S. 1605 — National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022

​SEC. 1004. Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform.

            (a) Establishment.–

                         (1) In general.–There is hereby established an independent commission in the legislative branch to be known as the “Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform” (in this section referred to as the “Commission”).

                        (2) Date of establishment.–The Commission shall be established not later 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

            (b) Membership.–

                        (1) Number and appointment.–The Commission shall be composed of 14 civilian individuals not employed by the Federal Government who are recognized experts and have relevant professional experience one or more of the following:

                                    (A) Matters relating to the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process of the Department of Defense.

                                    (B) Innovative budgeting and resource allocation methods of the private sector.

                                    (C) Iterative design and acquisition process.

                                    (D) Budget or program execution data analysis.

                        (2) Members.–The members shall be appointed as follows:

                                    (A) The Secretary of Defense shall appoint two members.

                                    (B) The Majority Leader and the Minority Leader of the Senate shall each appoint one member.

                                    (C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Minority Leader shall each appoint one member.

                                    (D) The Chair and the Ranking Member of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate shall each appoint one member.

                                    (E) The Chair and the Ranking Member of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives shall each appoint one member.

                                    (F) The Chair and the Ranking Member of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate shall each appoint one member.

                                    (G) The Chair and the Ranking Member of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives shall each appoint one member.

                        (3) Deadline for appointment.–Not later than 30 days after the date described in subsection (a)(2), members shall be appointed to the Commission.

                        (4) Expiration of appointment authority.–The authority to make appointments under this subsection shall expire on the date described in subsection (a)(2), and the number of members of the Commission shall be reduced by the number equal to the number of appointments so not made.

            (c) Chair and Vice Chair.–The Commission shall elect a Chair and Vice Chair from among its members.

            (d) Period of Appointment and Vacancies.–Members shall be appointed for the term of the Commission. A vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers and shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment was made.

            (e) Purpose.–The purpose of the Commission is to–

                        (1) examine the effectiveness of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process and adjacent practices of the Department of Defense, particularly with respect to facilitating defense modernization;

                        (2) consider potential alternatives to such process and practices to maximize the ability of the Department of Defense to respond in a timely manner to current and future threats; and

                        (3) make legislative and policy recommendations to improve such process and practices in order to field the operational capabilities necessary to outpace near-peer competitors, provide data and analytical insight, and support an integrated budget that is aligned with strategic defense objectives.

            (f) Scope and Duties.–The Commission shall perform the following duties:

                        (1) Compare the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process of the Department of Defense, including the development and production of documents including the Defense Planning Guidance (described in section 113(g) of title 10, United States Code), the Program Objective Memorandum, and the Budget Estimate Submission, with similar processes of private industry, other Federal agencies, and other countries.

                        (2) Conduct a comprehensive assessment of the efficacy and efficiency of all phases and aspects of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process, which shall include an assessment of–

                                    (A) the roles of Department officials and the timelines to complete each such phase or aspect;

                                    (B) the structure of the budget of Department of Defense, including the effectiveness of categorizing the budget by program, appropriations account, major force program, budget activity, and line item, and whether this structure supports modern warfighting requirements for speed, agility, iterative development, testing, and fielding;

                                    (C) a review of how the process supports joint efforts, capability and platform lifecycles, and transitioning technologies to production;

                                    (D) the timelines, mechanisms, and systems for presenting and justifying the budget of Department of Defense, monitoring program execution and Department of Defense budget execution, and developing requirements and performance metrics;

                                    (E) a review of the financial management systems of the Department of Defense, including policies, procedures, past and planned investments, and recommendations related to replacing, modifying, and improving such systems to ensure that such systems and related processes of the Department result in–

                                                (i) effective internal controls;

                                                (ii) the ability to achieve auditable financial statements; and

                                                (iii) the ability to meet other financial management and operational needs; and

                                    (F) a review of budgeting methodologies and strategies of near-peer competitors to understand if and how such competitors can address current and future threats more or less successfully than the United States.

                        (3) Develop and propose recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process.

            (g) Commission Report and Recommendations.–

                        (1) Interim report.–Not later than February 6, 2023, the Commission shall submit to the Secretary of Defense and the congressional defense committees an interim report including the following:

                                    (A) An examination of the development of the documents described in subsection (f)(1).

                                    (B) An analysis of the timelines involved in developing an annual budget request and the future-years defense program (as described in section 221 of title 10, United States Code), including the ability to make changes to such request or such program within those timelines.

                                    (C) A review of the sufficiency of the civilian personnel workforce in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to conduct budgetary and program evaluation analysis.

                                    (D) An examination of efforts by the Department of Defense to develop new and agile programming and budgeting to enable the United States to more effectively counter near-peer competitors.

                                    (E) A review of the frequency and sufficiency of budget and program execution analysis, to include any existing data analytics tools and any suggested improvements.

                                    (F) Recommendations for internal reform to the Department relating to the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process for the Department of Defense to make internally.

                                    (G) Recommendations for reform to the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process that require statutory changes.

                                    (H) Any other matters the Commission considers appropriate.

                        (2) Final report.–Not later than September 1, 2023, the Commission shall submit to the Secretary of Defense and the congressional defense committees a final report that includes the elements required under paragraph (1).

                        (3) Briefings.–Not later than 180 days after the date specified in subsection (a)(2), and not later than 30 days after each of the interim and final reports are submitted, the Commission shall provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing on the status of the review and assessment conducted under subsection (f) and include a discussion of any interim or final recommendations.

                        (4) Form.–The reports submitted to Congress under paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

            (h) Government Cooperation.–

                        (1) Cooperation.–In carrying out its duties, the Commission shall receive the full and timely cooperation of the Secretary of Defense in providing the Commission with analysis, briefings, and other information necessary for the fulfillment of its responsibilities.

                        (2) Liaison.–The Secretary shall designate at least one officer or employee of the Department of Defense to serve as a liaison between the Department and the Commission.

                        (3) Detailees authorized.–The Secretary may provide, and the Commission may accept and employ, personnel detailed from the Department of Defense, without reimbursement.

                        (4) Facilitation.–

                                    (A) Independent, non-government institute.–Not later than 45 days after the date specified in subsection (a)(2), the Secretary of Defense shall make available to the Commission the services of an independent, nongovernmental organization, described under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and which is exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of such Code, which has recognized credentials and expertise in national security and military affairs, in order to facilitate the discharge of the duties of the Commission under this section.

                                    (B) Federally funded research and development center.–On request of the Commission, the Secretary of Defense shall make available the services of a federally funded research and development center in order to enhance the discharge of the duties of the Commission under this section.

            (i) Staff.–

                        (1) Status as federal employees.–Notwithstanding the requirements of section 2105 of title 5, United States Code, including the required supervision under subsection (a)(3) of such section, the members of the commission shall be deemed to be Federal employees.

                        (2) Executive director.–The Commission shall appoint and fix the rate of basic pay for an Executive Director in accordance with section 3161(d) of title 5, United States Code.

                        (3) Pay.–The Executive Director, with the approval of the Commission, may appoint and fix the rate of basic pay for additional personnel as staff of the Commission in accordance with section 3161(d) of title 5, United States Code.

            (j) Personal Services.–

                        (1) Authority to procure.–The Commission may–

                                    (A) procure the services of experts or consultants (or of organizations of experts or consultants) in accordance with the provisions of section 3109 of title 5, United States Code; and

                                    (B) pay in connection with such services the travel expenses of experts or consultants, including transportation and per diem in lieu of subsistence, while such experts or consultants are traveling from their homes or places of business to duty stations.

                        (2) Maximum daily pay rates.–The daily rate paid an expert or consultant procured pursuant to paragraph (1) may not exceed the daily rate paid a person occupying a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code.

            (k) Authority to Accept Gifts.–The Commission may accept, use, and dispose of gifts or donations of services, goods, and property from non-Federal entities for the purposes of aiding and facilitating the work of the Commission. The authority in this subsection does not extend to gifts of money. Gifts accepted under this authority shall be documented, and conflicts of interest or the appearance of conflicts of interest shall be avoided. Subject to the authority in this section, commissioners shall otherwise comply with rules set forth by the Select Committee on Ethics of the Senate and the Committee on Ethics of the House of Representatives governing Senate and House employees.

            (l) Legislative Advisory Committee.–The Commission shall operate as a legislative advisory committee and shall not be subject to the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Public Law 92-463; 5 U.S.C. App) or section 552b, United States Code (commonly known as the Government in the Sunshine Act).

            (m) Contracting Authority.–The Commission may acquire administrative supplies and equipment for Commission use to the extent funds are available.

            (n) Use of Government Information.–The Commission may secure directly from any department or agency of the Federal Government such information as the Commission considers necessary to carry out its duties. Upon such request of the chair of the Commission, the head of such department or agency shall furnish such information to the Commission.

            (o) Postal Services.–The Commission may use the United States mail in the same manner and under the same conditions as departments and agencies of the United States.

            (p) Space for Use of Commission.–Not later than 30 days after the establishment date of the Commission, the Administrator of General Services, in consultation with the Commission, shall identify and make available suitable excess space within the Federal space inventory to house the operations of the Commission. If the Administrator is not able to make such suitable excess space available within such 30-day period, the Commission may lease space to the extent the funds are available.

            (q) Removal of Members.–A member may be removed from the Commission for cause by the individual serving in the position responsible for the original appointment of such member under subsection (b)(1), provided that notice has first been provided to such member of the cause for removal and voted and agreed upon by three quarters of the members serving. A vacancy created by the removal of a member under this subsection shall not affect the powers of the Commission, and shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment was made.

            (r) Termination.–The Commission shall terminate 180 days after the date on which it submits the final report required by subsection (g)(2).

Summary

The Biden Administration should enhance the efforts of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to defend against fraudulent trademark registrations. Since 2015, the PTO has struggled to cope with a rising flood of fraudulent trademark applications originating mainly from China. One study indicates that as many as two-thirds of Chinese trademark applications for certain classes of goods include falsified evidence that the applicant is using the mark in commerce in the United States — a requirement for trademark registration under U.S. law. High proportions (up to 40%) of these fraudulent applications survive the PTO’s application-review process and result in fraudulent trademark registrations.

Urgent action is necessary. The PTO reports that the trademark application rate has recently surged to extreme levels, which has doubled the number of applications awaiting examination. Many of these applications likely contain fraudulent claims of use. Identifying and denying fraudulent claims will help ensure that only those businesses that are actually using their trademarks in U.S. commerce benefit from the U.S. trademark system. In addition to creating a fair playing field for companies (both American and foreign) that abide by the rules, countering fraudulent trademark registrations will support American economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic by providing small businesses with robust protection for brand names of new products.

Summary

President Biden made advanced manufacturing a major policy priority during his campaign, including calling for a significant expansion of manufacturing programs to reach 50 communities through new manufacturing-technology hubs. Expanded manufacturing programs will invest in our nation’s long-term competitive innovation capacity. However, building these programs successfully requires a thoughtful and practical implementation plan. This memo presents two categories of recommendations to improve the U.S. advanced-manufacturing ecosystem:

1. Improve the existing Manufacturing USA institutes. Some new institutes are needed, but the Administration should concentrate first on strengthening support for the 16 existing Manufacturing USA Institutes, renewing the terms of institutes that are performing well, and expanding the reach of those institutes by launching more workforce-development programs, regional technology demonstration centers, initiatives to engage small- and mid-sized manufacturers and build regional manufacturing ecosystems.

2. Implement a multi-part strategy for collaboration among the Institutes: First, the Administration should create a “network function” across the Manufacturing USA Institutes because firms will need to adopt packages of manufacturing technologies not just one at a time. This could be supported by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and would combine the advances of different Institutes and package them to be integrated and interoperable for easy adoption by firms. Second, a NIST-led traded-sector-analysis unit should be created to evaluate the manufacturing progress of other nations and inform Institute priorities. Third, the Administration should provide research and development (R&D) agencies with resources to build manufacturing-related R&D feeder systems (e.g., an expanded pipeline of manufacturing technologies) that aligns with Institute needs. Fourth, the administration should establish an Advanced Manufacturing Office within the White House National Economic Council to coordinate and champion all of the above, as well as numerous other manufacturing programs.

Improving university/corporate research partnerships is key to advancing U.S. competitiveness. Reform of the IRS rules surrounding corporate sponsored research taking place in university facilities funded by tax-exempt bonds has long been sought by the higher education community and will stimulate more public-private partnerships. With Congress considering new ways to fund research through a new NSF Technology Directorate and the possibility of a large infrastructure package, an opportunity is now open for Congress to address these long-standing reforms in IRS rules.

Challenge and Opportunity

Research partnerships between private companies and universities are critical to U.S. technology competitiveness. China and other countries are creating massive, government-funded research centers in artificial intelligence, robotics, quantum computing, biotechnology, and other critical sectors, threatening our nation’s international technology advantage. The United States has responded with initiatives such as the corporate research and development (R&D) tax credit, the SBIR and STTR programs, Manufacturing USA institutes, and numerous other programs and policies to assist tech development and encourage public-private collaborations. States and cities have mirrored these efforts, helping to build a network of innovation hubs in communities across the nation

The U.S. Innovation and Competition Act recently passed by the Senate is designed to build on this progress. A key provision of the Act is the establishment of a National Science Foundation (NSF) Directorate for Science and Technology that would “identify and develop opportunities to reduce barriers for technology transfer, including intellectual property frameworks between academia and industry, nonprofit entities, and the venture capital communities.”

One such barrier is the suite of “private use” rules surrounding corporate research taking place in university facilities financed with tax-exempt bonds. Tax-exempt bonds are a preferred financing option for university research facilities as they carry lower interest rates and more favorable terms. But the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) prohibition on “private business use“ of facilities financed using tax-exempt bonds have the unfortunate consequence of hamstringing the U.S. research enterprise. Current IRS rules place universities wishing to avoid concerns about sponsoring research from outside organizations to hold the rights to almost all intellectual property (IP) generated within their research facilities, even when the research is sponsored by private corporations. This can lead U.S. corporations wishing to retain IP rights to partner with universities overseas instead of U.S. universities institutions. Small technology companies whose business plans depend on their claim to IP rights may similarly avoid partnerships with universities.

Though the IRS has issued policies that aim to address these problems (e.g., Revenue Procedure 2007-47), such policies are so narrow in scope that most research partnerships between companies and universities are still considered private uses. As a result, universities engaged in cutting-edge, industry-relevant research face an unenviable choice: they must either (i) forego promising partnerships with the many companies unwilling to completely cede claims to IP rights, (ii) dedicate substantial time and administrative resources to track and report all specific instances of corporate-sponsored research occurring in facilities financed by tax-exempt bonds, or (iii) use funding that would otherwise be available for research to finance facilities through taxable bonds.

Forcing this choice upon universities further exacerbates a system of “haves” and “have-nots”. Large and/or well-endowed universities may have the financial resources to avoid relying on tax-exempt financing for research facilities, or to hire sophisticated and expensive legal expertise for help structuring financing in a way that complies with IRS rules. But for many — perhaps most — universities, the more viable solution is to avoid corporate-sponsored research altogether.

Complex federal rules governing intellectual property and private business use are widely acknowledged as an issue. A memo from the Association of American Universities (AAU), which represents the leading research universities in North America, notes that “[m]any universities believe that the remaining [IRS] private use regulations are overly restrictive” and “[limit] their ability to conduct certain cooperative research.” Similarly, the website of the Carnegie Mellon University Office of Sponsored Programs warns:

“While colleges and universities have lobbied the Internal Revenue Service to reconsider its position with respect to sponsored research in bond financed facilities, they have not, as yet, been successful. Consequently, if the University does not receive fair market royalties from the sponsors of sponsored research, it risks having its tax-exempt bonds become taxable, with all of the concomitant consequences.”

At a 2013 hearing on “Improving Technology Transfer at Universities, Research Institute and National Laboratories” before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science, Space and Technology, several university witnesses and members of Congress commented on the complications that federal rules present for cooperative research conducted by universities working in partnership with corporations.

In 2014, Congress introduced H.R. 5829 to amend the Internal Revenue Code to provide an exception from the “business use” test for certain public-private research arrangements, but it did not pass as a stand-alone bill.

In June 2021, the American Council of Education and Association of American Universities released a letter to Congress on behalf of over 20 higher education organizations asking Congress to modernize rules on tax exempt bond financing.

Overly restrictive federal rules may hamstring bipartisan efforts by the new administration and Congress to accelerate tech commercialization and enhance U.S. competitiveness in science and technology (S&T). The recent U.S. Innovation and Competition Act, passed by the Senate, for instance, aims to support public-private partnerships, cross-sectoral innovation hubs, and other multistakeholder initiatives in priority S&T areas. But such initiatives may run afoul of rules on facilities financed by tax-exempt bonds…unless reforms are adopted.

Plan of Action

The administration should implement the following two reforms to clarify and update rules governing use of facilities financed by tax-exempt bonds:

1. Eliminate the requirement that universities must retain ownership to all IP generated in university-owned facilities financed by tax-exempt bonds. Instead, universities and corporations should be allowed to negotiate their own terms of IP ownership before entering a research partnership.
2. Broaden applicability of IRS safe-harbor provisions. IRS revenue procedures include safe-harbor provisions that exempt “basic research agreements” from restrictions on private business use. The IRS defines basic research as “any original investigation for the advancement of scientific knowledge not having a specific commercial objective.” This definition is too narrow. But especially today, the lines between “basic” and applied research are blurry — and virtually nonexistent when it comes to cutting-edge fields such as digitalization, biosciences, and quantum computing. The IRS should broaden the applicability of its safe-harbor provisions to include all research activities, not just ‘basic research’.

Together, these reforms would support new public-private initiatives by the federal government (such the research hubs funded under the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act); help emerging research universities (including minority-serving institutions such as historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) and Hispanic-serving institutions (HSIs)) grow their profiles and better compete for talent and resources; and repatriate corporate research to the United States. Moreover — since other countries do not have similarly onerous restrictions on research activities conducted in facilities financed with tax-exempt bonds — these reforms are needed for the U.S. tech economy to remain competitive on an international scale.

These reforms require changes to tax laws, but do not require a direct outlay of federal appropriations. Reforms could be implemented as part of several tech-commercialization legislative packages expected to be considered by this Congress, including the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act or the proposed US Infrastructure bill.

Conclusion

As the Congress and the Administration explore ways to make the U.S. more technologically competitive, ensuring robust university-industry partnerships should be a key factor in any strategy. Reforming the current rules concerning corporate research performed in university facilities needs to be considered, given that the IRS rules have not been updated in over 30 years. The debate over the infrastructure bill or other competitiveness initiatives provides such an opportunity to make these reforms. Now is the time.

The federal lab system is an enormous, $50 billion-plus enterprise of internal research and development (R&D) across the United States. As governments around the world, including China, pour billions of dollars into advanced technologies, it is imperative that we use our nation’s federal lab ecosystem as effectively as possible.

However, because federal labs have varying legal authorities, missions, and cultures, their records of local economic engagement and technology commercialization vary considerably. Universities, by contrast, have demonstrated a strong record of supporting regional innovation ecosystems through use of place (creating incubators, research parks, and adjacent innovation districts), talent (allowing university researchers to be involved with private-sector technology under approved and managed relationships), and innovation (using intermediary university foundations to take on business aspects of technology commercialization).

The Federal Authority for Science, Technology, Entrepreneurship, and Research (FASTER) Federal Labs Act will make it possible for all federal labs to use the tried-and-true tools that universities use for economic engagement and technology commercialization. The FASTER Federal Labs Act will do this by: (i) allowing surplus federal land to be used for public-private partnership facilities, (ii) creating clearer pathways for federal researchers to work with startup companies, and (iii) authorizing a federally charted tech-transfer organization based on models established at leading research universities. The FASTER Federal Labs Act will not require significant outlay of federal appropriations as many of its provisions simply give federal labs greater discretion over deployment of existing resources. The Act can be implemented relatively easily as an add-on to legislation expected to be considered by this Congress.

Innovative manufacturing techniques can expand the production of drugs and medical supplies in the U.S.

The COVID-19 pandemic caused significant disruptions in global supply chains, and policymakers are now strategizing around how to ramp up U.S. supply chain resiliency. Everything from beef to toilet paper became more difficult to find in U.S. stores, and the pandemic also caused dire shortages of medical supplies and lifesaving treatments. The shortages were caused by the closure of many manufacturing plants in countries like China, and our domestic supply chain was not sufficient to meet the demand gap. In fact, it is estimated that China exports more respirators, surgical masks, and other personal protective equipment than the rest of the world combined. The limited capacity of domestic supply chains – particularly for pharmaceuticals and medical supplies – was a focus for Chair Tammy Baldwin (D, WI) during last week’s Senate Appropriations Subcommittee hearing featuring testimony from Dr. Janet Woodcock, acting commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

The distributed nature of modern manufacturing

The production of goods such as smartphones, medical therapeutics, or kitchen appliances is complex. Manufacturers rely on highly-trained specialists to make different components that are eventually combined into a single product. For example, the manufacture of LCD displays requires obtaining the raw materials, like glass sheets, films, semiconductor chips, and circuit connectors, from other manufacturers around the world, and assembling components inside multi-billion-dollar factories. Specialization in manufacturing allows businesses to develop new, lower-cost technologies, and more easily scale production and design processes. Unfortunately, specialization also results in a layered network of manufacturers relying on yet other manufacturers, and so on, and it becomes very difficult to determine where each component is coming from in the supply chain. The lack of visibility into this process then exacerbates disruptions in manufacturing during crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic.

Federal partnerships to strengthen the domestic manufacturing base

To protect against future disruptions, implementing advanced manufacturing practices in domestic facilities, and encouraging businesses, particularly those that make critical drugs and medical supplies, to set up new advanced manufacturing plants in the U.S., can make a substantial impact. During last week’s hearing, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, FDA, and Related Agencies Chair Baldwin began by asking (33:05 mark in video) FDA Acting Commissioner Woodcock about how the agency is helping to strengthen domestic pharmaceutical supply chains with advanced manufacturing.

The implementation of advanced manufacturing is a top priority for the Biden Administration, and earlier this year, the FDA partnered with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop an advanced manufacturing regulatory framework. The partnership aims to “increase U.S. medical supply chain resilience and advanced domestic manufacturing of drugs, biological products, and medical devices through adoption of 21st century manufacturing technologies.” One emerging technology that will be explored by the partnership is the modularization of manufacturing processes. Modularization refers to structuring discrete parts of the manufacturing process in a way that they can be plugged into each other in different combinations and still function properly. With modular processes, reconfiguring the manufacturing floor to produce a different medicine or device could take just hours or days, instead of months. Another example is using artificial intelligence to track production, tweak settings to increase efficiency, and schedule maintenance to reduce the amount of downtime necessary.

In addition to FDA and NIST efforts to implement advanced manufacturing for medical supplies, two Manufacturing USA Institutes – the National Institute for Innovation in Manufacturing Biopharmaceuticals (NIIMBL) and the Bioindustrial Manufacturing and Design Ecosystem (BioMADE) – are pursuing new advanced biomanufacturing solutions. NIIMBL is a public-private partnership supported by industry and NIST to “accelerate biopharmaceutical innovation,” develop standards, and educate the biomanufacturing workforce. Advances in manufacturing processes developed by NIIMBL aid in the production of treatments for debilitating diseases like cancer, autoimmune disorders, microbial infections, and diabetes. BioMADE is one of the newest Manufacturing USA institutes, supported by the Department of Defense and industry partners. It will promote the commercialization of new biomanufacturing technologies by (i) developing predictive models to move products from the lab to production, (ii) de-risking new technologies, and (iii) manufacturing products at pilot and intermediate scales before they are produced at full scale. BioMADE would also help establish best practices for the biofabrication of novel chemicals, enzymes, and other useful biological products.

Advanced manufacturing for on-demand pharmaceuticals

There are already numerous advanced manufacturing technologies that could be leveraged to boost domestic capacity and improve U.S. self-sufficiency in the production of high-priority medicines, such as anesthetics. Building on work that is underway at the federal level, there are additional opportunities for the Executive Branch to form cross-cutting, productive partnerships. A proposal from Dr. Geoffrey Ling – former founding director of the Biological Technologies Office at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, CEO of On Demand Pharmaceuticals, and Day One Project contributor – suggests that the U.S. Government could launch a national adaptive pharmaceutical manufacturing initiative. This initiative would aim to achieve self-sufficiency for the production of medicines in the U.S. by implementing new technologies to establish high-quality and automated systems readily deployed across the country. Action steps would include fostering:

• “Targeted synthetic biology research and development to enable faster manufacturing of low-cost, on-demand vaccines and precision immunotherapies;”
• “Advanced development of green, modular, on-demand small-molecule manufacturing technologies;” and
• “New business models to support the economically sustainable domestic adoption and deployment of new manufacturing technology.”

By convening experts from the public and private sectors, as well as academia, to craft a national strategy for advanced manufacturing, and then supporting its execution, the federal government could help reduce U.S. dependence on foreign pharmaceutical and medical supply manufacturing.

Fundamental research setting the stage for advanced manufacturing

While much of the focus to implement advanced manufacturing technologies is on later-stage experimental development and commercialization, fundamental research is critical to launching these cutting-edge systems. For instance, the National Science Foundation (NSF) spent an estimated $318 million on basic manufacturing research in fiscal year 2021, and is requesting an additional $100 million in funding for its work in fiscal year 2022. In the coming fiscal year, NSF plans to sponsor research in scientific disciplines vital to advanced manufacturing, such as:

• “Highly-connected, adaptable, resilient, safe, and secure cyber-physical systems;”
• “New methods, processes, analyses, tools, or equipment for new or existing manufacturing products, supply-chain components, or chemicals and materials, including replacements for mainstay materials such as plastics that cause environmental harm;”and
• “Next-generation manufacturing infrastructure as part of a broader effort to design and renew national infrastructure.”

Today’s investments in fundamental research into manufacturing are expected to catalyze tomorrow’s breakthrough advanced manufacturing technologies.

Looking ahead

The full implementation of new developments in advanced manufacturing has the potential to ensure the resilience of U.S. medical supply chains in future crises. It can also provide other significant benefits, such as improvements in the quality of critical treatments and therapies, the creation of new jobs, and strengthening the economy. As the FDA, NIST, and other federal agencies work together, and Congress explores ways to continue supporting advanced manufacturing, we encourage the CSPI community to continue to serve as a resource to federal officials.

Summary

Technical standards underpin the functioning of digital devices central to everyday life. What might, at first glance, seem to be a wonky, technical process for figuring out things like how to ensure mobile devices can all connect to the same network, has emerged as an arena of geopolitical competition. Standards confers first-mover advantages on the companies that propose them and economic benefits on countries, and they implicate values like privacy. China has aggressively sought to promote its technical standards by encouraging Chinese representatives to assume leadership roles in standards bodies, financially rewarding companies that propose technical standards, coercing Chinese firms to vote as a bloc within standards bodies, and working to shape the standards landscape to its advantage.

In light of the growing recognition of the strategic importance of technical standards, the March 2020 report from the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission (CSC) recommended that the United States “engage actively and effectively in forums setting international information and communications technology standards.” In a similar vein, the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) included a provision tasking the Departments of State and Commerce and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) with considering how to advance U.S. representation in international standards bodies. This paper expands on the CSC’s recommendation and proposes concrete actions to be taken in support of the aims outlined in the FY2021 NDAA. In brief, the U.S. federal government should:

1. Direct and organize departments and agencies to better coordinate input to (and participation in) international standards bodies;
2. Work with like-minded countries to advance technically sound standards proposals that preserve the free, open, and interoperable nature of the ICT ecosystem;
3. Facilitate a public-private partnership to encourage and support greater participation of U.S. companies in international standards bodies; and
4. Seek transparency reforms within international standards bodies and advocate for “cooling-off periods” that prevent former government officials (from any country) from taking on leadership roles in standards bodies for a specified period of time following government service.

Summary

America faces a host of daunting problems that demand forward-looking solutions. Addressing these challenges will require us to unleash the full potential of our research and development community, leveraging new approaches to innovation that break through both technical and institutional barriers and initiate wholly new capabilities. The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) model has resulted in exactly this kind of high-impact innovation in defense, intelligence, and energy. This model can be applied to other critical societal challenges such as climate, labor, or health. But an ARPA must have the right core elements if it is to create the fresh solutions the country needs.

The ARPA model is distinctly different from other federal agencies in mission, operations, and culture. ARPA organizations are part of a much broader ecosystem that spans from research to implementation. Their role is to create breakthrough, paradigm-shifting solutions and capabilities. In order to position a new ARPA for success, Congress, the Administration, and the agency’s founding leaders must understand the unique properties of an ARPA and the process by which ARPAs approach and manage risk to develop game-changing advances.

To establish a strong foundation for a new ARPA to do this work, Congress and the Administration will need to address four factors:

• Purpose: Clearly and succinctly define the vital national purpose for the new ARPA.
• Operations: Set the agency up to function autonomously, with its own budget, staff, and operating practices.
• Authorities: Give the new ARPA flexible hiring and contracting authorities to draw new and extraordinary talent to the nation’s challenges.
• Leadership: Appoint an exceptional leadership team, hold them to a high standard for impact, and create room for them to deliver on the full potential of the ARPA model.

Over the course of a few years, a new ARPA can grow into a powerfully effective organization with people, practices, and culture honed to create breakthroughs. If well implemented, new ARPAs can be extraordinary additions to our R&D ecosystem, providing unimagined new capabilities to help us meet our most essential societal challenges.

Challenge and Opportunity

America faces some daunting problems today. Many millions of Americans are unable to access our nation’s rich opportunities, leaving all of us poorer without their contributions. Dozens of other countries have longer life spans and lower infant mortality rates, although we spend more per capita on healthcare than any other country. We are not yet on track to contain the damages of a changing climate or to manage its impacts. Global competition has resulted in more and more U.S. research advances being used to create jobs elsewhere. R&D alone won’t solve any of these problems. But every one of these challenges demands creative new solutions.

However, America’s phenomenally productive R&D ecosystem—with its half a trillion dollars spent annually by the public and private sectors—is not aimed at these large, society-wide challenges. How do we create a generational shift in our innovation ecosystem so that it contributes as much to meeting this century’s challenges as it did for those of the last century? What can we learn from our successful R&D history, and what approaches can we adapt to address the problems that we now face?

One part of the answer lies in the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) model for innovation. This kind of innovation knocks down both technical and institutional barriers to create transformational new capabilities. ARPA organizations are part of a much broader ecosystem, spanning from research to implementation, in which their role is to create breakthrough solutions and capabilities that fundamentally change what we define as possible. In pursuit of revolutionary advances, they accept and manage a level of risk for which companies and other government agencies have no incentive.

The first ARPA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), was launched in 1958 at the height of the Cold War. DARPA shifted military capabilities from mass bombing to precision strike with GPS, stealth technologies, and integrated combat systems. These innovations recast defense systems, changed military outcomes, and shaped geopolitics over decades. Meanwhile, DARPA’s programs in enabling technologies also seeded artificial intelligence, developed advanced microelectronics, and started the internet. In recent years, DARPA programs have built the first ship able to navigate from the pier and cross oceans without a single sailor on board,¹ created a radical new approach to reconfigurable military capabilities to outpace global adversaries,² developed the first systems—now in operation by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey—for cities to continuously monitor for dangerous nuclear and radiological materials,³ and created a rapid-response mRNA vaccine platform⁴ that enabled the astonishingly fast development⁵ of today’s mRNA vaccines for COVID-19.

We are also starting to show that the ARPA model can be successfully adapted to other national purposes. In 2006, the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) was formed to serve the intelligence community. One of IARPA’s programs has developed methods to overcome individual cognitive biases by weighting and synthesizing the judgments of many analysts. This approach provides important gains in prediction and is a new paradigm for forecasting events in a complex world. In 2009, the Advanced Research Projects Agency–Energy (ARPA-E) launched in the Department of Energy. Its programs have created new power semiconductors, new battery technologies, and new methods to improve appliance efficiency, making vital contributions to our clean energy future. Both ARPAs have invigorated R&D communities by connecting them to hard, important problems and giving them a pathway to drive impact.

Implementing the ARPA model to meet other critical challenges could have enormous impact. Indeed, President Biden has already proposed ARPAs for health and climate,⁶ and others have advanced visions for ARPAs for agriculture,⁷ labor⁸ and education. In addition, the Endless Frontier Act⁹ takes inspiration from the ARPA model in its vision for an expanded technology function at NSF to address economic competitiveness.

Behind each call for an “ARPA for X” is a yearning for R&D that throws open new doors to radically better solutions. But the ARPA model is very different from other federal agencies and unlocking its potential will require much more than affixing the name. The starting point is an understanding of how ARPAs generate their outsized advances.

Though specifics vary according to the mission of a new ARPA, the essential operating model is based on these elements:

• An ARPA designs and conducts programs that run for limited periods, typically 3-5 years. Each ARPA program sets out to achieve a specific, bold goal that may seem impossible but that, if demonstrated, can initiate a major advance. Each ARPA program contracts with companies, universities, and other organizations to execute R&D efforts. It also engages the parties who can implement and scale successful program results.
• An ARPA requires exceptionally talented program managers with a rare combination of expertise, vision, and the ability to execute and deliver results.
• ARPA leadership approves a series of individual programs, constructing and overseeing a full and diversified portfolio.

ARPA Programs

An ARPA generates major advances through intelligently managed risk-taking. The fundamental unit of work for an ARPA is a solutions-oriented R&D program that aims at achieving a previously unimaginable goal. Each program has a fixed term, typically 3-5 years, and each is designed, executed, and transitioned by an ARPA program manager.

Design

The program manager designs the program to achieve a bold goal—one that may seem impossible but that, if demonstrated, could catalyze a major advance. They build a rigorous plan to achieve the goal. A set of questions known as the Heilmeier Catechism¹⁰ (from an iconic DARPA director in the 1970s) guides program development:

• What are you trying to do? Articulate your objectives using absolutely no jargon.
• How is it done today, and what are the limits of current practice?
• What is new in your approach and why do you think it will be successful?
• Who cares? If you are successful, what difference will it make?
• What are the risks?
• How much will it cost?
• How long will it take?
• What are the mid-term and final “exams” to check for success?

These questions are easy—even obvious—to ask, but surprisingly difficult to answer well. Program managers typically grapple with them over 6-12 months to design a strong program, and agency leaders use them to guide their judgement about the potential of a new program for approval. The questions also guide program execution.

Execution

Once a program is launched, the program manager contracts with whichever organizations are needed to achieve the program’s goal. That typically means companies, universities, nonprofits, other parts of government, and other organizations with the talent and capacity to conduct the necessary R&D. Contracting this work has the obvious benefit that the ARPA doesn’t have to hire staff and provide facilities for this R&D. But even more important is the fact that this approach mobilizes individuals and organizations. Over the course of the program, these participants become a community that not only delivers the program vision but can help drive it forward beyond the term of the ARPA program.

The work of the program is to weave the threads of research from multiple domains together with lessons from the reality of use and practice in order to develop and demonstrate prototype systems or capabilities. The program rigorously evaluates how well its innovation works, how it works in specific environments, and how it can be scaled. 

An ARPA program often draws on basic research and often generates fresh research, but research is an input rather than the objective. Unlike the management of basic research, these programs drive to a specific goal. They may sometimes resemble product development, but for a prototype product that serves a public purpose rather than a visible market opportunity. Often, they require a much higher degree of risk than product development because they reach for a barely feasible goal. 

An ARPA program aims to demonstrate that a powerful new approach can work despite the risk inherent in trying something radically different. This requires actively managing the multiple efforts within the ARPA program. An ARPA program manager accelerates lines of work that show great promise and redirects or stops work that is not yielding results. They nimbly reallocate resources to keep wringing out risk and driving to the program’s objective.  

Transition

In parallel, the program manager engages the decision makers who can advance, adopt, implement, and fully scale the results of the program. If the breakthrough will require commercialization, that could include additional companies, investors, and entrepreneurs. If full-scale implementation requires changes in policies and practices, that means engaging regulators, policy makers, and community organizations. Understanding the needs and realities of implementers is important from the early stages of program design. It is sometimes the case that these implementers are skeptical about the program’s bold goal at the start. As the program unfolds, they are invited to program reviews and demonstrations. The program strives to address their concerns and may even provide support for their internal analyses, evaluations, and trials. When these engagements work well, the ARPA program manager is able to bring implementers along on the journey from wild dream to demonstrated reality. Successful transition starts when they change their minds about what’s possible. And the ultimate societal impact of the ARPA program comes when these implementers have fully scaled the ARPA breakthrough. 

A fully successful program ends with a convincing demonstration of a new capability; a community that can carry it forward; and decision makers who are ready to support and fund implementation in products, services, policies, and practices.

ARPA program managers

None of this can happen without exceptionally capable program managers. An ARPA organization hires program managers on fixed terms to design, manage, and transition these high-impact programs. ARPA leadership coaches program managers, helps build partnerships and remove obstacles, and approves and oversees all programs. But it puts enormous responsibility and authority on the shoulders of program managers. 

ARPA program managers come from backgrounds in companies, universities, nonprofits, and other parts of government, and they serve at different times in their careers. They bring a “head in the stars, feet on the ground” blend of these key characteristics: 

• The program manager is an expert in a relevant area. 
• They see the big picture and navigate easily from details to strategic outcomes. 
• They are driven to achieve a major impact. Sometimes this is manifested as a constructive impatience with the limitations of conventional organizations and approaches. 
• They are able to project a vision. 
• They are able to build and lead a community to accomplish goals. 
• They have a sound ethical core. 

ARPA portfolios

ARPA leadership approves a series of individual programs, constructing and managing a full portfolio that is diversified to maximize total impact despite the risk inherent in each program. Every program learns, not all succeed, and failure is accepted as integral to the mission.

Plan of Action 

Based on these core elements of a successful ARPA model, we offer four recommendations for policy makers as they establish new ARPA organizations. 

Purpose

Clearly and succinctly define the vital national purpose for the new ARPA. An ARPA exists to create breakthroughs for an important public need. For DARPA, this is national security. For ARPA-E, it is economic and energy security, and for IARPA, it is national intelligence. 

Operations

Set up the agency to function autonomously, with its own budget, staff and organization, and operating practices. An ARPA is a deliberate counterpoint to work already underway, originating from a recognition that something more and different is needed to achieve our national goals. An ARPA will not succeed if it is tightly integrated into its parent organization. Ironically, it may be more difficult to start a successful new ARPA in an area that already has robust federal research, because of the inclination to fit the square-peg ARPA into round-hole traditional research methods. The ARPA model is completely different than our well-honed approach to sponsoring fundamental research. The ARPA solutions-driven approach would not work well for greatly needed and highly valued basic research, and conversely, funding methods for fundamental research will not lead to ARPA-scale breakthroughs for our societal problems. This work is different, and it will require different people, different practices, and a different culture to succeed. 

Independent funding is also necessary. To develop a portfolio of programs with the potential for high impact, an ARPA requires funding that is sufficient to achieve its programs’ objectives. ARPA programs are sized not just to generate a new result, but to convincingly demonstrate a new approach, often across a variety of circumstances, in order to prove that the method can succeed and scale. 

The agency’s chain of command and Congressional authorizers and appropriators provide important oversight. However, the ARPA organization itself must bear the responsibility for designing, selecting, managing, and transitioning its programs. A new ARPA should report directly to the cabinet secretary to maintain independence and secure the support needed to achieve its mission. 

Authorities

Give the new ARPA flexible hiring and contracting authorities to draw new and extraordinary talent to the nation’s challenges. Flexible hiring mechanisms have proven to be very valuable in allowing ARPAs to attract the rare combination of expertise, vision, and execution required in great program managers. In addition, program managers must be able to contract with exceptional people and teams in companies, universities, nonprofits, and other government entities to achieve their aggressive program goals. ARPAs have used flexible contracting mechanisms to move fast and work effectively with all kinds of organizations, not just those already designed to work with government.

Flexible hiring and contracting authorities are extremely helpful tools for an ARPA organization. It’s worth noting, though, that flexible authorities by themselves do not an ARPA make. 

Leadership

Appoint an exceptional leadership team, hold them to a high standard for impact, and create room for them to deliver on the full potential of the ARPA model. A new ARPA’s director will be responsible for building an organization with people, practices, and culture honed for the mission of creating breakthroughs. This person must bring fresh and creative ways of looking at seemingly impossible problems, a rigorous approach to managing risk, a drive to achieve outsized impact, and an ability to lead people. A strong ethical orientation is also essential for a role that will grapple with the implications of powerful new capabilities for our society. 

The person to whom the ARPA director reports also plays an essential role. This individual must actively prevent others from trying to set the agenda for the ARPA. They enable the ARPA organization to hire program managers who don’t look like other department staff, undertake programs that conventional wisdom decries, manage programs actively, and develop a culture that celebrates bold risk-taking in pursuit of a great national purpose. They hold the ARPA organization accountable for the mission of creating breakthroughs and create room for the unconventional methods needed to realize that mission. 

Note that these four recommendations about purpose, independence, authorities, and leadership are interconnected. All are necessary to build the foundation for a successful new ARPA, and cherry-picking the easy ones will not work. 

Conclusion

A total of 87 years of experience across three different ARPA organizations have provided many lessons about how to build and run an organization that creates breakthroughs for an important national purpose. In establishing any new ARPA, both Congress and the Administration must create the space and allocate the resources that will allow it to flourish and realize its mission. 

Like its programs, a new ARPA will itself be a high-risk, high-reward experiment. If our challenges were modest, or if our current innovation methods were sufficient, there would be no need to try these kinds of experiments. But the problems we face today demand powerful new approaches. Adapting the ARPA model and aiming it at the most critical challenges ahead can create breakthroughs that redefine what is possible for our future. Let’s do everything possible to start new ARPAs on the right track/

Just a small group of nationally-ranked universities are awarded the majority of federal research funding. In 2018, a study found that out of more than 600 colleges and universities that received federal funding for science and engineering research, about 22 percent received over 90 percent of the funds. The equity and accessibility of these funds was the focus of this week’s Senate Appropriations Committee hearing held to discuss the budget that could be allotted to the National Science Foundation (NSF) in fiscal year 2022. During the hearing, NSF director Sethuraman Panchanathan emphasized that addressing research disparities and establishing far-reaching partnerships were priorities for the agency.

Disparities in research funding

Disparities in research funding can greatly harm the ability of students to enter scientific careers, and diminish the potential of the country’s scientific workforce overall. The institutions that received over 90 percent of federal science funding in 2018 served only 43 percent of all students in the U.S., and only 34 percent of students from underrepresented groups. So two-thirds of underrepresented minorities and almost 70 percent of Pell grant recipients (who are undergraduates with “exceptional financial needs”) have more limited access to valuable opportunities to participate in scientific research. At the same time, researchers argue that incorporating diverse perspectives and talents leads to more innovative solutions, and that not including underrepresented minorities in science will only harm the U.S.’ competitiveness.

NSF’s most well-known program to address research funding disparities is the Established Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCoR). This program, which is now over 40 years old, partners with institutions of higher education to stimulate sustainable improvements in research and development capacity in specific states. States (as well as U.S. territories and DC) become eligible for EPSCoR funding if they receive 0.75 percent or less of total NSF research and related activities funding over the previous three years. Studies have shown that states with EPSCoR funding increase the quality of their universities’ publications, and that they become more competitive for future federal research funding competitions. However, more research needs to be done to fully assess the program’s impact.

Expanded access to research funding a priority for the Biden Administration

The Biden Administration has emphasized the importance of addressing research funding accessibility in the FY 2022 skinny budget request, which highlights the President’s top spending priorities for the next year in advance of the release of the full request for each agency. Specifically, President Biden is requesting $100 million for programs that “aim to increase participation in science and engineering of individuals from racial and ethnic groups, who are traditionally underrepresented in these fields.” This funding is intended to support increasing science and engineering research and education capacity at Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) and other Minority-Serving Institutions (MSIs), as well as research on recruitment and retention methods, mentorship programs, and curriculum development. Studies by the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) have determined that this type of funding is critical to ensure the success of underrepresented minority students.

Director Panchanathan’s priorities for NSF

During the hearing, Director Panchanathan echoed (46:05) that more needs to be done to tap into the U.S.’ potential scientific talent. His two main priorities for NSF are to increase access to scientific research through regional innovation accelerators and to strengthen partnerships with other agencies, including the Department of Energy (DOE) and its national laboratories. The regional accelerators would rely on an expanded EPSCoR program, as well as support from other NSF directorates. NSF is also working to expand artificial intelligence (AI) research to every state to tap into as much talent as possible. Last year, NSF distributed grants to develop seven AI institutes which have operations in 20 different states. Director Panchanathan hopes (46:45) to expand this further in the coming years. This idea of widely-distributed hubs aligns with a new proposal from FAS’ Day One Project that suggests a path forward for the creation of innovation ecosystems that would launch new startup ideas and cultivate the next generation of research and development talent.

Regarding strengthening partnerships with DOE, NSF collaborates with the agency on a variety of programs, including the development of new algorithms to bolster the security and efficiency of modern power grids, the creation of collaborative robots to assist humans with a variety of tasks, and the advancement of basic plasma research and education. NSF historically focuses on basic research, while DOE, and its national labs in particular, drive the commercialization of new technologies. Director Panchanathan aims (1:22:06) to further develop relationships with the agency to more closely connect NSF’s basic research strengths with DOE’s expertise in technology transfer and ensuring cutting-edge research and technologies are commercialized in the U.S., instead of by other countries. By fostering closer cooperation between NSF and the other federal science agencies, the U.S. will be able to better compete with countries, such as China, that aim to supplant the U.S. as world leader in critical technology and science fields.

The future of research and development in the U.S.

Both the Biden Administration and Congress would like to accelerate science and engineering education and research to boost the U.S.’ domestic growth and global competitiveness. In the formulation of the FY 2022 federal budget for science funding, there will be more discussions on Capitol Hill about how to bolster the country’s expertise in high-priority fields such as AI, climate science, quantum computing, clean energy, and biotechnology, and harmonize the approaches of the executive and legislative branches. We encourage the CSPI community to get involved in future CSPI calls to action, and serve as a scientific resource for policymakers.

Summary

Rebooting the American Dream (RAD) is a proposed national challenge-grant program that funds “Regional Centers for Shared Prosperity” in emerging innovation ecosystems, with the intent of (1) accelerating startup creation, (2) developing the next-generation of talent, and (3) providing alternative capitalization models. It is expected that initially funding the program to award six regional challenge grants of $25 million each will yield at least a 3:1 return in private-dollar investments—for a total of $500 million—and create at least 21,000 jobs in underserved areas of the country. In light of the massive job losses induced by the COVID-19 pandemic, RAD grants will build momentum behind existing place-based initiatives and help surface the wealth of diverse human potential and innovation that exists across the United States. 

The RAD proposal aims to revive entrepreneurship across America by helping give every American, regardless of geography, race, gender, or socioeconomic status, the opportunity to build a competitive company. Advancements in internet capabilities, communication tools, and information technology have made entrepreneurship accessible to more people in more places than ever before. Yet massive job losses related to COVID-19 and ever-growing global competition require the United States to discover new ways to create sustainable jobs. Over the past decade, initiatives led by the federal government in partnership with academics and nonprofits have given policymakers a markedly better understanding of the issues facing entrepreneurs. RAD is directly informed by this body of knowledge. By supporting bottom-up, place-based investment and building a network of new ideas through RAD, the Biden-Harris Administration can simultaneously foster American dynamism and strengthen American economic competitiveness.

Summary

The Biden-Harris Administration should create the Local Innovation Unit (LIU) to catalyze and coordinate decentralized, city and county-based experiments focused on the most urgent and complex challenges facing the United States. Traditional “top-down” methods of policy design and problem solving are no longer effective in addressing our nation’s most pressing issues, such as pandemics, climate change, and decreasing economic mobility. The nature of these problems, coupled with an absence of tested solutions or “best practices” and ongoing partisan gridlock, demands a more agile and experimental “bottom-up” approach. Such an approach focuses on empowering coalitions of social innovators at the local level—including local governments, private-sector businesses, community-based organizations, philanthropists, and universities—to design and test solutions that work for their communities. Promising solutions can then be scaled horizontally (e.g., to other cities and counties) and vertically (e.g., to inform federal policy and action).

The LIU will be a place-based policy initiative consisting of two primary components: (1) multi-city and county experimentation cohorts organized around common problems, via which local coalitions design and test solutions within their communities, and (2) a digital platform, housed in the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), that will help LIU participants connect, exchange materials and resources, help participants collect and visualize data, evaluate solutions, and publish lessons learned.

Summary

COVID-19 has reshaped every facet of our social and professional experiences. What began for almost all of us as a short-term work-from-home event has turned into a prolonged crisis that will have lasting effects on how we interact with each other and do business. Even as vaccine rollouts continue and offices slowly start to reopen, much work will continue to be remote. Employees are likely to work staggered schedules or in predefined groups in order to maintain social distancing for an unknown period of time. Many meetings and tasks that went virtual during the pandemic will likely stay that way. And employers of all types, including governments, will continue to rely heavily on technology to keep employees and customers connected and engaged.

The pandemic accelerated an already rapid ongoing shift to a tech-driven world. As a nation, we must similarly accelerate investments in information technology (IT) to support this new normal. COVID-19 has already exposed critical weakness in existing U.S. IT systems at the federal, state and local levels. Technical problems delayed millions of Americans from receiving unemployment benefits, and are now delaying millions more from receiving timely vaccines. Remote work is raising equity issues and cybersecurity concerns, and periodic internet outages have caused major disruptions to school and work.

The upshot is clear: our investments in IT modernization and cloud computing over the last 10 years have not been sufficient. It’s time to start talking about the next steps the United States can and must take to lead at the federal level, ensuring that our nation’s IT infrastructure and tools can securely and adequately support all remote workers while providing secure, reliable, and state-of-the-art online services.