May 28, 1998


                           THE WHITE HOUSE

                    Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release                                    May 28, 1998

                           PRESS BRIEFING
                           BY MIKE MCCURRY

                          The Briefing Room

2:37 P.M. EDT


	     Q	  Did the detonation of the nuclear devices in 
Pakistan seal the fate of President Clinton's trip to India and 
Pakistan in the fall?
	     MR. MCCURRY:  Not necessarily.  That trip is still under 
review, and the President has not made a decision with respect to it.  
There are strong arguments to be made for going to press upon both 
governments and others in the region the importance we attach to 
steps now to de-escalate and to lessen tensions in South Asia.  But 
there clearly are some arguments against going, as a statement of our 
displeasure with both governments for steps, as the President said 
today, that move in the wrong direction, contrary to the tide of 
history that most of the world is celebrating. 

	     Q	  What's the assessment now on the part of the U.S. 
government that both countries will now move to another step of 
actually arming delivery systems with nuclear weapons? 

	     MR. MCCURRY:  There are a number of steps that these 
governments could take that would be threatening to each other and 
would create greater instabilities in the region.  There are also 
steps they could take that would be very reassuring to the world 
community at this point.  First and foremost among them would be for 
both to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty immediately and 
without condition, to join the discussions in Geneva for a cutoff of 
fissile material production, and to refrain from any steps, any 
actions that would suggest deployment or weaponization of ballistic 
missiles, which would clearly be seen throughout the world as a very 
destabilizing and very dangerous development. 

	     Q	  Mike, does the President have any reason to believe 
that Pakistan may do more tests in the next few days? 

	     MR. MCCURRY:  We will assess that and report on that as 
we can.  The statement by the government of Pakistan was quite clear 
that they believe that they have matched the tests that have been 
done by India, but obviously we'll continue to monitor the situation 
	     Q	  Did the President have any reason to believe that 
from his last conversation with Sharif?
	     MR. MCCURRY:  Well, to drop back a bit, he had a 
conversation that I reported to many of you around midnight last 
night in which he made the very strong case against testing, that the 
United States government and the President personally believes -- and 
believed -- was the correct course for the people of Pakistan to 
pursue.  He made the strong argument of what would accrue to the 
benefit of the people of Pakistan if its government refrained from 
testing and noted that the severe consequences that Pakistan will now 
face as a result of these tests.

	     That argument, obviously, and the arguments of many 
others in the world did not sway the government of Pakistan, the 
Prime Minister -- the Prime Minister called the President just before 
he made his public statement this morning around 8:30 a.m. to note 
his decision and to express his respect and respectful disagreement 
for the arguments raised by the President.
	     Q	  Just for the record, this means that the F-16s that 
were held up because of the Pressler Amendment, that Pakistan can 
certainly forget about ever getting those F-16s?
	     MR. MCCURRY:  Well, there are a variety of sanctions 
that will come in place and join those sanctions already in place, 
through the Symington Amendment, through the Pressler Amendment.  
There are a number of sanctions that have already -- were already 
imposed on the government of Pakistan.  Those obviously remain in 
place.  The serious consequences that result from the sanctions 
imposed by the Glenn Amendment, Section 102 of the Export Control 
Act, now come into place, and they will have a range of effects on 
our bilateral assistance programs and on the posture we take in 
international lending institutions.
	     Q	  So what can the United States now offer to India 
and Pakistan in an effort to get them to sign the treaty and forbear 
further testing?
	     MR. MCCURRY:  Well, for one, that all these strict 
sanctions in place remain in place and cannot be removed until there 
are the kind of steps that would allow the President to go to 
Congress and suggest that sanctions should be relaxed.  So to the 
degree that these sanctions do have an impact in these countries -- 
and there is a report in one of our newspapers today about the impact 
that sanctions are already having in India -- to the degree that that 
pressure begins to build on these governments and they see fit to 
follow the kind of course that we have suggested they need to pursue 
at this point, that would put the administration in a position to 
make a case to Congress if we were in that position to relax 
sanctions.  We are a long way -- in the aftermath of this decision, 
we're not there at this point.
	     Q	  When they talked at 8:30 a.m., did the President 
take the call?
	     MR. MCCURRY:  They -- Prime Minister Sharif had called 
earlier in the morning -- actually, I step back -- the government of 
Pakistan had called earlier in the morning and arranged the call, and 
it occurred right around 8:30 a.m.
	     Q	  What did the President sat to Sharif when Sharif --
	     MR. MCCURRY:  Well, he expressed exactly what he told 
all of you in his statement: his profound disappointment, his sense 
that this was exactly the wrong decision for the government of 
Pakistan to make.  He certainly understands the arguments the Prime 
Minister made.  He understands the unique regional and domestic 
pressures that the Prime Minister felt he faced.  But the President, 
nonetheless, felt that this was a very wrong decision and regretted 
the fact that the Prime Minister did not see the wisdom of the 
argument the President had carefully made.
	     Q	  Let me follow on the F-16s.  Is the U.S. now 
obligated to return the money to Pakistan?
	     MR. MCCURRY:  Well, we will have to review that.  It had 
been the policy of our government that we had accepted payment for 
the aircraft, that we were looking for some way that we could arrange 
for some compensation for the aircraft.  The Pressler Amendment was 
quite clear on restricting the delivery of the aircraft themselves.  
We'll have to assess now, in light of this development, if there's 
any relief that's available.  There may not be any relief.
	     Q	  When do the sanctions actually go into effect?
	     MR. MCCURRY:  They're being prepared now, and they could 
be issued as early as later today or certainly in coming days. 
	     Q	  Mike, do you have an idea of the economic impact of 
this latest sanction?

	     MR. MCCURRY:  The question is for a ballpark estimate 
and if you will accept this as really only a ballpark estimate, I can 
run through what we anticipate some of the implications of the 
imposition of Glenn Amendment sanctions under the Arms Export Control 
	     First, in the international financial institution 
lending that is done to Pakistan, it will now be the posture of the 
United States and its executive directors who sit on those lending 
institutions to oppose multilateral lending.  The government of 
Pakistan has got a fairly extensive international financial 
assistance program underway.  The IMF program there itself is, I 
think, a $1.6 billion dollar program.  Now, that doesn't immediately 
get shut off.  It's just the United States position in the IMF is 
that we would oppose that type of multilateral lending. 
	     Estimated disbursements by other entities, the Asian 
Development Bank, is expected to disburse roughly $1.8 billion during 
1998 to 2000.  Estimated disbursements by the World Bank are about 
$500 million to $750 million annually.  The next disbursement under 
the IMF program that was anticipated was expected to be $292 million 
toward the end of this year.  Those are all disbursements that we 
don't control, but it will now be our position in opposition to those 
	     There is not much bilateral assistance to Pakistan that 
we have currently because of the Symington Act restrictions that are 
already in place, so there's not, for example, an AID program to cut 
off or anything of that nature because most of that was currently 
proscribed, as is international military education training, funding, 
IMET funding, not currently prohibited by law or defense, sales and 
export licenses, but those now, under Glenn Amendment restrictions, 
would be prohibited.
	     I can give you some sense of the value, if you're 
interested in that, of what those licenses approved for commercial 
arms exports to Pakistan in the last full fiscal year that we have 
data for was roughly $83 million.  It's $60 million currently in 
FY97, which is the current data that we have available.
	     Q	  Mike, other than --
	     MR. MCCURRY:  Let me just run through the rest of this, 
	     License for dual use commodities, the Commerce 
Department regulated items -- don't have the exact value but there 
are 11 current license approvals in effect, 21 that are conditionally 
approved.  That all now, of course, is affected by -- could be 
affected by Glenn Amendment restrictions.  It's not clear that they 
are automatically impacted.
	     There's no current foreign military financing program 
for Pakistan, but that's -- you would assume that's the kind of thing 
that the government of Pakistan has now foregone any possibility of 
as a result of this decision.
	     And then in the area of credit guarantees and credit 
loan programs that we unilaterally administer, we had just recently 
made some decisions about restoring OPIC lending to Pakistan.  That 
all now comes under jeopardy, although that is something a lawyer is 
going to have to look at a little more carefully.  The Ex-Im Bank had 
already placed Pakistan on "on cover" status and identified about 
$293 million for new funding, and that is now in jeopardy as well.
	     So, all told, I think you can see it's a very 
significant range of economic sanctions and a very heavy price for 
the government of Pakistan to have paid for what, in effect, the 
President today called the wrong decision.

	     Q	  What was the tone of Sharif's arguments or 
responses to the President this morning after rejecting what sounded 
like impassioned appeals that the President made on four previous 
occasions not to go ahead with these tests?
	     MR. MCCURRY:  It would be most appropriate for the 
government of Pakistan to describe that, but I think it would be 
accurate to say that the Prime Minister clearly struggled with what 
was apparently, for him, a very difficult decision.  He knew the 
costs, he understood exactly the President's argument.  I think he 
had some sympathy for the argument that the right thing to do for the 
people of Pakistan and for Pakistan's place in history was to refrain 
from testing.  But I think he clearly felt the pressure and the 
burden of both domestic political opinion and also the reality of the 
pressure he faced in the region because of the decision by the 
government of India.  He sounded, in short, like someone who is very 
pained by a very difficult decision.
	     Q	  What does it say about the President's clout in 
international affairs that both India and now Pakistan have summarily 
rejected his advice?
	     MR. MCCURRY:  It says that the United States of America, 
despite all of its wealth and its might, cannot control every event 
every place in the world, particularly in a place where, for five 
decades now, governments have fought wars and peoples have lived with 
incredible tension.  And it just means it makes it all the more 
important and all the more incumbent upon the United States, given 
our unique role in the world, to work hard at doing the kinds of 
things we do. 
	     We've just recently celebrated the success of a peace 
effort in Northern Ireland that took three decades in the making.  
And the India subcontinent is a place where we're going to have to 
work a lot harder to resolve tensions.

	     We'll do D.C. Control Board in a little while, Mark.
	     Q	  Well, how hopeful should we be about the chances 
that the U.S. can try to --
	     MR. MCCURRY:  We have already undergone -- we've already 
undertaken urgent consultations.  I mentioned the work that the 
Secretary of State is doing in Brussels already.  By the way, in a 
short while, Deputy Secretary Talbott at the State Department will be 
briefing.  He, of course, is our most recent highest-level diplomat 
to have been in Pakistan.  
	     The work that we will have to do to try to encourage 
these parties to reach some understanding between themselves and to 
take the kinds of actions I described earlier with respect to CTBT, 
fissile material production -- the decisions they will have to make 
with respect to their own ballistic forces will be, we believe, 
impacted by the kind of diplomatic pressure the international 
community can bring to bear.  And I suspect you'll see in coming days 
a real effort by the United States to join with other governments to 
address this.
	     Q	  What kind of pressure did the administration ask 
the Chinese government to exert in the situation, and are you 
satisfied with their performance?
	     MR. MCCURRY:  We have had a very important exchange of 
views with the People's Republic and it would be better for the 
People's Republic to describe their role.  We will certainly remain 
in close contact with them as we address a regional security issue 
that has always been of very keen interest to the government of the 
People's Republic.

	     Q	  Can you say whether or not they were helpful or 
	     MR. MCCURRY:  I think I will leave it to their country.  
They've already said some things publicly and we are pursuing some 
other ideas as we exchange views with the Chinese government.
	     Q	  Other than offering India and Pakistan the prospect 
of removing the sanctions, going back to the status quo ante, which 
clearly wasn't enough leverage to get them to refrain, what kind of 
leverage does the United States have, other than that?  
	     MR. MCCURRY:  World opinion, which has turned very 
swiftly against the decision by the government of India and will no 
doubt bring some pressure to bear on the government of Pakistan as 
well, could have a very real impact.  As I suggested earlier, there 
is some initial reporting that public opinion, which was initially 
enthusiastic in India, presumably will be enthusiastic in Pakistan, 
turns a bit sour when people begin to see the price they pay.  You 
can read the reports today of power that's not available in New 
Delhi, the price that the citizens of India are going to pay for this 
decision by its government, by their government, and that will have 
some impact over time, we believe.
	     Q	  Have you seen any sign that either India or 
Pakistan are actually proceeding with the next step of attaching the 
devices to --
	     MR. MCCURRY:  I'm not going to describe that.  That's an 
intelligence matter, and we are monitoring that very carefully.
	     Q	  Mike, what prompted the President's call at 
midnight.  Was he aware that they were about to test and was he 
trying to talk them out of it?
	     MR. MCCURRY:  We have had -- I would describe as either 
very good or excellent information available to us about the status 
of the work being done at a technical level in Pakistan, but more 
importantly, the President had a very good sense of the way in which 
Prime Minister Sharif was dealing with this decision and he felt it 
was incumbent upon him to make what he knew would be, perhaps, a 
last-minute appeal to Prime Minister Sharif to reconsider, at least 
to consider the importance of the argument the President made.  You 
heard him -- President Clinton earlier today talk about the price 
that Pakistan has paid for this decision.  And I think President 
Clinton felt it would have been remiss of him not to make one last 
effort to remind the Prime Minister of that cost.
	     Q	  Does the United States give any humanitarian aid to 
Pakistan or India --
	     MR. MCCURRY:  No.  As I said, most bilateral assistance 
programs, because of the Symington Amendment, are in suspension in 
any event.
	     Q	  There is some talk floating around that the 
Pakistanis --
	     MR. MCCURRY:  I'm sorry, there are some humanitarian and 
food relief programs that are not restricted and not covered by Glenn 
Amendment, but normal foreign aid, foreign aid assistance --
	     Q	  Humanitarian and food to both countries is still --
	     MR. MCCURRY:  In both countries, humanitarian assistance 
or things related to drought relief, hunger relief, can proceed.

	     Q	  There is some talk of putting nuclear weapons on 
the missiles that Pakistan recently tested.  Did the President get 
any assurance from Prime Minister Sharif that Pakistan would not 
deploy weapons if indeed they had them?
	     MR. MCCURRY:  We will continue to press upon both 
governments, as I just said earlier, the dangers that would arise 
from any weaponization of the missiles they have or any efforts to 
nuclearize their current military forces.  I think both governments 
understand how strongly the United States has made that argument -- 
or makes that argument, and they understand the consequences that 
would arise from that escalation.  That would be taking a situation 
that is already very bad and making it very much worse than it is 
	     Q	  But they didn't talk about that last night?
	     Q	  Were there any assurances?
	     MR. MCCURRY:  They have had discussions about that and 
both governments are well aware of our thinking.
	     Q	  Has the administration gotten any pressure from 
U.S. business groups to exercise restraint in punishing India and 
	     MR. MCCURRY:  From business groups?
	     Q	  Yes, from business groups here that might be 
worried that their business or trade will be affected.
	     MR. MCCURRY:  Well, the arguments that we hear from some 
in the business community, but not all -- some private sector 
enterprises, as you know, have been supportive of the imposition of 
sanctions, but we do hear from some in the business community that 
the effect of unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States is to 
put U.S. companies, who employ people here in the United States, at 
risk to those foreign governments that will not adopt similar 
sanctions and will go ahead and exchange commerce and goods and 
services with both countries.

	     That is the price we pay for the way we use sanctions as 
an instrument of diplomacy.  That's true whether it's China, Iran, or 
any of the other places where we have sanctions policies in effect.  
But that is our law, and this administration intends to enforce that 
	     Q	  Mike, why did the President decide to make his 
Pakistan statement during the patient rights event, rather than 
making it a separate venue and giving us a chance to ask him 
questions about it?
	     MR. MCCURRY:  It was the venue available and, frankly, 
the first available.  There was a lot of pressure on us to make the 
President available because all of you had very strong interest in 
hearing from him.
	     Q	  Is the Pakistani delegation still coming tomorrow, 
and who are they going to meet with?
	     MR. MCCURRY:  They're coming next week, and I don't have 
any update on who or where they will be received here.
	     Q	  Does the President support Medicaid patients 
getting Viagra?
	     MR. MCCURRY:  It's not an issue we have dealt with here.  
You have to ask the health care finance agency.  We'll come back on 
it.  Let's do anything more on this. 
	     Q	  Even if you get India and Pakistan to de-escalate 
somewhat, the genie is really half out of the bottom.
	     MR. MCCURRY:  Half?
	     Q	  Well, the genie is out of the bottle, maybe all the 
way, but even if you get them not to deploy, if you get them to sign 
the CTBT and everything else, they still have the nuclear capability, 
so we're living in a world where there are no longer simply these 
five nuclear powers and the unspoken nuclear capabilities in other 
countries.  There would have to be a revamping of the 
nonproliferation architecture in some way to recognize that.
	     MR. MCCURRY:  No, because we have faced situations where 
other countries that had acknowledged, or at least were suspected of 
having some form of a nuclear program, renounced those programs and 
came into full compliance.  There are ways in which that can happen 
under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that's already been 
promulgated and is now in the process of ratification, but there are 
other ways that you can ensure compliance, too.  The International 
Atomic Energy Agency has a full-scope safeguards program that either 
country could adhere to, and by becoming adherents, you would have 
some satisfaction that they were not engaged in a program that had 
any proliferation-related risks attached to it.  That's the way we 
monitor compliance with the North Korea agreement that they made in 
Geneva in 1994.  
	     So there are ways in which the international community 
can assure itself that those -- even those that have demonstrated 
some capacity with a nuclear program remain in compliance and are 
respecting international nonproliferation norms.  So there are ways 
in which they can turn the clock back, and that's clearly what we 
will impress upon them the importance of doing.
	     Q	  Mike, when you spoke a moment ago about the serious 
consequences that the U.S. would see in either India or Pakistan 
weaponizing its missiles, did you mean by that the serious 
consequences just for the region because that would be inherently 
destabilizing, or that the U.S. would view that seriously and the 
U.S. would consider that provocative?
	     MR. MCCURRY:  I was not suggesting that it would prompt 
any kind of military response, if that's what you mean.  The former 
formulation is correct, though, that it would be inherently 
destabilizing on the subcontinent, it would lead to further tension, 
it would run the risk of escalating tensions that could be resolved 
diplomatically into military confrontations.  So that clearly makes 
the situation much more dangerous.
	     Q	  Mike, is the United States now trying to get other 
countries to impose sanctions to go along?
	     MR. MCCURRY:  We are in very close consultation with 
other governments.  As we saw with respect to the government of 
India, there is limited appetite in the world for the kind of 
economic sanctions that we impose as a matter of U.S. law, but there 
very clearly is sentiment to take steps that express the accumulated 
displeasure that many in the international community feel with these 
	     There have been consequences that India has faced even 
as recently as yesterday at the World Bank and the decisions 
governments are making about lending and about other types of 
economic activity.
	     Q	  Yes, a follow-up on that question.  What kinds of 
steps -- what other steps, besides sanctions, would we be looking at 
from other countries?
	     MR. MCCURRY:  A lot of governments expressed in the wake 
of the test by India their own unilateral decisions.  Canada did, 
Japan did.  Some of them have assistance programs that they have 
suspended or forms of bilateral aid or bilateral lending that they 
put in suspension.  Several European nations took action with respect 
to India.  So that type of response I imagine you will see with 
respect to Pakistan as well.
	     Q	  Mike, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, one of his 
arguments was that he found the response of the world community very 
	     MR. MCCURRY:  Well, they made that argument at time of 
the G-8 meeting, and our argument in response was that the 
consequences that over time the government of India would feel would 
be significant.  And as I say, there is some telling evidence that 
that is beginning to be the case.
	     Q	  But the U.S. has taken steps, but most of the other 
world powers --
	     MR. MCCURRY:  A number of other nations have taken 
significant economic steps -- the steps for them, since this is 
contrary to the way they normally use economic leverage as a tool of 
diplomacy, contrary to what has been their norm.  So that's just not 
	     Q	  What you're saying, the rest of the world had a 
limited appetite -- 
	     MR. MCCURRY:  -- for the kind of unilateral economic 
sanctions that we invoke as a matter of a law; that's correct.
	     Q	  Is part of that responsible, do you think, for 
Pakistan going ahead and testing?
	     MR. MCCURRY:  No, I don't personally believe that.  I 
think, based on the understanding that we can gain such as we can 
gain it from the conversation the President had with the Prime 
Minister, I think much more significant was domestic political 
opinion and regional security.
	     Q	  Can we just nail this thing.  You listed a number 
of dollar amounts in various world lending organizations that you 
said --
	     MR. MCCURRY:  These are eyeball estimates.
	     Q	  That's right, I understand.  That the United States 
will oppose. 

	     MR. MCCURRY:  Right. 

	     Q	  The U.S. opposing it, does that mean they are going 
to be cut off or restricted?  Or are you simply saying that they 
could continue even though we oppose it?
	     MR. MCCURRY:  That we do not have in those lending 
institutions -- don't have controlling votes.  Now, as you've seen at 
the World Bank, with respect to India, we have a great deal of 
influence on the outcome.  But how we exert that with respect to 
Pakistan, if future decision making is done, we'll have to see how 
that develops.
	     Q	  So, we don't go out automatically and say to --

	     MR. MCCURRY:  To your viewers they are going to cut off 
all that.  That's correct.
	     Q	  That this is going to be cut off.
	     MR. MCCURRY:  That's correct.
	     Q	  It may or may not. 
	     MR. MCCURRY:  That's correct.  Although there has to be 
some question mark put next to it.
	     Q	  Mike, there's going to be a lot of people who say 
that Pakistan is less than culpable than India.  First off, they 
didn't go first and there wasn't the element of deception that 
apparently there was with respect to India.  Is it really fair that 
they get the same degree of punitive consequence?
	     MR. MCCURRY:  Well, as a matter of law, the Glenn 
Amendment sanctions are automatic with respect to both governments.  
The tonal quality of the way we have addressed this decision by 
Pakistan, I'd suggest you is different, and we would acknowledge that 
there's a difference in the way these two governments have dealt with 
the United States with respect to this test.  Prime Minister Sharif 
was honest and straightforward in the description of the decision 
that he was wrestling with and in his own internal deliberations.  
And the government of India was manifestly not.
	     Q	  So what does that get them?  I mean, in other 
words, what substantive difference is there in the way we -- 
	     MR. MCCURRY:  We will have to assess that in coming days 
and see if there are different ways in which we could clearly express 
displeasure with what we think is a wrong decision, but clearly 
acknowledge that there is some difference between the respective 
	     Q	  Mike, it's been widely reported that Chinese 
companies, including China Aerospace, helped Pakistan get nuclear 
technology.  To what extent do we think China shares the blame for 
Pakistan's nuclear capability?
	     MR. MCCURRY:  Well, the assessments of possible Category 
1 or Category 2 MTCR infractions by China and Pakistan is a matter 
that is under U.S. law delegated to the Secretary of State and they 
can provide you the best update.  There has been no determination of 
a sanctionable event that's been made under MTCR restrictions.  And 
beyond that, I don't know I have anything to add.
	     Q	  Has the President conferred with any members of the 
Congressional leadership since Pakistan tested its weapons?
	     MR. MCCURRY:  Has the President conferred?
	     Q	  Yes.
	     MR. MCCURRY:  No, the National Security Advisor has been 
in contact with several -- I don't have a full list of all of them -- 
but we will be in contact with Congressional leaders and others.
	     Q	  What's the point, just to describe --
	     MR. MCCURRY:  Well, we want to make sure first, because 
Congress is not in session, that we can brief those that we are able 
to brief or need to brief.  Second, advise them to the steps that the 
President is taking, including invoking sanctions.

	     Q	  Mike, the President said today that Pakistan missed 
an opportunity to actually strengthen its security by foregoing the 
tests, which is obviously something Nawaz Sharif disagreed with.  Can 
you explain how Pakistan would have been more secure?
	     MR. MCCURRY:  In the very direct conversations we have 
had government to government, we've made it clear that we understand 
the security threat that Pakistan and its people would face because 
of the decision by the government of India to test.  We understood 
that both in terms of conventional arms and in terms of security 
assurances, the government of Pakistan would need to be able to say 
to its people that they had, if refrained from testing, taken steps 
to compensate for what had been done by the government of India.

	     Without detailing private diplomatic exchanges, the 
United States government clearly indicated that we would understand 
that reality and there were discussions about the need to enhance 
Pakistan's security in the course of making the argument to Pakistan 
about the reasons why it should not test.
	     Q	  To follow on that, was the F-16 issue -- was that 
an impediment to making that case?
	     MR. MCCURRY:  Well, it was --
	     Q	  It seems like we're less credible when we shafted 
them on that deal.
	     MR. MCCURRY:  It was -- having been used as a stick at 
one point, it then became a carrot.  (Laughter.)
	     Any more on this before we do D.C. Control Board?
	     Q	  Could I just follow on your response?  Were there 
U.S. security guarantees involved in those talks or were there talks 
about military transfers or --
	     MR. MCCURRY:  I just gave an artful answer that 
preempted that question.  (Laughter.)
	     Q	  Are you in a situation where all your carrots now 
are just the absence of sticks?  I mean, in other words, the only 
thing you can offer them is to not do the bad thing that you --
	     MR. MCCURRY:  I think there are other things growing in 
the vegetable garden.  (Laughter.)
	     Q	  Mike, to understand better what you were talking 
about earlier, the United States is not unduly concerned that the 
examples of India and Pakistan will prompt others to go the route of 
nuclear test because it has confidence in IAEA safeguards and 
	     MR. MCCURRY:  No, to the contrary.  There are a number 
of regimes that are not within IAEA full-scope safeguards, and other 
nations that are not adherents to MTCR, to nonproliferation treaty, 
other countries that have indicated no desire to conform to the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty requirements.  All of those things 
suggest that there are countries -- rogue nations -- that are 
pursuing nuclear programs.  And one, among many reasons, that we 
deplore the decision by the government of Pakistan and India to test 
is because of the impact that might have on the thinking of other