UNSCOM - Report to the Security Council - 25 January 1999



The Establishment of Monitoring System: Mandate and Background

Mandate and Tasks

1. The Commission's Plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance (the Plan for OMV) was approved by the Security Council in its resolution 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991. The Plan for OMV established specific obligations for Iraq. The Plan also laid out a set of comprehensive rights for the Commission under which it could develop and operate a monitoring system in Iraq in order to fulfil its mandate.

2. The Plan for OMV established that in order to ensure Iraq's compliance, the Commission should, through inspections and through aerial overflights, as well as through the provision of information by Iraq, monitor and verify that activities, sites, facilities, material and other items, both military and civilian, are not used by Iraq in contravention of its obligations.

3. The Plan stated that, in accepting unconditionally Security Council resolution 687 (1991), Iraq undertook not to use, retain, possess, construct or otherwise acquire, inter alia, any ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres or any related major parts, including launchers, or any repair or production facilities. Provisions specifically related to missiles are contained in Section E (paragraphs 40-45) and Annex IV of the Plan for OMV. Paragraphs 41 and 42 provide important definitions of activities, sites and items subject to monitoring. Paragraphs 43 and 44 and relevant portions of Annex IV outline specific information and data that Iraq is required to provide to the Commission on a regular basis.

4. Iraq initially refused to accept its obligations under resolution 715 (1991) and the Plan for OMV approved by the resolution. Through early and mid-1993, the Commission undertook an effort in the missile area called "interim monitoring". It was designed to gain a better understanding of the requirements and resources that would be necessary to conduct future full-scale monitoring activities in the missile area once Iraq accepted the Plan for OMV. In May 1993, the Commission began the provisional installation of cameras to observe Iraq's main static test stand for missile engines.

5. In November 1993, Iraq decided to accept the obligations set forth in resolution 715 (1991) and to comply with the provisions of the Plan for monitoring and verification as contained therein.

6. The Commission then began implementation of the monitoring system in the missile area. It conducted a number of baseline inspections of missile facilities and facilities with dual-use capabilities declared by Iraq. Declared operational missiles subject to monitoring were inspected and tagged. In August 1994, a resident missile monitoring team was established, for the first time, at the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre (BMVC).

Assumptions and Basic Considerations

7. At the time of the adoption of the Plan for OMV in 1991 and the subsequent establishment of the Commission's monitoring system in 1994, there was no established precedent for an international inspection and monitoring regime to verify missile related activities similar to the requirements established by the Security Council. No proven or tested procedures existed that could have served as a model for the construction of a regime for verification of Iraq's compliance with the prohibitions on proscribed missiles imposed by the Council, while allowing Iraq to conduct a full scope of activities with missiles of a shorter range.

8. The Commission decided to establish and operate the least intrusive missile monitoring system in Iraq consistent with the overall objectives set forth by the Security Council. In arriving at this decision, the Commission made a number of basic assumptions that determined practical inspection procedures that have been used since in its ongoing monitoring in the missile area.

9. The primary assumption made by the Commission was that, in the implementation of its obligations, Iraq would willingly and fully cooperate with the Commission, inter alia, by: submitting full and accurate declarations; providing prompt, accurate and detailed responses to the Commission's inquiries and requests; granting unimpeded access to facilities, equipment, personnel, and records; and, facilitating aerial overflight and operation of monitoring equipment such as cameras and sensors. In this sense, the Commission has postulated "monitoring friendly" policies and behaviour by Iraq.

10. The second assumption was that the Government of Iraq would take a political decision to abide strictly by its undertaking not to initiate or engage in any proscribed activities and would enforce this decision throughout the territory of Iraq. If this was the case, then discrepancies that were always expected to be identified through monitoring, especially at its initial stages, would be interpreted as honest mistakes by individuals rather than as proscribed activities being deliberately concealed by the Government. The Plan for OMV provided that Iraq adopt legislation prohibiting all natural and legal persons under its jurisdiction from undertaking anywhere any activity prohibited by the relevant resolutions and the Plan, and to enact penal legislation to enforce the aforesaid prohibitions. Such legislation was required to have been enacted within thirty days of adoption by the Security Council of resolution 715 (1991) on 11 October 1991. To date, the legislation has not been enacted.

11. The third assumption was that the Commission would receive, from Iraq, full and complete disclosures of all its proscribed activities and capabilities, and that the identification and disposal of all proscribed weapons, materials and programmes would be achieved. Thus, no disarmament tasks or investigations of the past proscribed activities would need to be pursued under monitoring. The Commission's monitoring could focus solely on non-proscribed activities in Iraq to verify that they are not being misused. Based on this assumption, the current missile monitoring system has not been tasked to search for proscribed weapons and materials. This task has been carried out by the Commission separately through disarmament activities and investigations.

12. In an effort to operate the monitoring regime in the missile area in the least intrusive manner, the Commission decided to concentrate on "check points" rather than to carry out "blanket" monitoring of all relevant activities. A "check point" was defined as a selected stage in missile development or production that specific components, critical for final assembly of a missile, would have to pass through. In many cases, this involves dual-use equipment or technologies. Examples of "check points", in a liquid propellant missile, are flow-forming machines to produce sections of a combustion chamber, and, in a solid propellant missile, casting chambers for motors.

13. "Check points" were designed to assist the Commission in accounting for specific missile components under production in order to gauge the number of complete missiles that Iraq had produced or could produce using such components. "Check points" could also allow the detection of the diversion of components for undeclared use. For its monitoring purposes, the Commission has identified some 50 "check points" at various facilities in Iraq. Most of them are under continuous camera surveillance.

14. In designing its monitoring system, the Commission aimed at denying the use of "declared" facilities for proscribed purposes. If proscribed activities were undertaken, they would have to be conducted at other facilities. Thus, the Commission also incorporated inspections of "undeclared" facilities into its monitoring system.

15. Under the Security Council resolutions, missiles, as such, are not proscribed for Iraq to develop, test, produce or acquire. Only missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres are prohibited to Iraq. From the technological point of view, there is no boundary to separate missiles with ranges below or above 150 kilometres. The Plan for OMV itself does not contain technical definitions that would distinguish proscribed missile features and characteristics such as permitted or prohibited length and diameter of a missile, weight of its warhead and propellants, technical specifications of the missile engine and other subsystems and parameters of flight trajectories. The monitoring system has to take into account that it is difficult, within this framework, to define, in a clear-cut manner, proscribed versus non-proscribed missile activities.

16. During the last year, the Commission studied the underlying assumptions of its missile monitoring system and the impact that they had on the level of confidence in Iraq's compliance. The Commission has also evaluated its monitoring practices in relation to progress in missile-related activities and available technologies in Iraq. This resulted in a review of the missile monitoring system. Through this review, several areas were identified which required additional or improved inspection efforts in order to monitor effectively Iraq's activities in the missile area. The implementation of some of these improvements were already in progress. Such improvements and other suggestions resulting from this review are outlined in the present paper.

Iraq's Missile Programmes relevant to Monitoring

17. After the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), Iraq declared that it would carry out activities related to non-proscribed missiles. In the course of implementation of the Plan for OMV, Iraq declared a number of specific missile projects. Some of these projects were a resumption of programmes that Iraq had been engaged in prior to the adoption of resolutions 687 (1991) and 715 (1991).

18. The main missile activity in Iraq under monitoring by the Commission since 1994 has been the development of a missile, with a declared range of just below 150 kilometres, for indigenous production in Iraq. This missile system, known variably as Ababil-100 or the Samoud, has been under development in both liquid and solid propellant versions.

19. Since the missile monitoring system was established in 1994, Iraq has achieved considerable progress in the development of the Samoud liquid propellant missile system with a declared range of 149 kilometres. A number of static tests of missile engines were conducted. In October 1997, Iraq carried out its first declared flight test of a Samoud missile. This flight test was declared a success by Iraq and demonstrated a significant step in Iraq's indigenous missile production capabilities. Iraq continued active flight test activities in 1998.

20. Iraq has been working on the design and development of the Ababil-100 solid propellant missile with a declared maximum range just short of the 150 kilometre limit. Iraq is in the process of establishing the infrastructure for the production of solid propellant motors and other components for such a missile.

21. Other major activities by Iraq include efforts aimed at indigenous production of a short range missile; the development of remotely piloted vehicles; and, reverse engineering and modification of various missile systems available in Iraq.

22. Iraq has pursued the indigenous production of a battlefield missile with technologies which could be used in longer range systems. Several static and flight tests of indigenously produced missiles have been conducted.

23. Iraq has declared the development of a remotely piloted vehicle. The Commission is monitoring this programme due to its use of components from a monitored operational missile as well as missile related technologies and capabilities covered under the Plan for OMV.

24. Iraq has declared programmes related to reverse engineering or modification of a number of missiles available in Iraq. These projects are subject to monitoring as they use listed facilities for related design or manufacturing activities. Dual-use equipment, material and items covered by the Plan for OMV are associated with the projects.

25. It should be noted that after the adoption of resolutions 687 and 715 (1991), Iraq undertook a number of missile activities that are covered by the Plan for OMV. These were not declared by Iraq in accordance with the Plan. The most significant of these covert programmes was a project called J-1 to acquire surface-to-surface liquid propellant missiles through the modification of surface-to-air missiles already available to Iraq. This project was not declared to the Commission until 1995, that is, more than two years after it had been allegedly aborted.

26. The monitoring activities in the missile area take into account the established scope of ongoing missile projects in Iraq and are adjusted in response to the projects' overall progress and specific achievements and developments.

Current Monitoring System: Its Architecture

27. The missile monitoring architecture is based on a process that interleaves different inspection procedures, data collection efforts and analytical tools. These tools in the missile area include on-site inspections by resident and non-resident teams, remote camera surveillance, use of other sensors, declarations and notifications from Iraq, participation in aerial inspections and Export/Import monitoring.

28. Before proceeding to the discussion of the actual operation of the missile monitoring systems and tools used, it is worthwhile to address at least two notions that have prime significance: firstly, sites for inspection and secondly; dual-use items.

List of Sites

29. The Commission has developed and maintained a list of sites in Iraq for regular inspection by missile resident teams. This list includes facilities declared by Iraq under the Plan for OMV as being involved in missile related activities or possessing dual-use capabilities; facilities identified by the Commission, and some other sites. Sites which are included in the list are referred to as "listed sites". Currently, there are some 80 sites on the missile list.

30. The main purpose of the list is to assist resident teams in planning and executing routine on-site inspections and in the verification of Iraq's declarations. The list has never been intended to be the only source for the identification of sites for inspection activities under the Plan for OMV. The scope of monitoring is not limited in any way to "listed sites". The monitoring regime was rather established by the Security Council for the purpose of monitoring and verifying that, throughout Iraq, activities, sites, facilities, material and other items are not used by Iraq in contravention of its obligations under resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991). For this purpose, Iraq undertook, under the Plan for OMV, to accept unconditionally the inspection of any site, facility, activity, material or other items declared by Iraq or designated by the Commission; and to provide immediate and unimpeded access to any site, facility, activity, material or other items to be inspected. Under its missile monitoring system, the Commission has carried out inspections of sites not included in the list in order to ascertain that no proscribed activities or activities that were to be declared under the Plan for OMV, took place at those "non-listed" sites.

31. The sites and facilities in the current list in the missile area can be broken down into six main categories: key facilities; supporting facilities; dual-use facilities; sites involved in previous proscribed activities; operational sites and, other sites.

32. Key facilities are facilities declared by Iraq that are directly engaged in the ongoing missile development, testing or production programmes in Iraq. These facilities have equipment or capabilities to produce missile or major missile components for both proscribed and non-proscribed purposes. There are 12 such facilities on the list. They were singled out for special inspection procedures to ensure that all activities at these sites are for non-proscribed purposes. The procedures at these facilities include frequent no-notice inspections by resident teams, remote camera surveillance at multiple points, tagging of dual-use and other critical equipment, notifications by Iraq of all equipment movement and detailed semi-annual and, as required, monthly declarations from Iraq. Based on its experience, the Commission recently began to use more frequently at these facilities such inspection procedures as document searches, computer searches and interviews of key personnel.

33. Supporting facilities are declared facilities which are involved in the design or production of components or tooling for ongoing non-proscribed missile programmes in Iraq. In many cases, this involves the use of dual-use items, materials and equipment. There are 18 such facilities on the list. The Commission inspects these sites for the number and type of components or tools that they produce for missile programmes as well as for their dual-use capabilities. Inspections of these facilities are critical since the components and tools produced could be misused for proscribed purposes or diverted for undeclared activities. These facilities have been subject to a lower intensity of inspection activities than key facilities. A more intensive inspection of supporting facilities may be required in response to progress in Iraq's missile activities.

34. Dual-use facilities are declared facilities which contain items and technologies listed in Annex IV of the Plan for OMV. As distinct from "key" or "supporting" facilities, dual-use capabilities at these facilities are not declared by Iraq as being used for the benefit of its missile programmes. There are 20 such facilities on the list. Such facilities are inspected to ensure that their missile related capabilities are only used in declared activities. The Commission maintains a minimal inspection presence through infrequent on-site inspections and remote camera surveillance of specific dual-use items. Based on experience, it is likely that some of these facilities would require more inspection efforts as more dual-use technologies and items might become available to Iraq.

35. Sites involved in previous proscribed activities are generally facilities which are currently abandoned. Inspections are done to ascertain that they remain so. There are eight such facilities on the list and they are generally subject only to aerial overflights.

36. Operational sites are those facilities which are involved in the maintenance or operation of non-proscribed missiles. On-site inspections are required to ensure that all missiles that require monitoring have been declared by Iraq and that the facilities are not involved in proscribed activities such as training for the use of proscribed missiles. There are some 10 facilities on the list. As it was assessed that Iraq was not producing indigenously or otherwise acquiring new missiles, the Commission, after an initial round of inspection of those sites, decided to limit further inspections of these facilities in order to respect Iraq's legitimate concerns relating to national security.

37. Other "listed sites" are sites which have some relation to the Commission's activities in Iraq, such as excavation sites at locations of the unilateral destruction of missile and related equipment, holding areas of proscribed components, former proscribed weapons and equipment hide sites, etc.

List of Dual-Use and Other Equipment

38. One way to collect the data required to assess Iraq's compliance is to monitor, throughout Iraq, equipment and other items that could be used by Iraq in proscribed missile activities or in undisclosed activities that Iraq is required to declare under the Plan for OMV. The Plan established a list of dual-use items for the missile area. This list constitutes Annex IV to the Plan. The Annex contains technical definitions of equipment, components, items, materials and technologies that are considered important to develop and produce proscribed missiles in Iraq. The list was subsequently revised to elaborate specific items which would be subject to Export/Import monitoring. Modifications to the list were mainly based on an internationally accepted missile non-proliferation regime, the Missile Technology Control Regime. This modified Annex IV was approved by the Security Council in March 1995. Further modifications may be expected in the future in the light of experience.

39. The monitoring of dual-use items establishes surveillance of the most critical equipment, materials, tooling, components or technologies to seek to ensure that they are only used, in practice, for legitimate declared purposes and are not diverted to proscribed applications. Most of these items have applications in both proscribed and non-proscribed missile development or production. Many could also be used in non-missile related industries. There are numerous dual-use items and materials in Iraq. The Commission attempts to monitor them by a variety of methods depending on the nature of items, but primarily by maintaining running inventories of identified items at "listed" facilities. For example, 38 pieces of dual-use equipment are tagged in the missile area. The Commission also conducts specific inspections to verify that no dual-use items are present at other, "non-listed" facilities.

40. In addition to items in Annex IV of the Plan for OMV, the Commission monitors some other critical equipment located mainly at key facilities. Iraq is required to declare all equipment at key facilities and their movement. While other equipment with similar capabilities is likely to exist in Iraq, the Commission views the tracking of declared equipment associated with key missile facilities necessary to its effort to prevent the movement of declared capabilities to undeclared sites.

41. A number of items which were used or acquired by Iraq specifically for proscribed programmes in the past have been tagged by the Commission. While these items are not explicitly listed on Annex IV and while other such untagged items might exist elsewhere in Iraq, the Commission views the monitoring of these tagged items as important because of their association with past proscribed activities.

On-site Inspections

42. On-site inspections are the main tool used by the Commission for monitoring and verification in Iraq. The Commission has developed and employed a variety of inspections to meet specific objectives.


43. In order to establish its current monitoring system in Iraq, the Commission conducted, in early 1994, baseline site inspections. They mostly covered Iraq's declared missile research, development, testing and production facilities, and declared dual-use facilities. The objective was to determine specific requirements for monitoring procedures for each site. During an initial round of baseline inspections, 33 facilities were inspected to assess the level of technical capabilities of each facility related to both proscribed and non-proscribed missile activities, follow the production process at each facility, identify requirements for tagging and remote camera surveillance and elaborate specific details for Iraq's declarations regarding each facility. All 33 facilities inspected were included in the site list in the missile area. The baseline inspections also assessed the overall status of each of the indigenous missile programmes declared by Iraq under the Plan for OMV.

44. The operation of the missile monitoring system revealed some weaknesses in initial assessments. As mentioned previously, the Commission assumed that Iraq would fully support the monitoring system. During over four years of missile monitoring, the Commission has learned that Iraq: sometimes provided incomplete declarations; had engaged in undeclared and even proscribed missile related activities; and, tended to understate the level of its achievement and technological skills.

45. In response to these events and Iraq's recent improvements in its non-proscribed missile related capabilities, the Commission began a process of a basic review of missile design, development and production activities in Iraq at their new levels. The goal is to maintain the Commission's ability to monitor effectively Iraq's activities. The Commission conducted new baseline inspections related to missile and dual-use production equipment at the end of 1997, and Iraq's solid propellant missile industry in the middle of 1998. Resultant assessments and recommendations are being incorporated into the monitoring system. Additional baseline inspections are still required to bring the current monitoring system up to speed.

Resident Teams

46. The centerpiece of the monitoring system is teams of resident inspectors stationed in the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre (BMVC). No other tool is as flexible. Inspectors can be recruited with specific technical knowledge and trained to exercise a variety of mandated inspection procedures. Resident inspectors are tasked to carry out on-site inspections of "listed" and "non-listed" facilities, conduct analysis and assessment of specific areas of Iraq's activities, participate in aerial inspections, etc.

47. The majority of on-site inspections by resident teams are done on a no-notice basis. On average, 350 inspections per year have been performed by missile resident teams. During on-site visits, inspectors observe ongoing activities at facilities, check the accuracy of Iraq's declarations and confirm the presence of tagged and other declared items, if applicable. Inspectors might ask questions of the facility personnel to obtain better understanding of relevant activities and status of missile programmes.

48. No-notice inspections by missile resident teams did not include regular use of such procedures as document searches, computer searches, interviews of personnel or sample taking. The active and regular use of these procedures may become necessary in order to verify effectively Iraq's compliance.

49. Missile resident teams interact on a regular basis with other resident teams in the BMVC. For example, the missile monitoring system covers essentially the same facilities and equipment as the nuclear monitoring system. Several items of equipment are under joint remote camera surveillance by the IAEA and the Commission.

50. Missile resident teams provide assistance to the Aerial Inspection (AIT) and Export/Import (EG) teams at the BMVC. For example, assistance to the AIT involves the interpretation of imagery or the identification of areas requiring photographic coverage. The work with the EG team is in the form of expert assessment of items imported by Iraq and their relation to Annex IV of the Plan for OMV. There has not been a significant inflow of such goods into Iraq. It is expected that the interaction between the missile and EG teams at the BMVC will increase in the future. This might necessitate the acquisition of dedicated personnel for missile resident teams to perform this specific coordination function.

51. The Commission has identified a requirement to improve the training of its resident missile inspectors. Their training and expertise have been declining to a level that could jeopardise the Commission's objectives in ongoing monitoring. The Commission has begun the development of a new training programme with a goal of meeting the new requirements.

52. The Commission has attempted to maintain five to seven technical inspectors on missile resident teams in the BMVC. In response to increased workload and the diversification of the team's tasks, it is expected that this number will need to be more than doubled in the future.

Non-resident Inspections

53. While missile resident teams have the responsibility to inspect sites on a daily basis, the Commission also sends non-resident teams to Iraq to conduct special monitoring inspections. Such inspections require specialised expertise, training, operational planning and support. Examples of such inspection missions are: missile tagging and tag checks; missile test activity observation; missile technology updates; baseline inspections; and, compliance inspections. Several missions went to Iraq to conduct discussions of monitoring activities with the Iraqi counterparts. Over 40 non-resident teams have been to Iraq on monitoring inspections and missions since 1994.

54. It is important to keep track of the technological progress of Iraq's industries to ensure that the ongoing monitoring is properly focused. Technology update inspection teams go to Iraq, usually on a semi-annual basis, to assess advancements in the technology base and to make recommendations for improvements in the monitoring system. Inspectors on such teams bring fresh perspectives on missile related developments and on the application of emerging technologies for monitoring purposes. Technology update inspections are critical to keeping the monitoring system in the missile area up-to-date. There have been seven such teams in Iraq since 1994.

55. Pursuant to the Plan for OMV, in particular its paragraph 43(a), the Commission monitors specified operational missiles in Iraq to ensure that they are not modified for prohibited purposes. Since mid-1994, 22 non-resident teams went to Iraq to conduct inspections for this purpose. A more detailed discussion of relevant issues is presented in a section below dealing with operational missiles.

56. As the development of the Samoud missile system progressed, Iraq has engaged in more test activities, both static and flight. In order to properly evaluate these activities and test results, the Commission reverted to the practice of supplementing, on a temporary basis, resident teams with special equipment and personnel, including missile test engineers. This practice has proven to be very useful. Some 10 such supplementary groups have been sent to Iraq starting in late 1997. In the future, test engineers and specialists will have to be placed permanently on missile resident teams to cover effectively and in detail all missile test activities.

57. Other non-resident inspection teams were sent to Iraq as required. They were involved in baseline inspections, monitoring discussions and compliance inspections. Baseline inspections are discussed above. Monitoring discussions were carried out on numerous occasions to clarify, elaborate or resolve technical issues related to ongoing monitoring in the missile area. For example, during these discussions, issues related to formats of Iraq's declarations and notifications, definitions of missiles, facilities, equipment and items subject to monitoring, deployment and operation of sensors and interaction between inspectors and Iraqi personnel have been addressed.

58. Seven compliance inspections have already been sent to Iraq since 1994 to verify information gained from inspections or received from other sources concerning Iraq's compliance with its obligations under the Plan for OMV not to use, develop, construct or acquire proscribed items. Most of them carried out investigations of Iraq's attempts, after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), to procure from abroad items or assistance for its missile programmes. A number of cases were identified when Iraq imported or sought to import missile-related items that it was required to declare under the Plan for OMV. Some of these efforts were not declared to the Commission. In one particular case, the Commission established that Iraq imported proscribed gyroscopes in 1995 that could be used in long-range missiles.

59. The Commission's use of non-resident inspections is likely to increase in the future to meet a growing number of specialized tasks that would need to be carried out in the framework of the missile monitoring system.

Inspections of Non-Listed Sites

60. In order to seek to deter or uncover Iraq's use of facilities or sites for undeclared or proscribed purposes, missile resident and non-resident teams conduct inspections of sites in Iraq that are not included in the missile site list. Such "non-listed" sites are designated by the Commission for inspection based on their assessed capability to be involved in proscribed activities or based on information that they are involved in undeclared or proscribed activities. Inspections of "non-listed" sites are crucial to the development of overall assessments of Iraq's compliance with the Plan for OMV. The Commission expects that the importance of this type of inspection in the missile area will increase in the future to improve the effectiveness of monitoring.


61. In addition to on-site inspections by expert personnel as its central element, the monitoring system in the missile area makes extensive use of technical devices. Cameras allow the surveillance of activities and equipment on a continuous basis. Application of tags ensures detection of tampering. As sensor technologies progress, the Commission intends to avail itself of emerging capabilities.


62. The primary sensor in the missile monitoring system is remote surveillance cameras. Cameras installed at missile facilities and their workshops allow continuous observation of selected locations and recording of ongoing activities. The system is also capable of transmitting imagery back to a camera control room at the BMVC.

63. In the missile area, 74 cameras are installed at 15 "listed" facilities. They are mostly used to observe "check points".

64. The Commission, both through its BMVC missile resident teams and its headquarter's staff, evaluates images recorded by the cameras to determine the nature of activities at locations and with equipment under camera surveillance, and to produce estimates of the quantity, quality and usage of components or missiles being produced at these locations. Examples of such locations are specified technological stages in the missile development and production such as flow forming; vacuum brazing; solid propellant mixing, casting, extrusion and curing; gyro balancing; hydrostatic testing; and missile final integration. Remote cameras have a particular value at static test stands for the testing of missile engines. They allow the recording of declared tests as well as the detection of any undeclared test activities at the declared stands. Temporary video cameras were also installed at storage areas to verify non-unauthorised access to such areas and ensure custody control of items in storage.

65. The Commission is planning an upgrade of its existing camera system and the deployment of advanced cameras in the missile area.


66. As missile related activities progressed in Iraq, the Commission began to put more effort into technical evaluation of Iraq's declared missile systems and their components. At the end of 1997, several specific issues for technical assessment of the Samoud missile were identified. The Commission resorted to additional technical instrumentation for independent and precise appraisal of specific missile parameters both through physical measurement and mathematical modelling. This called for the use of such instrumentation as precision scales and precision volumetric gauges. These were necessary to verify that declared missile characteristics such as weights of individual missile sub-systems and sections, volumes of propellant loads and matching parameters of the missiles actually used in tests. Such data is essential for verification that the declared system as a whole complies in practice with the Plan for OMV.

67. The Commission believes that the deployment in Iraq of its own system to track in-flight tests of missiles would considerably improve monitoring in the missile area. The Commission carried out a survey mission in December 1998 in preparation for the future use of the tracking system.

68. The Commission intends to use new sensors for monitoring activities in the missile area. Examples of emerging useful technologies under study are: remote sensors, real-time analytical samplers and detectors, and recorders of control units for production equipment.


69. Tamper-proof tags are being used in the missile area for inventory control and to prevent certain activities from being undetected. Their usage assisted in maintaining reliable inventories of dual-use and other equipment and controlling equipment movement. Tamper-proof tags are one of the main tools for verification of non-modification of declared operational missiles under monitoring. Tags are also used to control unauthorized access to some areas and to some items. The use of tags is relatively inexpensive and facilitates a whole range of monitoring activities.

70. Up to now, monitoring sensors including cameras, instrumentation and tags, have been provided by Governments on a "no-cost-basis". The Commission has relied on supporting Governments for necessary maintenance services and logistical support for the monitoring sensors.

Iraq's Declarations

71. The Plan for OMV was designed following the established and proven method in arms control: verification of declarations provided by the party under monitoring. According to the Plan, Iraq undertook to provide, on a regular basis, full, complete, correct and timely declarations and notifications as specified in the Plan or designated by the Commission as well as to respond fully, completely and promptly to questions and requests from the Commission.

72. In the missile area, Iraq is required, under paragraph 43 of the Plan, to submit on a regular semi-annual basis:

a list of all its missiles designed for use, or capable of being modified for use, in a surface-to-surface role with a range greater than 50 kilometres, specifying various missile parameters, and information on any project and on any site or facility for such missiles;

information on any project and on any site or facility for missile research, development, modification or testing;

information on the development, production, acquisition and other activities related to items and technologies listed in Annex IV.

73. Under paragraph 44 of the Plan, Iraq undertook to notify the Commission of developmental and test launches of any missile.

74. The Commission provided to Iraq formats for these declarations. It has also identified requirements for additional notifications and communications from Iraq in response to developments in missile-related activities in Iraq or through experience the Commission has gained in the implementation of the Plan.

75. Upon receipt of declarations and notifications from Iraq, the Commission assesses them, updates its relevant databases and conducts, through resident and non-resident teams, a verification of their completeness and accuracy. Assessment and verification of Iraq's declarations in the missile area is quite an enormous task. Each time they are submitted, semi-annual declarations alone contain some 1000 pages. Additional declarations and notifications, including on missile tests and equipment movement, are frequent and require follow-up actions on the part of the Commission.

76. The Commission's confidence in Iraq's compliance depends significantly on the openness, accuracy and completeness of Iraq's declarations. The Commission's experience with Iraq's declarations in the missile area is that they have been generally complete and correct. On several occasions, the Commission has noted Iraq's reluctance to declare, at an early stage, activities which should be under monitoring. An example is Iraq's acquisition of a facility for the production of Ammonium Perchlorate (APC), a missile propellant listed in Annex IV in the Plan for OMV. Iraq began the development for this facility in 1995, without providing a notification to the Commission. Through an on-site inspection of a "non-listed" site, the Commission first detected such activity in early 1996 when it discovered a pilot plant for the production of APC. In late 1997, Iraq notified the Commission that it had begun the construction of a full-scale facility for the APC production. Such delayed disclosures disrupt the smooth functioning of the monitoring system.

77. In a number of cases, Iraq refused to provide the required declarations or to respond fully and promptly to Commission's requests for clarifications. This has handicapped effective monitoring. In most of these cases, Iraq cited national security reasons for its refusals to comply with its obligations under the Plan for OMV.

78. If incomplete or delayed declarations were to become common in the missile area, the Commission will have to increase the intensity of its inspection activities by bringing under the inspection process design and management facilities, and by resorting to the increased use of document and computer searches at "listed" and "non-listed" facilities.

Operational Missiles

79. The Plan for OMV provides for the monitoring of missiles designed for use, or capable of being modified for use, in a surface-to-surface role with a range greater than 50 kilometres. Some such missiles are operational as they are deployed with Iraq's Armed Forces. The objective of monitoring operational missiles is to ensure that they are not modified for proscribed purposes, for example to extend their ranges over the non-prohibited limit of 150 kilometres or to modify them for the delivery of chemical or biological warfare agents. Paragraph 43 (a) of the Plan requires Iraq to provide a list of all missiles with a range greater than 50 kilometres in Iraq, including sites and facilities where such missiles and related equipment are located.

80. At the initiation of the monitoring system, the Commission had established, in cooperation with Iraq, certain modalities for monitoring Iraq's operational missiles. This was done to address security and national defence concerns expressed by Iraq and was motivated by the Commission's decision to operate the least intrusive missile monitoring system in Iraq. For these reasons, the Commission waived an option to inspect missiles and associated facilities at times and locations of its choosing as it has a right to do under the provisions of the Plan for OMV.

81. The established modalities envisioned that after all declared missiles are tagged, the Commission would verify non-modification of the missiles by checking the integrity of the tags affixed. For this purpose, the Commission would send no more than three teams per year. It would select for each inspection up to 10% of all tagged missiles, a list of which would be provided to Iraq ten days prior to each inspection. Iraq presents the missiles selected by the Commission for inspection at locations of its choosing.

82. Initially, in 1994, the Commission decided not to tag SA2/Volga surface-to-air missiles in Iraq. Although such missiles fall under definitions contained in the Plan for OMV and Iraq attempted, prior to the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), to modify such missiles for a surface-to-surface role, the Commission decided again to resort to less intrusive monitoring procedures for such missiles in order to accommodate, to the maximum, Iraq's stated security concerns. After August 1995, Iraq declared that, after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), it had secretly conducted modifications of SA2/Volga missiles for a surface-to-surface role without declaring such activities to the Commission. In response, the Commission changed its earlier decision not to tag these missiles. During 1996, these missiles were tagged and added to the list of missiles for annual inspections.

83. Monitoring of SA2/Volga missiles in Iraq presents particular problems. In response to the Commission's attempts to implement the relevant provisions of the Plan for OMV, Iraq raised objections to some inspection procedures and monitoring requirements citing national concerns. In some cases Iraq continues to refuse to accept some of them, including those related to reuse of specific components of these missiles for its programme to develop the Samoud surface-to-surface missile system. These issues remain mostly unresolved.

84. Currently, there are several thousand operational missiles of different types that are declared by Iraq under paragraph 43 (a) of the Plan for OMV. It includes short-range surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles and cruise missiles. There are no missiles on the current list that Iraq has produced indigenously.

85. Since 1994, the Commission has carried out 22 inspections related to tagging and checking operational missiles under monitoring. This includes 14 "annual" checks carried out pursuant to the established modalities. The Commission has not identified any evidence of proscribed modification of the tagged missiles.

86. The effectiveness of the established modalities for inspection of declared operational missiles depends on Iraq's cooperation. In particular, the Commission has assumed that Iraq would declare all available missiles subject to monitoring. The Commission has so far been refraining from conducting specialized inspections to verify that all relevant missiles have indeed been declared by Iraq. In the future, the Commission may have to resort to regular inspections with this purpose in order to maintain effective monitoring of the operational missiles. This will be particularly important when Iraq starts to acquire new missiles either through indigenous production or importation.


87. The staff in the Commission's headquarters in New York is responsible for advising the Executive Chairman on the day-to-day operation of the missile monitoring system, improvements to the system, and results of analysis of Iraq's activities and assessments of Iraq's compliance. The staff assists the Executive Chairman in the preparation of his reports to the Security Council.

88. The headquarters office conducts the assessment, in conjunction with resident teams in the BMVC, of Iraq's declarations and data collected through various inspection efforts. It is engaged in the evaluation of imagery collected by the Commission's aerial surveillance assets provided by supporting Governments and participates in the tasking for these assets in support of the ongoing monitoring in the missile area. The staff carries out, in support of the Joint Export/Import Unit, the technical review of information related to Iraq's importation of dual-use goods. It is responsible for the planning and execution of non-resident inspections. For many of these inspections, assistance is sought from governments in the form of information, personnel, technical and logistical support, and training. Many non-resident inspections include members of the headquarters staff to provide for continuity and leadership.

89. One of the main day-to-day responsibilities of the headquarters staff is overseeing, recruiting, manning, equipping, training and other general management tasks in operation of the missile monitoring system.

90. Currently, there are six officers in the Commission's headquarters in New York responsible both for disarmament and monitoring activities in the missile area.

External Support

91. The Commission has relied extensively on the support of Member States, in the form of personnel, equipment, services and information, to carry out its monitoring activities in the missile area.

92. Governments are the only source of personnel with technical expertise and the inspection skills required. The Commission has approached some 30 Governments with requests to provide experts for resident missile teams. Experts from 16 countries have participated in such teams since 1994. Missile technologies are limited to a few countries, the number of personnel involved in relevant industries is relatively small, generally over-employed, and very well paid. For these reasons, the Commission has found it increasingly difficult to obtain or retain qualified technical experts necessary for the ongoing monitoring in the missile area. Currently, the Commission can reliably depend on only a few Governments to provide, on a "cost-free basis", such personnel. In the future, the Commission will need to find additional sources of recruitment of its missile inspectors and will most probably have to bear considerable costs associated with the recruitment and training of technical experts and other inspection personnel.

93. In the missile area, the Commission's monitoring system requires extensive technical support ranging from the technical assessment of Iraq's missile designs and characteristics, to expert evaluation of development and production activities, to data analysis of both static and flight tests, to computer simulation of missile data, to the development, supply and service of monitoring sensors and technologies. The Commission has relied exclusively on Governments for such support. In the future, requirements for technical support will increase. The Commission is planning to approach a number of Governments with a request to designate national laboratories and establishments that would be able to provide, upon the Commission's request, technical and analytical support for ongoing monitoring in the missile area.

Current Monitoring System Capabilities: Lessons and Assessments

94. Through more than four years of its monitoring activities, the Commission has identified capabilities and deficiencies of the current monitoring system in the missile area. Based on the provisions of the Plan for OMV, the current system was established and operated on the basis of a number of political, technical, logistical and financial assumptions and considerations. These issues need to be kept under continuing review and scrutiny to maintain the relevance and effectiveness of the missile monitoring system

95. Certain lessons have been learned about what the current monitoring system can do with a high degree of confidence or cannot do in the verification of Iraq's compliance in the missile area. In between these two extreme points, a variety of Iraq's missile related activities could be verified with various degrees of confidence.

What the Current Monitoring System Can Do with a High Degree of Confidence

96. In the Commission's view, the current missile monitoring system can:

What the Current Monitoring System Cannot Do

97. In the Commission's view, the current missile monitoring system cannot:

98. The ultimate objective of ongoing monitoring in the missile area is to detect in a timely manner and to deter the deployment by Iraq of an operational force of proscribed missiles. Under existing conditions in Iraq, the current monitoring system is deemed able to accomplish this task in relation to indigenous production and deployment of large quantities of missiles required for an operational force of significance. Detection of Iraq's acquisition of such a force through importation would largely depend on receiving information from a supplier Government. The ability to discover any retained proscribed missiles and their operational assets is questionable at this juncture, as the monitoring system has not been engaged in such efforts. Were this to be attempted, substantial changes in inspection procedures that are being practised under the current monitoring system in the missile area would be required.