Information Operations in Iraq — What Went Wrong?
Information operations that are designed to influence the perceptions and conduct of enemy combatants and non-combatants can be a highly effective adjunct to military force, but they were not effectively executed by the U.S. military in Iraq, a new U.S. Army monograph (pdf) reports.
Information operations can include military deception, psychological operations, operations security, and electronic warfare.
The Army monograph investigates the role of information operations in Iraq and presents recommendations for changes in doctrine, training, resources and intelligence support.
See “Information Operations in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom — What Went Wrong?” by Major Joseph L. Cox, US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, May 2006 (134 pages, 3.6 MB PDF).
There is no question this is a Big Deal. If you are a university or research lab, or aspire to work in one, or are simply an enthusiast of federally-funded research, what’s next will matter.
The emerging federal metascience community is asking fascinating questions that are equally vital for democratic legitimacy: beyond “did this program work” to “how does the federal R&D enterprise itself work, and how could it work better?”
If you’re new to the climate intervention space, welcome! The TL;DR: if we can’t stop the most catastrophic impacts of climate change with current tools quickly enough, then we need a bigger toolbox.
After months of delay, the council tasked by President Trump to review the FEMA released its final report. Our disaster policy nerds have thoughts.