Constitutional Limitations on Domestic Surveillance
The constitutionality of the so-called Terrorist Surveillance Program was examined from various points of view at a hearing of the House Judiciary Committee today.
“The President had ample authority to authorize the Terrorist Surveillance Program under acts of Congress and the Constitution,” said Steven Bradbury of the Justice Department in a prepared statement (pdf).
It’s not so simple, said Louis Fisher of the Law Library of Congress in an extended analysis (pdf). “Federal courts have rejected the theory that the President has ‘inherent’ constitutional authority to engage in warrantless domestic surveillance.”
The President’s program is clearly illegal, argued conservative critic Bruce Fein. “If Congress leaves the Bush administration’s illegal spying programs unrebuked, a precedent will have been established that will lie around like a loaded weapon ready for permanent use throughout the endless conflict with international terrorism,” he said (pdf).
See the prepared testimony from the June 7 hearing on “Constitutional Limitations on Domestic Surveillance”.
DNA synthesis and export controls remain the primary regulatory safeguards against de novo production of harmful biological agents, yet governance frameworks lack the situational awareness and enforcement capacity to keep pace with rapidly falling technical barriers.
Called today to speak on behalf of U.S. science and technology, Dr. Jedidah Isler, astrophysicist, educator, strategist, policy-maker, and science communicator, will provide constructive, nonpartisan feedback to the House Committee’s hearing “American Global Competitiveness at 250: Legislative Proposals to Secure U.S. Technology Leadership.”
“Federal data and access to it is not a partisan issue. It is a people issue. Our country cannot achieve greatness without access to the data that measure what we value, who we are, and where we’re heading.”
The United States’ biosecurity governance system is structurally incapable of detecting and responding to certain classes of threats. U.S. biosecurity tools have not kept pace with technological advancements or a changing threat landscape.