The intelligence reform legislation of 2004 abolished the position of Director of Central Intelligence, transferring many of its functions to the new Director of National Intelligence.
This raised a technical legal question as to whether the DCI who was serving at the time, Porter J. Goss, would need to be formally reappointed to the position of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA).
The question was analyzed at length by the Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in a January 2005 memo that has just been released.
To cut to the chase, the OLC concluded “that when the Intelligence Reform Act takes effect the then-current DCI would not require a new appointment to serve as DCIA.”
See “Status of the Director of Central Intelligence Under the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004,” Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel, January 12, 2005 (published January 23, 2006).
In recent months, we’ve seen much of these decades’ worth of progress erased. Contracts for evaluations of government programs were canceled, FFRDCs have been forced to lay off staff, and federal advisory committees have been disbanded.
This report outlines a framework relying on “Cooperative Technical Means” for effective arms control verification based on remote sensing, avoiding on-site inspections but maintaining a level of transparency that allows for immediate detection of changes in nuclear posture or a significant build-up above agreed limits.
At a recent workshop, we explored the nature of trust in specific government functions, the risk and implications of breaking trust in those systems, and how we’d known we were getting close to specific trust breaking points.
tudents in the 21st century need strong critical thinking skills like reasoning, questioning, and problem-solving, before they can meaningfully engage with more advanced domains like digital, data, or AI literacy.