Collection of more intelligence-related information does not necessarily translate into better intelligence.
“Because of limitations associated with human cognition, and because much of the information obtained in war is contradictory or false, more information will not equate to better understanding.”
What makes that sensible observation doubly interesting is that it was written by Lt.Gen. H.R. McMaster, the newly designated National Security Advisor to President Trump.
It appears in the Foreword to the updated U.S. Army Functional Concept for Intelligence, 2020-2040, TRADOC Pamphlet, 525-2-1, February 2017.
The Army document, a somewhat speculative and aspirational look into the future of Army intelligence, presents a stark view of future threats, projected intelligence gaps, and directions forward. Some excerpts:
“International conditions will change more rapidly based on the increased velocity and momentum of human interactions and events. Technologies will become universally available and create a potential to overmatch U.S. capabilities. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation among state and nonstate actors will pose an increased threat to U.S. security interests. Advanced cyberspace and counter-space capabilities will spread to state and nonstate actors, allowing them to protect their access and disrupt or deny access to others. Operations will occur among populations in cities and complex terrain.”
“Geospatial databases support the understanding of existing infrastructure and potential entry points but do not fully address the complexities of large urban centers, such as megacities. Country studies establish an overview, but city studies and transnational studies are lacking. While infrastructure and order of battle information remain valid, understanding networked and transnational enemy organizations, social media, and biometric identity information have equal or greater importance in some missions. Commanders must also understand critical infrastructure, assets, and terrain in the cyberspace domain. Nonstate ideological movements or political competition may drive national and subnational change more rapidly than conventional analysis may indicate. Proliferation of technology and WMD between states and nonstate actors disrupts normalcy faster than country studies can update.”
“Current information collection techniques are not robust enough to understand the rapidly changing urban environment. The speed of human interaction is greatest in a large urban environment. Operations in urban environments are not traditional adversary centric problems — the environment itself offers significant challenges to a conventional force and provides ample concealment to the enemy. Social networking, flows, infrastructure layering, radical variations by neighborhood, multiple authority structures, and others, complicate information collection against populations, infrastructure, and physical environment signatures. Government, religious, economic, and ideological actors use social and traditional public media to influence the population. Understanding the environment requires collecting and exploiting relevant signatures, many of which are either as of yet undiscovered, or lack sufficient technical exploitation to be useful.”
“Population and structural and signal density in urban environments produce physical and virtual clutter that reduces the effectiveness of intelligence collection, and complicates target acquisition. Market saturation of cell phones and other web-enabled devices produce a signal dense environment which complicates target acquisition and SIGINT collection…. Increasing proliferation of personal mobile communications is making connectedness more robust at the personal level adding to the difficulty of identifying relationships. The density of information and communications technologies may slow our ability to identify actionable intelligence.”
Meanwhile, the document says, the Army should anticipate “budget and force reductions.”
“Fiscal constraints demand near-term solutions that preserve the balance of readiness, force structure, and modernization necessary to meet the demands of the national defense strategy now, while setting the stage to begin evolving the force in the mid-term (2020-2030) and bringing innovative solutions to fruition to meet the challenges of the far-term (2030-2040).”
Domestically, “Legal constraints govern intelligence support to operations conducted within the homeland, specifically Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) and homeland defense. The U.S. is a litigious environment within which the Army operates; intelligence leaders must understand the role legal limitations and authorities play in shaping intelligence support.”
In anticipation of future known and unknown health security threats, including new pandemics, biothreats, and climate-related health emergencies, our answers need to be much faster, cheaper, and less disruptive to other operations.
To unlock the full potential of artificial intelligence within the Department of Health and Human Services, an AI Corps should be established, embedding specialized AI experts within each of the department’s 10 agencies.
Investing in interventions behind the walls is not just a matter of improving conditions for incarcerated individuals—it is a public safety and economic imperative. By reducing recidivism through education and family contact, we can improve reentry outcomes and save billions in taxpayer dollars.
The U.S. government should establish a public-private National Exposome Project (NEP) to generate benchmark human exposure levels for the ~80,000 chemicals to which Americans are regularly exposed.