Financial Crisis, Midnight Rulemaking, and More from CRS
Some more reports from the Congressional Research Service that have not been made readily available to the public include the following (all pdf).
“The U.S. Financial Crisis: The Global Dimension with Implications for U.S. Policy,” November 18, 2008.
“China and the Global Financial Crisis: Implications for the United States,” updated November 17, 2008.
“Reporting Requirements in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008,” updated November 13, 2008.
“The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act and Current Financial Turmoil: Issues and Analysis,” October 31, 2008.
“Russia’s Economic Performance and Policies and Their Implications for the United States,” updated November 5, 2008.
“‘Political’ Activities of Private Recipients of Federal Grants or Contracts,” October 21, 2008.
“Defense: FY2009 Authorization and Appropriations,” updated November 3, 2008.
“Federal Evacuation Policy: Issues for Congress,” November 12, 2008.
“Homeland Emergency Preparedness and the National Exercise Program: Background, Policy Implications, and Issues for Congress,” November 10, 2008.
“Midnight Rulemaking: Considerations for Congress and a New Administration,” November 18, 2008.
DNA synthesis and export controls remain the primary regulatory safeguards against de novo production of harmful biological agents, yet governance frameworks lack the situational awareness and enforcement capacity to keep pace with rapidly falling technical barriers.
Called today to speak on behalf of U.S. science and technology, Dr. Jedidah Isler, astrophysicist, educator, strategist, policy-maker, and science communicator, will provide constructive, nonpartisan feedback to the House Committee’s hearing “American Global Competitiveness at 250: Legislative Proposals to Secure U.S. Technology Leadership.”
“Federal data and access to it is not a partisan issue. It is a people issue. Our country cannot achieve greatness without access to the data that measure what we value, who we are, and where we’re heading.”
The United States’ biosecurity governance system is structurally incapable of detecting and responding to certain classes of threats. U.S. biosecurity tools have not kept pace with technological advancements or a changing threat landscape.