Missile Watch

A publication of the FAS Arms Sales Monitoring Project

Vol. 2, Issue 2

October 2009

Written by Matt Schroeder and Scoville Fellow Matt Buongiorno

(more…)

By Matt Schroeder

Documents provided to the Federation of American Scientists by the US Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York provide additional details about the case against alleged arms trafficker Viktor Bout, but many important questions remain (publicly) unanswered. Below is a brief summary of these documents and their significance.

Background

Viktor Bout and an alleged associate, Andrew Smulian, were arrested in Thailand in March 2008 after an elaborate international sting operation organized by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).   Bout and Smulian have been accused of, among other offenses, conspiring to sell thousands of weapons to three “confidential sources” (CS) working with the DEA who were posing as representatives of the FARC, a Colombian terrorist group.  Since his arrest, Bout has been the subject of an international legal tug-of-war between Washington, which is seeking his extradition to the US, and Moscow, which is demanding that he be returned to Russia.  In August, Thai courts denied US extradition requests. Prosecutors appealed the ruling and are currently awaiting a decision on the appeal.

The Documents

The documents obtained by the FAS include copies of several pieces of evidence in the case, some of which were reportedly seized from Bout at the time of his arrest.  These documents include:

(1)   A print-out of an email that Bout allegedly sent to one of the DEA’s confidential sources. This email is mentioned prominently in other court documents made public shortly after Bout was arrested.  Oddly, the email was reportedly sent from an address linked to an account set up by a “Victor But.”   Use of an alias so close to his own name when setting up an email account intended for negotiating arms transfers seems uncharacteristically careless for Bout.

(2)   Excerpts from pamphlets on Soviet-era cargo planes that Bout allegedly recommended for delivering weapons to the FARC. According to investigators, the weapons were to be air-dropped from these planes.  The same delivery method was used by the orchestrators of a 1999 plot to divert to the FARC 50,000 Jordanian assault rifles intended for the Peruvian military.  The traffickers managed to drop 10,000 of the rifles into FARC-controlled areas of Colombia before the government of Jordan learned of the scheme and canceled the deal. In their book, Merchant of Death, Doug Farah and Stephen Braun suggest that Bout was linked to the diversion.  They claim that the plane used to deliver the rifles “…belong[ed] to one of Bout’s front companies…”

(3)  One of several articles on the FARC that describes their criminal activities.

(4) A map of South America that Bout reportedly used in discussions about the locations of American radar stations.

(5) Handwritten notes that Bout reportedly took during the meeting in Thailand. The notes include short-hand references to various weapons, including “AA” or anti-aircraft (believed to be a reference to Igla missiles), “AK-47,” “UAV” (unmanned aerial vehicle), 10,000,000 “7,62 x 54” (ammunition used in Russian Dragunov sniper rifles and PKM machine guns), RPG-7 and RPG-22 rocket launchers, and “AG-17” – presumably a reference to the AGS-17 30 mm automatic grenade launcher.  Some of the notes are more cryptic, including references to 500 “60 mm”, 200 “82 mm” and 40 “120 mm.”  Presumably, these are references to mortars since 60mm, 82mm and 120mm are all common calibers for mortar bombs.

(6) Technical documents on anti-tank missiles that Bout allegedly offered to sell to the FARC. The documents were reportedly taken from a memory stick provided to the DEA during the sting.  It appears that missile on offer was the AT-4 Spigot, a wire-guided Russian missile system that has a maximum range of 2000-2500 meters and can penetrate up to 400-460 mm of armor, depending on the type of missile used.

Other documents received by the FAS include affidavits from key players, the complaint and the indictment, most of which have been thoroughly dissected by the media.

Absent from the documents is a description of the 100 Igla missiles that Andrew Smulian reportedly claimed were immediately available to Bout.  Exhibit 6 of the Rebuttal Affidavit Concerning Request for Extradition reportedly contains “…photographs and specifications for anti-aircraft missiles…” but this material was not provided to the FAS.  The material on the anti-aircraft missiles would be useful in determining which of the three Russian missiles typically referred to as “Iglas” were allegedly accessible to Bout:  the SA-16, SA-18 or SA-24.  The first two models date back to the early 1980s and, while dangerous in the wrong hands, appear to be are less capable than the newer SA-24.  The SA-24 is also less widely available, meaning that it would presumably be easier to identify the point of diversion and the origin of black market SA-24s than SA-16s or SA-18s, both of which have proliferated widely.

While the documents contain some important details and add texture to the unfolding drama in Bangkok, they shed little additional light on several key questions, including whether Bout and Smulian actually had access to the weapons that they allegedly promised to deliver to the FARC.  This question is particularly important in regards to the 100 shoulder-fired, surface-to-air missiles, which, as explained in an earlier posting on the Strategic Security Blog, have been the focus of an international control campaign for nearly seven years because of the threat they pose to military and commercial aircraft.  Confirmation that Bout had access to the missiles would suggest the need for renewed vigor in the global fight against shoulder-fired missile proliferation.  Also unaddressed is the veracity of Smulian’s alleged claims that the weapons were located in Bulgaria, which was also reportedly identified by arms dealer Monzer al Kassar as his source of weapons during a similar sting in 2007.  According to Kassar’s indictment, he invited a DEA informant to “travel to Bulgaria and Romania where the weapons [on offer] were being manufactured”.  Investigating these claims is important because, if entities in Bulgaria are indeed offering to sell Igla missiles and the other weapons to arms traffickers, immediate action should be taken to identify them and shut down their operations.

Below is a list of some of the documents obtained by the FAS:

(1) Bout Complaint

(2) Bout Indictment

(3) Bout Rebuttal Affidavit in Support of Extradition 02.17.2009 – EX 1 (email allegedly from Bout)

(4) Bout Rebuttal Affidavit in Support of Extradition 02.17.2009 – EX 2 (plane Brochures)

(5) Bout Rebuttal Affidavit in Support of Extradition 02.17.2009 – EX 3 (article on FARC)

(6) Bout Rebuttal Affidavit in Support of Extradition 02.17.2009 – EX 4 (map of South America)

(7) Bout Rebuttal Affidavit in Support of Extradition 02.17.2009 – EX 5 (hand-written notes)

(8) Bout Rebuttal Affidavit in Support of Extradition 02.17.2009 – EX 6 (AT-4 Spigot description)

(9) Bout Affidavit in Support of Extradition 04.28.2008 – EX 1 (indictment)

(10) Bout Affidavit in Support of Extradition 04.28.2008 – EX A (photo of Bout)

by: Alicia Godsberg

This past Thursday and Friday marked the 6^th bi-annual Article XIV Conference, the Conference on Facilitating the Entry Into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).  This year’s conference was held at the United Nations in New York and was met with a measure of cautious optimism – most states voiced their appreciation of President Obama’s pledge to work toward US ratification of the CTBT, while many states recognized the challenges of obtaining all the necessary ratifications for entry into force of the Treaty and mentioned the challenges to the nonproliferation regime stemming from the lack of the Treaty’s entry into force (despite former commitments to do so) and from the DPRK’s 2006 and 2009 nuclear tests.

Entry into force of the CTBT has been on the international agenda for thirteen years. Because the US, China, UK, France, and Russian Federation have all imposed a voluntary moratorium on national nuclear testing, many question the need for entry into force of the CTBT.  Although the Treaty would bring few new tangible benefits, the political impact of entry into force would be tremendous.  As explained below, the vast majority of sates see entry into force of the CTBT as somewhat of a litmus test for the future viability of the nonproliferation regime.

The CTBT was opened up for signature in 1996 and since then the Treaty has obtained 181 signatories and 150 ratifications.  In order for the Treaty to enter into force, 44 states mentioned in annex II of the Treaty must ratify.  As of today, only 35 of these states have ratified the Treaty, leaving the full implementation of the Treaty in the hands of the remaining nine states.[i] The Treaty has an extensive verification system that is continuing to be built and includes 321 monitoring stations and 16 laboratories in 89 countries that make up an International Monitoring System (IMS).  This system is now approximately 85% operational and since 2000 has been transmitting data to an International Data Center (IDC) to be interpreted and shared with all signatories to the Treaty.  The IMS provides valuable data for civilian applications, such as advance tsunami warnings, but the main focus of the IMS is detection and attribution of nuclear test explosions.  The system was proven effective even without the CTBT entering into force after collecting and interpreting data from both of the recent DPRK nuclear tests.  However, the option of imposing intrusive on-site inspections is necessary for an extra layer of investigation into the attribution of nuclear explosions.  According to the terms of the CTBT this option cannot be exercised before the Treaty enters into force, and is one main reason for the need to obtain the remaining nine “annex II” state ratifications.

Entry into force of the CTBT is also important, as many states reiterated at this latest conference, because the early entry into force of the CTBT was one of the conditions under which the non-nuclear weapon states parties (NNWS) to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) agreed to indefinitely extend the NPT in 1995.  Similarly, at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, early entry into force of the CTBT was the first of 13 Practical Steps toward nuclear disarmament that was adopted by consensus by all states parties to the NPT that year.  Nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT (NWS) have all signed the CTBT, but China and the US have not ratified the Treaty.  President Obama has pledged to work toward US ratification, but it seems he is going to have to fight to get the 67 votes he needs in the Senate to do so.  Indonesia, also an annex II state, recently publicly stated that once the US ratifies the CTBT they will follow with ratification, and it is likely that China will follow US ratification as well.  Ratification of the CTBT by the last two NWS before the NPT Review Conference in May 2010 would be an important first step toward fulfilling NWS’s political commitments and legal obligations to NNWS.  US and China’s ratifications of the CTBT could set the tone for cooperation on President Obama’s nonproliferation agenda and perhaps even on the sensitive topic of the control of the nuclear fuel cycle at the upcoming NPT Review Conference in May.

If you go here and read a random selection of statements from the Article XIV Conference, you will find that most states are looking to the US to fulfill its past promises and to take up the leadership position on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, about which President Obama speaks so eloquently.  Yet, with all the positive reasons for states to ratify the CTBT, there still remain some important international and domestic stumbling blocks.  Because countries like the DPRK and Iran are on the list of annex II states, many in the US and around the world believe that the Treaty will never enter into force.  These voices in the US use such countries as one excuse not to support US ratification of the Treaty.  While US ratification is not sufficient for the Treaty to enter into force it is necessary, and US ratification is likely to be followed by the ratification of at least some other annex II states as well.  In addition, the international community would certainly see US ratification of the CTBT as a positive step toward a world free of nuclear weapons and toward fulfilling the nuclear disarmament obligation under Article VI of the NPT.

Policy makers in Washington don’t seem to make the connection between keeping political commitments/upholding international treaty obligations and getting support from the global community for US nonproliferation objectives.  This point is never lost at the UN on the vast majority of states (meaning all but the five permanent members of the Security Council).  In speech after speech, in forum after forum, NNWS – along with India, Pakistan, and Israel – call upon NWS to fulfill their obligations from the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and from the 13 Practical Steps of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.  President Obama recognizes the need for the international community to work together to manage our common security (see his speech to the GA here and to the Security Council here) and last week began reasserting US leadership at the UN in matters of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.  To show the high-level of engagement that the US intends to have on the subject, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton led the US delegation to the Article XIV Conference (the first US delegation at an Article XIV Conference in ten years) and President Obama addressed the 64^th General Assembly the day before the conference started and chaired the first ever Security Council Summit on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation in a separate meeting on the conference’s first day.  All this high-level attention from the US for the CTBT, nuclear disarmament, and nonproliferation was noted and welcomed by most of the states in attendance at the conference.

One thing that was not mentioned by any states in their official statements to the conference was the possibility of the provisional entry into force of the Treaty prior to obtaining all remaining annex II ratifications.  Provisional entry into force of the CTBT could allow states parties to the Treaty to agree to on-site inspections when necessary, an important added layer to detect potential cheating.  Provisional entry into force might also put pressure on those annex II states that have not yet ratified the Treaty to do so by being yet another indicator of the importance the vast majority of the international community places on the CTBT.  Recognizing that international law helps solidify norms of state behavior and brings predictability and stability to international relations, many states at the conference spoke about the importance of codifying the voluntary nuclear testing moratoria the NWS have made into the CTBT, a legally binding treaty.  Provisional entry into force of the Treaty before all annex II states have ratified could be an important step in the cementing of the norm against nuclear testing, thus providing another motivation for more annex II states to work toward ratification of the Treaty.

One other interesting note from the conference is that the actual measures to promote early entry into force of the CTBT – the main stated purpose of the conference – were not mentioned by many countries.  Japan was one of only a few countries to discuss such measures in their speech, measures that included sending high-level envoys to annex II states to encourage their ratification of the Treaty at an early date.  And while 103 states were represented at the conference, attendance during the bulk of state speeches was relatively low.  This could be due to the fact that the General Assembly was simultaneously in session, and it should be noted that the large number of participants is indicative of the importance the international community places on the early entry into force of the CTBT.

The conference ended with the adoption of a final document but without much celebration.  NNWS want serious progress to be made toward nuclear disarmament before NWS further restrict nuclear technology for peaceful purposes; the ratification of the CTBT by the two hold-out NWS is a promise that needs to be fulfilled for the vast majority of the world to recognize such serious progress.  Despite the positive developments many states mentioned since the last Article XIV Conference in 2007, the CTBT is still not in force.  US ratification of the CTBT might become the strongest signal of the revitalization of the nonproliferation regime, which will be tested for its durability at the upcoming NPT Review Conference in May 2010.

[i] The following is the list of annex II states that need to ratify the CTBT before it can enter into force: China; DPRK; Egypt; Indonesia; India; Islamic Republic of Iran; Israel; Pakistan; and the United States of America.  Of these nine countries, three have not yet signed the Treaty (DPRK, India, and Pakistan).

By Matt Schroeder

The recent discovery of Swedish AT-4 anti-tank rockets sold to Venezuela in a Colombian rebel arms cache raises serious questions about Venezuela’s ability to safeguard its arsenal of modern weaponry, including dozens of advanced SA-24 shoulder-fired, surface-to-air missiles.  Given the potential threat posed by these missiles and other weapons in Venezuela’s rapidly growing arsenal, the international community should take immediate steps to identify and close the gaps in Venezuela’s stockpile security and to ensure that the end-use monitoring conducted by states that export weapons to Venezuela is sufficiently robust.

According to Colombian authorities, Swedish anti-tank rocket launchers were found in October 2008 in an arms cache allegedly linked to the FARC.[1] On July 27^th, Colombian Vice President Francisco Santos asserted that “[i]n several operations in which we have recovered weapons from the FARC, we have found powerful munitions and powerful equipment, including anti-tank weapons, from a European country that sold them to Venezuela and that turned up in the hands of the FARC.”[2] Thomas Samuelsson of the Swedish firm Saab Bofors Dynamics confirmed that the AT-4 rockets were manufactured and sold to Venezuela by his firm.[3] The Venezuelan government responded harshly to Colombia’s revelation, calling it “laughable” and recalling the Venezuelan ambassador to Colombia.[4]

This is not the first time that Colombian authorities have discovered Venezuelan weapons in rebel arms caches.  In 2006, the Federation of American Scientists called attention to several reports of Venezuelan firearms acquired by the FARC, sometimes “…in lots of 50,” according to a demobilized guerrilla interviewed by Jane’s Information Group.[5] In most of these cases, it is not clear what role, if any, that Venezuelan government officials played in the diversion.  There is much speculation about the regime’s support of the FARC and its role in arms trafficking to the embattled rebel group,[6] but verifying accusations of high-level complicity by the Venezuelan government based on information in the public domain is nearly impossible and, at one level, it doesn’t matter.  The Venezuelan government is responsible for safeguarding the military’s arsenal and should be held accountable for any diverted weapons, regardless of the circumstances surrounding their diversion. The focus, therefore, should shift from the fruitless back-and-forth with Chavez over his regime’s alleged support for the FARC to identifying the specific sources of diverted weapons, bolstering Venezuelan stockpile security, and calling on states that arm Venezuela to closely monitor their exported weapons.

The need for strong controls on Venezuela’s arsenals has never been greater.  In April, the world got its first, surprising glimpse of dozens of sophisticated SA-24 surface-to-air missiles imported by Venezuela, presumably from Russia.  The missiles – the acquisition of which was rumored but not confirmed – were caught on tape during a military parade.  The SA-24 is an advanced, shoulder-fired, infra-red seeking missile with a range of 6000 meters.[7] Given recent events, the wisdom of selling dozens of sophisticated shoulder-fired missiles to Venezuela seems dubious.  But Chavez is not about to give up the missiles, and Russia is not about to take them back.  What to do?

The international community should start by demanding an immediate and thorough investigation into the diversion of Venezuelan weapons seized from Colombian rebels or other unauthorized end-users.  This investigation should be led by an independent organization such as the Organization of American States, which conducted a similar investigation into the diversion of Nicaraguan assault rifles in 2001.  As part of this investigation, the Venezuelan government should provide a detailed summary of the stockpile security measures currently applied to its small arms, light weapons, and ammunition.  This summary should be at least as detailed as the information provided by the United States in the U.S. Defense Department manual, “Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition and Explosives,”[8] and should be made available to the Organization of American States, its members, and the governments of countries that sell weapons to Venezuela.    If done correctly, the investigation will reveal any problems with Venezuela’s stockpile security controls, and will provide a blueprint for any necessary changes to these controls.

Secondly, the states that export weapons to Venezuela should condition future weapon sales on a full and complete investigation into recent reports of arms trafficking and diversion, and the implementation of corrective actions aimed at preventing future incidents.  Countries that have recently suspended weapon sales to Venezuela should make it clear that arms sales will not resume until shortcomings in stockpile security are fully addressed and Venezuelan weapons stop turning up in the caches of illegal armed groups.

Exporting states should also adopt rigorous end-use monitoring requirements for all small arms and light weapons exported to Venezuela.  This monitoring should be applied retroactively to previously exported arms and should include on-site inspections of Venezuela’s weapons depots by officials from the exporting state; rigorous transport, use, storage and retransfer requirements and restrictions; and routine post-shipment checks of exported weapons. Additional controls should be applied (if they aren’t already in place) to the SA-24 shoulder-fired missiles, including mandatory on-site physical inventories by serial number of all missiles and launchers.  The inventories should be conducted monthly by Venezuelan authorities and annually by officials from exporting states.  The international community should monitor implementation of these measures by Venezuela and its arms suppliers, and should intervene if these governments fail to make adequate progress in a timely fashion.

Finally, the international community should embrace post-shipment end-use monitoring as a fundamental anti-trafficking strategy and should push for universal adoption of robust EUM by arms exporting states.  Venezuela is but one of many sources of illicit arms, even in South America, and the global nature of arms trafficking means that unsecured arsenals anywhere are a potential target for international traffickers everywhere. While stemming the illicit arms trade requires action on many fronts, onsite physical inspections of exported weapons are particularly important as they have the potential to deter unauthorized retransfer and ensure that incidents of diversion and lapses in stockpile security will be detected by the exporting state.  Few exporters actively and systematically track their weapons after they leave their shores, however, and fewer still regularly send officials to physically check on exported weapons.  According to Sarah Parker of Small Arms Survey, “[i]n practice…it seems that few states other than the United States conduct significant physical and post-delivery checks.”[9] This must change if arms exporters and their clients are ever to curb the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.

Notes

[1] Frank Bajak, “Rocket launchers sold to Venzuela went to FARC,” Associated Press, 28 July 2009.

[2] Arthur Brice, “Venezuela freezes relations with Colombia,” CNN, 29 July 2009.

[3] Chris Kraul, “Colombia-Venezuela relations erode further with rocket revelation,” Los Angeles Times, 28 July 2009.  During a telephone call on 30 July 2009, Swedish officials confirmed to the FAS that serial numbers on the seized missiles matched those sold to Venezuela.

[4] Chavez claims that the AT-4s were stolen from a naval post in Cararabo in 1995.  Others, including Anna Gilmour of Jane’s Information Group, think that the launchers were acquired more recently.  FARC leader Alfonso Cano claims that his group captured the launchers “a long time ago in a military battle on the border.”  See “FARC chief denies getting launchers from Venezuela,” Associated Press, 13 August 2009; “Chavez halts imports of 10,000 Colombian cars,” Agence France Presse, 6 August 2009; and Brice, “Venezuela freezes relations with Colombia.”

[5] ; Andy Webb-Vidal, “South American cocaine trafficking operations shift towards Venezuela,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 2006.  See also Gonzalo Guillen, “Venezuelan ammunition reaching rebels,” Miami Herald, 21 January 2008; David Gonzales, “Assembly to be Asked to Investigate Alleged Trafficking of Arms to Guerrillas,” El Nacional , 28 March 2005 (English translation); “General Tapias on Weapons Seized from Illegal Armed Groups in Past Five Years,” El Pais, 11 July 2000 (English translation); Andy Webb-Vidal, “Lords of War: Running the arms trafficking industry,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 2008; “Venezuelans admit charges of arm traffic in Colombia,” El Universal, 9 June 2008; Kim Cragin and Bruce Hoffman, Arms Trafficking and Colombia (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003); UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Violence, Crime and Illegal Arms Trafficking in Colombia, December 2006;  Jose de Cordoba, “Colombia rebels wield power inside Venezuela,” Associated Press Financial Wire, 25 November 2008; and Matthew Schroeder, Small Arms, Terrorism and the OAS Firearms Convention, FAS Occasional Paper No. 1, March 2004.

[6] See Simon Romero, “Venezuela Still Aids Colombia Rebels, New Material Shows,” New York Times, 3 August 2009.   In September 2008, the US Treasury Department added two senior Venezuelan government officials and a former official to the Office of Foreign Asset Control’s list of Specially Designated Nationals list.  According to the Treasury Department, these officials “armed, abetted and funded the FARC…”  See “Treasury Targets Venezuelan Government Officials Supporting the FARC,” Press Release HP-1132, 12 September 2008. http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1132.htm

[7] James C. O’Halloran and Christopher F. Foss, Jane’s Land-based Air Defense 2008-2009 (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

[8] DOD 5100.76-M

[9] “Devils in Diversity: Export Controls for Military Small Arms,” in Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 82.

Deliveries of arms through the Defense Department’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program decreased by nearly a billion dollars in fiscal year 2008, according to the most recent edition of the Annual Military Assistance Report. The report, which is often referred to as the “Section 655 Report” after the section in the Foreign Assistance Act that requires it, is compiled each year by the Defense Department and the State Department. The Defense Department’s contribution to the report was acquired by the Federation of American Scientists under the Freedom of Information Act.

According to this year’s report, FMS deliveries in FY08 totaled $10,996,180,000 – nearly $1 billion less than the $11,910,160,000 delivered in FY2007.  This is surprising given the significant increase in FMS agreements in recent years.   FMS agreements jumped from $9.5 billion in FY2005 to more than $18 billion in FY2006, and nearly doubled again to $36 billion in FY2008. One possible explanation for the apparent lag is that deliveries, and particularly deliveries of big-ticket items, can take years.  If this is the case, FMS delivery totals are likely to rise sharply over the next few years.

Adam Willner contributed to this report.

Click here to read the full article

On Wednesday, the FBI thwarted an alleged terrorist plot to shoot down a military cargo plane with a Stinger missile.  According to a criminal complaint obtained by the New York Times, four men were arrested on charges of conspiring to use “a surface-to-air missile system to destroy military aircraft at the New York Air National Guard Base located at Stewart Airport in Newburgh, New York. “ The plot also allegedly included plans for a simultaneous attack on a Bronx synagogue using an improvised explosive device containing more than 30 pounds of C-4 explosives.

The FBI operation in New York is one of several since the 1980s in which undercover US agents have thwarted  attempts to smuggle, acquire or use man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), including US-made Stinger missiles.  These plots feature conspirators that range from rank amateurs whose ability to obtain MANPADS is dubious at best to sophisticated criminals with a demonstrated ability to obtain and ship weapons to bad actors worldwide.  An example of the former is Hemant Lakhani, a British merchant born in India who was arrested in 2003 for attempting to import 200 Russian Igla missiles into the US and to sell them to individuals claiming to be members of a Somali terrorist organization.  Lakhani was so inept that undercover Russian agents ended up furnishing him with a (deactivated) SA-18 missile after he repeatedly tried and failed to obtain a missile himself.  The agents then had to reroute the missile after Lakhani arranged to have it delivered to the wrong address.

The suspects in the New York plot clearly fall into the same category as Lakhani – bumbling amateurs whose ambitions vastly exceed their actual abilities.   Relatives and others interviewed by the Associated Press used phrases like “down-on-their-luck” and “intellectually challenged” when describing the men, all of whom are ex-convicts and were either unemployed or working low-skill jobs when they were arrested. Furthermore, the complaint obtained by the New York Times indicates that the suspects asked the FBI’s confidential witness to teach them “how to operate the devices,” presumably including the deactivated Stinger missile supplied by the FBI.  While the basic operation of a MANPADS is not difficult to learn, successfully using them in real world conditions requires training and practice.  Without this training, the chances of shooting down a plane with a single missile are low.  It is also doubtful that the suspects could have acquired the missile without the help of the US government.  Stinger missiles are some of the US military’s most tightly guarded items and there are no (publicly) confirmed cases of successful thefts from US arsenals.  Nothing in the personal histories of the four men suggests that they had the knowledge or contacts necessary to pull off such a feat.

Even if the suspects in this case were incapable of acquiring a Stinger missile and shooting down a plane on their own, ‘Stinger Stings’ are a good investment.  They send a clear message to would-be terrorists and arms traffickers that the US is a dangerous place to do business, and sow seeds of doubt about loyalties and affiliations within criminal networks.   Occasionally, such operations also nab truly capable criminals, such as famed arms trafficker Monzer al Kassar, who was arrested in Spain after a lengthy undercover operation orchestrated by the US Drug Enforcement Administration.  Kassar was later extradited to the US and convicted of conspiring to supply Colombian guerrillas with millions of dollars in weapons, including MANPADS.   Another legendary arms dealer, Viktor Bout, may suffer a similar fate.  After eluding authorities for years, Bout was arrested by Thai police in March 2008 in an international sting that was remarkably similar to the one that nabbed Monzer al Kassar just nine months earlier.  Thai courts will decide later this summer whether Bout will be extradited to the US.  If he is, his (alleged) gun running days are over.  Taking Kassar and Bout off the streets may ultimately prevent the trafficking of thousands or tens of thousands of weapons to some of the world’s most dangerous groups.  Their arrests are proof positive that Stings are an essential element of any national strategy for combating the MANPADS threat, even if they don’t nab criminal masterminds every time.

At a press conference in Mexico City yesterday, President Obama urged the Senate to take up the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials, which is often referred to by its Spanish acronym, CIFTA.

The Convention aims to curtail the illicit international trade in small arms by requiring member states to establish basic export controls and to cooperate with each other to stop international arms trafficking.  These controls include the establishment of effective systems for authorizing international arms transfers, identifying and preventing arms trafficking at border points, exchanging information on illicit trafficking and best practices for combating it, and providing technical assistance to countries attempting to increase their capacity to identify and thwart arms trafficking.  As stated in the preamble, “this Convention does not commit States Parties to enact legislation or regulations pertaining to firearms ownership, possession, or trade of a wholly domestic character…”

The US played an important role in drafting the Convention, and was one of the first signatories in November, 1997.  The Convention was transmitted to the Senate in June 1998 and, more than a decade later, still awaits the Senate’s advice and consent.  To date, 29 of the 34 OAS member states have ratified the Convention.  Only the US, Canada, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and St. Vincent & Grenadines have yet to take that step.

For more information:

Small Arms, Terrorism and the OAS Firearms Convention, FAS Occasional Paper No. 1

“US-Mexico Discuss New Approach to Bilateral Relationship,” White House Fact Sheet

“Obama in Mexico, pledges help to slow US arms flow,” Associated Press

“OAS Firearms Convention,” ASMP Issue Brief #2

“Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA),” Department of International Legal Affairs of the Organization of American States.

Afghanistan

In March, the Sunday Times of London reported on the Taliban’s alleged acquisition of Iranian-supplied SA-14 missiles, which the Afghan insurgent group reportedly wants for a “spectacular” attack on coalition forces. The accusation reportedly came from unidentified “American intelligence sources.” According to the Sunday Times, “…coalition forces only became aware of the presence of SA14s two weeks ago when parts from two of them were discovered during an American operation in western Afghanistan.” The article provides no information on the number of SA-14s allegedly circulating in Afghanistan, their condition, or Iran’s alleged connection to them. When queried about the Sunday Times article, a US military official told the Federation of American Scientists that “[man-portable air defense systems] have been recovered in Afghanistan since 2007,” but refused to provide additional details because of “operational security concerns.”

Other types of MANPADS reportedly acquired by the Taliban and other unauthorized end-users in Afghanistan include the Chinese HN-5, photographs of which were obtained by the Washington Times in 2007, and the ubiquitous SA-7.

For information on Iraq, Sri Lanka and Somalia, click here.

Though the nuclear arsenal of the United States is smaller than it was during the Cold War, the day-to-day deployment of forces has changed very little. The United States still has weapons ready to launch at a moment’s notice at all times.

The reason is simple: the mission for nuclear weapons has not changed from the time of the Cold War.

Most Americans would be surprised to discover that the instructions to our nuclear targeteers still include a requirement for a surprise first strike against Russian nuclear forces to destroy them on the ground. It is time to shift the focus from reducing numbers of nuclear weapons to reducing the missions of nuclear weapons.

Despite a million dollar buyback program and hundreds of raids on illicit weapons caches, US and Iraqi forces are still finding surface-to-air missiles in insurgent stockpiles.  US military press releases and media reports reveal that, since October 2006, at least 121 such missiles have been recovered, along with 4 additional launchers and various components.  These reports suggest that insurgents still have ready access to surface-to-air missiles, including MANPADS, at least some of which are reportedly still operational.  The missiles pose an immediate threat to civilian and military aircraft in Iraq and a potential threat to aircraft in the region.

To read the rest of Missile Watch #3, click here.

CNN and AFP are reporting that the Shabaab, a militant wing of a Somali insurgent group, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), has threatened to treat “as an enemy combatant” any plane that attempts to land at Mogadishu Airport.  According to AFP, the threat, which was posted on the Internet, was confirmed by Shabaab leader Mukhtar Robow.  The web posting reportedly includes a list of grievances used to justify the threat, including the airport’s use by “Ugandan and Bulgarian mercenaries,” money generated by the airport for the Ethiopian government, and harassment of “Somali religious personalities” by “US and Israeli secret services…”  The warnings are accompanied by a graphic of a man pointing a shoulder-fired missile at a plane as it is landing.

The threat is not to be taken lightly. Last year, the FAS identified Somalia as one of three MANPADS proliferation hotspots worldwide in response to numerous reports of illicit missile activity, most of which involved the ICU and the Shabaab.  In 2006, UN investigators identified at least six shipments of MANPADS and other weapons to the violent Insurgent group, including a shipment of “50 units” of ”shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles and second generation infrared-guided anti-tank weapons” from Eritrea, “45 units” of surface-to-air missiles from Iran, and three surface-to-air missiles from Syria.  In each case, the missiles were part of larger arms shipments that also included dozens of assault rifles, machine guns, and other small arms and light weapons.  The Associated Press later reported that the ICU had received 200 shoulder-fired missiles from Eritrea alone.

In March 2007, the Islamists fired two advanced SA-18 missiles at a Belarussian cargo aircraft as it was departing from Mogadishu International Airport.  One of the missiles hit the plane, causing it to crash and killing all eleven people on board.  UN investigators later concluded that the missiles used in the attack were part of a consignment of six SA-18s acquired from Eritrea.  This summer, the UN traced another SA-18 found in Somalia back to a batch of Russian missiles that were shipped to Eritrea in 1995. The Eritrean government denies allegations that it provides missiles and other weapons to the ICU.

To sign up for Missile Watch, click here.  For more information on illicit MANPADS in Somalia and elsewhere, see ASMP Issue Brief #1: MANPADS Proliferation.

written by Matt Schroeder

In response to a Freedom of Information Act request filed by the FAS, the Defense Department has released its contribution to the Fiscal Year 2007 edition of the Annual Military Assistance Report required by Section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act.

The “Section 655” report, as it is known, contains information on five major security assistance programs: Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Excess Defense Articles Grant Authorizations and Deliveries (EDA), Drawdown Assistance Authorizations, and Foreign Military Sales (FMS). The section on FMS (i.e. government-to-government arms sales) is particularly valuable as it provides information on the types of items exported, not just the aggregate dollar value of the exported weapons.

The State Department voluntarily posts its section (on Direct Commercial Sales) on its website. The rest of the report is acquired by the FAS each year through the Freedom of Information Act.

To access the report, click here.

For more information:

U.S. Arms Transfers: Government Data

Defense Trade Data, Government Accountability Office, 28 January 2005.

State Department Needs to Resolve Data Reliability Problems that Led to
Inaccurate Reporting to Congress on Foreign Arms Sales, Government Accountability Office, 28 January 2005.