PCAST Federal Energy Policy Report Released

U.S. public energy RD&D spending as share of GDP is only 1/3 of Japan's

Yesterday morning the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) released its “Report to the President on Accelerating the Pace of Change in Energy Technologies Through an Integrated Federal Energy Policy.”  This report, requested by President Obama, issues recommendations for the Administration and the Department of Energy on how to “transform the energy system” over the next two decades through “leadership in energy technology innovation.”

Informed by a working group of PCAST members and energy experts, this report makes recommendations that are, in large, both feasible and ambitious.  Based on our reading of the report and the summaries presented by co-chairs Maxine Savitz and Ernest J. Moniz at the release event, we particularly applaud PCAST in calling for the coordination of federal energy policies and for its recommendation that the US Federal government spend $16 Billion annually on energy RD&D.

Some of the key recommendations of this report are to:

  • Establish an interagency Quadrennial Energy Review (QER) led by the Office of the President (OOP)
  • Based on the QER, realign federal energy subsidies and incentives and align DOE processes and organization to meet energy objectives
  • Enhance energy technology innovation and technology by exercising the Federal Government’s purchasing power
  • Increase annual energy research, development, demonstration, and deployment (RDD&D) funding to about $16B, with $10-16B of that generated through “new revenue streams”
  • Direct $12B of the new RD&D money to outside the DOE-national lab sphere and focus on funding DOE competitive programs such as ARPA-e
  • Initiate a multidisciplinary social science research program

While we approve of the goals and objectives of this report, we have significant concerns about the feasibility and implementation of both the QER and the RDD&D fund.

The QER is not a new idea. Rather, it is a timescale change.  The Section 7321 of US Code (Title 42, 84, VIII, 7321) already legally obligates the President to produce and submit to Congress a biennial National Energy Policy Plan.  The comprehensive plan is to be developed with the participation of “consumers, small businesses, and a wide range of other interests, including those of individual citizens who have no financial interest in the energy industry.” The last plan produced was the Bush Administration’s controversial 2001 report, Reliable, Affordable, and Environmentally Sound Energy for America’s Future.

While changing the timescale from two years to four years will decrease the time burden on the DOE and the OOP, it will not fundamentally change the fact that the energy review process will still depend upon annual Congressional appropriations for funding as well as continued OOP compliance.  In order to ensure the success of the QER, the relevant legislation must both fund the entire four year process outright and include provisions compelling Congress and of Executive branch to act upon the results and recommendations of the QER.

Raising $16 Billion for energy RDD&D will require finding significant new funds. While the program could and will likely be funded in part through Congressional appropriations, this is neither the preferred nor the most stable long-term funding stream.  Rather, the report calls for generating the funds through “new revenue streams”—government speak for taxes.  Likely to take the form of new energy taxes on transmission, production, generation, and/or consumption, in the current fiscal and political environment new taxes are going to be an extremely hard sell.

To raise these funds, the government must work to build a base of support for energy RDD&D at the national and local levels and must sell the long-term advantages of innovative energy technologies to all energy and energy policy stakeholders.  Support will need to come from voters, local governments, industry and business, regulatory authorities, public utilities, the finance and venture capital sector, academia, and think tanks.  Before a new energy technology tax can be passed and this critical energy technology development process begun, the OOP and DOE must take the helm and begin this necessary, but difficult dialogue.

Both the full PCAST report and executive summary can be accessed here: http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ostp/pcast/docsreports.

The Race to Fix the Classification System

The massive disclosure of a quarter million diplomatic records by Wikileaks this weekend underscores the precarious state of the U.S. national security classification system.

The Wikileaks project seems to be, more than anything else, an assault on secrecy.  If Wikileaks were most concerned about whistleblowing, it would focus on revealing corruption.  If it were concerned with historical truth, it would emphasize the discovery of verifiably true facts.  If it were anti-war, it would safeguard, not disrupt, the conduct of diplomatic communications.  But instead, what Wikileaks has done is to publish a vast potpourri of records — dazzling, revelatory, true, questionable, embarrassing, or routine — whose only common feature is that they are classified or otherwise restricted.

This may be understood as a reaction to a real problem, namely the fact that by all accounts, the scope of government secrecy in the U.S. (not to mention other countries) has exceeded rational boundaries.  Disabling secrecy in the name of transparency would be a sensible goal — if it were true that all secrecy is wrong.  But if there is a legitimate role for secrecy in military operations, in intelligence gathering or in diplomatic negotiations, as seems self-evident, then a different approach is called for.

Although it has rarely been front-page news, important progress has been made this year in shifting U.S. government secrecy policy away from its cold war roots, and promoting greater discernment and discrimination in the use of national security classification.

In May, the U.S. government formally disclosed the current size of the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal for the first time (5,113 warheads as of September 30, 2009).  Declassification of this information, which is integral to future arms control and disarmament efforts, had been sought — and resisted — for decades.  That battle for public disclosure has now been won.  Also this year, the Report of the Nuclear Posture Review, the basic statement of U.S. nuclear weapons policy, was produced and released in unclassified form for the first time.

In September, the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense revealed the total intelligence budget ($80.1 billion in FY2010) as well as its “national” ($53.1 billion) and military ($27 billion) components.  This is a more complete and detailed disclosure of U.S. intelligence spending than has ever been provided before.  (An aggregate figure — with no further breakdown — was disclosed in 1997 and 1998.)  It also represents a major policy reversal.  Just a few years ago, intelligence community leaders swore under penalty of perjury that disclosure of this information would damage national security and compromise intelligence methods.  Now annual intelligence budget disclosure is the new norm.

These are not cosmetic changes.  They represent real discontinuities with past practice.  Stockpile secrecy and intelligence budget secrecy have each been cornerstones of entire edifices of national security classification that will now be susceptible to change.  And in each case their disclosure is the culmination and the successful fruition of years or even decades of advocacy, agitation and litigation by the Federation of American Scientists and other organizations and political leaders.

In fact, the deepest significance of these disclosures may lie in the fact that they demonstrate the feasibility of effective public advocacy in national security secrecy policy.  If a half century of nuclear stockpile secrecy and intelligence budget secrecy can be overturned in favor of public disclosure, then citizens can confidently seek the release of many other, less deeply entrenched official secrets as well as a continuing reduction in the overall scope of the secrecy system.

Of course, efforts to reduce government secrecy have not been uniformly successful.  For example, the Obama Administration’s use of the state secrets privilege to derail litigation on sensitive national security topics is indistinguishable from that of the Bush Administration, despite a September 2009 policy change promising “greater accountability” and more limited use of the privilege.  Moreover, it appears that the Obama Justice Department has failed to fulfill its own policy of referring to agency Inspectors General any legitimate cases against the government that could not be litigated because of the state secrets privilege.  (We are still attempting to confirm and to document that this is indeed the case.)  Nor has it offered any other alternative remedy to those who may have been wronged by U.S. government actions concealed by state secrets claims.

But even when the wheels of progress move slowly — or slip into reverse — proponents of greater openness are not helpless.  At Secrecy News, we have tried to shine a spotlight on the mechanics of secrecy, and to provide our own almost daily disclosures of official documents of public policy value that are somehow restricted or otherwise hard to find.  Not just because they are restricted, but because they are also of public policy value.  Over the past year, Secrecy News produced unique coverage of numerous important secrecy stories.  For example:

**  Leaking classified information may be the right thing to do in certain circumstances, suggested district court Judge T.S. Ellis III at a 2009 hearing, “but you have to stand up and take the consequences.”  We obtained and released the previously unpublished transcript of that remarkable hearing last March.  (“Judge: If You Leak Classified Info, Take the Consequences,” March 22).

**  We offered the most complete and in-depth reporting of the dispute between Congress and the executive branch over Government Accountability Office access to intelligence information.  We provided related documentation including a 1988 Office of Legal Counsel opinion and a new Department of Defense directive on GAO access to highly classified DoD special access programs.  In congressional testimony and public advocacy, we also argued in favor of an increased role for GAO in intelligence oversight.  Despite a veto threat from the White House earlier this year, a favorable resolution of the matter now seems to be within reach. (“GAO Gains a Foothold in Intelligence Oversight,” September 29).

**  We maintained and expanded our online library of reports from the JASON defense science advisory board.  Ours is the most complete public collection  of these consistently interesting and influential studies.

**  We obtained and published numerous unreleased reports from the DNI Open Source Center, such as a March 2010 report on Turkey’s mysterious underground Ergenekon movement.

**  We spent more time than we would have liked criticizing the Wikileaks organization, whose spectacular releases of large collections of classified documents continue to generate controversy.  From our perspective, Wikileaks has been inattentive to the unintended consequences of its actions, careless about putting individuals in harm’s way, particularly in the case of the Afghan war records, and ethically deficient in its invasions of personal privacy.  (In its latest release, Wikileaks did redact some names of individuals and some other sensitive information.)

**  With other like-minded organizations (and, in this case, a remarkably responsive White House), we helped prevent the creation of an ominous new information control system for so-called Controlled Unclassified Information.  Instead of constituting a fourth level of classification, the new CUI marking should simply facilitate information sharing without providing authority for any new restrictions on information. (“A New Policy on Controlled Unclassified Info,” November 4).

**  We obtained and published a previously undisclosed 2009 report from the Intelligence Science Board on the virtues of non-coercive interrogation.  We also reported that the DNI had disbanded the ISB this year.

**  We published hundreds of Congressional Research Service reports that had not previously been made available to the public, and numerous other popular records from a three-volume description of the Soviet army to the U.S. Army’s latest weapons system handbook to a speculative scientific paper on “interstellar archeology.” And quite a bit more.

It’s impossible to say whether the race to fix the classification system can be won through our kind of advocacy from the outside and by enlightened self-interest within government.  Before that happens, classification itself could be rendered moot and ineffective by leaks, abuse or internal collapse.  Or, in a reflexive response to continuing leaks, officials might seek to expand the scope of secrecy rather than focusing it narrowly, while increasing penalties for unauthorized disclosures.

But in the coming year, we see some promise in what is called the Fundamental Classification Guidance Review.  This is a procedure (mandated in executive order 13526, section 1.9) for every agency that classifies information to seek out, identify and remove classification requirements that are no longer valid.  In effect, it provides an opportunity and a mechanism for rewriting the “software” of the entire classification system.  Though success is not guaranteed, we expect the Review to produce a measurable reduction in the scope of national security classification.  We plan to monitor its progress as closely as we can.

Finally, we want to ask for your help.  If you identify with our approach and you derive value from the work that we are doing, then we encourage you to help sustain it for another year with a tax-deductible contribution.  Although we make our online resources freely available to everyone who wants them, we incur costs in collecting, analyzing, and publishing them as well as in our related advocacy activities.  If you can help us with that, please do.

Donations can be made online here (select “Government Secrecy” in the drop-down menu to allocate your donation for the FAS Project on Government Secrecy).  Donors who contribute $25 or more will automatically be enrolled as members of the Federation of American Scientists (unless you prefer not to be). Donations can also be made by sending a check made out to Federation of American Scientists and earmarked for Secrecy News to this address:

Attn: Secrecy News
Federation of American Scientists
1725 DeSales Street NW, Suite 600
Washington, DC  20036

Responding to Senator Bond on New START

Senator Kit Bond, Republican of Missouri, gave a speech in the Senate on the New START treaty.  Eli Lake’s summary is in the Washington Times.  He made accusations of serious shortcomings in the treaty.  I address these points because they appear to be substantive and earnest, unlike some of the hysteria and outright silliness coming from other treaty opponents.  I believe that the Senator’s concerns are sincere but that does not make them correct.  They reflect, instead, shortcomings in understanding about the treaty, misrepresentation of exiting U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, and a mistake in statistics. Continue reading

Seeking the Rule of Law in Afghanistan

Updated below

U.S. efforts to promote the rule of law in Afghanistan are expanding and accelerating.  Nearly a billion dollars has been spent in the past decade to strengthen Afghanistan’s legal infrastructure, rising from $7 million in FY2002 to an estimated $411 million in FY2010.  In July 2010, a new Ambassador-rank position was created to focus on justice-related issues in the country.  Yet the effectiveness and even the feasibility of these efforts to establish the rule of law are in doubt.

A new report (pdf) from the Congressional Research Service provides a detailed overview of the U.S. approach to rule of law (ROL) issues in Afghanistan.  It describes the numerous and diverse initiatives that have been undertaken, the political, cultural and institutional obstacles that confront them, and their uncertain results.

The rule of law in this context simply means the stable, predictable, and fair application of public legal standards.  It is considered essential to the establishment of a legitimate and effective government.  “Without ROL the country cannot progress no matter what contributions are made by outsiders,” according to a 2008 State Department Inspector General report.

But progress towards a state of rule of law in Afghanistan is stymied both by the general instability in the country and by the pervasive corruption that prevails.  “As many as one out of every two Afghans experienced bribery in the past year,” the CRS noted, based on UN data, “resulting in an estimated $2.5 billion in bribe payments in 2009 alone.”  The average bribe was said to be around $160, and those who paid bribes did so three to five times per year.

The U.S. has a “Strategy for Rule of Law in Afghanistan” but it is “not available publicly,” the CRS said.  A summary of its contents was provided in the CRS report, based on State Department information.  For the first time this year, rule of law issues in Afghanistan constitute a separate portfolio under the new position of the Coordinating Director of ROL and Law Enforcement, held by Ambassador Hans Klemm.

“Although significant progress in establishing ROL in Afghanistan has been achieved, there appear to be several fundamental limitations on the ability of the U.S. government and other donors to strengthen the Afghan justice sector in the short term,” the CRS report concluded.  Besides the instability of war and widespread corruption, other obstacles include illiteracy and the lack of qualified personnel to serve in law enforcement and the judiciary;  local reliance on traditional councils that do not always practice a consistent or egalitarian form of law;  and “existing perceptions among many Afghans that high-level corrupt officials are exempt from the full force of Afghan law.”

Afghan officials themselves have observed that “despite increasing resources devoted to justice sector support, efforts have not yet translated into a functional formal justice system in Afghanistan.”

“The 112th Congress may choose to address these long term issues in the context of the Obama Administration’s review of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan,” the CRS suggested.

A copy of the new CRS report was obtained by Secrecy News.  See “Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance,” November 9, 2010.

Update: “Despite some efforts by the Government of Afghanistan to eliminate corruption and improve rule of law, overwhelming reports of corruption continue,” a new report to Congress (pdf) from the Department of Defense said.

“The latest survey of Afghan perceptions of the Afghan Government’s rule of law capacity shows an almost 7 percent decline in Afghans’ confidence in their government’s ability to deliver reliable formal justice. This is likely due to continued corruption and to the slow progress in hiring and placing justice professionals at the provincial level. Additional polling shows that fewer than half of Afghans polled trust the Afghan Government to settle a legal dispute,” the November 2010 DoD report to Congress said.

The Evolution of American Military Intelligence (1973)

An unclassified U.S. Army history of military intelligence that was formerly used as a textbook in officer training at the Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca is now publicly available online (large pdf).

The 1973 volume has been superseded in many or even most respects by subsequent research and publication. But it retains some interest as a snapshot of the contemporary self-understanding and presentation of military intelligence. “It remains one of the best overviews of the history of Army Intelligence, although it is dated,” one admirer of the document told Secrecy News.

According to the Preface, “This history concentrates on intelligence support to tactical forces since, in truth, this is where military intelligence, per se, receives its greatest visibility and its greatest importance.”

See “The Evolution of American Military Intelligence” by Marc B. Powe and Edward Wilson, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, AZ, May 1973.

NATO Strategic Concept: One Step Forward and a Half Step Back

NATO General Secretary Anders Fogh Rasmussen presents the alliance’s new Strategic Concept

By Hans M. Kristensen

The new Strategic Concept adopted today by NATO represents one step forward and a half step backward for the alliance’s nuclear weapons policy.

The forward-leaning part of the nuclear policy pledges to actively try to create the conditions for further reducing the number of and reliance on nuclear weapons, recommits to the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament, and reaffirms that circumstances in which the alliance could contemplate using its nuclear weapons are “extremely remote.”

But the strategy fails to present any steps that reduce the number of or reliance on nuclear weapons. As such, the new Strategic Concept – Active Engagement, Modern Defence – falls short of the Obama administration’s recent Nuclear Posture Review.

Even so, there are important changes in the document that hint of things to come. Continue reading

US-Saudi Arms Deal Defended by Gates, Clinton

A $60 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia — the largest in U.S. history — is poised to proceed despite questions raised by some members of Congress. In a November 16 letter to Congress (pdf), Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton defended the deal:

“This proposed sale will directly support U.S. interests by reinforcing our longstanding defense and security partnership with Saudi Arabia, enhancing Saudi Arabia’s ability to deter and defend itself against terrorist groups and other regional threats, improving interoperability with the U.S. military, and sending a strong message to all countries that the United States is committed to supporting the security of its key partners and allies in the Gulf and broader Middle East,” they wrote.

Members of Congress had written to the Administration on November 12 (pdf) “to raise concerns and pose a number of strategic questions about the impact such sales would have on the national security interests of the United States and our allies.” The Gates-Clinton letter was written in response.

Illicit Global Trade in Botulinum Neurotoxin

Crystal Structure of Botulinum Neurotoxin Serotype A,  Credit: RCSB Protein Data Bank
Crystal Structure of Botulinum Neurotoxin Serotype A, (Credit: RCSB Protein Data Bank)

The world market in counterfeit pharmaceuticals is estimated to be worth some $75 billion annually.  A couple million dollars worth of this trade can be attributed to the trade of botulinum neurotoxin (BoNT), an extremly potent toxin that, at very low doses, is commonly used in both cosmetic,  e.g. BoTox, and therapeutic medical treatments.  Because BoNT is the most potent toxin known to man, it is grouped with the world’s most lethal potential biological weapons agents, sharing “Select Agent” status with the pathogens that cause smallpox, anthrax and plague.  This biowarfare potential puts the existence of illicit laboratories churning out the toxin and of shady distributors selling it worldwide through the Internet into a more disturbing light than most pharmaceutical fraud.   Continue reading

Engaging Yemen on the Sources of Insecurity

  • US aid for Yemen goes predominantly to military and hard security projects.
  • To confront the key sources of instability the U.S. must look beyond military assistance.
  • Tier two engagement will be a critical component of this strategy, especially in looking at challenges to natural resource and human security.
government protesters in Sana'a, 2009

As Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen makes headlines yet again for attempted terrorist activities against the United States, the US government is preparing a $150 million package aimed at training and aiding Yemeni security and military forces.  This unsurprising move represents business as usual for US-Yemeni relations; a continuation of security and terrorism-centric dialogue, policy, and funding that pervades all levels of the two countries’ engagement.    In fact, of the $63 million in aid money to Yemen in FY10, well over half goes toward military and security assistance.

In his October 29th speech on the attempted cargo plane bombings, President Obama announced that the US government intends to “strengthen a more stable, secure and prosperous Yemen so that terrorist groups to not have the time and space they need to plan attacks from within its borders.”   This statement is coupled with an announcement to increase the military aid to Yemen to $150 million.  Considering that the President’s FY11 budget called for just over $100 million in total aid for Yemen, 48% of which was for military and security assistance, this new announcement triples military aid and makes it approximately 75% of Yemen’s aid money.

While security is the primary focus of the FY 11 budget, under its new Yemen strategy USAID is also working to address some of the soft security issues that fuel instability.  Included in this FY11 budget are projects on:

  • Military and security assistance;
  • Responsive governance, a multi-sector project expected to be funded at $43 million for 5 years and aimed to strengthen public policies and institutions;
  • The Community Livelihoods Project, a multi-sector program expected to be funded at $125 million for 5 years with the goal of economic stabilization through government services, job creation, civic participation, and responsive local governance.
  • Urban refugee aid for those living in Sana’a;
  • Public health; and
  • Supporting an independent media.
AQAP, 2009, courtesy of The Long War Journal

This $200 million in aid compares to packages of over $1.5 billion for Egypt, $730 million for Iraq, $680 million for Jordan, $550 million for the West Bank and Gaza, and $250 million for Lebanon.

A recent article by Christopher Boucek of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace points out that Yemen suffers from more than just the hard security challenges associated with AQAP, the Houthi Rebellion in Sa’da, and the Southern Mobility separatist movement in the South and in Hadramawt[1]. Boucek notes that, “Beyond its security concerns, Yemen is on the brink of economic disaster, suffering from poor governance and quickly dwindling water supplies.”

The article rightly calls for the U.S. government to expand its aid focus to help Yemen: improve its legal system and laws, fight corruption, increase policing capacity, improve the economy, alter the land distribution and ownership system, and enhance the education system. These policy prescriptions are standard practice in the Middle East—multilateral aid packages with the goals of addressing economic instability, furthering governance and rule of law, promoting civil society, and improving education and with debatable effectiveness. Boucek further calls on the U.S. government to partner with Saudi Arabia, Yemen’s largest donor nation at $2 billion a year.

While these prescriptions will be important components in a comprehensive Yemen strategy, they fall short of addressing Yemen’s immediate and long term stability challenges, especially those

related to:  natural resources, population growth, and human health and capacity.

Robust track one and track two Yemeni-U.S. engagement will be necessary over the coming years.  Track two approaches will be especially important for addressing these core resource, population, and human challenges as their solutions are highly technical in nature, the target populations often live in areas with limited central government involvement or legitimacy, and effective solutions will require individual buy-in and stakeholder engagement from diverse actors.

Note that an effective strategy must include cooperation and engagement with the tribal and religious networks and stakeholders that are central components of Yemen’s social structure and civil society.  Tribes especially will be important partners in Yemen’s ongoing stability.  As an example of this, the leader of Yemen’s largest Bakil tribe, Sheikh Naji Abdul Aziz Al-Shayef, recently called for the creation of a coalition aligned with the government against Al Qaeda.

In the immediate future, the U.S. must support both track one and especially track two engagement in:

  • Resource ownership. An immediate problem, Yemen’s oil and natural gas are running out and its water is running out even faster.  The U.S. must support scientists, technologists, and other experts in working with Yemeni government officials, scientists, and stakeholders to determine resource distribution, replenishment rate, and must begin dialogues with stakeholders on how resources are distributed, allocated, and managed.
  • Land ownership. Before radically overhauling the land ownership system, the U.S. must work with the Yemeni government to institute legal safeguards that ensure that traditional land tenure systems are recognized. Current land reform efforts seek to secure land titling through registration and ownership legislation.  However, much land is owned at the tribal level, is communally owned, or is owned by the local mosque for the benefit of the mosque and the area’s poor (generally as a result of land donated through zakat or alms) and land reformation has the potential to further increase poverty as those without registration are displaced.
  • Science and technology (S&T) cooperation. The U.S. government should take advantage of the Arab world’s favorable opinion of U.S. S&T to develop exchange programs and build internal Yemeni S&T capacity, focusing on issues such as water, energy, and biosecurity, which are of mutual need and interest.
  • Refugees. Located not just below Saudi Arabia, but just across the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden from Africa, Yemen is a country of 23 million people, with almost 200,000 refugees.  The majority of these refugees are from Somalia, with small groups from Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Iraq.  The U.S. must work with civil society in the U.S., Yemen, and internationally, as well as with the UNHRC, to develop a strategy for permanent resettlement and to aid refugees as well as the populations in the South of Yemen where the refugee camps are located.
  • Internally displaced persons. Yemen has an estimated 150,000-250,000 internally displaced persons, mostly in Sa’da and the North.  The U.S. must work with local tribes, international human rights and refugee organizations, and the government of Yemen and to develop a strategy for infrastructure and housing development, for public health initiatives, and for economic development.

Long term formal and informal engagement on the following issues is critical:

  • Resource management. With dwindling resources, especially of water and fossil fuels, management is an increasingly critical challenge.  Sustainable resource use and allocation mechanisms are critical.   Their development can be best facilitated by the U.S. supporting tier two collaborations between experts, resource managers, and stakeholders, backed by tier one cooperation with politicians to develop supportive legislation, markets, and profit sharing mechanisms.
  • Infrastructure development.
  • Public health. Foci of these efforts should be infectious diseases, material and reproductive health, access to basic medical services, and population control issues.

No one policy or engagement strategy will be a panacea for Yemen’s root destabilizing factors.  Instead, the U.S. and other donor nations must focus on a variety of strategies at multiple levels of engagement that enhance human capacity and education, stabilize resource use and availability, improve governance, engage Yemen in the global S&T community, and approach Yemen as both a unique state and as a critical actor in a volatile region.

[1] For an overview of the Southern Mobility Movement (SMM) in Hadrawawt, see Michael Horton’s article “The Growing Separatists Threat in Yemen’s Hadramawt Governorate,” TerrorismMonitor Volume VIII, Issue 40.