International Collaboration to Strengthen Domestic Critical Minerals Efforts
Despite most people not being able to name a single one, critical minerals are fundamental to the advanced technologies that underpin U.S. economic competitiveness and national security. Think microchips, electric vehicles, and life-saving medical devices. However, as well-documented by FAS, the United States remains dependent on exports from a limited number of countries that mine and process them. This is despite efforts to onshore and diversify supply chains through major initiatives like the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, Inflation Reduction Act, and targeted trade policies. The consequences of failing to meet this domestic demand, and meet it promptly, will be passed onto American consumers: inflationary risks, supply chain disruptions, and the possibility of the U.S. being “exposed to the leverage of resource-rich countries or market incumbents abroad.” That’s flowery speak for the U.S. being held hostage by our reliance on rocks.
We’re not the only country dealing with this. And given the scale of this challenge, no single nation will be able to address it solely through domestic policy. Rather, it will require significant collaboration and cooperation amongst allied nations through vehicles of international science and technology engagement.
Since late last year, we have seen the Trump administration’s willingness to address export promotion, supply chain security, and technology leadership for other national priorities through a flurry of bilateral technology prosperity deals:
- In October 2025, the U.S. signed a technology prosperity deal with Japan focused on AI, quantum, 6G telecommunications, fusion energy, and space exploration.
- That same month, the U.S. formalized a technology prosperity deal with Korea, focused on AI, 65 telecommunications, quantum, pharmaceutical supply chains, space exploration, and basic research and STEM exchange.
- In September 2025, the U.S. announced a technology prosperity deal with the United Kingdom focused on AI, civil nuclear energy, quantum, 6G telecommunications, and research security; however, just a short time later, in December, implementation was suspended over frustration over a lack of progress, but restarted back in February 2026 with a more narrow focus on nuclear energy.
- Most recently, in May 2026, the U.S. signed a technology prosperity deal with Sweden focused on AI, 5G/6G connectivity, biomedical research, advanced manufacturing, nuclear energy, space exploration, quantum, and research security.
These technology prosperity deals reflect the administration’s approach to science diplomacy as focused on economic and security returns for the United States, first and foremost. But more importantly, while signaling intent to cooperate on shared interests, all these agreements explicitly state that they do not create legally binding obligations, and that nothing commits the participants to the expenditure of funds, thus rendering them effectively toothless. Rather than attempting to tackle critical minerals through bilateral technology prosperity deals that commit nothing and bind no one, the U.S. needs a dedicated, properly resourced device for international science and technology cooperation with real authority, funding, and accountability.
The Strategic Technology and Resilient Alliances Act of 2026 (STRATA Act) would do exactly that. This new bipartisan bill by Representatives Young Kim (R-CA-40) and Ami Bera (D-CA-06) would establish a Critical Minerals Innovation Partnership program within the Department of State, to be led by a Senate-confirmed director reporting to the Under Secretary of Economic Affairs. Unlike the toothless technology prosperity deals, the STRATA Act would create real mechanisms for cooperation: binding partnership agreements with specific objectives, quantitative benchmarks, multiyear funding plans, and intellectual property protections. The Director would be empowered to issue joint solicitations with partner countries, coordinate demand aggregation across allied governments and the private sector, and establish International Centers of Excellence for innovative extraction and processing technologies in partner nations. A public-facing digital platform would connect U.S. startups, universities, and research institutions to funding opportunities and collaborative projects. Crucially, the bill also amends the Foreign Assistance Act to explicitly authorize financing for critical minerals S&T cooperation, giving the program the legal and budgetary backbone that bilateral deals have lacked. The program would sunset after ten years, providing a built-in accountability horizon while allowing existing agreements to run their course. There are historical and contemporary analogous efforts that can serve as models of success.
The Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 established and authorized the Cooperative Threat Reduction program to facilitate “cooperation between the United States, the Soviet Union, its republics, and any successor entities to (1) destroy nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and other weapons, (2) transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction, and (3) establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons.” 25 years into the program, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) documented the program’s significant accomplishments, including the destruction of 2,532 missiles, the decommissioning of 1,300 delivery systems, the destruction of over 4,700 tons of chemical weapons agents, and the employment of 22,000 former WMD scientists.
More recently, the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 authorized the International Technology Security and Innovation Fund (ITSI). It provided the Department of State $100 million per year over five years “to promote the development and adoption of secure and trustworthy telecommunications networks and ensure semiconductor supply chain security and diversification.” ISTI awards have included a $13.8 million cooperative agreement in 2024 with Arizona State University to expand semiconductor workforce capacity and strengthen supply chain infrastructure across partner countries in the Americas and Indo-Pacific. That same year, through the ITSI Fund, the State Department collaborated with the Inter-American Development Bank to launch the CHIPS ISTI Western Hemisphere Semiconductor Initiative, to enhance “semiconductor assembly, testing, and packaging (ATP) capabilities in key partner countries, beginning with Mexico, Panama, and Costa Rica.” Additionally, the fund enabled a partnership between the State Department and the India Semiconductor Mission, Ministry of Electronics and IT, Government of India, focused on assessing India’s semiconductor ecosystem, including its regulatory framework, workforce, and infrastructure needs, to inform potential future joint initiatives.
When Congress provides dedicated authority and real funding, the State Department can serve as an effective vehicle for technology-focused international partnerships. The same model should be applied to critical minerals. As Congress considers broader packages to advance critical minerals production and supply chain resilience, science diplomacy vehicles must be part of that conversation. It cannot be an afterthought; rather, it must be an intentional pillar of any strategy.
“Structured partnerships with our allies on critical minerals innovation can ensure that the best science and the best talent are working together towards shared security and economic prosperity.”
Could the largest U.S. public-private critical minerals deal of the decade be a model for the future?
The Federation of American Scientists supports the Critical Materials Future Act and the Unearth Innovation Act.
The current planned capacity for lithium processing in the U.S. is on track to meet demand from domestic battery factories. However, current planned capacity for nickel, cobalt, and graphite still fall well short of future demand.