting dismantlement.
The number of “approximately 2,500” retired warheads awaiting dismantlement is close to the 2,340 warheads we estimated in the FAS Nuclear Notebook in March 2015.
Increasing Warhead Dismantlements
Kerry also announced that the administration “will seek to accelerate the dismantlement of retired nuclear warheads by 20 percent.”
“Over the last 20 years alone, we have dismantled 10,251 warheads,” Kerry announced.
This updates the count of 9,952 dismantled warheads from the 2014 disclosure, which means that the administration between September 2013 and September 2014 dismantled 299 retired warheads.
Under current plans, of the “approximately 2,500” warheads in the dismantlement queue, the ones that were retired through (September) 2009 will be dismantled by 2022. Additional warheads retired during the past five years will take longer.
How the administration will accelerate dismantlement remains to be seen. The FY2016 budget request for NNSA pretty much flatlines funding for weapons dismantlement and disposition through 2020. In the same period, the administration plans to complete production of the W76-1 warhead, begin production of the B61-12, and carry out refurbishments of four other warheads. If the administration wanted to dismantle all “approximately 2,500” retired warheads by 2022 (including those warheads retired after 2009), it would have to dismantle about 312 warheads per year – a rate of only 13 more than it dismantled in 2014. So this can probably be done with existing capacity.
Implications
Secretary Kerry’s speech is an important diplomatic gesture that will help the United States make its case at the NPT review conference that it is living up to its obligations under the treaty. Some will agree, others will not. The nuclear-weapon states are in a tough spot at the NPT because there are currently no negotiations underway for additional reductions; because the New START Treaty, although beneficial, is modest; and because the nuclear-weapon states are reaffirming the importance of nuclear weapons and modernizing their nuclear arsenals as if they plan to keep nuclear weapons indefinitely (see here for worldwide status of nuclear arsenals).
And the disclosure is a surprise. As recently as a few weeks ago, White House officials said privately that the United States would not be releasing updated nuclear warhead numbers at the NPT conference. Apparently, the leadership decided last minute to do so anyway. [Update: another White House official says the release was cleared late but that it had been the plan to release some numbers all along.]
The roughly 500 warheads cut from the stockpile by the Obama administration is modest and a disappointing performance by a president that has spoken so much about reducing the numbers and role of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the political reality has been an arms control policy squeezed between a dismissive Russian president and an arms control-hostile U.S. Congress.
In addition to updating the stockpile history, the most important part of the initiative is the disclosure of the number of weapons awaiting dismantlement. This is an important new transparency initiative by the administration that was not included in the 2010 or 2014 stockpile transparency initiatives. Disclosing dismantlement numbers helps dispel rumors that the United States is hiding a secret stash of nuclear warheads and enables the United States to demonstrate actual dismantlement progress.
And, besides, why would the administration not want to disclose to the NPT conference how many warheads it is actually working on dismantling? This can only help the United States at the NPT review conference.
There will be a few opponents of the transparency initiative. Since they can’t really say this harms U.S. national security, their primary argument will be that other nuclear-armed states have so far not response in kind.
Russia and China have not made public disclosures of their nuclear warhead inventories. Britain and France has said a little on a few occasions about their total inventories and (in the case of Britain) how many warheads are operationally available or deployed, but not disclosed the histories of stockpiles or dismantlement. And the other nuclear-armed states that are outside the NPT (India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan) have not said anything at all.
But this is a work in progress. It will take a long time to persuade other nuclear-armed states to become more transparent with basic information about nuclear arsenals. But seeing that it can be done without damaging national security and at the same time helping the NPT process is important to cut through old-fashioned excessive nuclear secrecy and increase nuclear transparency. Hat tip to the Obama administration.
This publication was made possible by a grant from the New Land Foundation and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.
Is China Planning To Build More Missile Submarines?
By Hans M. Kristensen
Is China increasing production of nuclear ballistic missile submarines?
Over the past few months, several US defense and intelligence officials have stated for the record that China is planning to build significantly more nuclear-powered missile submarines than previously assumed.
This would potentially put a bigger portion of China’s nuclear arsenal out to sea, a risky proposition, and further deepen China’s unfortunate status as the only nuclear-armed state party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation that is increasing it nuclear arsenal.
US Projections For Chinese SSBNs
China does not provide information about how many nuclear submarines it plans to build, but US government officials and agencies occasionally give projections.
The most recent comes from the commander of US Pacific Command (PACOM), Admiral Samuel Locklear, who in his prepared testimony to the US Congress earlier this month stated that in addition to the three Jin-class SSBNs currently in operation, “up to five more may enter service by the end of the decade.”
PACOM Commander Admiral Samuel Lochlear, seen here shaking hands with Chinese defense minister Liang Guanglie in Beijing in 2012, says that China may be building up to eight ballistic missile submarines.
National Intelligence Director James Clapper was a little less specific in his testimony to the Senate in February when he predicted that China “might produce additional Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.”
The Pentagon’s annual report on Chinese military issues from June 2014 stated that three Jin-class SSBNs (Type-094) were operational and that “up to five may enter service before China proceeds to its next generation SSBN (Type-096) over the next decade.” That projection was not seen as implying that five additional SSBNs would be produced but that a total of five might be built. But in hindsight it could of course be seen as similar projection as the latest PACOM statement.
PACOM’s projection of “up to five” additional Jin-class SSBNs is a doubling of the projection of “4-5” SSBNs that the Office of Naval Intelligence made in 2013. That projection followed the first estimate from late-2006 of “a fleet of probably five” submarines.
Production of five additional SSBNs by the end of the decade would require fielding one SSBN per year for the next five years, a production pace that China has yet to demonstrate. The first three Jin SSBNs took more than a decade to complete and a fourth boat is rumored to have started sea trials in 2014. The fourth SSBN might be the one seen on commercial satellite images in the dry dock at Huludao in October 2013.
Google Earth images from 2014 and 2015 do not show SSBNs at Huludao, only attack submarines. However, unassembled 10-meter diameter hull sections seen at the shipyard in December 2014 indicate that construction of additional Jin SSBN hulls may be underway (see image below).
Although no Jin-class SSBN has been visible at Huludao shipyard on Google Earth since October 2013, possible Jin-class hull sections seen later indicate additional construction. Click on image to see full size.
Although no Jin-class SSBN has been visible at Huludao shipyard on Google Earth since October 2013, possible Jin-class hull sections seen later indicate additional construction. Click on image to see full size.
Potential Effect on Nuclear Arsenal
Construction of additional Jin SSBNs obviously would have implications for the size of China’s nuclear arsenal. With each submarine capable of carrying 12 Julang-2 (JL-2) long-rang ballistic missiles, the low- and high-end projection of a fleet of 4-8 submarines would be able to carry 48-96 missiles with as many warheads. (Despite occasional claims on the Internet that the JL-2 carries MIRV, the US Intelligence Community assigns only one warhead to each missile.)
We estimate that China has a stockpile of approximately 250 nuclear warheads of which nearly 150 are for land-based missiles, 48 for submarines, and perhaps 20 for bombers. Some have speculated that China might have several thousand nuclear weapons, but former USSTRATCOM Commander General Kehler in 2012 rejected this saying that “the Chinese arsenal is in the range of several hundred” nuclear weapons. If China builds eight Jin SSBNs, it would presumably have to produce more warheads for their additional missiles. This could increase the stockpile to around 300 warheads (see table below).
Other weapon systems have also been rumored to have nuclear capability, although status is uncertain: The DH-10 ground-launched land-attack cruise missile is listed by Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) as “conventional or nuclear”; the DH-20 (CJ-20) air-launched cruise missiles was listed in 2013 by US Air Force Global Strike Command the DH-20 (CJ-20) as nuclear-capable; and a CIA intelligence memorandum in 1993 concluded that China “almost certainly has developed a warhead” for the DF-15 short-range ballistic missile and predicted that deployment of a nuclear-armed DF-15 would start in 1994. A nuclear test in January 1972 was with a small bomb delivered by a fighter-bomber (Q-5), although it is uncertain if the capability was ever operationalized and fielded.
SSBN Operational Questions
If China is indeed building significantly more Jin SSBNs, as the statement by PACOM implies, then it is a surprise that raises a number of questions.
The first question is whether it is accurate. The PACOM projection is above and beyond the estimate of 4-6 SSBNs projected by the Office of Naval Intelligence in 2013. The Jin-class is a work in progress and the submarines are noisier than Soviet Delta III SSBNs developed in the 1970s. Presumably the Chinese navy is working hard to make the Jin SSBNs survivable, but up to eight would be an expensive experiment. And China appears to be designing a newer SSBN type anyway, the Type-096. Projections such as these often prove too much too soon, so only time will tell.
But if China were to deploy up to eight Jin SSBNs with up to 96 missiles, it would be a significant shift in China’s nuclear posture, which up till recently was almost entirely focused on land-based nuclear weapons. And this is odd. Why, after having spent significant sources on building mobile ICBMs to hide in forests and caves across China’s vast territory to protect its nuclear deterrent from a first strike, would the Chinese government chose to deploy a significant portion of its nuclear warheads on noisy submarines and send them out to sea where US Navy attack submarines can sink them?
A more important question is how China would actually operate the SSBNs. The Central Military Commission (CMC) does not normally hand out nuclear weapons to the military services but the whole point of having SSBNs is to hide nuclear weapons in the oceans as a secure retaliatory capability. It would be a significant change for Chinese nuclear policy if the CMC loaded warheads on the submarines and deployed them outside Chinese territory. Perhaps they will not be continuously deployed in peacetime but serve as a surge capability in a crisis.
And China does not have much (if any) experience in operating SSBNs on lengthy deterrent patrols. It has only recently started operating nuclear-powered attack submarines on lengthy patrols, including into the Indian Ocean, but the SSBNs have yet to conduct one. PACOM predicted the first would happen last year, but that didn’t happen. Now they predict it will happen this year. We’ll see.
As a party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a significant increase of the SSBN fleet would further deepen China’s unfortunate status as the only nuclear-armed state part to the treaty that is increasing the size of its nuclear arsenal.
This publication was made possible by a grant from the New Land Foundation and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.
New Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces 2015
By Hans M. Kristensen
Russian nuclear weapons have received a lot of attention lately. Russian officials casually throw around direct or thinly veiled nuclear threats (here, here and here). And U.S. defense hawks rail (here and here) about a Russian nuclear buildup.
In reality, rather than building up, Russia is building down but appears to be working to level off the force within the next decade to prevent further unilateral reduction of its strategic nuclear force in the future. For details, see the latest FAS Nuclear Notebook on the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists web site.
This trend makes it more important for the United States and Russia to reach additional nuclear arms control agreements to reduce strategic nuclear forces. Hard to imagine in the current climate, but remember: even at the height of the Cold War the two sides reached important arms limitation agreements because it was seen then (as it is now) to be in their national security interest.
Trends: Launchers and Warheads
There are many uncertainties about the future development of Russian nuclear forces. Other than three aggregate numbers released under the New START Treaty, neither Russia nor the United States publish data on the numbers of Russian nuclear forces.
Russian officials occasionally make statements about the status of individual nuclear launchers and modernization programs, and Russian news articles provide additional background. Moreover, commercial satellite photos make it possible to monitor (to some extent) the status of strategic nuclear forces.
As a result, there is considerable – and growing – uncertainty about the status and trend of Russian nuclear forces. The available information indicates that Russia is continuing to reduce its strategic nuclear launchers well below the limit set by the New START Treaty. Over the next decade, all Soviet-era ICBMs (SS-18, SS-19, and SS-25) will be retired, the navy’s Delta III SSBN and its SS-N-18 missiles will be retired, and some of the Delta IV SSBNs will probably be retired as well.
To replace the Soviet-era launchers, Russia is deploying and developing several versions of the SS-27 ICBM and developing a new “heavy” ICBM. The navy is deploying the Borey-class SSBN with a new missile, the SS-N-32 (Bulava). This transition has been underway since 1997.
Depending on the extent of modernization plans over the next decade and how many missiles Russia can actually produce and deploy, the overall strategic force appears to be leveling off just below 500 launchers (see below), well below the New START Treaty limits of 700 deployed strategic launchers and 800 deployed and non-deployed strategic launchers.
The warhead loading on the strategic launchers is also decreasing mainly because of the retirement of warhead-heavy SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs. But because single-warhead SS-25s are being replaced with MIRVed SS-27s, and because the navy’s new SS-N-32 (Bulava) missile carries more warheads than the SS-N-18 and SS-N-23 missiles it is replacing, the overall warhead loading appears to be leveling off as well (see below).
Not all of these warheads are deployed on launchers at any given time. Weapons are not loaded on bombers under normal circumstances and some SSBNs and ICBMs are down for maintenance or repair. The latest New START Treaty warhead count was 1,582 warheads, which means approximately 1,525 warheads were on SSBNs and ICBMs (excluding the roughly 55 counted bombers that are artificially attributed one weapon each).
Non-strategic nuclear weapons are also described in the Notebook. Their status is even more uncertain than the strategic forces. We estimate there are roughly 2,000 warheads assigned to fighter-bombers, short-range ballistic missiles, naval cruise missiles and anti-submarine weapons, and land-based defense and missile-defense forces. Some of the non-strategic nuclear forces are also being modernized and the United States has accused Russia of developing a new ground-launched cruise missile in violation of the INF Treaty, but overall the size of the non-strategic nuclear forces will likely decreased over the next decade.
Russian Nuclear Strategy: What’s Real?
Underpinning these nuclear forces is Russia’s nuclear strategy, which reportedly is causing concern in NATO. A new study was discussed at the NATO ministerial meeting in February. “What worries us most in this strategy is the modernization of the Russian nuclear forces, the increase in the level of training of those forces and the possible combination between conventional actions and the use of nuclear forces, including possibly in the framework of a hybrid war,” one unnamed NATO official told Reuters.
That sounds like a summary of events over the past decade merged with fear that Putin’s currently military escapades could escalate into something more. The nuclear modernizations have been underway for a long time and the increased training is widely reported but its implications less clear. For all its concern about Russian nuclear strategy, NATO hasn’t said much in public about specific new developments.
A senior NATO official recently said Russia’s Zapad exercise in 2013 was “supposed to be a counter-terrorism exercise but it involved the (simulated) use of nuclear weapons.” In contrast, an earlier private analysis of Zapad-13 said the exercise included “virtually the entire range of conceivable military operations except for nuclear strikes…”
Russian nuclear strategy has been relatively consistent over the past decade. The most recent version, approved by Putin in December 2014, states that Russia “shall reserve for itself the right to employ nuclear weapons in response to the use against it and/or its allies of nuclear and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, as well as in the case of aggression against the Russian Federation with use of conventional weapons when the state’s very existence has been threatened.”
This formulation is almost identical to the mission described in the 2010 version of the doctrine, which stated that Russia “reserves the right to utilize nuclear weapons in response to the utilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, and also in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is under threat.”
Despite many rumors in both 2010 and 2014 that the strategy would incorporate preemptive nuclear strikes, neither document discusses such options (it is unknown what is in the secret versions). On the contrary, the nuclear portion of the strategy doesn’t seem that different from what NATO and the United States say about the role of their nuclear weapons: responding to use of weapons of mass destruction and even significant conventional attacks. The Russian strategy appears to limit the nuclear use in response to conventional attacks to when the “very existence” of Russia is threatened.
Given this defensive and somewhat restrictive nuclear strategy, why do we hear Russian officials throwing around nuclear threats against all sorts of scenarios that do not involve WMD attacks against Russia or threaten the very existence of the country?
For example, why does the Russian Ambassador to Denmark threaten nuclear strikes against Danish warships if they were equipped with radars that form part of the U.S. missile defense system when they would not constitute a WMD attack or threaten the existence of Russia?
Or why does President Putin say he would have considered placing nuclear weapons on alert if NATO had intervened to prevent annexation of the Crimean Peninsula if it were not an WMD attack or threaten the existence of Russia? (Note: Russia already has nuclear weapons on alert, although not in Crimea).
Or why did Russian officials tell U.S. officials that Russia would consider using nuclear weapons if NATO tries to force return of Crimea to Ukrainian control or deploys sizable forces to the Baltic States, if these acts do not involve WMD attacks or threaten the existence of Russia? (Kremlin denied its officials said that).
When officials from a nuclear-armed country make nuclear threats one obviously has to pay attention – especially if made by the president. But these nuclear threats so deviate from Russia’s public nuclear strategy that they are either blustering, or Russia has a very different nuclear strategy than its official documents portray.
Ironically, the more Russian officials throw around nuclear threats, the weaker Russia appears. Whereas NATO and the United States have been reluctant to refer to the role of nuclear weapons in the current crisis (despite what you might hear, the justification for U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe is weaker today than it was before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine) and instead emphasized conventional forces and operations, Russia’s nuclear threats reveal that Russian officials do not believe their conventional forces are capable of defending Russia – even against conventional attack.
That makes it even stranger that Putin is wasting enormous sums of money on maintaining a large nuclear arsenal instead of focusing on modernizing Russia’s conventional forces, as well as using arms control to try to reduce NATO’s nuclear and conventional forces. That would actually improved Russia’s security.