Air Force Plans Minuteman Weapons Modification Program.
Aerospace Daily, Mar 27, 1997, p 463
The Air Force intends to modify the hardware and software necessary to enable the Minuteman weapon system to accept the Peacekeeper Mk 21/W87 warhead. Based on an in depth study, the Air Force has determined that the most cost and operationally effective method to enhance Minuteman nuclear safety and meet unique operational requirements is to replace the Mk 21/W62 with Mk 21/W87.
Clinton, Yeltsin Strike Deal On ABM Demarcation.
Aerospace Daily, Mar 24, 1997, p 437
President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin have agreed on new distinctions to differentiate between the strategic missiles banned by the ABM Treatey and new theater missile defense systems that would be permitted.
Administration Says ABM Agreement Doesn't Set Velocity Limits.
Aerospace Daily, Mar 25, 1997, p 441, 443
The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty demarcation agreement between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and President Clinton, doesn't limit US theater-ballistic missile defense (TMD) programs and with the exception of the US Navy Upper-Tier program, there isn't even a question about their ABM compliance.
Critics Say Clinton Accepted Too Many Restrictions On TMD.
Aerospace Daily, Mar 26, 1997, p 452-453
Members of Congress and defense analysts outside the government are raising objections to Helsinki Summit language on the demarcation between theater and national missile defenses, arguing that the Helsinki language could hobble US efforts to develop theater defenses.
US Army In Talks With Hughes To Fix THAAD.
Aerospace Daily, Mar 27, 1997, p 457, 459
The US Army has approached Hughes Missile Systems to see if it can help fix problems Lockheed Martin has encountered on its Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) program.
SLAM-ER Test Clears Way For LRIP.
Aerospace Daily, Mar 27, 1997, p 464 The McDonnell Douglas Standoff Land Attack Missile
Expanded Response exceeded test objectives in its first development test, clearing the way for the US Navy to begin low rate initial production. Descriptors,
Panel Uphold NIE Assessment of Ballistic Missile Threat To US.
Arms Control Today. Craig Cerniello, Jan 01, 1997, p 22
The CIA unclassified version of the independent panel review of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 95-19. The controversial assessment that concluded that no countries, other than the declared nuclear weapon states, will develop a ballistic missile capable of threatening the contiguous 48 states or Canada in the next 15 years.
UNSCOM Head Says Iraq Has Operational Missile Force.
Arms Control Today. Howard Diamond, Jan 01, 1997, p 25
Iraq has managed to retain an operational force of ballistic missiles in violation of UN prohibitions against possessing such weapons with ranges above 150 kilometers. Iraq's refusal to comply with the UN resolutions persists even in the face of economic sanctions, which has cost Iraq more than $100 billion in lost oil revenue.
NMD Debate In Congress Heats Up As Lott, Lugar Introduce New Bills.
Arms Control Today. Craig Cerniello, Jan 01, 1997, p 21
The debate about whether the United States should deploy a national missile defense (NMD) system intensified. The National Missile Defense Act of 1997 requires the United States to deploy an NMD system by the end of 2003. The Clinton administration's so-called 3-plus-3 program requires the United States to develop the elements of an NMD system by 2000.
Next Arrow Test This Summer After Scoring Direct Hit.
Aviation Week & Space Technology. David Hughes, Mar 24, 1997, p 34
The two stage Arrow 2 is designed to handle any medium range tactical ballistic missile threat (up to 2,000-3,000 km in range) that Israel might encounter in the next 10-15 years. In addition, it could be upgraded with counter countermeasures should any penetration aids be added to threat systems. But there are no plans at present to test the Arrow against missiles breaking up in flight or missile warheads that are spiraling, as encountered with Al Hussein Scuds in Operation Desert Storm. But Arrow, which operates in the upper endoatmospheric range, should be able to intercept such threats at a high enough altitude to destroy them before breakup.
Asteroid Threat Spurs New Defense Analyses.
Aviation Week & Space Technology. William B. Scott, Mar 24, 1997, p 58-59
Advances by astronomers, geologists, atmospheric physicists and paleontologists during the last 10 years determined that the threat from near Earth asteroids and comets is significant and far greater than suspected. According to George Friedman, an adjunct professor of engineering at USC, the best near term strategy would be to intensify detection efforts and prepare an intercept strategy. This would bolster passive Earth based sensor systems with long range and spac- based radars. Only when an actual near earth object (NEO) threat is detected would production of an intercept system begin.
Pentagon Considers Space As New Area Of Responsibility.
Aviation Week & Space Technology. William B. Scott, Mar 24, 1997, p 54-55
The DoD is reviewing a USSPACECOM "informational" proposal for establishing space as a separate military Area of Responsibility (AOR) equivalent to those associated with air, land and sea operations. When international and allied spacecraft are included, more than 500 platforms are in Earth orbit, according to Army LtCol Rudy Veit, branch chief for strategy, policy and doctrine at USSPACECOM. As these assets become more crucial to national welfare and economic strength, "I, as a military commander, have to say that somebody is going to threaten them. And when they [do], we [should] have armed forces to protect them," said Gen Howell M. Estes, 3rd, commander-in-chief of the US or unified Space Command (CINCSPACE) and commander of Air Force Space Command.
THAAD Second Source Unlikely, Army Says.
Aviation Week & Space Technology. Michael A. Dornheim, Mar 24, 1997, p 33
Col Louis P. Deeter, the Army THAAD program manager, expects THAAD flight test No. 8 to occur this summer. It will incorporate several new items: a more sensitive indium antimonide focal plane array, replacing the platinum silicide seeker used to date; test timing will be paced by new seeker software; the THAAD User Operational Evaluation System radar will be fully populated with transmit/receiver elements; and the flight test will include new battle management software.
Arrow Flight Tests To Continue Pushing The Envelope.
BMD Monitor, Mar 21, 1997, p 99
The second successful intercept test of an Arrow-2 missile March 11 in Israel keeps the program on track toward an initial deployment before the end of the century. The joint US-Israeli program is developing the interceptor for Israel's Arrow Weapon system, a stand-alone missile defense system intended to protect population centers and military sites. Information from the program can benefit US TMD programs such as Patriot PAC-3, THAAD, Navy Area and Theater Wide programs.
Kaminski: BMD Program Is Balanced And Affordable.
BMD Monitor, Mar 21, 1997, p 93
UndSecDef (A&T) Paul Kaminski recently told a congressional subcommittee the fundamental priorities in the missile defense program have not changed in the past year, but funding has been increased. The priorities remain the same: to defend against theater ballistic missiles and cruise missiles; to develop a capability to defend against ICBMs and cruise missiles: and to develop a robust technology base. Chart showing DoD Missile Defense Budget Summary.
THAAD Test Failure Report Due Shortly.
BMD Monitor, Mar 21, 1997, p 100
BMDO Director LtGen Lyles who is leading the investigation into the failure of the March 7 THAAD intercept test told a House National Security Committee subcommittee the team will find what went wrong and go over the design of the test and equipment.
BMD Summit Proposed In New Study.
BMD Monitor, Mar 21, 1997, p 96-97
A new study, "Cold Peace or Cooperation? The Potential for US-Russian Accommodation on Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty," to be published in the Spring 1997 Comparative Strategy concludes the US and Russia can resolve their differences on BMD and the ABM Treaty can be worked out, at least in principle.
Kaminski: NMD Aims To Be 3 Years From Deployment.
BMD Monitor, Mar 21, 1997, p 94-95
UndSecDef (A&T) Paul Kaminski recently told a congressional committee that the Clinton administration's "3+3" national missile defense program goal is now "2+3". The goal is to be in a posture to be three years away from deployment, so that a response can be made to the emergence of a threat.
Lockheed Martin, Raytheon And TRW To Form NMD Team.
Defense Daily. Greg Caires and Vago Muradian, Mar 25, 1997, p 461
On May 1, BMDO will award up to three national missile defense (NMD) concept definition contracts. Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and TRW are expected to disclose a teaming arrangement to compete for one of the upcoming contracts.
Air Force's ABL Program Passes Another Key Review.
Defense Daily. Tom Breen, Mar 26, 1997, p 471
The Airborne Laser (ABL) system being developed for the Air Force passed another key review according to a Boeing official. The ABL is a theater ballistic missile defense system that will consist of a laser and a beam-control apparatus fixed on a Boeing 747-400F freighter aircraft. As envisioned, the ABL should be able to strike missiles hundreds of miles away.
Israel Seeks US Funds For Follow-On To Arrow.
Defense News, Mar 24, 1997, p 3, 64
Israeli government officials and their supporters in the US Congress are trying to convince the Clinton government to extend the joint US-Israel Arrow antimissile program through 2006 via a new initiative estimated to cost about $200 million over eight years.
Administration Confident That ABM Demarcation Deal Can Be Finalized.
Inside The Pentagon, Mar 27, 1997, p 1,4-5
Clinton administration officials are confident they can successfully turn last week's understanding with Russian President Boris Yeltsin on demarcation between theater and strategic anti-ballistic missile systems into a formal agreement. The difference this time, is the personal commitment from Yeltsin, which had been lacking in the past, as well as a commitment from Russian side on a clear, limited formula for a final demarcation pact.