A new book delves into “the secret history of federal drug law enforcement” and the role of the Drug Enforcement Administration.  See “The Strength of the Pack: The Personalities, Politics and Espionage Intrigues that Shaped the DEA” by Douglas Valentine, TrineDay, 2009.

Former Congressional Research Service scholar Morton Rosenberg authored a detailed account of the principles and practices of congressional oversight entitled “When Congress Comes Calling” (pdf). It was published by the Constitution Project in July and is available in full-text online.

During the course of World War I, tens of thousands of photographs were withheld from publication by the U.S. military.  These included images that might have revealed troop movements or military capabilities, pictures that were liable to be used in enemy propaganda, or those that could adversely affect military or public morale.

The development of military controls on publication of photographs during WWI was described in a 1926 U.S. Army report (large pdf) that is illustrated with dozens of images that had been withheld, with a description of the reasons their publication was not permitted.

See “The Military Censorship of Pictures:  Photographs that came under the ban during the World War – and why” by Lt. Col. Kendall Banning, U.S. Army Signal Reserve Corps, 1926 (courtesy of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center).

The decision last week by the Director of National Intelligence to declassify the FY2009 budget for the National Intelligence Program is inconsistent with other ODNI classification actions and highlights the confusion over the proper scope of national security secrecy that prevails in the U.S. intelligence community today.

On October 30, DNI Dennis C. Blair announced that the total appropriation for the National Intelligence Program (NIP) in FY 2009 was $49.8 billion.  (Under the terms of a 1997 law, the President could have withheld the FY 2009 budget figure if he filed a statement with Congress declaring that revelation of the number “would damage national security.”  But he did not do so.) Yet at the same time, the Office of the DNI refuses to reveal the NIP budget figure from FY 2006 — three years earlier — on grounds (pdf) that its disclosure would damage national security and jeopardize intelligence sources and methods.

Can these two conflicting evaluations of the same information from two different years be reconciled?  It is hard to see how, especially since the budget number that was withheld is the older of the two, and is even farther removed from current operations.  One of the DNI’s classification actions appears to be in error.

The DNI’s October 30 statement announcing the latest budget figure for 2009 also makes some other questionable assertions that suggest internal confusion and fuzzy thinking about secrecy and disclosure.

“I’m hopeful that this [budget] information will give the American people a better understanding of how their tax dollars are being used to help protect the country and keep Americans safe,” DNI Blair said.  But disclosure of the budget figure reveals nothing about “how tax dollars are being used” for intelligence — which is one reason why such information could not be properly classified.

Worse than that, the DNI’s disclosure is incomplete and misleading.  The total intelligence budget is composed of two budget constructs, the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the Military Intelligence Program (MIP).  (Several of the large defense intelligence agencies — NSA, NGA, and others — are funded through both the NIP and the MIP.)  But only the NIP number has been released, which means that not even the aggregate intelligence budget figure has been made public.  (In a September 15 media conference call, the DNI said the combined budget was around $75 billion.)  Based on the new NIP figure alone, one cannot even say how much money was spent on intelligence in 2009, whether the total has increased or decreased from the year before, or by how much — much less “how tax dollars are being used to help protect the country.”

The October 30 ODNI news release went on to insist that “Any and all subsidiary information concerning the National Intelligence (NIP) budget will not be disclosed as such disclosures could harm national security.”

“Any and all subsidiary information”?  This implies, for example, that if a breakdown of the amount of money spent by the intelligence community on declassification activities were published, it “could harm national security.”  But that hardly seems likely.

In a candid moment last year, ODNI officials admitted that they really don’t know why they classify all the things that they do.  “There is wide variance in application of classification levels,” an internal January 2008 ODNI study (pdf) obtained by Secrecy News found.  “The definitions of ‘national security’ and what constitutes ‘intelligence’ — and thus what must be classified — are unclear.”

Lacking clarity about first principles, the intelligence community is ripe for the sort of “Fundamental Classification Guidance Review” that has been proposed in the Obama Administration’s pending draft executive order on national security information (sec. 1.9) “to identify classified information that no longer requires protection and can be declassified.”  If such a review is actually carried out by impartial subject matter experts who are relatively free of bureaucratic blinders and willing to take a fresh look at the requirements of national security, it might help to introduce a degree of rationality into the current chaos of classification policy.

David C. Gompert, the new Principal Deputy DNI, told the Senate Intelligence Committee in September that he recognized that new measures were needed to address overclassification in the intelligence community.

“If confirmed,” he said (pdf, in reply to the Committee’s question 28B), “I would expect that the DNI and I would work closely with the Information Security Oversight Office to ensure that standards are created for the establishment of classification management programs within the IC.  Then, new IC guidance could be issued by the DNI regarding classification guides, marking tools, training, and classification audits. I believe that these efforts would go far to assist in resolving the serious issue of overclassification.”

An aggregate intelligence budget figure, including both national and military intelligence spending, has not been published since 1998, when it was released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request.  At that time, the total was $26.7 billion.  At congressional direction, a budget number for the NIP was previously released by the DNI in 2007 ($43.5 billion) and 2008 ($47.5 billion).  Unclassified portions of recent MIP budget documents were released to Secrecy News last month.

The production of unmanned aerial vehicles by the Pakistani defense firm Integrated Dynamics is described in a new publication (pdf) from the DNI Open Source Center (OSC).

Based on public information, the Pakistani UAV product line is intended for scientific and surveillance purposes and does not include weaponized systems.

A copy of the OSC publication, which largely derives from the Integrated Dynamics website, was obtained by Secrecy News.  See “Media Aid on Website of Pakistani UAV Manufacturing Company,” Open Source Center, October 20, 2009.

In a move that will strengthen internal executive branch oversight of intelligence, President Obama this week said that a White House intelligence oversight board will be required to alert the Attorney General whenever it learns of “intelligence activities that involve possible violations of Federal criminal laws.” A similar requirement for the board to notify the Attorney General had been canceled by President Bush in February 2008.  President Obama reversed that step in his executive order 13516 on the authorities of the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB) and the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB).

The new Obama order also restores to the PIAB and the IOB some of the other teeth that the Bush Administration had removed.  The order states that the Director of National Intelligence and others “shall provide such information and assistance as the PIAB and the IOB determine is needed to perform their functions.”  The Bush order had only spoken of “such information and assistance as the PIAB and the IOB may need to perform functions under this order.”  So the new order (like the prior Clinton order) helpfully specifies that the PIAB and the IOB are the ones who will “determine” what they need–not the DNI or anyone else.

The Obama order does not restore the Clinton-era requirement that all intelligence agencies heads report quarterly to the IOB.  Instead, as in the Bush order, the DNI is to report to the Board at least twice a year.

The Obama order states that the PIAB membership should be comprised of individuals “who are not full-time employees of the Federal Government.”  Previously, they had to be “not employed by the Federal Government” at all.  The basis for this change is unclear.

Strengthening internal oversight of intelligence activities is among the easiest of changes to Bush Administration intelligence policy that the Obama Administration could be expected to make.  The action does not entail any increase in public disclosure or congressional reporting concerning intelligence activities, not does it infringe on executive authority in any way.

On October 28, President Obama announced the appointment of former Senators Chuck Hagel and David Boren to the PIAB, which had been vacant until then.

“We are off to a good start with this meeting by welcoming the press, which past advisory boards have rarely done,” the President said. “That’s a reflection of my administration’s commitment to transparency and open government, even, when appropriate, on matters of national security and intelligence.”  But judging from a published transcript, no matters of substance were discussed and no questions from the press were taken at the meeting.

As a result of polygraph testing, more than a thousand applications for employment at the Federal Bureau of Investigation have been rejected or otherwise terminated in the last year alone, the FBI told Congress last month.  Polygraph testing has been the single largest reason for discontinuing an application, well ahead of administrative or medical issues, use or sale of illegal drugs, or other suitability or security issues. In Fiscal Year 2009, 339 special agent applicants were turned away on polygraph-related grounds, and 825 professional support applications were similarly discontinued.

These data were presented in responses to questions for the record (pdf) from a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing (pdf) last March, and were transmitted to Congress on behalf of FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III on September 15, 2009.

Most of the congressional questions, on everything from Freedom of Information Act compliance to detainee interrogation, are focused and pointed.  Some of the answers are informative and occasionally even startling.

Each day between March 2008 and March 2009, Director Mueller told the Committee, “there were an average of more than 1,600 nominations for inclusion on the [Terrorist] watchlist,” as well as 4,800 proposed modifications of existing records, and 600 proposed removals.  “Each nomination for addition [to the watchlist] does not necessarily represent a new individual,” Mueller cautioned, “but may instead involve an alias or name variant for a previously watchlisted person.”

Former FAS President Jeremy J. Stone has published a memoir of his efforts to promote constructive dialogue in several of the world’s most intractable conflicts through his own organization, Catalytic Diplomacy.  Remarkably, writes Morton H. Halperin in a Preface to the memoir, “The conflicts that Jeremy sought to mitigate — US-Russian nuclear relations, China’s relation with Taiwan, North Korea’s relations with its neighbors, and U.S.-Iranian relations — have all been affected for the better by his efforts.”

The susceptibility of anti-satellite weapons to the control of international law is considered in a new paper called “ASAT-isfaction: Customary International Law and the Regulation of Anti-Satellite Weapons” (pdf) by David A. Koplow, Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 30, No. 4, Summer 2009.  Mr. Koplow is now Special Counsel for Arms Control at the Defense Department Office of the General Counsel.

Effective congressional oversight depends not only on the good intentions of the overseers, but also on their familiarity with the legislative, investigative and other tools they have at their disposal.  But the skillful use of those tools has been largely a matter of tacit knowledge, handed down through the generations of congressional staff.  To help preserve and propagate the techniques involved, the Project on Government Oversight has published a new handbook entitled “The Art of Congressional Oversight: A User’s Guide to Doing It Right.”

Some of the steps that are favored by the Obama Administration to open up government to public access and participation may be “useful” but they are nevertheless “prohibited” on U.S. Air Force web sites, according to a new Air Force policy instruction.

In a January 21, 2009 memorandum on transparency and open government, President Obama directed that “Executive departments and agencies should harness new technologies to put information about their operations and decisions online and readily available to the public…. Executive departments and agencies should solicit public feedback to assess and improve their level of collaboration and to identify new opportunities for cooperation.”

The U.S. Air Force has a different vision, however.

A new Air Force policy on public communications (pdf) observed that “web-based message boards, threaded chat rooms, and guest books… allow users to post opinions, messages, or information openly on a web site.  They provide a useful means of creating two-way communication but are prohibited as part of public web site services (sec. 10)”

Instead of the “unprecedented level of openness” promised by the President, the Air Force prefers to follow precedent in other ways as well.

Only content that “is intended for a wide public audience” will be considered by the Air Force for publication online.  All other materials “should be posted on the [password-protected] Air Force Portal web site.”  Moreover, “all content on a public web site must be cleared for public release.”  See “Public Web Communications,” Air Force Instruction 35-107, October 21, 2009.

Unfortunately, the Air Force’s mandatory pre-publication clearance process (pdf) for “all content” is arduous, time-consuming and technologically primitive.  Authors should allow ten days for Air Force review, or twenty days when approval is needed from the Department of Defense.  Incredibly, materials for review can only be submitted in hardcopy (six paper copies for the Air Force and an additional four copies for DoD). Air Force Public Affairs says that it “does not accept material for review via e-mail or any other electronic means” (sec. 8).

On the other hand, “theatrical reviews… and works of fiction that are not sourced from active-duty experience” are excused from the pre-publication review requirement.  See “Security and Policy Review Process,” Air Force Instruction 35-102, October 20, 2009.

These new Air Force directives, and another Air Force Instruction on Public Affairs Policies and Procedures (pdf) that was modified last week, do not even mention the January 2009 Obama transparency memorandum, and certainly do not reflect its declared intent.

The impact of the President’s January memorandum has been deferred because the implementing Open Government Directive that was originally due for release in May has still not been completed. [Correction: The May 2009 deadline was for development of “recommendations” for the Open Government Directive, not for release of the Directive itself.]

But the Directive “will come out this fall,” said Beth Noveck, White House deputy chief technology officer for open government, at a meeting organized by the Center for Democracy and Technology yesterday.  The forthcoming Directive, to be issued by the Office of Management and Budget, will provide “a framework for agencies to pursue their own transparency initiatives,” she said.

Whatever its archaic publication policy may say, the U.S. Air Force still manages to generate and publicly release documents of significant policy interest.  A new manual on the Open Skies Treaty explores the origins, development, and implementation of the Open Skies regime, which permits the overflight and inspection of member nations’ territory and facilities.  See Air Force Manual 16-604 (pdf) on “Implementation of, and Compliance with, the Treaty on Open Skies,” October 20, 2009.

A summary account of U.S. government programs to combat weapons of mass destruction is provided in the latest annual report from the interagency Counterproliferation Program Review Committee.  See “Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and NBC Terrorism,” Volume I, executive summary, July 2009 (published September 2009).

From time to time, publishers send us review copies of new books.  We are glad to receive them, even if we cannot always read the books promptly or produce substantial reviews.  New receipts include these:

“Nuclear Insights: The Cold War Legacy” by Alexander DeVolpi, volume 2: Nuclear Threats and Prospects, 2009.

“Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in Efforts to Halt the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” by Thomas Graham Jr. and Keith A. Hansen, Stanford University Press, 2009.

“Vanished,” a novel by Joseph Finder, St. Martin’s Press, 2009.

A House Subcommittee is reviving a decade-old debate over the need to expeditiously replace the older security locks on safes for storing classified documents with new, more sophisticated electromechanical locks.

“The secure storage of classified information is a matter of paramount importance to the national security of the United States,” wrote Rep. John F. Tierney (D-MA) earlier this month.  Yet, he complained, government contractors that have possession of classified materials have been slow to upgrade their locks and safes to meet the new government standards.

Rep. Tierney’s House National Security Subcommittee is therefore “conducting an investigation” focusing on  industry’s ability and intention to carry out the mandatory upgrade to improved locks and containers prior to a 2012 deadline.  Almost 20,000 “substandard security containers” are supposed to be replaced in the next three years, according to the Defense Security Service.

“Based on Industry’s slow rate of transition over the past decade, and the substantial number of substandard security containers still in use, it appears that Industry may not have adequate plans in place to complete the transition by October 1, 2012.”  Rep. Tierney described his concerns in an October 7 letter (pdf) to William J. Bosanko, director of the Information Security Oversight Office.  The letter was released at a recent meeting of the NISP Policy Advisory Committee.

Although Rep. Tierney did not mention it, the origins of the requirement to upgrade security locks for storage of classified documents are tainted by parochial financial concerns, and the move is questionable on security policy grounds.

Beginning in the 1990s, the lock conversion requirement was zealously advocated by Senator Jim Bunning (R-KY) whose constituents, not coincidentally, included the manufacturer of the proposed replacement lock.  The manufacturer also enlisted the lobbying support of Douglas Feith, who went on to become the Bush Administration’s controversial Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.  See “Sen. Bunning Pushes Electronic Locks to the Dismay of Industry, DoD” by Hampton Stephens, Defense Information and Electronics Report, August 10, 2001.

But there has never been any known compromise of classified information in government or industry that was attributable to a faulty security container or lock.  For that reason, the cost-benefit ratio of a systematic retrofit does not seem very compelling, particularly when compared to other potential uses for the limited supply of security dollars.

On the other hand, the fact that self-serving financial interests drove the political debate does not mean the security issue is entirely groundless, an independent security consultant told Secrecy News.  Existing mechanical locks “can be penetrated surreptitiously within 20 minutes,” he said, and the older barlock containers that are still in use “can be penetrated surreptitiously within seconds.”

The records of several noteworthy congressional hearings that were held in the past two years have been published in the last few weeks, including these:

“A Report Card on Homeland Security Information Sharing,” House Homeland Security Committee, September 24, 2008.

“Turning Spy Satellites on the Homeland: The Privacy and Civil Liberties Implications of the National Applications Office,” House Homeland Security Committee, September 6, 2007.

“Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation” (pdf), Senate Judiciary Committee, March 27, 2007.

“FISA Amendments: How to Protect Americans’ Security and Privacy and Preserve the Rule of Law and Government Accountability,” October 31, 2007.

Sen. Patrick Leahy and Sen. Charles Grassley of the Senate Judiciary Committee wrote to Attorney General Holder (pdf) on October 20, asking the Department of Justice to comply with outstanding Committee requests for information that have gone unanswered, in some cases for several years.