There is “an astonishing number of groups and activities concurrently pursuing the subject” of information sharing, according to a newly disclosed 2004 report (pdf) of the Intelligence Science Board (ISB). But those activities are not well coordinated. “In effect, we aren’t even sharing information about information sharing.”
The ISB is a little-known advisory panel that addresses intelligence science and technology issues at the direction of the Director of National Intelligence. Almost all of its products are classified, but a few are not.
It’s hard to say whether the ISB is influential. But it has performed important and interesting work, most notably on the science of interrogation. Its 2006 report on “Educing Information” (pdf), concluded that there was no scientific evidence to support a belief in the efficacy of coercive interrogation. (“Intelligence Science Board Views Interrogation,” Secrecy News, January 15, 2007.)
Now the only other unclassified ISB reports have been released by ODNI under the Freedom of Information Act: “Concept Paper on Trusted Information Sharing” (November 2004) and “What Makes for a Great Analytic Team?: Individual versus Team Approaches to Intelligence Analysis” (February 2005). All of the unclassified ISB reports are available here.
DNA synthesis and export controls remain the primary regulatory safeguards against de novo production of harmful biological agents, yet governance frameworks lack the situational awareness and enforcement capacity to keep pace with rapidly falling technical barriers.
Called today to speak on behalf of U.S. science and technology, Dr. Jedidah Isler, astrophysicist, educator, strategist, policy-maker, and science communicator, will provide constructive, nonpartisan feedback to the House Committee’s hearing “American Global Competitiveness at 250: Legislative Proposals to Secure U.S. Technology Leadership.”
“Federal data and access to it is not a partisan issue. It is a people issue. Our country cannot achieve greatness without access to the data that measure what we value, who we are, and where we’re heading.”
The United States’ biosecurity governance system is structurally incapable of detecting and responding to certain classes of threats. U.S. biosecurity tools have not kept pace with technological advancements or a changing threat landscape.