Title: "White House Reports on Sanctions, Arms Exports to Iraq." White House report on the international export to Iraq of nuclear, biological and chemical and ballistic missile
technology and report on sanctions taken by other countries against Iraq. (910917)
WHITE HOUSE REPORTS ON SANCTIONS, ARMS EXPORTS TO IRAQ (Texts: Reports to Congress 9/10/91) (5030)
Washington -- The White House sent to Congress on September 10 a classified report on the international export to Iraq of nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile technology.
The unclassified summary of the report, which was made available to the press, notes that throughout the 1980's many countries, especially in Western Europe, "were key suppliers of chemical equipment, chemical precursors, and technical expertise for Iraq's chemical weapons program." Similarly, Iraq's "nuclear, missile and biological weapons program also benefited from foreign sources, mainly in Europe," according to the summary.
The report is mandated by the Foreign Operations Act of 1991.
Following is the unclassified summary of that report, as well as the text of the administration's report to Congress on sanctions taken by other countries against Iraq:
SUMMARY OF WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS TO IRAQ:
During the 1980s the international community became increasingly concerned about Iraq's nonconventional weapons proliferation activities. Restrictions on exports of proliferation-related goods and technology were imposed and strengthened throughout the decade by the United States and other Western countries. Nonetheless, companies and individuals in many countries, especially in Western Europe, were key suppliers of chemical equipment, chemical precursors, and technical expertise for Iraq's chemical weapons program. Iraqi nuclear, missile and biological weapons programs also benefited from foreign sources, mainly in Europe. During this period, U.S. suppliers and the U.S. Government maintained significant strictures on exports to Iraq, including an arms embargo, thus preventing the United States from being a major source of Iraqi military capabilities. Nonetheless, some exports to Iraq of dual-use goods were made from the U.S. it is possible that Iraq diverted some of these from their intended civilian uses to military support purposes.
During the 1980s, although 771 U.S. dual-use export licenses were granted for Iraq, 362 were not approved.
GE 2 nxe207 That 30 percent non-approval rate compared to a rate of approximately five per cent for dual-use exports to all destinations worldwide. Over the period, then, significantly more rigorous U.S. export controls were in place for Iraq than for most other destinations, despite legal and regulatory restraints on those controls (e.g., foreign availability standards).
International and U.S. efforts to stem proliferation have intensified in recent years. Seeing that U.S. controls were not air-tight, in the spring of 1990 U.S. officials developed proposals -- unanimously approved through interagency review -- to tighten U.S. export controls further. These proposals led to the strengthening of U.S. nonproliferation controls under the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI), launched in December 1990. In connection with this initiative, the U.S. also increased its efforts to strengthen international nonproliferation controls (e.g., through the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group). In addition to these multilateral efforts, the U.S. has sought the adoption of national controls comparable to EPCI by its nonproliferation partners, many of whom have tightened their own controls. Finally, increased U.S. concern over exports to Iraq was reflected in enforcement actions, e.g., the interception at Heathrow Airport of capacitors useful for a nuclear weapons program, and the halting of the export of high-temperature furnaces destined for Iraq which could have contributed to nuclear weapons development.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 provides the basis for a regime to eliminate Iraq's conventional weapons capabilities, prevent their rebuilding, and monitor Iraqi compliance over the longer term.
The United States should place the highest emphasis on strengthening and expanding as appropriate existing non- proliferation mechanisms. It should review its legislation and regulations on a continuing basis to make improvements where appropriate. At the same time, it should continue to seek greater harmonization of controls and enforcement among member countries of the various non-proliferation groups. The U.S. should also explore the utility of additional nonproliferation initiatives, including regional arrangements.
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PL 101-513 ON SANCTIONS TAKEN BY OTHER COUNTRIES AGAINST IRAQ
Steps taken by other nations, both before and after the August 2, 1990, invasion of Kuwait, to curtail the export of goods, services, and technologies to Iraq which might contribute to or enhance Iraq's nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile capabilities.
GE 3 nxe207 INTRODUCTION
International efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missiles have been underway for some years. Many of these efforts have been multilateral, although individual countries have also taken unilateral steps to impede proliferation.
Nonproliferation efforts have normally targeted any country seeking to develop nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons (NBC) or missile capabilities. However, the international community recognized that Iraq was a particular proliferation problem. Restrictions on the export of goods, services, and technology to Iraq gained momentum during the 1980s. Nuclear non-proliferation regimes had already been in place for some time. Multilateral organizations in the area of chemical and biological weapons and missile proliferation were established and strengthened during the decade.
The 1980s saw the creation of two important new international nonproliferation groups: the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1987 and the Australia Group of countries concerned about chemical and biological weapons proliferation in 1985. These groups have grown both in size and effectiveness.
In the nuclear nonproliferation area, the United States has been active diplomatically for more than a decade in efforts to encourage other nuclear supplier countries to exercise caution and restraint in exporting nuclear and potentially nuclear-related commodities to Iraq. In recent years, other supplier countries demonstrated greater caution and restraint, and cooperation with Iraq in the nuclear area markedly diminished. For example, Italy interrupted assistance it had been providing for laboratory-scale nuclear facilities. France decided to forego commercially lucrative opportunities to repair the damaged Osirak reactor. Additionally, the Soviet Union declined to go beyond its initial provision of a small research reactor.
Through multilateral arrangements such as the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines, supplier countries have controlled the trade in fissile material and specially designed or prepared nuclear equipment to non- nuclear weapons states.
In recent years, the twenty-two members of the Zangger Committee (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, USSR, United Kingdom and United States) have held regular meetings to upgrade and
GE 4 nxe207 clarify the lists of specially-designed or prepared nuclear equipment that member countries would place under control for export to countries of concern.
Of particular value with respect to Iraq was the Zangger Committee initiative to develop a detailed list of the key components for a gas centrifuge enrichment program. The technical work accomplished by U.S. experts to prepare for this exercise has been of great value to export control and customs officials in supplier countries.
For example, this data was used in a training course in Turkey and more recently this background information was provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for use in carrying out its responsibilities under U.N. Resolution 687.
On March 5-7, 1991, an informal meeting took place in the Hague of the twenty-six countries (Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finalnd, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, USSR, United Kingdom, United States) that have adhered to the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines of 1978. This is an agreed set of principles and conditions that apply to transfers of nuclear materials, equipment and technology. This group of countries met to review current supplier conditions of supply and to consider some ways and means to strengthen export controls with a veiw to reinforcing the nuclear nonproliferation regime. They reconfirmed their strong commitment to preventing nuclear proliferation, which represents one of the greatest threats to worldwide security and stability facing the international community. They also reaffirmed the great importance of IAEA safeguards.
In facilitating international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the participants at the March meeting recognized the responsibility of all supplier states to ensure that such cooperation does not contribute directly or indirectly to nuclear proliferation as well as the need to assure that safeguards and nonproliferation assurances are not compromised by commercial competition. There was a consensus view that the widest acceptance of the Nuclear Supplier Guidelines by new nuclear supplier countries would significantly enhance the nonproliferation regime and they invited all such countries that have not yet done so to adhere to the guidelines.
At the meeting, the suppliers recognized the growing problem posed by the potential use of nuclear-related dual- use items in contributing to unsafeguarded nuclear programs or to the development of nuclear explosive devices. They agreed to establish a working group to examine all possible arrangements to control these items.
GE 5 nxe207 The supplier countries are in full accord on the need to continue the review and strengthening of supplier arrangements and on the value of regular consultations among suppliers.
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS
The United States and other Western countries have been active for some years in seeking to curtail the export of chemical and biological weapons-related goods, services, and technology to Iraq and other countries of proliferation concern.
Earlier efforts to curtail chemical and biological weapons- related goods, services, and technology to proliferant countries were largely in the form of treaties to ban such weapons. These include the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972, which entered into force in 1975, and the negotiations on a comprehensive global ban on chemical weapons, which have not yet been concluded.
The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention commits each State Party never to develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; as well as weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.
In addition, the states parties undertook in the convention not to transfer to any recipient, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any state, group of states or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any biological agents, toxins, weapons equipment or means of delivery. 149 countries are now parties to the convention, including virtually all Western nations.
The convention does not specify whether and what kind of export controls might be appropriate to fulfill the purposes of the convention, but some countries, including the United States and Germany, have applied export controls consistent with the Convention's purposes. The United States, for example, controls the export of pathogenic organisms suitable for biological weapons and in March 1991 added new controls on dual-use biological weapons related equipment. The United States for many years has maintained a ban on export of defense goods and services to Iraq, including biological or chemical weapons agents or weapons. The U.S. Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 imposes penalties on anyone who knowingly develops, produces, stockpiles, transfers, acquires, retains, or possesses any biological agent, toxin or delivery system
GE 6 nxe207 for use as a weapon, as well as knowing assistance to any foreign state or any foreign organization to do so.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
Since 1980 the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has focused on the negotiation of a comprehensive, global ban on chemical weapons. In 1984, the United States gave a major boost to the talks when then Vice President Bush presented a draft chemical weapons treaty. Among other provisions, the current draft treaty (the "rolling text") prohibits the direct or indirect transfer of chemical weapons and requires the states parties to undertake not to assist, encourage or induce in any way anyone to engage in activities prohibited to parties under the convention, namely the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention, or use of chemical weapons.
The draft treaty provides for strict controls on the transfer of chemicals that have been developed, produced, stockpiled or used as chemical weapons or otherwise pose a high risk to the objectives of the convention by virtue of their high potential for activities prohibited by the convention. States are also to provide detailed data declarations and notifications of transfer to the technical secretariat of any transfers. For certain other chemicals which are chemical weapons precursors or have potential use as chemical weapons, the convention requires data reporting on aggregate export and import of chemicals, and on-site inspections of facilities producing, processing or consuming the chemicals. Depending on the chemical and the facility, monitoring may be accomplished by systematic routine inspections, ad hoc inspections, or challenge inspections.
Some countries, such as India, have used the schedules of chemicals in the Chemical Weapons convention as a model for establishing national export controls.
The January 1989 Conference Against Chemical Weapons Use, held in Paris, was intended to sensitize the international community to the problem of chemical weapons and their use. Promoted by the U.S., it was attended by more than 100 countries. The September 1989 Canberra Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons, encouraged by the United States and attended by representatives from about 70 countries, sensitized industry regarding the risk of exports being diverted to create chemical weapons and built support for the chemical weapons convention.
On May 13, 1991, President Bush announced a new initiative aimed at concluding the Chemical Weapons Convention within twelve months. The initiative contains forward-looking concrete proposals to advance the negotiations and is intended to encourage other countries to work with the U.S.
GE 7 nxe207 to devise solutions to outstanding convention problems. The U.S. proposal calls for other countries to impose export controls similar to those of the U.S. and specifically for the convention to require parties to refuse to trade in chemical weapons related materials with countries which do not become parties to the convention within a reasonable time after the treaty enters into force.
The Australia Group (AG), an informal consultative group of countries concerned about chemical and biological weapons (CBW) proliferation, was formed in 1985 in the wake of chemical weapons use in the Iran-Iraq war. The Australia Group considers its efforts to be interim measures pending the completion of a convention banning chemical weapons. While the group is concerned about proliferation worldwide, until recently its primary focus was the countries of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya.
Initially, the Australia Group was composed of seventeen members: The United States, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Canada, and the twelve members of the European Community (Ireland, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, Germany, France, Greece, Italy, and Denmark). Subsequently, Switzerland, Austria, and Norway joined the Australia Group, and other countries have expressed interest in becoming members.
At its beginning in 1985, Australia Group members established national export controls over four chemical weapons precursors. The number of chemicals controlled by all members has expanded progressively. By the end of 1990, all Australia Group members had established controls on fourteen chemicals, called the "core list". In addition to this core list, the AG maintained a warning list of 36 precursors (a total of 50 chemicals) for monitoring purposes. AG members informed their respective industries to be cautious in exporting these chemicals because of the risk of diversion to chemical weapons purposes.
In 1990, the United States undertook a major new initiatives against chemical and biological and missile proliferation called the Enhanced Proliferation Controls Initiative (EPCI). This resulted in March 1991 in the imposition of an interlocking network of U.S. proliferation export controls. These include the following measures:
-- an individual validated license requirement for export worldwide (except for AG and NATO countries) of all 50 chemical weapons precursors identified by the Australia Group;
-- an individual validated license requirement for export to twenty-eight listed destinations of dual-use equipment
GE 8 nxe207 and technical data potentially useful in chemical and biological weapons development; -- an individual validated license requirement for a U.S. person to assist foreign chemical weapons, biological weapons, or missile projects;
-- an individual validated license requirement for a U.S. person to assist in the export or design of whole chemical plants making chemical weapons precursors; and
-- an individual validated license requirement where an exporter knows or is informed by the U.S. government that an export is destined for a chemical or biological weapons or ballistic missile project.
Spurred by the Gulf War and the U.S. EPCI initiative, Australia Group members' export controls recently have expanded rapidly. At the most recent AG meeting (May 1991), the AG agreed that by December all members would control the export of all 50 AG-listed CW precursors (up from only 14 chemicals controlled by all members six months ago).
AG members also agreed in principle that they would control the export of dual-use equipment usable to produce or develop CW and developed a common list of such equipment for approval by members. In other steps to expand controls on CBW, AG members agreed to discuss in detail at the next meeting the need for controls on exporting BW organisms and equipment and agreed to consider U.S.-style "safety net" controls on non-listed items destined for CBW use.
The Australia Group also continued its exchanges on proliferation patterns and problems, enforcement activities, and harmonization of licensing and enforcement procedures among members.
In 1987, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was established to impede the proliferation of missiles through imposition of strict export controls on the specified missile-related goods and technology listed in the MTCR equipment and technology annex. The export of complete missile systems, as well as major subsystems (e.g. rocket stages, engines, guidance sets, reentry vehicles) carries a presumption of denial for all non-MTCR countries. Export of production facilities for these items is currently prohibited. The export of other, less sensitive components can be authorized if their transfer would not contribute to the development of a missile of MTCR range and payload (300 kilometers and 500 kilograms).
Since its inception, the MTCR has grown dramatically. It started with only seven founding members: the United
GE 9 nxe207 States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, Germany, France and Canada. Subsequently, nine additional countries have joined: Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Denmark, and Austria. Several other countries are close to joining. Sweden and Finland are in the process of implementing export controls consistent with the MTCR guidelines, and the MTCR partners are working hard to bring into the MTCR the remaining European Community, NATO, and European Space Agency countries. The Soviet Union has expressed its support for the MTCR's objectives, and the partners are considering how best to bring the Soviets more fully into the Regime.
At the most recent MTCR meeting, in Tokyo in March 1991, the partners made significant progress toward adopting a revised, updated annex of controlled technologies. A number of additional items usable in missile development will be added and technical parameters will be clarified for several other items. It is expected that the revised annex will be put into effect in all member countries by December 1991. The partners also agreed to study the controls the U.S. has adopted under EPCI. These include requiring a license for any item, whether or not on the MTCR annex, when the exporter knows or is informed by the Government that it is destined for a missile project. The MTCR partners also agreed to consider further harmonization of controls and procedures.
INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES' ACTIONS
The following are highlights of selected countries' export controls relevant to proliferation.
CHINA, while not a member of the MTCR, has stated that it would "take into account" relevant international parameters in missile-related exports and not sell intermediate-range missiles to the Middle East. China has stated that it supports effective international control of weapons exports and is participating in arms control efforts pursuant to the President's May 29 initiative on Middle East Arms Control. China has agreed in principle to sign the NPT and adhere to the MTCR guidelines. The U.S. continues to press China to fully implement its stated intentions.
FRANCE is now committed to implementing export controls on all 50 Australia Group precursors and controls five additional precursors as well. France has also developed its own list of dual-use CBW equipment for export control, aside from the draft AG common list. It is also strengthening licensing procedures, including end-user certificates for countries outside the Australia Group. Licenses will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. Violations are subject to prison terms and fines.
GERMANY now has an extensive network of laws and regulations intended to control the export of chemical
* PAGE 10 PAGE 10 nxe207 weapons precursors, pathogenic organisms, dual-use CBW related equipment, and other forms of assistance to foreign CBW or missile projects. German cooperation with the United States in preventing export of goods and technology related to proliferation has become closer and more effective in recent years.
German government policy has prohibited the export of war weapons to Iraq since 1961.
German proliferation export control efforts date to at least 1984, when the Federal Republic of Germany applied controls on four chemical weapons precursors. In August 1984, Germany also imposed a new regulation requiring the licensing of whole chemical plants and certain chemical equipment suitable for the production of chemical weapons agents and precursors. This was especially aimed at the exports by Karl Kolb to Iraqi chemical weapons facilities in Samarra. Karl Kolb, however, won a court case in which it contested blocking of its shipments.
On February 15, 1989, the German Cabinet introduced a requirement for an export license for plants suitable for the production of biological agents and tightened the definition for the requirement for an export license for chemical plants.
As of February 20, 1990, Germany made all 50 Australia Group chemical weapons precursors subject to licensing worldwide.
On July 20, 1990, the penalty for violations of the Foreign Trade and Payments Act was increased from three to 10 years. A general license requirement for activities of German nationals in connection with the development and production of weapons, ammunition and combat agents was introduced. Fines under the Foreign Trade and Payments Act were increased from 500,000 Deutschmarks to one million Deutschmarks.
On August 11, 1990, Germany imposed an export license requirement for participation of German citizens in foreign missile projects. Unauthorized services carry a fine or a term of imprisonment of 5 years and in very serious cases up to 10 years. Authorizations will normally be denied, and the German government has advised German nationals to terminate such services.
In October 1990, a new law was passed providing up to 15 years imprisonment for the particularly sensitive area of participation in the production of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Acts performed by German citizens in foreign countries are covered. The minimum sentence for intentional offenses was fixed at two years.
* PAGE 11 PAGE 11 nxe207 The German government subsequently introduced legislation to strengthen further its export controls, which as of this writing has failed to pass the German parliament.
The German government has initiated a large number of investigations concerning possible proliferation-related violations. On March 12, 1991, the Federal Prosecutor in Darmstadt issued indictments against twelve individuals and one corporation (Preussag) in connection with the export of chemical weapons technology to Iraq. The indictments are the culmination of a three-year investigation in connection with the construction of the Samarra chemical weapons complex.
INDIA issued an amended order, effective January 31, 1991, establishing export controls over 3 chemical weapons precursors.
ISRAEL maintains controls over the export of all chemicals. Applications for exports of a list of chemicals relevant to chemical weapons are screened by the Disarmament Bureau of the Foreign Ministry.
JAPAN maintains export controls on all 50 chemical precursors identified by the Australia Group. It also consults with businesses in the case of exports of specified dual-use CBW related equipment and was instrumental in developing the draft AG common list of dual-use CW-related equipment.
THE SOVIET UNION established controls over the export of some 9 chemical weapons precursors under a 1986 law. The list has been expanded subsequently to cover 22 Australia Group precursors. In the US-Soviet Joint Non-proliferation Statement of June 1, 1990, the Soviet Union pledged cooperation against nuclear, missile, and chemical weapons proliferation. It agreed on the need for stringent controls over exports of nuclear-related material, equipment, and technology, and urged other countries capable of exporting nuclear-related technology to apply similarly strict controls. It stated that it had instituted export controls to stem chemical weapons proliferation and would join with other nations in multilateral efforts to coordinate export controls, exchange information, and broaden international cooperation to stem chemical weapons proliferation. It also stated specifically its support for the objectives of the MTCR and noted that it was taking measures to restrict missile proliferation on a worldwide basis, including export controls and other internal procedures.
SWEDEN controlled the export of 33 Australia Group chemicals as of early 1991 and was working on a list of dual-use equipment to be controlled. Sweden is strongly considering joining the Australia Group.
* PAGE 12 PAGE 12 nxe207 THE UNITED KINGDOM has agreed to impose export controls on all 50 Australia Group precursors and has agreed in principle with the rest of the AG to control the export of dual-use CW equipment.
EASTERN EUROPEAN countries, including CZECHOSLOVAKIA, POLAND, HUNGARY, and ROMANIA, have been briefed on U.S. perspectives on non-conventional weapons proliferation and are working to establish effective controls. In January 1991, Romania placed general regulations on the export of equipment which might be used in the production of nuclear, chemical or bacteriological weapons or of missiles to deliver them. In July 1991, Romania placed regulatory controls on the export of items on the MTCR annex, Australia Group chemicals, and nuclear items. Hungary in a decree of October 1, 1990 put into effect a license requirement for CBW-related exports.
The Eastern European countries attended a proliferation export controls seminar in December 1990 in London with members of the Australia Group. Some Eastern European countries have expressed interest in joining the Australia Group.
POST-INVASION OF KUWAIT
The national and multilateral measures listed above have remained in force subsequent to the August 2, 1991 invasion of Kuwait, when they became a small part of the much more stringent and far-reaching U.N. embargo on Iraq. The embargo effectively denied Iraq imports to aid its nuclear, biological, chemical, or missile programs, in addition to much else. Subsequently, the United Nations has been developing a plan to eliminate and prevent the resurgence of Iraq's capabilities in this area for the long term.
Many countries have cooperated closely in the drafting and implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991. This resolution envisions extraordinary measures to divest Iraq of CBW, nuclear weapons, and missile capabilities. Stringent cease-fire conditions include the supervised destruction of Iraqi nuclear, CBW and missile capabilities and long-term monitoring of compliance.
A U.N. Special Commission with wide international participation has been established to carry out the resolution's mandate to inspect Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities and supervise the elimination of Iraq's capabilities in these areas, as well as long-term monitoring of Iraqi undertakings not to reacquire such weapons. At the Commission's request, Iraq has submitted initial data declarations concerning its nuclear, chemical,
* PAGE 13 PAGE 13 nxe207 biological, and missile capabilities and these are being analyzed by the Commission.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been tasked with inspecting Iraq's-nuclear capabilities and arranging the removal or destruction of any nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons usable material. Initial data declarations have been submitted by Iraq to the IAEA, and the U.S. and the Special Commission provided additional information to the IAEA. The first actual on-site inspection of an Iraqi facility under UNSCR 687 was organized by the IAEA with the assistance and cooperation the U.N. Special Commission. The team entered Iraq on May 14 and began its initial inspection of the Iraqi nuclear facilities at Tuwaitha shortly thereafter. The IAEA will also provide for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's undertaking not to acquire nuclear weapons.
In addition, the resolution provides that U.N. members shall, continue to prevent the sale or supply or the promotion or facilitation of such sale or supply to Iraq of:
-- Conventional arms;
-- All chemical and biological weapons, all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities;
-- All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers and related major parts and repair and production facilities; and
-- Nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to nuclear weapons.
This prohibition on exports includes technology under licensing or other arrangements used in the production, utilization or stockpiling of these items and personnel or materials for training or technical support services relating to the design, development, manufacture, use, maintenance or support of such items.
The United Nations Secretariat is now working actively to develop guidelines for the full international implementation of the export prohibitions required by the resolution.
MIDDLE EAST ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE
Another large step forward on nonproliferation efforts was taken in May by President Bush with his Middle East Arms Control Initiative, which covers the categories of
* PAGE 14 PAGE 14 nxe207 nonconventional weapons as well as conventional weapons. This proposal will enlist the support and cooperation of regional arms importers and their most important suppliers -- the U.S., the UK, France, the Soviet Union and China. The core of the initiative is a commitment by suppliers to observe a code of responsible arms transfers, avoid destabilizing transfers, and establish effective export controls on the end use of arms and related exports. Suppliers would observe guidelines for arms transfers to the Middle East, including notifications in advance of certain sales, regular consultations on arms transfers, ad hoc consultations if it appears the guidelines are not being observed, and annual reports on transfers.
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File Identification: 09/17/91, NX-207
Product Name: Wireless File
Product Code: WF
Keywords: IRAQ/Defense & Military; TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER; TRADE CONTROLS; NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION; NUCLEAR WEAPONS; UNITED NATIONS-SECURITY COUNCIL; PERSIAN GULF WAR; MILITARY CAPABILITIES; MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR); INTE
Document Type: TXT
Thematic Codes: 1NE; 1AC; 1UN; 3TR; 5TT
Target Areas: NE
PDQ Text Link: 197305