How Did U.S. Assess Iraqi Bioweapon Production?
One of the most vivid allegations made by the U.S. government regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was the claim that Iraqi had developed mobile laboratories for the production of biological weapons. The allegation, based on reports from a source known as “Curveball,” proved to be false.
But the U.S. intelligence assessment of the supposed mobile BW labs, though erroneous, raised questions that still remain unanswered, wrote (pdf) bioweapons expert Milton Leitenberg of the University of Maryland.
According to a cryptic reference spotted by Leitenberg in the Silberman-Robb WMD Commission report, U.S. contractors performed a “replication” of the Iraqi design and found that “it works.”
The exact nature of this “replication” and whether it led to the production of actual BW agents are among several lingering questions he posed.
See “Unresolved Questions Regarding US Government Attribution of a Mobile Biological Production Capacity by Iraq” by Milton Leitenberg, June 2006.
As Congress considers broader packages to advance critical minerals production and supply chain resilience, science diplomacy vehicles must be part of that conversation, not as an afterthought, but as an intentional and foundational pillar of any strategy.
“Structured partnerships with our allies on critical minerals innovation can ensure that the best science and the best talent are working together towards shared security and economic prosperity.”
This is a bipartisan, commonsense measure to reauthorize the Technology Modernization Fund (TMF) before it expires in September 2026.
Many states are introducing AI policies and task forces, but lack the “AI-native” personnel to build and maintain initiatives. To address this in the short term, states should establish AI Resilience Cohorts to embed early-career technologists in key offices to support state AI initiatives. Right now, Virginia and New Jersey have the opportunity to take […]