Changes in the cyber threat environment require the Army to be able to rapidly reprogram its own military software, a newly updated Army Regulation directs.
“Warfare is rapidly moving into a new domain: cyberspace. This will affect warfighting in all domains, and the Army will take measures to adapt to the cyberspace environment.”
“This increased responsiveness demands shortened timelines to combat enemy threats as they adapt to new technology and to new methods of employment.”
“RSR [Rapid Software Reprogramming] will be required to become even more adaptive, automated, and integrated with weapons systems operating in the EMS [electromagnetic spectrum].”
“This policy gives the Army a process which enables soldiers a reach-back RSR capability that will assist commanders to attain tactical superiority, achieve surprise, gain and retain the initiative, maintain awareness of new and emerging threats, and obtain decisive results…,” the unclassified Regulation said.
The Assistant Secretary of the Army (ALT) will “Ensure that sensor-based weapons and CEMA [Cyber Electromagnetic Activities] systems are developed using software reprogrammable signature detection, classification, and response capabilities that can be responsive and enabling to EW [Electronic Warfare], spectrum management and cyber operations.”
See Software Reprogramming for Cyber Electromagnetic Activities, Army Regulation 525-15, 19 February 2016.
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