“We remain concerned that Tehran may have a clandestine nuclear weapons program,” according to a new but rather anticlimactic U.S. intelligence report (pdf) to Congress.
The new report on foreign acquisition of weapons of mass destruction during 2004 was released by the Deputy Director of National Intelligence this week.
Such a report is required by statute to be prepared and delivered every six months. The last report, for the second half of 2003, was released in November 2004.
See “Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 31 December 2004,” Unclassified DDNI Report to Congress, May 2006.
In recent months, we’ve seen much of these decades’ worth of progress erased. Contracts for evaluations of government programs were canceled, FFRDCs have been forced to lay off staff, and federal advisory committees have been disbanded.
This report outlines a framework relying on “Cooperative Technical Means” for effective arms control verification based on remote sensing, avoiding on-site inspections but maintaining a level of transparency that allows for immediate detection of changes in nuclear posture or a significant build-up above agreed limits.
At a recent workshop, we explored the nature of trust in specific government functions, the risk and implications of breaking trust in those systems, and how we’d known we were getting close to specific trust breaking points.
tudents in the 21st century need strong critical thinking skills like reasoning, questioning, and problem-solving, before they can meaningfully engage with more advanced domains like digital, data, or AI literacy.