Last week, the Department of Defense published the 2012 edition of the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM).
The Manual contains the Rules for Courts-Martial (RCM), the Military Rules of Evidence (MRE), and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The latest edition incorporates legislative amendments and other changes introduced since the previous edition was published in 2008.
The Manual details the elements of various crimes such as “Aiding the Enemy” (Article 104), which is among the charges pending against Bradley Manning, who is suspected of having provided classified and other restricted records to WikiLeaks without authorization.
“No unauthorized communication, correspondence, or intercourse with the enemy is permissible,” according to the Manual’s explanation of Article 104 (which has not been amended recently).
“The intent, content, and method of the communication, correspondence, or intercourse are immaterial. No response or receipt by the enemy is required. The offense is complete the moment the communication, correspondence, or intercourse issues from the accused. The communication, correspondence, or intercourse may be conveyed directly or indirectly.”
“Giving intelligence to the enemy is a particular case of corresponding with the enemy made more serious by the fact that the communication contains intelligence that may be useful to the enemy for any of the many reasons that make information valuable to belligerents. This intelligence may be conveyed by direct or indirect means.”
See, more generally, Military Justice: Courts-Martial, An Overview from the Congressional Research Service, March 14, 2012.
Called today to speak on behalf of U.S. science and technology, Dr. Jedidah Isler, astrophysicist, educator, strategist, policy-maker, and science communicator, will provide constructive, nonpartisan feedback to the House Committee’s hearing “American Global Competitiveness at 250: Legislative Proposals to Secure U.S. Technology Leadership.”
“Federal data and access to it is not a partisan issue. It is a people issue. Our country cannot achieve greatness without access to the data that measure what we value, who we are, and where we’re heading.”
The United States’ biosecurity governance system is structurally incapable of detecting and responding to certain classes of threats. U.S. biosecurity tools have not kept pace with technological advancements or a changing threat landscape.
The United States has never lacked for scientific ambition. What we need now is a renewed civic commitment to ensuring that talent is harnessed for the benefit of all people. Science can work for everyone. Join us as we build a broader coalition committed to that vision.