This memo is part of the Day One Project Early Career Science Policy Accelerator, a joint initiative between the Federation of American Scientists & the National Science Policy Network.

Summary

One-third of the food Americans eat comes from honeybee-pollinated crops. Honeybees used for commercial pollination operations are routinely treated with antibiotics as a preventative measure against bacterial infections. Pre- and probiotics are marketed to beekeepers to help restore honeybee gut health and improve overall immune function. However, there is little to no federal oversight of these supplements. Apiculture supplements currently on the market are expensive but often ineffective. This leaves unaware farmers wasting money on “snake oil” products while honeybee colonies remain weakened — threatening not just the U.S. agricultural economy, but also the livelihoods of beekeepers and farmers. At the same time, widespread use of antibiotics in apiculture puts honeybees at high risk of spreading antibiotic resistance.

To address these issues, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)’s Office of Human and Animal Food Operations and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)’s National Institute for Food and Agriculture (NIFA) should work together to (1) create an FDA review and approval process for pre- and probiotic apiculture products, (2) design educational programs designed to educate veterinarians on best practices for beekeeping health and husbandry, and (3) offer grants to help farmers and apiculturists access high-quality veterinary care for honeybee colonies.

Challenge and Opportunity

Honeybee pollination services are pivotal to the U.S. agricultural economy. It is estimated that about one-third of the food Americans eat comes from crops pollinated by honeybees. Throughout the past decade, beekeepers have suffered colony losses that make commercial apiculture challenging. These colony losses are caused by complex and interconnected issues including the rise of honeybee diseases such as bacterial infections like American Foulbrood or viral infections linked to pests like the Varroa mite, a general increase in hive pests, habitat fragmentation and nutrition loss, and increased use of pesticides and/or pesticide exposure. 

The substantial threats posed by bacterial and viral diseases to honeybee colonies have driven commercial beekeeping operations to routinely treat their hives with antibiotics (mainly oxytetracycline). Unfortunately, antibiotic treatment can also (i) compromise honeybee health by wiping out beneficial bacteria in the honeybee microbiome, and (ii) promote antibiotic resistance. Routine use of antibiotics in apiculture hence compounds the challenges mentioned above and further compromises the livelihoods of U.S. farmers and the security of U.S. food systems.

In 2017, the FDA responded to antibiotic overuse in apiculture by amending the Veterinary Feed Directive (VFD) section of the Animal Drug Availability Act of 1996 (ADAA). The 2017 amendment required beekeepers to obtain veterinary approval to treat their colonies with antibiotics against certain diseases. While attractive on paper, the implementation of this policy has encountered challenges in practice. Finding a vet who understands the highly complex dynamics of apiculture has been a substantial challenge for commercial beekeepers, especially in rural areas. Improvements to the implementation of the VFD are needed to contain the spread of antibiotic resistance in apiculture.

Relatedly, researchers, beekeepers, and companies alike have all been on the hunt for a solution to restore honeybee health after antibiotic treatment. Pre- and probiotic therapy has recently been proposed as a promising and cost-effective strategy to enhance human and animal health, particularly to restore beneficial gut bacteria following antibiotic treatment. Several companies have developed pre- and probiotic supplements targeted at commercial apiculturists. Two popular supplements are HiveAlive^TM and SuperDFM®-HoneyBee^TM. HiveAlive^TM is marketed as a prebiotic and is composed of seaweed, thymol, and lemongrass extracts. Although there is some evidence that HiveAlive^TM decreases infectious fungal-spore counts and reduces winter honeybee mortality, the value of this supplement as a honeybee prebiotic (i.e., to boost growth or activity of beneficial gut bacteria prior to antibiotic treatment) has not been tested. SuperDMF®-HoneyBee^TM is marketed as a probiotic that can restore the honeybee gut microbiome. But SuperDMF®-HoneyBee^TM is exclusively composed of microbes — isolated from mammals or the environment — that have never been found in honeybees and therefore are probably incapable of colonizing the bee gut. To date, neither HiveAlive^TM nor SuperDFM®-HoneyBee^TM has been scientifically shown to protect or restore the honeybee gut microbiome from adverse effects of antibiotic treatment.

A big part of the reason why pre- and probiotic supplements for honeybees (as well as for other agricultural uses) have not been externally validated is that such products are not subject to FDA or USDA regulation. This lack of federal oversight means that beekeepers interested in using such products have only the manufacturer’s word that the products will work as promised. Federal intervention is needed to protect commercial farmers and beekeepers from predatory companies selling expensive “snake oil” products.

Plan of Action

To ensure the long-term sustainability of U.S. apiculture and agriculture, the FDA and USDA should work together on the following three-part strategy to improve the administration of antibiotics in apiculture and to strengthen the regulation of pre- and probiotic supplements marketed to commercial beekeepers. 

Part 1. Educate veterinarians in beekeeping to limit misuse and overuse of antibiotics.

For instance, the USDA’s Office of Pest Management Policy (OPMP) and National Institute for Food and Agriculture (NIFA) could collaborate with the U.S. Honeybee Veterinary Consortium on an annual training program, hosted at the USDA’s Bee Research Laboratory, to educate vets working in agricultural areas on the basics of honeybee disease, prevention, treatment, and post-treatment options. The training could also discuss the latest evidence on the efficacy of pre- and probiotic supplements, ensuring that vets can help beekeepers navigate this emerging marketplace of products. Additionally, for veterinarians who are unable to travel to in-person training, these resources could be made available in an online portal. 

Part 2. Strengthen regulation of pre- and probiotics marketed to beekeepers. 

Currently, the market for pre- and probiotics targeted at beekeepers is a veritable “wild west”: one that allows the marketing and sale of essentially any product as long as the ingredients included are deemed safe per the Official Publication of the Association of American Feed Control Officials and are either (i) approved for addition to animal feed (per part 573 in Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations (21 CFR 573)), and/or (ii) generally recognized as safe (GRAS) for the intended use (including those listed in 21 CFR 582 and 584). Notably, the efficacy of marketed pre- and probiotics does not have to be demonstrated. Therefore, in alignment with an FDA guidance document recommending stronger oversight of pre- and probiotics targeted at beekeepers, FDA’s Office of New Animal Drug Evaluation (ONADE) should extend its normal animal drug approval process to include pre- and probiotic supplements marketed to beekeepers.

Part 3: Provide apiculturists with better access to high-quality veterinary care.

USDA could create a new Honeybee Veterinary Services Grant Program (HVSGP) that offers rural farmers and beekeepers funding to obtain vet care for their colonies. This program would be modeled after the American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA)’s Veterinary Services Grant Program, which provides funding to help rural farmers access high-quality vet care for farm animals. The USDA could also consider launching a parallel Honeybee Veterinary Medicine Loan Repayment Program (HVMLRP; again modeled on an AVMA program), which would help place vets trained in beekeeping husbandry “in high-need rural areas by providing strategic loan repayment help in exchange for service”. Vets participating in this program would agree to provide the following services:

• Quarterly visits to commercial apiaries in need of vet support. 

• Prescriptions of antibiotics as appropriate after colony inspection.

• Collection and reporting of data on health and treatment outcomes of serviced hives

Conclusion

Widespread use of antibiotics in commercial beekeeping is a problem for bees, beekeepers, and the larger ecosystem due to the spread of antibiotic resistance and the negative effects of antibiotic treatment on honeybee health. The federal government can mitigate these adverse effects by improving the knowledge and reach of vets trained in best practices for antibiotic treatment in apiculture, as well as by improving regulation of pre- and probiotic supplements purported to restore honeybee gut microbiomes following antibiotic treatment. These actions will collectively secure the health of honeybees — and the livelihoods of farmers who depend on them — for the long term.

An estimated 815 million children (one in three) around the globe have dangerous levels of lead in their bloodstream, levels high enough to cause irreversible brain damage and impose severe health, economic, and societal consequences. 96% of these children live in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), where collectively only about $6–10 million from non-governmental organizations is available each year to address the problem. To help eliminate childhood lead poisoning worldwide, the U.S. Federal Government should (1) add blood lead level (BLL) testing to the USAID-led Demographic and Health Survey Program, (2) create a Grand Challenge for Development to end childhood lead poisoning, and (3) push forward a global treaty on lead control.

Challenge and Opportunity

Lead is a potent toxin that causes irreversible harm to children’s brains and vital organs. Elevated body lead levels result in reduced intelligence, lower educational attainment, behavioral disorders, violent crime, reduced lifetime earnings, anemia, kidney disease, and cardiovascular disease. Impacts of lead on cognitive development are estimated to cause nearly $1 trillion of income loss in LMICs annually. Adverse health effects related to lead poisoning account for 1% of the global disease burden, causing 1 million deaths annually and substantial disability.

This enormous burden of lead poisoning in LMICs is preventable. It results from a combination of sources of exposure, some of the most important being:

• Lead that is intentionally added to paint, spices, cookware, and cosmetics.
• Lead that contaminates the environment from unsafe lead-acid battery and e-waste recycling practices.
• Lead that contaminates drinking water from pipes.

These sources of lead exposure have been effectively regulated in the United States and other high-income countries, which have seen average blood lead levels in their populations decline dramatically over the last 40 years. To achieve the same success, LMICs will need to prioritize policies such as:

• Regulation limiting the lead content of paint available on the market. 
• Regulation of lead-acid battery and e-waste recycling. 
• Inclusion of lead parameters in national drinking-water-quality standards. 
• Regulation of the use of lead compounds in other locally important sources, such as spices, ceramics, cookware, toys, and cosmetics. 

LMICs generally face three major barriers to implementing such policies:

1. Lack of data on blood lead levels and on the scale and severity of lead poisoning. Most LMICs have no studies measuring blood lead levels. Policymakers are therefore unaware of the extent of the problem and hence unlikely to act in response. 
2. Lack of data on which sources of lead exposure are the biggest local contributors. Causes of lead poisoning vary spatially, but the vast majority of LMICs have not conducted source-apportionment studies. This makes it difficult to prioritize the most impactful policies. 
3. Limited access to equipment needed to detect lead in paint, spices, water, other sources, or the environment. Without needed detection capabilities, regulators cannot investigate the lead content of potential sources, nor can they monitor and enforce regulation of known sources. 

These barriers are relatively simple to overcome, and when they are overcome do indeed result in action. As an example, at least 20 LMICs introduced legally binding lead paint regulation after the Global Alliance to Eliminate Lead Paint and its partners helped those countries confirm that lead paint was an important source of lead poisoning. Moreover, addressing childhood lead poisoning is in line with the priorities of the Biden Administration and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The Administration has already proposed an ambitious $15 billion plan to address childhood lead poisoning in the United States by eliminating lead pipes and service lines. By contributing to global elimination efforts (for only a fraction of what it will cost to solve the problem domestically), the Administration can multiply its impact on reducing childhood lead poisoning. Doing so would also advance USAID’s mission of “advanc[ing] a free, peaceful, and prosperous world”, since a reduction in childhood lead poisoning worldwide would improve health, strengthen economies, and prevent crime and conflict.

Plan of Action

Lead poisoning, from a variety of sources, affects one in three children worldwide. This is an unacceptable situation that demands action. The United States should adopt a three-part roadmap to help LMICs implement and enforce policies needed to achieve global elimination of childhood lead poisoning. 

Recommendation 1. Add blood lead level (BLL) testing to the USAID-led Demographic and Health Survey. 

USAID, through its Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), is in an ideal position to address the first barrier that LMICs face to implementing anti-lead poisoning policies: lack of data and awareness. The DHS collects, analyzes, and disseminates accurate and representative data on health in over 90 countries. Including BLL testing in the DHS would:

• Make accurate and representative data on the prevalence and severity of lead poisoning in LMICs available for the first time.
• Draw national and international attention to the immense burdens that childhood lead poisoning continues to impose. 
• Determine which LMIC populations are most impacted by childhood lead poisoning.
• Motivate interventions to target the most impacted populations and most important sources of exposure.
• Support quantitative evaluation of interventions that aim to reduce lead exposure.

As such, USAID should add BLL testing of children into the DHS Biomarker Questionnaire for all host countries. This could be done in DHS revision for Phase 9, beginning in 2023. Including BLL testing in the DHS is also the first step to addressing the second barrier that LMICs face: lack of data on sources of lead exposure. BLL data collected through the DHS would reveal which countries and populations have the greatest lead burdens. These data can be leveraged by researchers, governments, and NGOs to investigate key sources of lead exposure.

BLL testing of children is feasible to carry out in the context of the DHS. It was successfully piloted in 1998 and 2002 via the DHS presence in India and Uzbekistan, but not rolled out further. Testing can be carried out using finger-stick capillary sampling and portable analyzers, so venipuncture and laboratory analysis are not required. Further, such testing can be carried out by health technicians who are already trained in capillary blood testing of children for anemia as part of the DHS. The testing can be conducted while questionnaires are administered, and results and any follow-up actions can be shared with the parent/guardian immediately. Alternatively, laboratory lead tests can be added onto sample analysis if blood draws are already being taken. Costs are low in both cases, estimated at around $10 per test. 

Recommendation 2. Create a Grand Challenge for Development to end childhood lead poisoning.

Childhood lead poisoning in LMICs is dramatically neglected relative to the scale of the problem. Though childhood lead poisoning costs LMICs nearly $1 trillion annually and accounts for 1% of the global disease burden, only about $6–10 million per year is dedicated to addressing the problem. A USAID-led Grand Challenge for Development to end childhood lead poisoning would mobilize governments, companies, and foundations around generating and implementing solutions. In particular, the Challenge should encourage solutions to the second and third barriers presented above: lack of data on sources of lead exposure and limited detection capacity. 

Recommendation 3. Push forward a global treaty on lead control.

A global push is needed to put childhood lead poisoning on the radar of decision-makers across the world and spur implementation and enforcement of policies to address the issue. The Biden Administration should lead an international conference to develop a global treaty on lead control. Such a treaty would set safe standards for lead in a variety of products (building on the Global Alliance to Eliminate Lead Paint’s toolkit for establishing lead-paint laws) and recommend regulatory measures to control sources of lead exposure. The success of the UN’s Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles in bringing about global elimination of leaded gasoline illustrates that international political will to act can indeed be generated around lead pollution. 

Conclusion

By implementing this three-part roadmap the Biden administration and USAID can make a historic and catalytic contribution towards global elimination of lead poisoning. There is true urgency; the problem becomes harder to solve each year as more lead enters the environment where it will remain a source of exposure for decades to come.  Acting now will improve the health, wellbeing and potential of hundreds of millions of children. 

Summary

The Biden-Harris Administration should deploy a national network of low-cost, co-located, real-time greenhouse gas (GHG) and air-pollution emission sensors in 300 American cities by 2030 to help communities address environmental inequities, combat global warming, and improve public health. Urban areas contribute more than 70% of total GHG emissions. Aerosols and other byproducts of fossil-fuel combustion — the major drivers of poor air quality — are emitted in huge quantities alongside those GHGs. A “300 by ‘30” initiative establishing a national network of local, ground-level sensors will provide precise and customized information to drive critical climate and air-quality decisions and benefit neighborhoods, schools, and businesses in communities across the nation. Ground-level dense sensor networks located in community neighborhoods also provide a resource that educators can leverage to engage students on co-created “real-time and actionable science”, helping the next generation see how science and technology can contribute to solving our country’s most challenging issues.

Challenge and Opportunity

U.S. cities contribute 70% of our nation’s GHG emissions and have more concentrated air pollutants that harm neighborhoods and communities unequally. Climate change profoundly impacts human health and wellbeing through drought, wildfire, and extreme-weather events, among numerous other impacts. Microscopic air pollutants, which penetrate the body’s respiratory and circulatory systems, play a significant role in heart disease, stroke, lung cancer, and asthma. These diseases collectively cost Americans $800 billion annually in medical bills and result in more than 100,000 Americans dying prematurely each year. Also, health impacts are experienced more acutely for certain communities. Some racial groups and poorer households, especially those located near highways and industry, face higher exposure to harmful air pollutants than others, deepening health inequities across American society. 

GHG emissions and ground-level air pollution are both negative products of fossil-fuel combustion and are inextricably linked. But our nation lacks a comprehensive approach to measure, monitor, and mitigate these drivers of climate change and air pollution. Furthermore, key indicators of air quality — such as ground-level pollutant measurements — are not typically considered alongside GHG measurements in governmental attempts to regulate emissions. A coordinated and data-driven approach across government is needed to drive policies that are ambitious enough to simultaneously and equitably tackle both the climate crisis and worsening air-quality inequities in the United States.

Technologies that are coming down in cost enable ground-level, real-time, and neighborhood-scale observations of GHG and air-pollutant levels. These data support cost-effective mapping of carbon dioxide (CO₂) and air-quality related emissions (such as PM2.5, ozone, CO, and nitrogen oxides) to aid in forecasting local air quality, conducting GHG inventories, detecting pollution hotspots, and assessing the effectiveness of policies designed to reduce air pollution and GHG emissions. The result can be more successful, targeted strategies to reduce climate impacts, improve human health, and ensure environmental equity.

Pilot projects are proving the value of hyper-local GHG and air-quality sensor networks. Multiple universities, philanthropies, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have launched pilot projectsdeploying local, real-time GHG and air-pollutant sensors in cities including Los Angeles, New York City, Houston, TX, Providence, RI, and cities in the San Francisco Bay Area. In the San Francisco Bay Area, for instance, a dense network of 70 sensors enabled researchers to closely investigate how movement patterns changed as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. Observations from local air-quality sensors could be used to evaluate policies aimed at increasing electric-vehicle deployment, to demonstrate how CO and NOx emissions from vehicles change day to day, and to prove that emissions from heavy-duty trucks disproportionately impact lower-income neighborhoods and neighborhoods of color. The federal government can and should incorporate lessons learned from these pilot projects in designing a national network of air-quality sensors in cities across the country. 

Components of a national air-quality sensor network are in place. On-the-ground sensor measurements provide essential ground-level, high-spatial-density measurements that can be combined with data from satellites and other observing systems to create more accurate climate and air-quality maps and models for regions, states, and the country. Through sophisticated computational models, for instance, weather data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) are already being combined with existing satellite data and data from ground-level dense sensor networks to help locate sources of GHG emissions and air-pollution in cities throughout the day and across seasons. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is working on improving these measurements and models by encouraging development of standards for low-cost sensor data. Finally, data from pilot projects referenced above is being used on an ad hoc basis to inform policy. Data showing that CO₂ emissions from the vehicle fleet are decreasing faster than expected in cities with granular emissions monitoring are that policies designed to reduce GHG emissions are working as or better than intended. Federal leadership is needed to bring the impacts of such insights to scale on larger and even more impactful levels.

A national network of hyper-local GHG and air-quality sensors will contribute to K–12 science curricula. The University of California, Berkeley partnered with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) on the GLOBE educational program. The program provides ideas and materials for K–12 activities related to climate education and data literacy that leverage data from dense local air-quality sensor networks. Data from a national air-quality sensor network would expand opportunities for this type of place-based learning, motivating students with projects that incorporate observations occurring on the roof of their schools or nearby in their neighborhoods to investigate the atmosphere, climate, and use of data in scientific analyses.Scaling a national network of local GHG and air-quality sensors to include hundreds of cities will yield major economies of scale. A national air-quality sensor network that includes 300 American cities — essentially, all U.S. cities with populations greater than 100,000 — will drive down sensor costs and drive up sensor quality by growing the relevant market. Scaling up the network will also lower operational costs of merging large datasets, interpreting those data, and communicating insights to the public. This city-federal collaboration would provide validated data needed to prove which national and local policies to improve air quality and reduce emissions work, and to weed out those that don’t. 

Plan of Action

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), in partnership with the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the National Science Foundation (NSF) should lead a $100 million “300 by ’30: The American City Urban Air Challenge” to deploy low-cost, real-time, ground-based sensors by the year 2030 in all 300 U.S. cities with populations greater than 100,000 residents.

The initiative could be organized and managed by region through an expanded NOAA Regional Collaboration Network, under the auspices of NOAA’s Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research. NOAA is responsible for weather and air-quality forecasting and already manages a large suite of global CO₂ and global air-quality-related observations along with local weather observations. In a complementary manner, the “300 by ‘30” sensor network would measure CO₂, CO (carbon monoxide), NO (nitric oxide), NO₂ (nitrogen dioxide), O₃ (ozone), and PM2.5 (particulate matter down to 2.5 microns in size) at the neighborhood scale. “300 by ‘30” network operators would coordinate data integration and management within and across localities and report findings to the public through a uniform portal maintained by the federal government. Overall, NOAA would coordinate sensor deployment, network integration and data management and manage the transition from research to operations. NOAA would also work with NIST and EPA to provide uniform formats for collecting and sharing data.

Though NOAA is the natural agency to lead the “300 by ‘30” initiative, other federal agencies can and should play key supporting roles. NSF can support new approaches to instrument design and major innovations in data and computational science methods for analysis of observations that would transition rapidly to practical deployment. NIST can provide technical expertise and leadership in much-needed standards-setting for GHG measurements. NASA can advance the STEM-education portion of this initiative (see below), showing educators and students how to observe GHGs and air quality in their neighborhoods and how to link ground-level observations to observations made from space. NASA can also work with NOAA to merge high-density ground-level and wide-area space-based datasets. BEA can develop local models to provide the nonpartisan, nonpolitical economic information cities will need to inform urban air-policy decisions triggered by insights from the sensor network. Similarly, the EPA can help guide cities in using climate and air-quality information from the sensor network. The CDC can use network data to better characterize public-health threats related to climate change and air pollution, as well as to coordinate responses with state and local health officials. 

The “300 by ‘30” challenge should be deployed in a phased approach that (i) leverages lessons learned from pilot projects referenced above, and (ii) optimizes cost savings and efficiencies from increasing the number of networked cities. Leveraging its Regional Collaboration Network, NOAA would launch the Challenge in 2023 with an initial cohort of nine cities (one in each of NOAA’s nine regions). The Challenge would expand to 25 cities by 2024, 100 cities by 2027, and all 300 cities by 2030. The Challenge would also be open to participation by states and territories whose largest cities have populations less than 100,000.

The challenge should also build on NASA’s GLOBE program to develop and share K–12 curricula, activities, and learning materials that use data from the sensor network to advance climate education and data literacy and to inspire students to pursue higher education and careers in STEM. NOAA and NSF could provide additional support in promoting observation-based science education in classrooms and museums, illustrating how basic scientific observations of the atmosphere vary by neighborhood and collectively contribute to weather, air-quality, and climate models.

Our roundtable of climate and procurement experts discussed the underutilized role of the federal government as a strategic buyer to overcome market failures in scaling innovative solutions to climate change. Speakers included:

• Andrew Mayock, Federal Chief Sustainability Officer at the White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ).
• Thomas Kalil, Chief Innovation Officer at Schmidt Futures
• Dr. Lara Pierpoint, Director of Climate, Actuate
• Jetta Wong, Day One Project Policy Entrepreneur in Residence and SeniorFellow, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF)

Initial Perspectives

The session began with remarks from Thomas Kalil (Schmidt Futures), who provided an introduction into procurement levers, or “demand-pull” mechanisms.

• Economists distinguish between push and pull approaches to innovation. The former is an important, traditional feature of government efforts to promote R&D, such as tax credits or grants to a university researcher or firm that covers costs of a project. The latter involves innovative ways to leverage the role of government as a buyer.
• For example, the Falcon 9 rocket, a partnership between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and SpaceX, gave the United States an important capability to send rockets to the International Space Station without being dependent on Russia. The NASA-SpaceX contract used payments that were contingent on meeting key milestones, or “milestone- based payments.” NASA got access to this capability at a fraction of the cost as a “business as usual” approach, such as cost-plus contracts.
• Another example was Operation Warp Speed, which applied Nobel laureate Michael Kremer’s solution of “advanced market commitments” — a guarantee to purchase a given volume of a product that doesn’t exist yet — to the market failure of vaccine development.
• Government should utilize financial contingencies based on success, not failure, by identifying where market failures exist and defining metrics of success and the reward (e.g., prize, purchase order, milestone payment, etc.) This would be a powerful new arrow in our quiver to solve the climate crisis. Ideally, demand-pull mechanisms would create a marketplace for outcomes: someone establishes a goal, industry teams compete to meet this goal, investors bet on these teams, and we see who is successful at reaching finish line.

The session then shifted to a discussion from Andrew Mayock (CEQ) about the Bidenadministration’s key priorities in combatting climate change, along with nascent conversations on procurement.

• The federal government is back in action in the procurement area. From Day One of the administration with Executive Order 14008, the President called on agencies to use our buying power to tackle the climate crisis. The power of the executive order and its impact on movement throughout the federal government is noteworthy. It has helped increase transparency and standards, especially with respect to transitioning the full federal fleet of vehicles to zero emissions.
• On October 7th, the administration released a series of agency climate adaptation and resilience plans to deliver on the President’s Day One goals. The White House Council on Environmental Quality played a key role in defining standards and implementing quality reports.
• More recently, the administration’s Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council has been meeting to improve the rules of the game when it comes to procurement. They released the Federal Acquisition Regulation: Minimizing the Risk of Climate Change in Federal Acquisitions for public comment and would welcome your feedback on this.
• Finally, we plan on releasing a detailed framework for a federal sustainability plan, that will include government footprints over buildings, vehicles, and goods & services and how to move the needle on carbon reduction.The last individual speaker was Dr. Lara Pierpoint (Actuate), who discussed her experiences with the private sector in scaling climate innovation solutions.
• We operate under the assumption that if we have the right innovation and policy formula, climate technology will commercialize at scale. This isn’t necessarily wrong, but it will simply take too long. Consider solar energy, which was first developed at Bell Labs and took three decades to arrive at a viable place. Even now, after a series of policies and several more decades, just over two percent of U.S. energy is from solar. We simply do not have this kind of time for each technology.
• We’re getting there, but we need to understand more about how demand-pull mechanisms work and how they can be applied towards key sectors and challenges. For example, it is very expensive to produce carbon-free cement. Mass timber is one way to reduce embodied carbon in buildings, but timber happens to be even more expensive as there isn’t a large supply of materials available domestically. The real problem is that U.S. companies are not convinced the demand for carbon-free cement is there, so they don’t invest.
• Clean hydrogen and grid storage technologies are other examples where demand-pull mechanisms could be applied to incentivize innovation and reach climate goals.

Q&A Panel Discussion

Day One Project Policy Entrepreneur in Residence Jetta Wong (ITIF) moderated the panelist Q&A session, asking the following questions with summarized responses:

If we all agree that demand-pull mechanisms could have an outsized impact on driving climate solutions, what are some of the barriers preventing the widespread adoption of these tools?

Thomas Kalil:

One problem is that we have a shortage of people that know how to design effective demand-pull mechanisms. Then there’s the lack of cultural awareness within agencies over useful examples like Falcon 9 for accomplishing strategic objectives. This has resulted in an underutilization of Other Transactions Agreements — perhaps the broadest laws passed by Congress as it is defined by what it is not (not a grant, not a contract) rather than what it is. Under the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010, federal agencies can support incentive prizes of up to $50 million, but few agencies are using these authorities for ambitious prizes. Finally, appropriations processes pose another obstacle, as Congress traditionally requires that agencies spend their annual appropriations in two years. But for architecting successful demand-pull mechanisms, agencies may need to disperse these funds over a longer time period. It’s important that Congress consider utilizing “No-year” funding foragency R&D and market-shaping efforts. The private sector has an equally important role. Consider the automotive industry: research by the Boston Consulting Group indicates that if an automobile was made with carbon neutral materials, it would only increase the sticker price by 2%. The federal government has not realized the potential to shift markets in this direction.

Jetta Wong:

During the Obama administration, only one person in the entire agency knew about prizes and challenges; it was her job to teach others. Now the Department of Energy has many people working on these issues, but a lot more opportunities to execute on. We need more people willing to leverage these procurement innovations.

Andrew Mayock:

People, policy, and resources matter most. The CEQ and Administration appreciates that many good civil servants with this know-how have left. We have a people deficit; we need more individuals who possess the right skills to effect the transformation we’re hoping for. In terms of policy, the federal sustainability plan we hope to release soon comments on these issues, and sends a clear signal to markets with goals of carbon-free electricity and emission-free federal vehicles. Finally, on resources, now is an opportune time in Washington with the Build Back Better agenda. It has the ability to turbocharge the federal procurement space into truly solving climate challenges.

Lara Pierpoint:

We also have a structural problem with how the federal government is set up. The Department of Energy is focused on sources of energy, not climate, which has caused an organizational and resource challenge in meeting their climate objectives. The climate challenge is a different problem and requires new experiences. In the previous administration, the Department of Energy actually took a step forward. They had robust conversations with industry players and took a systemic view to thinking about how to unlock new technology pathways. It’s important to acknowledge where industry is coming from, what barriers are in their way, and how we might unlock more pathways for scaling innovations.

Despite these barriers, we know a few agencies have started deploying these tools. How should agencies think about getting this right?

Thomas Kalil:

When it comes to the Other Transaction Authorities, agencies have a large amount of flexibility in terms of how to use it. The authority is there, but agencies either haven’t used it or aren’t using it creatively enough. The goal of these partnerships, in the climate context, needs to be on accelerating the scale of deployment and eliminating the “green premium.” Climate solutions need to be scaled and profitable. The government should be partnering with the consumers of new technologies, not just the producers.

Andrew Mayock:

The “Buy Clean” policy is a critical tool towards making progress on these fronts and agencies should recognize the high-level strategic support for these procurement solutions. We should think more about how to scale up and work with the private sector.

One of the solutions mentioned was for Congress to utilize no-year funding, is there a concern with transparency over this and other demand- pull mechanisms?

Thomas Kalil:

If anything, demand-pull mechanisms require more transparency as the government must get specific about what it wants and when. The sponsor of the prize sets a very clear goal, and the results usually follow from this. Performance-based goals versus “we know it when we see it” is a useful mode of operation. The no-year funding element is important for addressing the appropriations obstacle, so agencies have available pools of funding to disperse at later stages.

Lara Pierpoint:

Milestone-based approaches are a great way to achieve progress with transparency, especially with complex technologies like nuclear power. If you want to get the innovation you need, it’s important to have clarity on regulatory milestones in addition to procurement and other targets. Milestone-based payments offer this support.

If you could challenge the audience to do one thing related to tackling the climate crisis with procurement, what would it be?

Thomas Kalil:

Find technologies that have potential for impact and describe the challenges and opportunities to applying demand-pull mechanisms in those sectors. Get specific. You can read about the different levers on the Day One Project website.

Lara Pierpoint:

For those in the agencies, and outside of government, embrace a broader problem- solving mindset. It’s too easy to fall into climate tech silos. Let’s think about what the end-point is and what tools can help us get there. This will involve an interdisciplinary collaboration across offices and fields, so let’s be open to it.

Andrew Mayock:

We need resources, and if we get them, we’ll figure out the people and policy. Stay tuned for the federal sustainability plan and send us your thoughts!

Follow-up Opportunities

The Day One Project is committed to sourcing diverse ideas from a wide community. We encourage you to stay engaged with us as we cultivate more science and technology policy ideas to set the agenda on industrial policy and beyond.

The Day One Project recently conducted a white-boarding session with 20 PPBE experts. The product of this seminar is the following list of broad questions about the financial barriers to the Department of Defense’s efforts to modernize the US military. These questions, and the research necessary to answer them, can serve as a roadmap for the Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Reform’s work.

1. Do PPBE and related resource allocation processes, including the appropriations process, limit the ability of emerging technologies to cross the “valley of death” into operations and contribute to DoD’s inability to compete in time with agile competitors?
2. Is the DoD’s current planning process able to translate future concepts of operations into the programming guidance necessary to develop future warfighting capabilities, or is it overly constrained by the construct of a weapons system program?
3. Does the current emphasis on a predictive requirements system hinder the Department’s ability to rapidly adopt emerging technologies and undermine its use of recent procurement reforms?
4. Is the Department’s reliance on manual data calls, PowerPoint presentations, and PDF spreadsheets hosted on different enterprise systems a hindrance to effective budgetary oversight and digital transparency?
5. Are year-of-execution reprogramming authorities big enough or flexible enough to allow the Department to take advantage of the dynamics of the emerging technology market?
6. Are DoD’s programmatic measures of effectiveness and performance structured to value adherence to original predictions over the potential of unforeseen outcomes? Is the DoD measuring the right things?

Introduction

The current administration should announce its intention to achieve net-zero soil loss by 2050. This target aligns with President Biden’s plan to “mount a historic, whole-of-Government-approach to combating climate change,”¹ would help fulfill the administration’s commitment to achieving a net-zero-emissions economy by 2050,² and is key to protecting our nation’s agricultural productivity.

Healthy soil is essential to food production. Less well recognized is the vital role that soil plays in climate modulation. Soil is the largest terrestrial carbon repository on the planet, containing three times the amount of carbon in Earth’s atmosphere.³ Soil represents a potential sink for 133 billion tons of carbon (equal to 25 years of U.S. fossil- fuel emissions).^{4 5} Using soil to offset emissions generates significant co-benefits. Carbon sequestration in soil nourishes soil ecosystems by improving soil architecture and increasing water-holding capacity. Deeper and more fertile soil also supports biodiversity and enriches natural habitats adjacent to agricultural land.

Over two-thirds of the United States is grassland, forestland, and cropland.⁶ Land practices that increase the amount of carbon stored underground⁷ present a relatively low-cost means for President Biden’s administration to pursue its goal of net-zero carbon emissions by 2050.⁸ But lost soil can no longer serve as a carbon repository. And once lost, soil takes centuries to rebuild. Increasingly extreme climate events and soil-degrading industrial farming practices are combining to rapidly deplete our nation’s strategic soil resources. The United States is losing 10.8 tons of fertile soil per hectare per year: a rate that is at least ten times greater than the rate of soil production.⁹ At this rate, many parts of the United States will run out of soil in the next 50 years; some regions already have. For example, in the Piedmont region of the eastern United States, farming practices that were inappropriate for the topography caused topsoil erosion and led to the abandonment of agriculture.^{10 11} The northwestern Palouse region has lost 40–50% of its topsoil,¹² and one-third of the Midwest corn belt has lost all of its topsoil.¹³

Soil loss reduces crop yields, destroys species’ habitats that are critical to food production, and causes high financial losses. Once roughly half of the soil is lost from a field, crop yields and nutrient density suffer. Maintaining a desired level of agricultural output then requires synthetic fertilizers that further compromise soil health, unleashing a feedback loop with widespread impacts on air, land, and water quality — impacts that are often disproportionately concentrated in underserved populations.

Climate change and soil erosion create a dual-threat to food production. As climate change progresses, more extreme weather events like intense flooding in the northeastern United States and prolonged drought in the Southwest make farmland less hospitable to production. Concurrently, soil erosion and degradation release soil carbon as greenhouse gases and make crops more vulnerable to extreme weather by weakening the capabilities of plants to fix carbon and deposit it in the soil. Halting soil erosion could reduce emissions, and building stable stores of soil carbon will reduce atmospheric carbon.

Prioritizing soil health and carbon sequestration as a domestic response to the climate and food-security crises is backed by centuries of pre-industrial agricultural practices. Before European occupation of tribal lands and the introduction of “modern agricultural practices,” Indigenous peoples across North America used soil protective practices to produce food while enhancing the health of larger ecosystems.¹⁴ Some U.S. farmers adhere to principles that guide all good soil stewardship — prevent soil movement and improve soil structure. Practices like no-till farming, cover cropping, application of organic soil amendments, and intercropping with deep-rooted prairie plants are proven to anchor soil and can increase its carbon content.^{15 16} In livestock production, regenerative grazing involves moving animals frequently to naturally fertilize the soil while allowing plants to recover and regrow. If all farms implemented these practices, most soil erosion would halt. The challenge is to equip farmers with the knowledge, financial incentives, and flexibility to use soil-protective techniques.

This document recommends a set of actions that the federal government — working with state and local governments, corporations, research institutions, landowners, and farmers — can take towards achieving net-zero soil loss by 2050. These recommendations are supported by policy priorities outlined in President Biden’s Discretionary Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2022 and the bipartisan infrastructure deal currently under negotiation in Congress. Throughout, we emphasize the importance of (1) prioritizing storage of stable carbon (i.e., carbon that remains in soils for the long term) and (2) addressing environmental injustices associated with soil erosion by engaging a broad group of stakeholders.

Firm commitments to restore degraded land will establish the United States as an international leader in soil health, help avoid the worst impacts of climate change, strengthen food security, advance environmental justice, and inspire other countries to set similar net-zero targets. The health of our planet and its people depend on soil preservation. Our nation can, and should, lead the way.

Summary

Climate change is an enormous environmental, social, and economic threat to the United States. Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from burning fossil fuels and other industrial processes are a major driver of this threat. Even if the world stopped emitting CO2 today, the huge quantities of CO2 generated by human activity to date would continue to sit in the atmosphere and cause dangerous climate effects for at least another 1,000 years.¹ The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has reported that keeping average global warming below 1.5°C is not possible without the use of carbon dioxide removal (CDR).² While funding and legislative support for CDR has greatly increased in recent years, the United States does not yet have a coordinated plan for implementing CDR technologies. The Department of Energy’s CDR task force should recommend a governance strategy for CDR implementation to responsibly, equitably, and effectively combat climate change by achieving net-negative CO2 emissions.

Introduction

For those who can afford to fill their fridge by clicking a button on their smartphone or walking around to the organic grocery around the corner, it is easy to forget how complex and fragile our food systems can be. However, for millions of Americans who suffer from poor health because of food insecurity, or farmers and ranchers whose yields are decreasing along with the nutrient density of their product, that fragility is felt every day. Sustainable food systems engender intricate connections and feedback loops among climate change, public health, food security, national security, and social equity. When one of these factors is overstressed, disaster can result.

COVID-19 has underscored the vulnerability of our food systems. The pandemic caused restaurants to close overnight, strained supply chains, and led to food rotting on land, in warehouses, and on shelves. Low-income and food-insecure families waited in lines that stretched for miles while producers and distributors struggled to figure out how to get supplies to those who needed them. Concurrently, generations of racial inequity and the coordinated disenfranchisement of Black, Indigenous, and other people of color (BIPOC) has crystalized as an issue that needs to be addressed at every level in our country, especially within our food and agricultural systems.

Addressing these issues—now and for the future—requires a coordinated response across sectors. Food security is deeply intertwined with public health and social equity. Un- and under- employment, the racial wealth gap, and increased financial hardships for certain communities result in increased malnutrition, obesity, metabolic diseases, and chronic illness, as well as particular susceptibility to severe impacts from COVID-19 infections during the present pandemic. The climate crisis compounds these issues. Farming practices that degrade soil health, reduce agriculture capacity, and compromise the well-being of small farms and rural communities prevent us as a nation from becoming healthier and more secure. As we look at opportunities to “build back better,” we must embrace paradigmatic shifts—fundamental restructuring of our systems that will support equitable and inclusive futures. Compounding crises require changes in not only what we do, but how we think about what we do.

A fundamental problem is that progress in modern agriculture has been implicitly defined as progress in agricultural technology (AgTech) and biotechnology. Little emphasis is placed on examining whole-systems dependencies and on how connections among soil health, gut bacteria, and antibiotic use in livestock impact human health, economic prosperity, and climate change. With such a narrow view of “innovation,” current practices will solve a handful of isolated problems but create many more.

Fortunately, alternatives are ripe for adoption. Regenerative farming, for instance, is a proven way to combat future warming while increasing the adaptive capacity of our lands, providing equitable access to food, and creating viable rural economies. Regenerative farming can also restore soil health, which in turn improves food quality while enhancing carbon sequestration and providing natural water treatment.

Transitioning away from dominant but harmful practices is not easy. The shift will require an inclusive innovation ecosystem, investors with long time horizons, new infrastructure, tailored education, economic incentives, and community safety nets. This document explores how the agricultural sector can support, and be supported by, policies that advance science, technology, and innovation while revitalizing living systems and equitable futures. We recognize that agricultural policy often overlooks interventions that are appropriately suited to advance these concepts with Black, Indigenous, people of color (BIPOC) communities and on tribal lands. To avoid this mistake, the concepts presented herein start from the ground up. We focus on the benefits of improving soil health and food security through regenerative agricultural activities, and provide examples of policies that could promote such activities in a variety of ways. Letting practice drive policy— instead of having policy dictate practice—will result in more sustainable, inclusive outcomes for all communities.

While agricultural policy can and should be shaped at the local, regional, state, and national level, this document places special emphasis on the role of the federal government. Building better food systems will require multiple government agencies, especially federal agencies, to collaboratively advance more equitable policies and practices. Most national agricultural programs are housed within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). But the interconnectedness of how we produce food and fiber (and the ways in which those practices impact our environment and nourish people) demands priority investment not only from USDA, but also from the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Energy, the Department of the Interior, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Health and Human Services—to name just a few. This document—based on a review of existing policy recommendations and current practice, development and refinement of new ideas, and identification of underleveraged roles and programs within the government— suggests what such investments might look like in practice.

Summary

Putting a price on carbon is fundamental to achieving U.S. climate goals for 2050. Many options for carbon price-setting exist, and in this policy brief we propose a tax-and-dividend approach that mitigates the challenging impacts that carbon policies have on poor and suburban/rural communities, particularly those in Middle America. Such a plan will be a net gain for low-income households, in contrast to other proposed climate change policies which will adversely affect the poor. Furthermore, it has been shown that even a modest carbon tax can have large benefits in terms of cost-effectiveness.

For that reason, we propose the following:

• Introduce a carbon tax-and-dividend plan as part of any federal climate policy.
• Use revenue to offset impacts on low-income households, taking into account enormousregional disparities.
• If political dynamics favor regulatory standards, consider coupling such standards with amodest carbon tax whose revenue can be used to offset their regressive effects.

Summary

The United States needs to radically enhance its efforts to build community disaster resilience. The frequency and cost of billion-dollar weather and climate disasters have increased significantly over the past decade. According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency’s estimates, the direct costs of disasters between 2018 and 2019 amounted to over $136 billion. And 2017 Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria resulted in over $265 billion in damage and displaced many communities. Moreover, accelerated urbanization and climate change continue to exacerbate communities’ vulnerability to climate disasters, rendering the current disaster mitigation, recovery, and emergency response policies untenable in the near future.

Resilience has served as an organizing principle for policymakers, first responders, and businesses in marshalling resources to reduce community vulnerability, stimulate recovery, and ensure reliable access to critical services (e.g., energy, water, shelter, food, health, ecosystems services and mobility) in the aftermath of climate disasters. However, the current set of reactive disaster recovery efforts and resilience policies have proven to be inefficient and costly, contributing to the widening of the `climate gap’ and entrenching vulnerability traps, particularly among marginalized and disadvantaged communities.

The Biden-Harris Administration should invest in information technology, data transparency and convergence research to build data-enabled predictive capabilities that anticipate shifts in communities’ demand for critical services under compound climate disasters, and inform effective resource allocation to equitably mitigate the impacts of climate change. These investments will not only enhance stewardship of taxpayer dollars, create jobs and bolster the economy, but will also shrink the rapidly widening climate gap and save lives.

Summary

Every year, Americans lose billions of dollars to natural hazards. Hurricanes, wildfires, floods, heat waves, and droughts affect millions of Americans and are particularly devastating for low-income communities and communities of color. The number of ‘billion-dollar disasters’—those that cause over a billion dollars in damage—is rising as a result of climate change, urbanization, high risk developments, communities in vulnerable areas, aging infrastructure, and federal policy that rewards risk-prone behavior rather than incentivizing risk reduction. An overhaul of U.S. federal disaster policy will reverse the trend and eliminate billion-dollar disasters. This goal requires action at all levels of government, coordination across agencies, and leadership from the highest levels.

The Biden-Harris Administration should implement a multi-phase plan beginning with an executive order instructing federal agencies to define federal roles in disaster response, coordinate agency efforts, and integrate social justice and climate change into decision-making. Agency-level mandates will develop and implement best practices, incentivize state and local measures, and create an evidentiary basis for funding allocations. Finally, legislative reform of disaster laws will enable flexible responses to the continuing effects of climate change. A coordinated overhaul of federal laws and policies will inspire change at state and local levels, leading to a U.S. disaster policy that is climate-ready, addresses social inequities, reduces taxpayer liability and disaster damage, and saves lives.

Challenge and Opportunity

Disaster effects continue to worsen. Climate change is exacerbating hurricanes, floods, heat waves, and wildfires. Development and population growth in at-risk areas have placed more people, infrastructure, and economic activity in harm’s way. Serious disasters are more frequent and more costly (Figure 1). In 2019 alone, the U.S. experienced fourteen different billion-dollar disasters. In a five-month period that year, flooding affected eleven states: Oklahoma, Nebraska, Missouri, Illinois, Kansas, Arkansas, Kentucky, Tennessee, Texas, Mississippi, and Louisiana.

Federal aid is designed to be a last resort in disasters: the backstop when local and state resources have been overwhelmed. Current disaster policy and practice, however, results in disincentives for local governments to engage in proactive risk reduction. The more damage a county experiences, for example, the more money the county receives from the Federal Government, providing little incentive to adopt better building codes or limit development in risk-prone areas. The National Institute of Building Sciences estimates that updating and refining building codes alone could save $4 for every $1 spent—as well as save 600 lives, avoid 4,000 cases of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and create 87,000 new jobs (NIBS 2019). Despite this alternative approach, U.S. disaster policy emphasizes recovery rather than prevention. Only a fraction of disaster funding—just 15%—is spent on reducing future losses.

Relief decisions use wealth and assets as measures of need, rather than people. The result is that disaster funding increases wealth inequality. There is also little evidence that the billions in disaster recovery paid by U.S. taxpayers each year has increased community resilience. According to the Government Accountability Office, nearly 45,000 new homes experienced repeat flood losses over the last decade, while less than half that number had their flood risk reduced through elevation, acquisition, or floodproofing.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is a key organizer for federal response in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. In the long tail of recovery, though, other agencies— including the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Federal Transit Authority (FTA), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), and Small Business Administration (SBA)— become involved. These agencies have significant and increasing spending authority and autonomy, but the risk reduction projects they prioritize and the reasons for their selection are often unclear or unavailable to researchers or the public. Projects are also not required to complement or support one another; each agency has its own mission, and there is little overarching coordination. At times, their actions may even work at cross-purposes.

Overhauling U.S. disaster policy will require a major effort across multiple levels and branches of government. This effort will not only limit but also potentially reverse the trend of increasing disaster costs. Disaster policy can create incentives for risk-smart development, promote climateproof investments in infrastructure, and protect society’s most vulnerable populations.

Plan of Action

A complete overhaul of U.S. disaster policy will require many actions across government branches. The following roadmap is a starting point: an initial set of steps to establish leadership, coordination, and a structure within which numerous actors can engage in a collaborative effort to build a disaster-resilient nation.

The plan is guided by the following principles:

• Equity must be at the center; disaster policy must focus on enabling communities.
• High-level leadership is required to coordinate multiple mutually supporting actions throughout the Federal Government.
• Aligning state and local government incentives will encourage these institutions to assume responsibility for building resilient communities.
• Transparent, evidence-based decision-making and implementation are most effective.

Executive Branch

An executive order from the President or memorandum from the Office of Science and Technology Policy should direct agencies to address climate change and social equity in all federal actions. The order should provide a new mandate for inter-agency task forces such as the Mitigation Framework Leadership Group (MitFLG) to take, at minimum, the following actions:

• Define leadership and roles for each federal agency and establish coordination mechanisms to align actions during pre-disaster risk mitigation and long-term recovery.
• Provide a roadmap for federal agencies to create incentives for local governments to take risk reduction measures.
• Direct all agencies to review disaster expenditures and decision-making processes, make the results public, and review consistency among agencies.
• Pursue place-based pilot programs that are participatory and community-based to establish participatory processes and evaluation methods.
• Develop a long-term plan for disaster recovery that (1) addresses inequities in access to housing, infrastructure, and social services, (2) promotes quality of life, (3) and ensures a just transition process for communities as they build resilience.

Legislative Branch

Following the executive action, Congress should legislate reform both the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (NFIP) and the Stafford Act of 1988. Congress should adopt the guidelines made by inter-agency task forces and recommendations made by the hazard science community. Congress must deliberate on:

• Increased spending flexibility to support community resilience and functioning.
• Raising the disaster threshold given the increasing frequency and severity of events and the need to incentivize local and state governments to prepare for and limit the damage caused by common hazards.
• Adjusting the federal cost-share to incentivize action without burdening communities.
• Creating incentives that protect vulnerable populations.

University and Government Research

New science is needed to create a more robust foundation of evidentiary knowledge. Through National Science Foundation calls and inter-agency task force member agencies commissioning National Academies Studies, funding should be allocated toward:

• Defining and developing a public insurance program that covers a wide range of disasters.
• Evaluating the adequacy of the disaster directive for achieving national goals.
• Undertaking research to inform thresholds for federal action at state and local levels

Summary

The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed systematic vulnerabilities in the way that wildlife movement and emerging infectious diseases are managed at national and international scales. The next administration should take three key steps to address these vulnerabilities in the United States. First, the White House should create a “Task Force on the Control of Emerging Infectious Diseases”. This Task Force would convene agencies with oversight over animal imports, identify necessary policy actions, determine priority research areas, and coordinate a national response strategy. Second, the next president should work with Congress to pass a bill strengthening live- animal import regulations. Third, U.S. agencies should coordinate with international organizations to address global movement of infectious diseases of animals. Together, these actions would reduce the risk of emerging infectious diseases entering the United States, offer greater protection to citizens from zoonotic diseases, and protect American biodiversity from losses due to wildlife diseases.