By Matt Schroeder

The recent discovery of Swedish AT-4 anti-tank rockets sold to Venezuela in a Colombian rebel arms cache raises serious questions about Venezuela’s ability to safeguard its arsenal of modern weaponry, including dozens of advanced SA-24 shoulder-fired, surface-to-air missiles.  Given the potential threat posed by these missiles and other weapons in Venezuela’s rapidly growing arsenal, the international community should take immediate steps to identify and close the gaps in Venezuela’s stockpile security and to ensure that the end-use monitoring conducted by states that export weapons to Venezuela is sufficiently robust.

According to Colombian authorities, Swedish anti-tank rocket launchers were found in October 2008 in an arms cache allegedly linked to the FARC.[1] On July 27^th, Colombian Vice President Francisco Santos asserted that “[i]n several operations in which we have recovered weapons from the FARC, we have found powerful munitions and powerful equipment, including anti-tank weapons, from a European country that sold them to Venezuela and that turned up in the hands of the FARC.”[2] Thomas Samuelsson of the Swedish firm Saab Bofors Dynamics confirmed that the AT-4 rockets were manufactured and sold to Venezuela by his firm.[3] The Venezuelan government responded harshly to Colombia’s revelation, calling it “laughable” and recalling the Venezuelan ambassador to Colombia.[4]

This is not the first time that Colombian authorities have discovered Venezuelan weapons in rebel arms caches.  In 2006, the Federation of American Scientists called attention to several reports of Venezuelan firearms acquired by the FARC, sometimes “…in lots of 50,” according to a demobilized guerrilla interviewed by Jane’s Information Group.[5] In most of these cases, it is not clear what role, if any, that Venezuelan government officials played in the diversion.  There is much speculation about the regime’s support of the FARC and its role in arms trafficking to the embattled rebel group,[6] but verifying accusations of high-level complicity by the Venezuelan government based on information in the public domain is nearly impossible and, at one level, it doesn’t matter.  The Venezuelan government is responsible for safeguarding the military’s arsenal and should be held accountable for any diverted weapons, regardless of the circumstances surrounding their diversion. The focus, therefore, should shift from the fruitless back-and-forth with Chavez over his regime’s alleged support for the FARC to identifying the specific sources of diverted weapons, bolstering Venezuelan stockpile security, and calling on states that arm Venezuela to closely monitor their exported weapons.

The need for strong controls on Venezuela’s arsenals has never been greater.  In April, the world got its first, surprising glimpse of dozens of sophisticated SA-24 surface-to-air missiles imported by Venezuela, presumably from Russia.  The missiles – the acquisition of which was rumored but not confirmed – were caught on tape during a military parade.  The SA-24 is an advanced, shoulder-fired, infra-red seeking missile with a range of 6000 meters.[7] Given recent events, the wisdom of selling dozens of sophisticated shoulder-fired missiles to Venezuela seems dubious.  But Chavez is not about to give up the missiles, and Russia is not about to take them back.  What to do?

The international community should start by demanding an immediate and thorough investigation into the diversion of Venezuelan weapons seized from Colombian rebels or other unauthorized end-users.  This investigation should be led by an independent organization such as the Organization of American States, which conducted a similar investigation into the diversion of Nicaraguan assault rifles in 2001.  As part of this investigation, the Venezuelan government should provide a detailed summary of the stockpile security measures currently applied to its small arms, light weapons, and ammunition.  This summary should be at least as detailed as the information provided by the United States in the U.S. Defense Department manual, “Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition and Explosives,”[8] and should be made available to the Organization of American States, its members, and the governments of countries that sell weapons to Venezuela.    If done correctly, the investigation will reveal any problems with Venezuela’s stockpile security controls, and will provide a blueprint for any necessary changes to these controls.

Secondly, the states that export weapons to Venezuela should condition future weapon sales on a full and complete investigation into recent reports of arms trafficking and diversion, and the implementation of corrective actions aimed at preventing future incidents.  Countries that have recently suspended weapon sales to Venezuela should make it clear that arms sales will not resume until shortcomings in stockpile security are fully addressed and Venezuelan weapons stop turning up in the caches of illegal armed groups.

Exporting states should also adopt rigorous end-use monitoring requirements for all small arms and light weapons exported to Venezuela.  This monitoring should be applied retroactively to previously exported arms and should include on-site inspections of Venezuela’s weapons depots by officials from the exporting state; rigorous transport, use, storage and retransfer requirements and restrictions; and routine post-shipment checks of exported weapons. Additional controls should be applied (if they aren’t already in place) to the SA-24 shoulder-fired missiles, including mandatory on-site physical inventories by serial number of all missiles and launchers.  The inventories should be conducted monthly by Venezuelan authorities and annually by officials from exporting states.  The international community should monitor implementation of these measures by Venezuela and its arms suppliers, and should intervene if these governments fail to make adequate progress in a timely fashion.

Finally, the international community should embrace post-shipment end-use monitoring as a fundamental anti-trafficking strategy and should push for universal adoption of robust EUM by arms exporting states.  Venezuela is but one of many sources of illicit arms, even in South America, and the global nature of arms trafficking means that unsecured arsenals anywhere are a potential target for international traffickers everywhere. While stemming the illicit arms trade requires action on many fronts, onsite physical inspections of exported weapons are particularly important as they have the potential to deter unauthorized retransfer and ensure that incidents of diversion and lapses in stockpile security will be detected by the exporting state.  Few exporters actively and systematically track their weapons after they leave their shores, however, and fewer still regularly send officials to physically check on exported weapons.  According to Sarah Parker of Small Arms Survey, “[i]n practice…it seems that few states other than the United States conduct significant physical and post-delivery checks.”[9] This must change if arms exporters and their clients are ever to curb the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.

Notes

[1] Frank Bajak, “Rocket launchers sold to Venzuela went to FARC,” Associated Press, 28 July 2009.

[2] Arthur Brice, “Venezuela freezes relations with Colombia,” CNN, 29 July 2009.

[3] Chris Kraul, “Colombia-Venezuela relations erode further with rocket revelation,” Los Angeles Times, 28 July 2009.  During a telephone call on 30 July 2009, Swedish officials confirmed to the FAS that serial numbers on the seized missiles matched those sold to Venezuela.

[4] Chavez claims that the AT-4s were stolen from a naval post in Cararabo in 1995.  Others, including Anna Gilmour of Jane’s Information Group, think that the launchers were acquired more recently.  FARC leader Alfonso Cano claims that his group captured the launchers “a long time ago in a military battle on the border.”  See “FARC chief denies getting launchers from Venezuela,” Associated Press, 13 August 2009; “Chavez halts imports of 10,000 Colombian cars,” Agence France Presse, 6 August 2009; and Brice, “Venezuela freezes relations with Colombia.”

[5] ; Andy Webb-Vidal, “South American cocaine trafficking operations shift towards Venezuela,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 2006.  See also Gonzalo Guillen, “Venezuelan ammunition reaching rebels,” Miami Herald, 21 January 2008; David Gonzales, “Assembly to be Asked to Investigate Alleged Trafficking of Arms to Guerrillas,” El Nacional , 28 March 2005 (English translation); “General Tapias on Weapons Seized from Illegal Armed Groups in Past Five Years,” El Pais, 11 July 2000 (English translation); Andy Webb-Vidal, “Lords of War: Running the arms trafficking industry,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 2008; “Venezuelans admit charges of arm traffic in Colombia,” El Universal, 9 June 2008; Kim Cragin and Bruce Hoffman, Arms Trafficking and Colombia (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003); UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Violence, Crime and Illegal Arms Trafficking in Colombia, December 2006;  Jose de Cordoba, “Colombia rebels wield power inside Venezuela,” Associated Press Financial Wire, 25 November 2008; and Matthew Schroeder, Small Arms, Terrorism and the OAS Firearms Convention, FAS Occasional Paper No. 1, March 2004.

[6] See Simon Romero, “Venezuela Still Aids Colombia Rebels, New Material Shows,” New York Times, 3 August 2009.   In September 2008, the US Treasury Department added two senior Venezuelan government officials and a former official to the Office of Foreign Asset Control’s list of Specially Designated Nationals list.  According to the Treasury Department, these officials “armed, abetted and funded the FARC…”  See “Treasury Targets Venezuelan Government Officials Supporting the FARC,” Press Release HP-1132, 12 September 2008. http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1132.htm

[7] James C. O’Halloran and Christopher F. Foss, Jane’s Land-based Air Defense 2008-2009 (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

[8] DOD 5100.76-M

[9] “Devils in Diversity: Export Controls for Military Small Arms,” in Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 82.

Deliveries of arms through the Defense Department’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program decreased by nearly a billion dollars in fiscal year 2008, according to the most recent edition of the Annual Military Assistance Report. The report, which is often referred to as the “Section 655 Report” after the section in the Foreign Assistance Act that requires it, is compiled each year by the Defense Department and the State Department. The Defense Department’s contribution to the report was acquired by the Federation of American Scientists under the Freedom of Information Act.

According to this year’s report, FMS deliveries in FY08 totaled $10,996,180,000 – nearly $1 billion less than the $11,910,160,000 delivered in FY2007.  This is surprising given the significant increase in FMS agreements in recent years.   FMS agreements jumped from $9.5 billion in FY2005 to more than $18 billion in FY2006, and nearly doubled again to $36 billion in FY2008. One possible explanation for the apparent lag is that deliveries, and particularly deliveries of big-ticket items, can take years.  If this is the case, FMS delivery totals are likely to rise sharply over the next few years.

Adam Willner contributed to this report.

Click here to read the full article

On Wednesday, the FBI thwarted an alleged terrorist plot to shoot down a military cargo plane with a Stinger missile.  According to a criminal complaint obtained by the New York Times, four men were arrested on charges of conspiring to use “a surface-to-air missile system to destroy military aircraft at the New York Air National Guard Base located at Stewart Airport in Newburgh, New York. “ The plot also allegedly included plans for a simultaneous attack on a Bronx synagogue using an improvised explosive device containing more than 30 pounds of C-4 explosives.

The FBI operation in New York is one of several since the 1980s in which undercover US agents have thwarted  attempts to smuggle, acquire or use man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), including US-made Stinger missiles.  These plots feature conspirators that range from rank amateurs whose ability to obtain MANPADS is dubious at best to sophisticated criminals with a demonstrated ability to obtain and ship weapons to bad actors worldwide.  An example of the former is Hemant Lakhani, a British merchant born in India who was arrested in 2003 for attempting to import 200 Russian Igla missiles into the US and to sell them to individuals claiming to be members of a Somali terrorist organization.  Lakhani was so inept that undercover Russian agents ended up furnishing him with a (deactivated) SA-18 missile after he repeatedly tried and failed to obtain a missile himself.  The agents then had to reroute the missile after Lakhani arranged to have it delivered to the wrong address.

The suspects in the New York plot clearly fall into the same category as Lakhani – bumbling amateurs whose ambitions vastly exceed their actual abilities.   Relatives and others interviewed by the Associated Press used phrases like “down-on-their-luck” and “intellectually challenged” when describing the men, all of whom are ex-convicts and were either unemployed or working low-skill jobs when they were arrested. Furthermore, the complaint obtained by the New York Times indicates that the suspects asked the FBI’s confidential witness to teach them “how to operate the devices,” presumably including the deactivated Stinger missile supplied by the FBI.  While the basic operation of a MANPADS is not difficult to learn, successfully using them in real world conditions requires training and practice.  Without this training, the chances of shooting down a plane with a single missile are low.  It is also doubtful that the suspects could have acquired the missile without the help of the US government.  Stinger missiles are some of the US military’s most tightly guarded items and there are no (publicly) confirmed cases of successful thefts from US arsenals.  Nothing in the personal histories of the four men suggests that they had the knowledge or contacts necessary to pull off such a feat.

Even if the suspects in this case were incapable of acquiring a Stinger missile and shooting down a plane on their own, ‘Stinger Stings’ are a good investment.  They send a clear message to would-be terrorists and arms traffickers that the US is a dangerous place to do business, and sow seeds of doubt about loyalties and affiliations within criminal networks.   Occasionally, such operations also nab truly capable criminals, such as famed arms trafficker Monzer al Kassar, who was arrested in Spain after a lengthy undercover operation orchestrated by the US Drug Enforcement Administration.  Kassar was later extradited to the US and convicted of conspiring to supply Colombian guerrillas with millions of dollars in weapons, including MANPADS.   Another legendary arms dealer, Viktor Bout, may suffer a similar fate.  After eluding authorities for years, Bout was arrested by Thai police in March 2008 in an international sting that was remarkably similar to the one that nabbed Monzer al Kassar just nine months earlier.  Thai courts will decide later this summer whether Bout will be extradited to the US.  If he is, his (alleged) gun running days are over.  Taking Kassar and Bout off the streets may ultimately prevent the trafficking of thousands or tens of thousands of weapons to some of the world’s most dangerous groups.  Their arrests are proof positive that Stings are an essential element of any national strategy for combating the MANPADS threat, even if they don’t nab criminal masterminds every time.

At a press conference in Mexico City yesterday, President Obama urged the Senate to take up the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials, which is often referred to by its Spanish acronym, CIFTA.

The Convention aims to curtail the illicit international trade in small arms by requiring member states to establish basic export controls and to cooperate with each other to stop international arms trafficking.  These controls include the establishment of effective systems for authorizing international arms transfers, identifying and preventing arms trafficking at border points, exchanging information on illicit trafficking and best practices for combating it, and providing technical assistance to countries attempting to increase their capacity to identify and thwart arms trafficking.  As stated in the preamble, “this Convention does not commit States Parties to enact legislation or regulations pertaining to firearms ownership, possession, or trade of a wholly domestic character…”

The US played an important role in drafting the Convention, and was one of the first signatories in November, 1997.  The Convention was transmitted to the Senate in June 1998 and, more than a decade later, still awaits the Senate’s advice and consent.  To date, 29 of the 34 OAS member states have ratified the Convention.  Only the US, Canada, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and St. Vincent & Grenadines have yet to take that step.

For more information:

Small Arms, Terrorism and the OAS Firearms Convention, FAS Occasional Paper No. 1

“US-Mexico Discuss New Approach to Bilateral Relationship,” White House Fact Sheet

“Obama in Mexico, pledges help to slow US arms flow,” Associated Press

“OAS Firearms Convention,” ASMP Issue Brief #2

“Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA),” Department of International Legal Affairs of the Organization of American States.

Afghanistan

In March, the Sunday Times of London reported on the Taliban’s alleged acquisition of Iranian-supplied SA-14 missiles, which the Afghan insurgent group reportedly wants for a “spectacular” attack on coalition forces. The accusation reportedly came from unidentified “American intelligence sources.” According to the Sunday Times, “…coalition forces only became aware of the presence of SA14s two weeks ago when parts from two of them were discovered during an American operation in western Afghanistan.” The article provides no information on the number of SA-14s allegedly circulating in Afghanistan, their condition, or Iran’s alleged connection to them. When queried about the Sunday Times article, a US military official told the Federation of American Scientists that “[man-portable air defense systems] have been recovered in Afghanistan since 2007,” but refused to provide additional details because of “operational security concerns.”

Other types of MANPADS reportedly acquired by the Taliban and other unauthorized end-users in Afghanistan include the Chinese HN-5, photographs of which were obtained by the Washington Times in 2007, and the ubiquitous SA-7.

For information on Iraq, Sri Lanka and Somalia, click here.

Though the nuclear arsenal of the United States is smaller than it was during the Cold War, the day-to-day deployment of forces has changed very little. The United States still has weapons ready to launch at a moment’s notice at all times.

The reason is simple: the mission for nuclear weapons has not changed from the time of the Cold War.

Most Americans would be surprised to discover that the instructions to our nuclear targeteers still include a requirement for a surprise first strike against Russian nuclear forces to destroy them on the ground. It is time to shift the focus from reducing numbers of nuclear weapons to reducing the missions of nuclear weapons.

Despite a million dollar buyback program and hundreds of raids on illicit weapons caches, US and Iraqi forces are still finding surface-to-air missiles in insurgent stockpiles.  US military press releases and media reports reveal that, since October 2006, at least 121 such missiles have been recovered, along with 4 additional launchers and various components.  These reports suggest that insurgents still have ready access to surface-to-air missiles, including MANPADS, at least some of which are reportedly still operational.  The missiles pose an immediate threat to civilian and military aircraft in Iraq and a potential threat to aircraft in the region.

To read the rest of Missile Watch #3, click here.

CNN and AFP are reporting that the Shabaab, a militant wing of a Somali insurgent group, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), has threatened to treat “as an enemy combatant” any plane that attempts to land at Mogadishu Airport.  According to AFP, the threat, which was posted on the Internet, was confirmed by Shabaab leader Mukhtar Robow.  The web posting reportedly includes a list of grievances used to justify the threat, including the airport’s use by “Ugandan and Bulgarian mercenaries,” money generated by the airport for the Ethiopian government, and harassment of “Somali religious personalities” by “US and Israeli secret services…”  The warnings are accompanied by a graphic of a man pointing a shoulder-fired missile at a plane as it is landing.

The threat is not to be taken lightly. Last year, the FAS identified Somalia as one of three MANPADS proliferation hotspots worldwide in response to numerous reports of illicit missile activity, most of which involved the ICU and the Shabaab.  In 2006, UN investigators identified at least six shipments of MANPADS and other weapons to the violent Insurgent group, including a shipment of “50 units” of ”shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles and second generation infrared-guided anti-tank weapons” from Eritrea, “45 units” of surface-to-air missiles from Iran, and three surface-to-air missiles from Syria.  In each case, the missiles were part of larger arms shipments that also included dozens of assault rifles, machine guns, and other small arms and light weapons.  The Associated Press later reported that the ICU had received 200 shoulder-fired missiles from Eritrea alone.

In March 2007, the Islamists fired two advanced SA-18 missiles at a Belarussian cargo aircraft as it was departing from Mogadishu International Airport.  One of the missiles hit the plane, causing it to crash and killing all eleven people on board.  UN investigators later concluded that the missiles used in the attack were part of a consignment of six SA-18s acquired from Eritrea.  This summer, the UN traced another SA-18 found in Somalia back to a batch of Russian missiles that were shipped to Eritrea in 1995. The Eritrean government denies allegations that it provides missiles and other weapons to the ICU.

To sign up for Missile Watch, click here.  For more information on illicit MANPADS in Somalia and elsewhere, see ASMP Issue Brief #1: MANPADS Proliferation.

written by Matt Schroeder

In response to a Freedom of Information Act request filed by the FAS, the Defense Department has released its contribution to the Fiscal Year 2007 edition of the Annual Military Assistance Report required by Section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act.

The “Section 655” report, as it is known, contains information on five major security assistance programs: Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Excess Defense Articles Grant Authorizations and Deliveries (EDA), Drawdown Assistance Authorizations, and Foreign Military Sales (FMS). The section on FMS (i.e. government-to-government arms sales) is particularly valuable as it provides information on the types of items exported, not just the aggregate dollar value of the exported weapons.

The State Department voluntarily posts its section (on Direct Commercial Sales) on its website. The rest of the report is acquired by the FAS each year through the Freedom of Information Act.

To access the report, click here.

For more information:

U.S. Arms Transfers: Government Data

Defense Trade Data, Government Accountability Office, 28 January 2005.

State Department Needs to Resolve Data Reliability Problems that Led to
Inaccurate Reporting to Congress on Foreign Arms Sales, Government Accountability Office, 28 January 2005.

As part of its on-going efforts to track and call attention to the illicit trade in shoulder-fired, surface-to-air missiles, the FAS is launching a new e-newsletter called “Missile Watch.” Subscribers will receive periodic updates on the black market trade in shoulder-fired missiles, stockpiling and use of these missiles by non-state groups, and related topics. A comprehensive archive of “Missile Watch” updates will be available on the Strategic Security Blog and on the Arms Sales Monitoring Project’s website at /programs/ssp/asmp/MANPADS.html.

To sign up for this free service, go to /press/subscribe.html.

The latest report of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia sheds new light on the SA-18 Igla missiles illicitly acquired by armed Somali groups in recent years. Since 2006, UN investigators and journalists working in Somalia have documented the transfer of dozens, possibly hundreds, of shoulder-fired, surface-to-air missiles to Islamic insurgents. The missiles range in sophistication from the relatively primitive SA-7b Strela to the third generation SA-18 Igla. In March 2007, two SA-18s were used to shoot down a Belarusian Ilyushin-76 cargo plane shortly after it departed from Mogadishu airport. All eleven crew members were killed.

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The military budget is out of control. Not in the sense of the mantra of “waste, fraud, and abuse.” That is, in fact, a tiny slice of the enormous U.S. military spending. No, the budget is out of control in the sense that spending on the military is no longer subject to meaningful political review. The Pentagon has slipped its leash and Congress is not asking questions.

Congress is currently considering President Bush’s proposed budget, which included $515 billion for the military and separate requests for tens of billions more for intelligence and nuclear weapons and, on top of that, separate requests of over a hundred billion can be expected to cover the operating costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is more than we spent on the military during the height of the Cold War, even accounting for inflation. The president is constantly reminding us of how dangerous the world is and, of course, the threats to American security are all too real. But using the threats faced by the US today to justify Cold War-level budgets is possible only if we have near total amnesia about what the threat during the Cold War really was.

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Wolfgang Pauli is a legendary figure among physicists. He is remembered for having both one of the greatest minds of the twentieth century and one of its sharpest tongues. One student’s paper he dismissed by saying: That’s not right; it isn’t even wrong. (Or words to that effect in German; Pauli was Viennese.) If a theory isn’t relevant to the facts at hand, if it can’t be tested, if it doesn’t advance our understanding, then it isn’t that the theory is not right, it’s not even really a theory, it isn’t even wrong. It simply isn’t a tool for scientific understanding. Congressman Rush Holt once used Pauli’s expression in response to the claims that creationism, now often called Intelligent Design (ID), could be an “alternative” to the theory of evolution. Creationism isn’t even wrong because creationism can’t explain anything in the sense that science understands the word “explain.” Most advocates of creationism accept that evolution works at some scale and explains some things but for anything evolution does not explain they then assert that God, the Intelligent Designer, simply made it so. This is a valid religious belief. But what is the testable hypothesis? What is the prediction? What is the deeper understanding of mechanism? There isn’t anything there for a scientist to grab hold of. As far as science is concerned, creationism isn’t even wrong.

In contrast, Ben Stein has just released a movie, Expelled: No Intelligence Allowed, that is very, very wrong, indeed. (I confess, I have not seen the movie yet. It opens later today. This essay is based on Ben Stein’s extensive interviews, the movie website, and an extended, nine minute trailer available on the website. I will see the movie this weekend, although it pains me to give him any of my money.) I won’t argue about creationism here; it has been discussed in depth elsewhere. That “Intelligent Design” is a phrase designed in a transparent attempt to teach creationism without using the word “creationism” is well established. Ben Stein’s charges of unethical suppression of creationist spokesmen has been repudiated. But what is so very wrong about Ben Stein’s movie is not just the science; what I want to discuss here is his portrayal of how science works.

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