“The National Security Agency is committed to declassifying national security information as instructed in Executive Order 12958, as amended,” the NSA declared in a 2005 declassification plan (pdf).
“The Agency will use all available resources to successfully accomplish the provisions of the E.O. within the required time.”
See “NSA Declassification Plan for Executive Order 12958, as Amended,” January 13, 2005 (obtained by Michael Ravnitzky).
“The fact that the U.S. Army and Navy mounted a [World War II] effort called Project BOURBON against certain Soviet cryptosystems can be released,” according to a newly disclosed 2001 NSA notice on declassification policy.
“Most details beyond this statement, as well as the cooperation with the British in this effort, remain classified.”
See selected NSA declassification guidance (pdf), released June 2006.
Other agency declassification plans, including newly posted plans of the Army and Navy, may be found here.
DNA synthesis and export controls remain the primary regulatory safeguards against de novo production of harmful biological agents, yet governance frameworks lack the situational awareness and enforcement capacity to keep pace with rapidly falling technical barriers.
Called today to speak on behalf of U.S. science and technology, Dr. Jedidah Isler, astrophysicist, educator, strategist, policy-maker, and science communicator, will provide constructive, nonpartisan feedback to the House Committee’s hearing “American Global Competitiveness at 250: Legislative Proposals to Secure U.S. Technology Leadership.”
“Federal data and access to it is not a partisan issue. It is a people issue. Our country cannot achieve greatness without access to the data that measure what we value, who we are, and where we’re heading.”
The United States’ biosecurity governance system is structurally incapable of detecting and responding to certain classes of threats. U.S. biosecurity tools have not kept pace with technological advancements or a changing threat landscape.