A Step Forward in Mitigating Existential Threats
It’s no secret that the world is becoming increasingly complex and interconnected. And as our societies become more technologically advanced, the risks of a global catastrophe become greater. Natural disasters or severe climate change in one part of the world can quickly become a humanitarian crisis in another, an airborne virus can spread around the globe in days, and a terrorist attack can have ripple effects across borders. In recent years, we’ve seen a number of such major disasters—both natural and man-made—that have had devastating impacts on communities around the world. From hurricanes and earthquakes to cyberattacks and pandemics, these events have shown us just how vulnerable we are to the forces of nature and the dangers posed by our own technologies. Yet, despite the clear and present danger, governments appear woefully unprepared to manage any of these risks.
Fortunately, top lawmakers on the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee (HSGAC), Senator Rob Portman (R-OH) and Senator Gary Peters (D-MI), have introduced legislation—the Global Catastrophic Risk Preparedness Act—that would establish an interagency taskforce to study how the U.S. government should be prepared to mitigate and manage such risks. This bipartisan legislation would ensure that our government has the tools and resources necessary to identify, assess, and respond to these risks in a coordinated and effective manner and would be the first critical step towards a national preparedness plan.
In recent years, the U.S. government has been caught flat-footed by a number of global catastrophic risks. From pandemics to climate change, the U.S. has been slow to respond to these existential threats. While the probability of some of these events happening may be low, the potential consequences are far too severe to ignore.
Given the potentially devastating consequences of these events, it is essential that the U.S. government is prepared to manage them should they occur. Moreover, the cost of preparing for them is dwarfed by the cost of doing nothing and being caught unprepared when one of them does occur. For instance, the COVID-19 pandemic has cost the United States over $16 trillion, while the White House estimates it needs merely $65 billion to help prevent the next pandemic. Similarly, an analysis by Deloitte found that if the U.S. does not decarbonize over the next 50 years, it would cost the economy nearly $14.5 trillion but the U.S. economy would gain $3 trillion if it rapidly decarbonizes during that time. But to prevent such catastrophic events from happening requires an all-of-government approach to mitigation and preparedness—a gap this legislation aims to fill.
Aside from the natural catastrophes waiting to happen in the lack of a coordinated global response, there are also man-made catastrophic risks that the U.S. Government must be prepared to mitigate and manage. In 1939, Einstein wrote to President Roosevelt, warning him of the possibility to engineer a nuclear chain reaction that could lead to the creation of powerful bombs. Just a few years later, these bombs were created. In little more than a decade, enough had been produced that, for the first time in history, a handful of decision-makers could destroy civilization. Humanity had entered a new age, in which we faced not only existential risks from our natural environment, but also the possibility that we might be able to extinguish ourselves. This technology which was considered “emerging” in 1939 almost led to destruction of humanity 23 years later.
It is difficult to forecast what emerging technologies may develop in the future. Emerging technologies are quite literally emerging. When they are realized, they develop rapidly and the full extent of their capabilities is often not known for years or even decades. Just last year, The Department of Justice indicted several FSB officers for their involvement in a multi-stage campaign in which they gained remote access to critical infrastructure, including a US nuclear power plant where they planted malware. In 2005, Paul Krugman would have likely laughed at the possibility of the internet being used as a weapon to cause a nuclear meltdown. Yet to come machine learning technologies in possession of power hungry dictators could potentially be used in a similar manner to expand their powers and harm large populations in other countries. An algorithm that can identify a cure for superbugs could also be used by bioterrorists to find strains of viruses that likely evade any such cures. Thus preparing for what could potentially happen, even if considered a low probability event today, only makes sense.
While lawmakers fuss over the finer details of the Global Catastrophic Risk Preparedness Act, it is also essential to look at the next steps. If an interagency task force works to develop an assessment of the current state of preparedness and implementation plans to prepare the U.S. government for these risks, it would also be responsible for ensuring that these plans are regularly updated and tested, so that we can be as prepared as possible when—not if, as we see with climate change—one of these events happens. Some may argue that this is unnecessary bureaucracy—but given the stakes involved, we cannot afford to take chances. The time to act is now, before it’s too late.
Regulating Use of Mobile Sentry Devices by U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Summary
Robotic and automated systems have the potential to remove humans from dangerous situations, but their current intended use as aids or replacements for human officers conducting border patrols raises ethical concerns if not regulated to ensure that this use “promot[es] the safety of the officer/agent and the public” (emphasis added). U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) should update its use-of-force policy to cover the use of robotic and other autonomous systems for CBP-specific applications that differ from the military applications assumed in existing regulations. The most relevant existing regulation, Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, governs how semi-autonomous weapons may be used to engage with enemy combatants in the context of war. This use case is quite different from mobile sentry duty, which may include interactions with civilians (whether U.S. citizens or migrants). With robotic and automated systems about to come into regular use at CBP, the agency should proactively issue regulations to forestall adverse effects—specifically, by only permitting use of these systems in ways that presume all encountered humans to be non-combatants.
Challenge and Opportunity
CBP is currently developing mobile sentry devices as a new technology to force-multiply its presence at the border. Mobile sentry devices, such as legged and flying robots, have the potential to reduce deaths at the border by making it easier to locate and provide aid to migrants in distress. According to an American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) report, 22% of migrant deaths between 2010 and 2021 that involved an on-duty CBP agent or officer were caused by medical distress that began before the agent or officer arrived on the scene. However, the eventual use cases, rules of engagement, and functionalities of these robots are unclear. If not properly regulated, mobile sentry devices could also be used to harm or threaten people at the border—thereby contributing to the 44% of deaths that occurred as a direct result of vehicular or foot pursuit by a CBP agent. Regulations on mobile sentry device use—rather than merely acquisition—are needed because even originally unarmed devices can be weaponized after purchase. Devices that remain unarmed can also harm civilians using a limb or propeller.
Existing Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regulations governing autonomous systems seek to minimize technological bias in artificially intelligent risk-assessment systems. Existing military regulations seek to minimize risks of misused or misunderstood capabilities for autonomous systems. However, no existing federal regulations govern how uncrewed vehicles, whether remotely controlled or autonomous, can be used by CBP. The answer is not as simple as extending military regulations to the CBP. Military regulations governing autonomous systems assume that the robots in question are armed and interacting with enemy combatants. This assumption does not apply to most, if not all, possible CBP use cases.
With the CBP already testing robotic dogs for deployment on the Southwestern border, the need for tailored regulation is pressing. Recent backlash over the New York Police Department testing similar autonomous systems makes this topic even more timely. While the robots used by CBP are currently unarmed, the same company that developed the robots being tested by CBP is working with another company to mount weapons on them. The rapid innovation and manufacturing of these systems requires implementation of policies governing their use by CBP before CBP has fully incorporated such systems into its workflows, and before the companies that build these systems have formed a powerful enough lobby to resist appropriate oversight.
Plan of Action
CBP should immediately update its Use of Force policy to include restrictions on use of force by mobile sentry devices. Specifically, CBP should add a chapter to the policy with the following language:
- A “Mobile Sentry Device” should be defined as any remotely controlled, autonomous, or semi-autonomous mobile technology used for surveillance. Examples of Mobile Sentry Devices include self-driving cars, legged robots, or quadcopter drones.
- No amount of force may be determined “reasonable” if administered by a Mobile Sentry Device, whether the Device is (i) completely controlled by an agent or officer, or (ii) operating in an autonomous or semi-autonomous mode.
- No Mobile Sentry Device may be authorized to administer Lethal Force, Less-Lethal Force, or any type of force applied directly by contact with the Device (i.e., contact equivalent to an “Empty Hand” technique). For example, a legged robot may not be used to discharge a firearm, disperse Oleoresin Capsicum spray (pepper spray), or strike a human with a limb.
- A Mobile Sentry Device may not be used as a Vehicular Immobilization Device (or used to deploy such a device), whether the Mobile Sentry Device is (i) completely controlled by an agent or officer, or (ii) operating in an autonomous or semi-autonomous mode.
- When powered on, Mobile Sentry Devices must maintain a distance of at least two feet from any humans not authorized to operate the Device. The Device and its operator are responsible for maintaining this distance.
- Mobile Sentry Devices may not be used to detain or perform arrests, nor to threaten or intimidate with the implicit threat of detainment or arrest.
- A Mobile Sentry Device may be used to administer humanitarian aid or provide a two-way visual or auditory connection to a CBP officer or agent.
- When approaching people to offer humanitarian aid, the Device must use de-escalation techniques to indicate that it is not a threat. These techniques will necessarily vary based on the specific technology. Some examples might include a flying device landing and immediately unfolding a screen playing a non-threatening video, or a legged device sitting with its legs underneath it and cycling through non-threatening audio recordings in multiple languages.
- When used for humanitarian purposes, the Device may not touch its human target(s) or request them to touch it. To transfer an item (such as food, water, or emergency medical supplies) to the target(s), the Device must drop the package with the items while maintaining at least two feet of distance from the closest person.
- When used to provide a two-way visual or auditory connection with a CBP officer or agent, the Device must indicate that such a connection is about to be formed and indicate when the connection is broken. For example, the Device could use an audio clip of a ringing phone to signal that a two-way audio connection to a CBP officer is about to commence.
These regulations should go into effect before Mobile Sentry Devices are moved from the testing phase to the deployment phase. Related new technology, whether it increases capabilities for surveillance or autonomous mobility, should undergo review by a committee that includes representatives from the National Use of Force Review Board, migrant rights groups, and citizens living along the border. This review should mirror the process laid out in the Community Control over Police Surveillance project, which has already been successfully implemented in multiple cities.
Conclusion
U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) is developing an application for legged robots as mobile sentry devices at the southwest border. However, the use cases, functionality, and rules of engagement for these robots remain unclear. New regulations are needed to forestall adverse effects of autonomous robots used by the federal government for non-military applications, such as those envisioned by CBP. These regulations should specify that mobile sentry devices can only be used as humanitarian aids, and must use de-escalation methods to indicate that they are not threatening. Regulations should further mandate that mobile sentry devices maintain clear distance from human targets, that use of force by mobile sentry devices is never considered “reasonable,” and that mobile sentry devices may never be used to pursue, detain, or arrest humans. Such regulations will help ensure that the legged robots currently being tested as mobile sentry devices by CBP—as well as any future mobile sentry devices—are used ethically and in line with CBP’s goals, alleviating concerns for migrant advocates and citizens along the border.
Regulations on purchasing are not sufficient to prevent mobile sentry device technology from being weaponized after it is purchased. However, DHS could certainly also consider updating its acquisition regulations to include clauses resulting in fines when mobile sentry devices acquired by the CBP are not used for humanitarian purposes.
DOD Directive 3000.09 regulates the use of autonomous weapons systems in the context of war. For an autonomous, semi-autonomous, or remotely controlled system that is deployed with the intention to be a weapon in an active battlefield, this regulation makes sense. But applications of robotic and automated systems currently being developed by DHS are oriented towards mobile sentry duty along stretches of American land where civilians are likely to be found. This sentry duty is likely to be performed by uncrewed ground robots following GPS breadcrumb trails along predetermined regular patrols along the border. Applying Directive 3000.09, the use of a robot to kill or harm a person during a routine patrol along the border would not be a violation as long as a human had “meaningful control” over the robot at that time. The upshot is that mobile sentry devices used by CBP should be subject to stricter regulations.
Most companies selling legged robots in the United States have explicit end-user policies prohibiting the use of their machines to harm or intimidate humans or animals. Some companies selling quadcopter drones have similar policies. But these policies lack any enforcement mechanism. As such, there is a regulatory gap that the federal government must fill.
No, but it is an immediately actionable strategy. An alternative—albeit more time-consuming—option would be for CBP to form a committee comprising representatives from the National Use of Force Review Board, the military, migrant-rights activist groups, and experts on ethics to develop a directive for CBP’s use of mobile sentry devices. This directive should be modeled after DoD Directive 3000.09, which regulates the use of lethal autonomous weapons systems by the military. As the autonomous systems in DOD Directive 3000.09 are assumed to be interacting with enemy combatants while CBP’s jurisdiction consists mostly of civilians, the CBP directive should be considerably more stringent than Directive 3000.09.
The policies proposed in this memo govern what mobile sentry devices are and are not permitted to do, regardless of the extent to which humans are involved in device operation and/or the degree of autonomy possessed by the technology in question. The policies proposed in this memo could therefore be applied consistently as the technology continues to be developed. AI is always changing and improving, and by creating policies that are tech-agnostic, CPB can avoid updating regulations as mobile sentry device technology evolves.
Establishing a National Endemic Disease Surveillance Initiative (NEDSI)
Summary
Global pandemics cause major human and financial losses. Our nation has suffered nearly a million deaths associated with COVID-19 to date. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that COVID-19 will cost the United States $7.6 trillion in lost economic output over the next decade. While much has rightly been written on preventing the next pandemic, far less attention has been paid to mitigating the compounding effects of endemic diseases. Endemic diseases are consistently present over time and typically restricted to a defined geographic region. Such diseases can exacerbate pandemic-associated financial losses, complicate patient care, and delay patient recovery. In a clinical context, endemic diseases can worsen existing infections and compromise patient outcomes. For example, co-infections with endemic diseases increase the likelihood of patient mortality from pandemic diseases like COVID-19 and H1N1 influenza.
Accurate and timely data on the prevalence of endemic diseases enables public-health officials to minimize the above-cited burdens through proactive response. Yet the U.S. government does not mandate reporting and/or monitoring of many endemic diseases. The Biden-Harris administration should use American Rescue Plan funds to establish a National Endemic Disease Surveillance Initiative (NEDSI), within the National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System (NNDSS), to remove barriers to monitoring endemic, infectious diseases and to incentivize reporting. The NEDSI will support the goals of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)’s Data Modernization Initiative by providing robust infection data on a typically overlooked suite of diseases in the United States. Specifically, the NEDSI will:
- Provide healthcare practitioners with resources to implement/upgrade digital disease reporting.
- Support effective allocation of funding to hospitals, clinics, and healthcare providers in regions with severe endemic disease.
- Prepare quarterly memos updating healthcare providers about endemic disease prevalence and spread.
- Alert citizens and health-care practitioners in real time of notable infections and disease outbreaks.
- Track and predict endemic-disease burden, enabling strategic-intervention planning within the CDC and with partner entities.
Challenge and Opportunity
The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the need for a multilevel approach to addressing endemic diseases. Endemic diseases are defined as those that persist at relatively stable case numbers within a defined geographic region. Though endemic diseases are typically geographically restricted, changes in population movement, population behaviors, and environmental conditions are increasing the incidence of endemic diseases. For example, Valley fever, a fungal respiratory disease endemic to the California Central Valley and the American Southwest, is predicted to spread to the American Midwest by 2060 due to climate change.
Better preparing the United States for future pandemics depends partly on better countering endemic disease. Effective patient care during a pandemic requires clinicians to treat not only the primary infection, but also potential secondary infections arising from endemic pathogens taking advantage of a weakened, preoccupied host immune system. Though typically not dangerous on their own, secondary infections from even common fungi such as Aspergillus or Candida can become deadly if the host is pre-infected with a respiratory virus. On the individual level, secondary infections with endemic diseases adversely impact patient recovery and survival rates. On the state level, secondary infections impose major healthcare costs by prolonging patient recovery and increasing medical intervention needs. And on the national level, poor endemic-disease management in one state can cause disease persistence and spread to other states.
Robust surveillance is integral to endemic-disease management. The case of endemic schistosomiasis in the Sichuan province of China illustrates the point. Though the province successfully controlled the disease initially, decreased funding for disease tracking and management—and hence lack of awareness and apathy among stakeholders—caused the disease to re-emerge and case numbers to grow. During active endemic-disease outbreaks, comprehensive data improves decision-making by reflecting the real-time state of infections. In between outbreaks, high-quality surveillance data enables more accurate prediction and thus timely, life-saving intervention. Yet the U.S. government mandates reporting and/or monitoring of relatively few endemic diseases.
Part of the problem is that improvements are needed in our national infrastructure for tracking and reporting diseases of concern. Approximately 95% of all hospitals within the United States use some form of electronic health record (EHR) keeping, but not all hospitals have the same resources to maintain or use EHR systems. For example, rural hospitals generally have poorer capacity to send, receive, find, and integrate patient-care reports. This results in drastic variation in case-reporting quality across the United States: and hence drastic variation in availability of the standardized, accurate data that policy and decision makers need to maximize public health.
With these issues in mind, the Biden-Harris administration should use American Rescue Plan (ARP) funds to establish a National Endemic Disease Surveillance Initiative (NEDSI) within the CDC’s National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System (NNDSS). Fighting an individual pandemic disease is difficult enough. We need better systems to stop endemic diseases from making the battle worse. Implementing NEDSI will equip decision makers with the data they need to respond to real-time needs— thereby protecting our nation’s economy and, more importantly, our people’s lives.
Plan of Action
To build NEDSI, the CDC should use a portion of the $500 million allocated in the ARP to strengthen surveillance and analytic infrastructure and build infectious-disease forecasting systems. NEDSI will support the goals of the CDC’s Data Modernization Initiative by allocating resources to implement and/or upgrade digital-disease reporting capabilities needed to obtain robust infection data on endemic diseases. Specifically, NEDSI would strive to minimize healthcare burdens of endemic diseases through the following four actions:
- Disease monitoring. NEDSI will identify and track notable endemic infectious diseases for each state, including but not exclusive to (i) existing infectious diseases with historical presence and/or relevance, and (ii) infectious diseases that disproportionately impact particular workers. For example, Valley fever disproportionately impacts those employed in outdoor occupations related to ground/soil work (such as agricultural workers, solar farmers, construction workers, etc.). Endemic-disease reporting under NEDSI will follow reporting templates and frameworks that have already been developed by the NNDSS, but will also include information on co-infections (i.e., whether a reported endemic-disease case was a primary, secondary, or higher-order infection).
- Disease notification. As part of monitoring, case-report numbers that rise above historical norms will be automatically flagged for alerts to community members, health-care providers, public-health officials, and other stakeholders.
- Alerts to community members will be geotargeted (for example, by city, county, or region), enabling residents and travelers in endemic zones to take precautions. Alerts will be text-message-based and include resource links vetted by public-health experts.
- Alerts to health-care providers will contain links to resources providing the latest information on accurate diagnosis and appropriate treatment of the disease in question. This will allow providers to quickly identify emerging cases of the disease, as well as to prepare for above-average use/need of particular treatments and equipment.
- Alerts to public-health officials will help shape recommendations for travel restrictions, emergency-funding requests and allocations, and rapid-response resources.
- Disease prediction. NEDSI will work with the CDC and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to build an endemic-disease prediction model that ranks the severity of current and anticipated endemic-disease burden by geographic region in the United States, enabling proactive intervention against emerging threats.
- Model insights will be shared with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and state health departments to inform allocation of funds (e.g., from the federal-to-state and state-to-county levels) to support public health.
- Key model insights could also be posted on the CDC’s website and transmitted in notices to regional public-health officials and healthcare practitioners, especially when predicted risks and infection trends are high.
- Data underlying the model should be made publicly available and accessible to support external disease-modeling and -prediction efforts.
- In alignment with priorities of the Data Modernization Initiative and the American Pandemic Preparedness Plan, the CDC could also consider offering financial assistance (e.g., through grants or cooperative agreements) to external research efforts conducted in partnership with NEDSI and/or using NEDSI data. NEDSI and NNDSS should work to identify key research targets and promote them appropriately in Notices of Funding Opportunities.
- Health education. The NNDSS, utilizing data and model outputs from NEDSI, should prepare quarterly memos synthesizing key information related to endemic diseases in the United States, including (i) summary statistics of endemic-disease case numbers and co-infections by state and county; (ii) an up-to-date list of available treatments, medications, and therapies for different endemic diseases, and (iii) predicted disease trends for coming months and years. Memos should be published digitally and archived on the CDC website. Publication of each memo should be accompanied by a digital campaign to help spread the resource to healthcare practitioners, public-health authorities, and other stakeholders. NEDSI representatives should also prioritize participation in disease-specific research/clinical conferences to ensure that the latest scientific findings and developments are reflected in the memos.
Conclusion
Despite the clear burdens that endemic diseases impose, such diseases are still largely understudied and poorly understood. Until we have better knowledge of immunology related to endemic-disease co-infections, our best “treatment” is robust surveillance of opportunistic co-infections—surveillance that will enable proactive steps to minimize endemic-disease impacts on already vulnerable populations. Establishing a National Endemic Disease Surveillance Initiative within the National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System will close a critical gap in our nation’s disease-monitoring and -reporting infrastructure, helping reduce healthcare burdens while strengthening pandemic preparedness.
NEDSI, like other systems standardizing and streamlining disease reporting, will allow healthcare practitioners to efficiently—and in some cases, automatically—share data on endemic diseases. Such real-time, consistent data are invaluable for informing public-health responses as well as future emergency planning.
An ounce of endemic-disease prevention is worth far more than a pound of cure—and effective prevention depends on effective monitoring. Research shows that endemic diseases account for an alarming number of co-infections with COVID-19. These co-infections have detrimental impacts on patient outcomes. Further, population growth and migration trends are increasing transmission of and exposure to endemic diseases. Mitigating the severity of future epidemics and pandemics hence requires near-term investment in endemic-disease monitoring.
Yes: even in non-pandemic times, co-infections represent a major risk for the immunocompromised and elderly. AIDS patients succumb to secondary infections as a direct result of becoming immunocompromised by their primary HIV infection. Annual flu seasons are worsened by opportunistic co-infections. Monitoring and tracking endemic diseases and their co-infection rates will help mitigate existing healthcare burdens even outside the scope of a pandemic.
Due to a combination of funding challenges and lack of research progress/understanding, endemic-disease monitoring was only recently identified as a crucial gap in overall infectious disease preparedness. But now, with allocated funds from the American Rescue Plan to strengthen surveillance and infectious-disease forecasting systems, there is a historic opportunity to invest in this important area
Using “Wargaming” to Evaluate Manufacturing Cyberthreats and Ensure Supply-Chain Cybersecurity
Summary
Small to medium-sized manufacturing (SMM) companies are the backbone of the U.S. industrial base. However, they do not have the financial or technical resources needed to protect themselves from cyberthreats such as computer hacking, embedded malicious software, and “internet of things” sensors sending sensitive information to foreign counties. These cyberthreats can cause huge damage to the U.S. economy and national security. With relatively limited investment, cybercriminals can disrupt critical supply chains, damage key sectors, and delete or corrupt important information resources.
The Biden-Harris administration should address these threats through a government-industry partnership that uses “wargaming” analyses — i.e., virtual techniques to model and assess threats — to evaluate manufacturing cyberthreats and test strategies for ensuring supply-chain cybersecurity. As part of this partnership, the Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) should implement a pilot program to spread robust and scalable cybersecurity best practices throughout manufacturing-based supply chains. Coordinating the resources and expertise of other federal agencies — including the Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE), the Department of Defense (DOD) Digital Manufacturing Institute (MxD), the National Institutes of Standards and Technology (NIST) Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP), and the DOD Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) program — with the resources and expertise of external entities (e.g., academic institutions) will enable the administration to become more proactive in anticipating and neutralizing cyberthreats, thus enhancing the stability and security of U.S. manufacturing supply chains.
White House: Prepare for the Unpredictable
“The Nation must prepare to mitigate an unpredictable global security and national emergency environment,” the White House said in a report to Congress this month.
The report, transmitted by President Trump on April 3, provided principles for reform of the selective service process by which young Americans enter the military. The report was required by section 555 of the 2017 defense authorization act.
“The Nation must be ever mindful of the unpredictable global security environment that requires an effective and efficient means to provide manpower to the national security community, including military and non-military support in a national emergency,” the President’s report said.
How to prepare in practice for the unpredictable is not clear, except that it involves flexibility.
“Any system, process, or program used to identify, recruit, and employ additional skill sets should be effective in times of peace, war, and other levels of conflict or emergency response. Associated initiatives, systems, and processes must be seamless, robust, and able to expand and contract as needed,” the report said.
Congress established a new National Commission to consider changes to the selective service system, and to develop “the means by which to foster a greater attitude, ethos, and propensity for military services among United States youth.”