Navy personnel are forbidden to disclose or even discuss the presence or absence of nuclear weapons aboard any U.S. Navy vessel, according to a new Navy Instruction.
“Military members and civilian employees of the Department of the Navy shall not reveal, purport to reveal, or cause to be revealed any information, rumor, or speculation with respect to the presence or absence of nuclear weapons or components on board any specific ship, station or aircraft, either on their own initiative or in response, direct or indirect, to any inquiry.”
See OPNAV Instruction 5721.1F, “Release of Information on Nuclear Weapons and on Nuclear Capabilities of U.S. Forces,” February 3, 2006.
The new Instruction was first spotted by Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists.
See his paper “The Neither Confirm Nor Deny Policy: Nuclear Diplomacy at Work,” February 2006.
After months of delay, the council tasked by President Trump to review the FEMA released its final report. Our disaster policy nerds have thoughts.
FAS and FLI partnered to build a series of convenings and reports across the intersections of artificial intelligence (AI) with biosecurity, cybersecurity, nuclear command and control, military integration, and frontier AI governance. This project brought together leaders across these areas and created a space that was rigorous, transpartisan, and solutions-oriented to approach how we should think about how AI is rapidly changing global risks.
Investment should instead be directed at sectors where American technology and innovation exist but the infrastructure to commercialize them domestically does not—and where the national security case is clear.
AI is already consequential, but its future trajectory remains contested. Policymakers should make their assumptions explicit, focus on what can be shaped rather than what can be perfectly predicted, and build institutions that can learn and respond as evidence changes.