The Law Library of Congress last year prepared a survey of legal frameworks affecting refugees and asylum seekers in twenty-two countries around the world.
The survey covers “laws and regulations governing the admission of refugees and handling refugee claims; processes for handling refugees arriving at the border; procedures for evaluating whether an applicant is entitled to refugee status; the accommodations and assistance provided to refugees in the jurisdiction; requirements for naturalization; and whether asylum policy has been affected by international emergencies, such as the current refugee crisis in Europe.”
In practice, states “vary significantly in their receptivity to asylum seekers and the extent to which conflicting national policies affect adherence to norms prescribed in the [Geneva Convention on Refugees].”
See Refugee Law and Policy in Selected Countries, Law Library of Congress, March 2016.
Another Law Library report examines the diverse legal and regulatory regimes concerning the use of drones or unmanned aerial systems in twelve countries and the European Union. See Regulation of Drones, Law Library of Congress, April 2016.
DNA synthesis and export controls remain the primary regulatory safeguards against de novo production of harmful biological agents, yet governance frameworks lack the situational awareness and enforcement capacity to keep pace with rapidly falling technical barriers.
Called today to speak on behalf of U.S. science and technology, Dr. Jedidah Isler, astrophysicist, educator, strategist, policy-maker, and science communicator, will provide constructive, nonpartisan feedback to the House Committee’s hearing “American Global Competitiveness at 250: Legislative Proposals to Secure U.S. Technology Leadership.”
“Federal data and access to it is not a partisan issue. It is a people issue. Our country cannot achieve greatness without access to the data that measure what we value, who we are, and where we’re heading.”
The United States’ biosecurity governance system is structurally incapable of detecting and responding to certain classes of threats. U.S. biosecurity tools have not kept pace with technological advancements or a changing threat landscape.