Seeking Reciprocity in Security Clearance Policy
Reciprocity in security clearances — meaning the acceptance by one agency of a security clearance granted by another agency, and vice versa — has been an elusive security policy goal for well over a decade. But lately it has become the subject of increased attention.
“The Director [of National Intelligence] has done little to ensure the reciprocal recognition of security clearances within the [Intelligence] Community,” the House Intelligence Committee complained in its new report (pdf).
“It def[ies] common sense… that it takes months to transfer clearances for an individual who will work in the exact same space but transfer from the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to the CIA,” the House report said.
A July 17 memo from the Office of Management and Budget addresses the problem of reciprocity in highly restricted “special access programs,” and provides a checklist of permitted exceptions to reciprocity.
The Department of Defense and Department of Energy have each issued new directives lately on reciprocal recognition of security clearances.
In the current environment of declining trust and magnifying strategic competition, banning debris-creating tests is a concrete step towards stability that favors interests of all states seeking to conduct space activities.
Often negotiations between data center developers and local officials are conducted behind closed doors, protected by NDAs. How can we have an informed debate, when we don’t know what’s on the table?
As federal data policy nerds, the question we get asked all the time is “How much data has the current administration terminated?”
Google’s motto famously used to be “don’t be evil.” However, its latest feature has just made being evil a whole lot easier.